TELEOLOGICAL ASPECTS OF CREATION: A COMPARISON OF THE CONCEPTS OF BEING AND MEANING IN THE THEOLOGIES OF JONATHAN EDWARDS AND PAUL TILLICH

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CHAPTER I

INTRODUCTION

The "Will-to-Meaning"

> Ours is a time when man is threatened by existential frustration, by frustration of his will-to-meaning, by his unfulfilled claim to a meaning for his existence, by his existential vacuum, by his "living" nihilism. For nihilism is not a philosophy which contends that there is only nothing and therefore no being: nihilism says that being has no meaning; a nihilist is a man who considers being (and, above all, his own existence) meaningless. But apart from this academic and theoretical nihilism there is also a practical, as it were, "living" nihilism: there are people who consider their own lives meaningless, who can see no meaning in their personal existence and therefore think it valueless.
>
> --Viktor E. Frankl[1]

What is the answer to the religious question of the meaning of life? What is the ultimate and most adequate frame of reference in which the "Why" question can come to rest? There is something in all of us that responds affirmatively when a psychiatrist like Viktor Frankl talks about the "will-to-meaning" being constitutive of life. Being related to meaning not only affects the quality of life, it also has much to do with its vitality and survival power. A nation that lacks a sense of its "Manifest Destiny" or is unaware of its "unfinished business" is a nation that vacillates in its policy, languishes in vitality, and could easily be in mortal peril. On the other hand, a man with a mission has the strength of ten, and his calling not only heightens his powers to produce but also deepens his capacities for suffering and self-sacrifice. Still again, a patient who has lost his will to live because he feels it is "no use" is the subject of a poor prognosis.

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[1] From Death Camp to Existentialism: A Psychiatrist's Path to a New Therapy, trans. Ilse Lasch (Boston: Beacon Press, 1959), pp. 108-109.

Admittedly, these are examples of partial, preliminary, and private systems of meaning where the relation between meaning and well-being is obvious. Isn't that enough? Why talk about the "religious" question and "ultimate" frames of reference? Do we not actually live from day to day on a much less ambitious scale, tackling problems as they arise, and projecting plans in the short range? That this is the prevailing attitude of contemporary secularism would be hard to refute. This is what Helmut Thielicke calls "naive nihilism" because the question of meaning is not negated, rather it is not allowed to appear because of confinement to the moment.[1] But suppose all these little meanings add up to zero? Suppose "reflective nihilism"--"There is no meaning"--is the truth of the human situation?[2] Would that not be completely enervating and debilitating?

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[1] Helmut Thielicke, Nihilism: Its Origin and Nature--With a Christian Answer, trans. John W. Doberstein ("Religious Perspectives," Vol. IV; New York: Harper & Bros., 1961), pp. 148-49.

[2] Ibid.

This kind of nihilism is not to be confused or equated with present-day Existentialism. There is a superficial resemblance in that both attitudes reject the idea that there is any external, objective, ready-made system of meaning. But the basic difference is radical. Whereas nihilism is a product of and an acquiescence in the depersonalization of modern life, Existentialism is a protest against all the forces that make for that depersonalization. Nihilism presupposes (naive) and accepts (reflective) the idea that man is essentially a "thing" actuated by blind mechanisms of heredity and environment. Meanings are subjective emotional grunts. Hence, its despair about the validity of meaning is total and final. Existentialism, on the other hand, is passionately concerned with the question of meaning. It rejects the notion that man's essence is something given, ready-made, independent of his decision. It looks for the creative source of both man's being and meaning in inward personal experience.

The Problem of "Meaning"

That there is something and not nothing, even the nihilist does not deny. It is the "Why?" that is illegitimate or unanswerable. Being, then, in the popular mind at least, has a security that meaning lacks. Being is "given";

meaning is "problematical." That this is a grossly oversimplified and perhaps altogether false point of departure is something which even the preliminary and inadequate generalizations about the Existentialist protest mentioned above should lead us to suspect. But, for the moment, since it throws the problem of meaning into focus, let us use it as an occasion to clarify the sense in which we will be concerned about meaning in this inquiry. The fact that we have to qualify the phrase "question of meaning" with the adjective "religious" betrays that there are different levels to the concept "meaning" that need to be distinguished.

Levels of meaning

Partial or total involvement

The first way of distinguishing has to do with whether the concern of the self is partial or total. One well established and well recognized signification of the term "meaning" is the semantic one: How does language refer? This is a scientific level of questioning; the central concern is the question of truth. At this level we are supposed to be objective--not allowing any or at least discounting all personal involvement. Another signification of the term "meaning" is the logical one: Is the language used consistently? This is a more critical-philosophical level of questioning; the central concern is the question of rationality, coherence, integrity. A third signification is an existential one: What is the relevance and purpose of it all? Here, personal involvement is at a maximum. This is the question of ends and values. These distinctions are like concentric circles, each succeeding one more inclusive of the total interests of the self than the preceding. The last is the locus of the specifically "religious" question of meaning. It is the concern for the truth _that matters_.

Preliminary or ultimate concern

There is a second way of distinguishing which has to do with whether the total concern is preliminary or ultimate. Not all existential concerns are religious. There can be, and manifestly is, all manner of discourse about ends and means, values, goals, personal projects or purposes, and the like, that is carried on in an intra-worldly context. A person goes to school to enable him to get a better job, and a better job to enable him to enjoy a higher standard of living, and a higher standard to enable him to be a better provider for his family, and so on and on. All of these values engage the whole person, but each one is instrumental to some other. Unlike the scientific and philosophical interests, which may conceivably come to rest in an intra-worldly system of answers, there is an ultimacy, an insatiability, in the existential question that drives it to the ultimate question: What is the meaning of my life as a whole? What is the ultimate destiny which supports and informs the chain of preliminary means and ends?

Private or general systems

There is a third level of distinguishing which has to do with whether the question of ultimate destiny is a private system or a general system. Perhaps this can best be illustrated by referring to the classical figures in Shakespeare of Macbeth and Hamlet. Macbeth cannot be comprehended simply in terms of an overweening ambition. He was destined to be king. It was that summons of destiny (whether divine or demonic) which gave legitimacy, power, and resolution to his ambition. It informed his whole life with meaning and power. But his destiny was a private system. It could comprehend the meaning of his removing Duncan as an obstacle and Banquo as a threat, but it could not comprehend his own demise. The same destiny, part of which he could embrace so whole-heartedly--namely, the kingship for himself--also decreed that he should not enjoy it, that the succession should fall ultimately to Banquo's heirs. The tragic element was that the private system which gave vitality and meaning to his life was fated to founder on the general system, for the general system treated him as a pawn just as he had treated Duncan and the others. He was just an interlude, a transition between dynasties whose meanings did not include him. His meaningful and meaning-giving private system crushed upon the rocks of an inscrutable and meaning-destroying general system, no wonder he sits broken and brooding upon it all as "a tale told by an idiot, full of sound and fury signifying nothing."[1]

Hamlet, by contrast, presents the reverse picture. It is the general system that comprehends his meaning but which tragically denies him the small comfort of any private system of fulfilment. "The time is out of joint," and destiny summons him "to set it right." But he cannot regard it as anything but "cursed spite" for it alienates him from and ruins everyone he loves and demands of him the sacrifice of himself as well.[2] Hamlet is spent in his summons, but unlike Macbeth he does not die broken. His private meaninglessness is borne by and conquered in the general meaningfulness. "There's a divinity that shapes our ends, rough-hew them how we will."[3]

The religious question defined

The religious question, then, does not come to rest with the meaning of one's own life as a whole. For any private system to be secure it must ask for the meaning of the whole of life, the general system of being in which the private is inextricably interwoven. When I ask the religious question of the meaning of my life I am not asking for a meaning in terms of some partial, preliminary, or private concerns. I am really asking the question of the meaning of the world as a whole, which informs my life, as a part, with an ultimate security, value, and destiny.

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[1] Act V, scene v, line 30.

[2] Act I, scene v, lines 189-90.

[3] Act V, scene ii, line 10.

The inescapability of the religious question

When we think about the meaning of life nothing could seem more normal, legitimate, and inescapable than the religious question of the Whence and Whither of the World-as-a-whole. It is what John E. Smith calls the "permanent truth" of the many and various attempts at a Natural Theology.

> The evidence of anthropology and the well known fact that no form of human society has ever been found which does not have a religious community in some form, can only lead to the conclusion that man is by nature a religious animal. He is, that is to say, the being who asks the question of the ground and goal of his life and exhibits a concern which betrays his radical need for some answer to his question and the overcoming or fulfilling of his concern. This means that there belongs to human life in the world as we encounter it, a religious dimension; above all the special aims and activities of life there is a concern for our ultimate purpose in the scheme of things. This purpose is . . . the "final word" because it bestows significance upon all our finite concerns and does not itself need to be illuminated from beyond itself. No specific accomplishment is ultimately satisfying if life itself is regarded as without an essential purpose. Every man participates in the religious dimension of life and it

> belongs to the structure of human life as such. It is a pervasive feature exhibiting itself in every cultural form.[1]

The question is both philosophical and religious since it asks the relation between being and its ultimate source and destiny. And if the question is real, legitimate, and inescapable, then it means that "philosophical theology" is a valid enterprise, however difficult may be its path and however limited may be its contribution to the "answer." But one must emphasize the "if" in "_If_ the question is real," for few if any questions have been so rejected or excoriated in the modern world as this one, and that from both philosophical and theological quarters.

Philosophical objections

From the philosophical side, the religious question has shared the same fate as metaphysics, which means that it has fared badly. Traditionally that discipline was regarded as the science of ultimate reality. As such it is divided into two main branches: ontology and cosmology. Ontology has to do with the first principles of being: What is the nature and structure of all things insofar as they are said "to be"? and How many kinds of basic being are there? Cosmology has to do with the first principles of order: What are the principles of hierarchy among beings? and What are the causes and methods by which change and motion are determined? The convergence of these metaphysical-philosophical concerns with the religious question of being and meaning is apparent, but convergence is not to be taken as congruence or identity. In the Christian context--and that is what we shall be concerned with specifically--the religious question has a dimension that transcends strictly metaphysical concerns. This dimension or complicating factor is the doctrine of Creation _ex nihilo_. The God of the ontologist need only be Necessary Being; the Creator God of the Christian faith can be no less than the author, power, and end of being as such. The God of the cosmologist only need be the Highest Being and the First and Final Causes of such order as the cosmos exhibits; the Creator God of the Christian faith can be no less than the author, power, and end of order as such. It is the _transcendent_ reference of the Creationist faith that goes beyond what need be only a _transcendental_ reference of metaphysical inquiry. A case could be made, and doubtless already has, that it was the uses to which Christians put metaphysics in making it the "handmaid of theology" that spoiled metaphysics for so much of modern philosophy, that the useful and legitimate search for those immanent first principles which could account for the coherence of being and the unification of the sciences was transformed into the illegitimate search for "proofs" of the existence of a transcendent being and to provide cognitive knowledge of at least some of his attributes.

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[1] John E. Smith, "The Permanent Truth in the Idea of Natural Religion," _Harvard Theological Review_, LIV (January, 1961), 12.

Metaphysics not a science.--Ever since Hume and Kant the status of metaphysics as a science has been in radical doubt. Since metaphysical notions--such as God, the soul, substance, etc.--are not objects of possible experience and hence incapable of being either verified or falsified, we can have no knowledge with respect to them. This is not necessarily to say that such conceptions are useless. There has been no lack of those who claim that metaphysical notions and systems, like myths or metaphors or hypotheses, have a usefulness and practical value; but they are not cognitive.

Metaphysical notions as subjective.--Closely related to the above, but different in perspective, is the questioning of the subject matter which metaphysical discourse is supposed to illumine and explain. Have we any basis to talk about being as an ordered whole, a cosmos, a universe? Unity and wholeness are demands of reason, not of things. We impose certain unifying conceptions upon the flux of existence, so the argument goes, for the sake of simplification and economy of ideas, but "it is a simplification of knowledge, not of existence."

Even if a unity of science were achieved, marvelous

> though that would be, it would not warrant our talking of the universe-as-a-whole. It would warrant talking of science-as-a-whole. The notion of *The Universe* . . . is another basic metaphor.[1]

These things are mentioned to show some of the major difficulties in the contemporary status of metaphysics which have bearing on the religious question. If the religious question could surrender its transcendent reference, if it could forswear any truth claim, and if it could forego any attempt to be relevant to being, then it would not have much trouble from philosophical quarters! But then who would care to ask it? It is strange that whereas nihilism takes being for granted and finds meaning problematical, so much of contemporary analytical philosophy exhibits just the reverse. It is terribly concerned about systems of meaning and meaningful language but not sure that it refers to anything.

These objections from the philosophical side are formidable and important. And if they do not succeed in extinguishing the existential need for asking the religious question of the ground and goal of life, they do demand that we proceed with utmost caution. False or facile answers are no help.

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[1] George Boas, *The Limits of Reason* ("Religious Perspectives," Vol. III; New York: Harper & Bros., 1961), p. 82. For the whole discussion see pp. 78-82.

Theological objections

From the theological side the religious question has shared the same fate as Natural Theology, which also means that it has fared badly. John E. Smith, whose description of the religious question was cited earlier, takes the natural religion of the Enlightenment period as the classical expression of Natural Theology, and in it he distinguishes three basic ideas:

> First, there was the idea of a universal religion stripped of all particularity or provincial ties such as would serve to confine it to some particular group or class of human beings. Secondly, there was the idea that personal, individual experience and understanding are essential to genuine religious faith and that these are threatened by institutional forms of mediation. Thirdly, there was the idea that reason as a trustworthy guide finds its proper locus in the universals or pervasive traits of human experience and consequently that the differences in experience and doctrine derivative from particular, historical circumstances are to be disregarded as unimportant.[1]

Aside from attacking the competence of reason, which is really a philosophical critique, the brunt of the theological attack upon the religious question is that it is man-centered, idolatrous, and a complete reversal of proper theological method.

"Natural Theology": man-centered.--It is man-centered in that it begins with concern for man and his needs and looks for an answer, God, that is adequate to satisfy those needs. Man is the known and God is problematical. This makes man superior to God. Rather than beginning with God and his particular self-disclosure, it proposes to state the general conditions upon which revelation is admissible and the terms in which it must be expressed.

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[1] Harvard Theological Review, LIV(January, 1961), pp.5-6

"Natural Theology": idolatrous.--It is idolatrous because any "God" that we can know on our own terms is not God. There is no transition, so the argument goes, from our own false knowledge to revealed knowledge. Our own experience whether particular or general does not prepare us for what to expect from revelation; in fact, it leads us to expect precisely the opposite of what we have received in the Incarnation and thus to reject it. There is no continuity between Christ and culture.

"Natural Theology": reversal of method.--It is a complete reversal of proper theological method, for that should begin with the reality of revelation in all its historical particularity and uniqueness and then ask the questions of its possibility and extent of knowability. Awareness of need arises from grace; it does not precede it.[1]

Like the philosophical objections, these cannot be brushed aside as irrelevant and immaterial. But just as little do they extinguish the existential need reflected in the religious question. What are we to make of this?

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[1] Karl Barth is the most formidable contemporary critic of Natural Theology. The above mentioned criticisms were summarized from his section on "The Knowability of God," Church Dogmatics, Vol. II/1: The Doctrine of God (Edinburgh: T & T Clark, 1957), pp. 63-178.

The ambiguous testimony of Kant and Barth

It is interesting and instructive that the two men, Kant and Barth, who with the most devastating brilliance have laid the axe to the roots of metaphysics and Natural Theology, respectively, have both been most acutely aware that what we have called the religious question still persists and is ineradicable. Kant, in the closing section of his Prolegomena to Any Future Metaphysics, has this to say:

> That the human mind will ever give up metaphysical researches is as little to be expected as that we, to avoid inhaling impure air, should prefer to give up breathing altogether. There will, therefore, always be metaphysics in the world; nay, everyone, especially every reflective man, will have it and, for want of a recognized standard, will shape it for himself after his own pattern. What has hitherto been called metaphysics cannot satisfy any critical mind, but to forego it entirely is impossible; therefore, a Critique of Pure Reason itself must now be attempted or, if one exists, investigated and brought to the full test, because there is no other means of supplying this pressing want which is something more than mere thirst for knowledge.[1]

And Barth, at the conclusion of his section on "The Readiness of God" where he has shown that any kind of Natural Theology is "incontestably impossible in the sphere of the Church," goes on to say:

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[1] Immanuel Kant, Prolegomena to Any Future Metaphysics ("Library of Liberal Arts," No. 27; New York: Liberal Arts Press, 1950), p. 116.

> Why, then, is all this not so simple and self-evident? Why, then, in spite of all the refutations like those we have just made, can a theology of this kind continually arise, announcing itself anew in ever new forms (as if nothing had been said against it and as if it had not been refuted), creeping into theological ventures which have quite different intentions, and like a rank weed clinging even to what is apparently the soundest stalk, weakening it and finally killing it? It cannot be disputed--and there is no sense in shutting our eyes to the fact--that it actually can do this. And it can do it to a degree that we cannot rate too highly, and with a weight which, once released, will generally sweep away all opposing considerations and even the most careful and complete refutations.[1]

These statements are no occasions for glee, and it would be beneath contempt if we should seize upon these melancholy reflections as though they were some kind of instant, though back-handed, validation of the religious question. Rather, we must be instructed by the real and indispensable light they both cast upon the religious question. Until we do that we have no right to proceed.

Continuity and discontinuity: reason.--In the first place, we can see that the religious question is "something more than mere thirst for knowledge" (Kant), else it could be satisfied by the kind of knowledge for which our minds are demonstrably competent. Further, it is something other than simple error (Barth), else it could be dispatched once and for all by "careful and complete refutations." Barth, in the passage cited, attributes to it a kind of superhuman, demonic power against which reason is of no avail, a "rank weed" which can kill even the soundest stalk. Yet, though it transcends the thirst for knowledge and is not simply amenable to rational critique, it still stubbornly insists upon being relevant to knowledge, meaning cognitive knowledge generally available and pertaining to universal experience. Here is the nub of the whole matter: Is it possible and necessary to raise a real question for which our cognitive powers are unable to produce an answer? Is there a cognitive "I ought" (or "I _must_ have") which does _not_ guarantee a cognitive "I can"? If there is, there is only one such question, and that is the ground and goal of the life of which this cognitive endeavor is an essential constituent. And further, is it possible or even conceivable that we could receive an answer "from beyond" which was not in some real sense an answer to _that_ question? When life itself is the question, can any encroachment from beyond that is not in terms of having life, and that more abundantly, be anything that would concern us ultimately or at all? There is a continuity and a discontinuity involved here. There is discontinuity between the source of the question and the source of the answer; but there is continuity in the substance of both question and answer.

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[1] Church Dogmatics, II/1, 126-27.

Continuity and discontinuity: truth.--There is a second observation closely related to the first. And that is, if the religious question could be successfully disengaged from any general truth claim, the problem of its status could be greatly simplified. It was Kant's solution to disengage religion from metaphysics in order to establish it upon moral reason. Truth belongs to the sphere of theoretical reason; rational faith belongs to the sphere of practical reason. This is the fateful split--the fact-value dichotomy, or really, impasse--which has well nigh made the problem of the relation of being and meaning insoluble for the modern mind. Barth's solution involves even more radical surgery. He proposes to disengage the reality of revelation, which alone confers both being and meaning, from the total cultural experience of and reflection about being and meaning. In the divine encroachment a totally new reality is posited to which the old, pseudo-reality--all of it--is not relevant either in terms of anticipating the new or of interpreting and criticizing it once it has come. Kant would divide the self, or rather the self's concerns, and validate religion in only one, albeit the most important, sphere or dimension--namely, universal moral experience. Barth would preserve the unity of the self but validate faith in a particular, self-authenticating revelation which is unconcerned with or unaffected by any general experience, and yet which is the only real truth and criterion of all experience.

Here, again, there is a play upon the themes of continuity and discontinuity. If disengagement of the religious question from any universal truth claim were desirable or possible, there are two simple solutions: one is to deny that faith has anything to do with truth altogether; the other is some variant of the "two truths" position--religious truth and scientific truth are both valid, but they have nothing to do with each other. But neither Kant nor Barth really does either of these. Whereas in Kant there is discontinuity between the validity of religious postulates and theoretical truth, still the religious postulates are held _for reasons_, they are validated by universal moral experience; hence, there is continuity. Whereas in Barth there is discontinuity between the truth of revelation and all general experience and its criteria, still there is continuity in the claim that revelation is _the_ truth, and hence normative for all experience, or rather, there is no real experience outside it.

The legitimacy of the religious question

What are we to make of this persistence of the theme of continuity-and-discontinuity? Is it possible that life itself carries within itself the condition of such an awareness of radical contingency as to both being and meaning that it can know that it cannot find any ultimate security, value, or destiny from within itself, either by thought or by activity? This is really just a re-statement of the religious question, but it is a re-statement which sheds light on the critical issues involved in it. To some this description of the human situation is such a truism that it will be wondered why it is stated in the form of a question. To others this description of the human situation is false and impossible. Since this is an issue which divides contemporary theology into its two main camps let us outline the issues at stake.

Negative arguments: theologies of Act

First, let us consider the negative arguments. There is, it is maintained, no condition of a universal awareness of radical contingency; such an awareness, where it exists, is a *product* of, not a *prolegomenon* to, Christian revelation. Radical contingency is a correlate of the Christian doctrine of creation *ex nihilo*, and were it not for nineteen hundred years of the Christian education and conditioning of the Western mind it could never occur to us to frame the question thus. As much has already been implied in the foregoing admission that it was the Christian doctrine of creation that added a complicating factor to metaphysics in that it transformed into a transcendent reference what need be only a transcendental reference of metaphysical inquiry.

This is the methodological starting point of what are generally referred to as theologies of Act. Apart from God's free and incomprehensible act of self-disclosure in revelation we neither could nor would ask the question of God. And apart from what is therein disclosed--namely, his absolute being, freedom, and sovereign disposal over our lives--we could not know that we are or that our being is radically contingent upon his will and intent. The heaviest emphasis, as we have stated, is on the freedom and incomprehensibility of the act of revelation. The freedom is God's, and it stresses the discontinuity. God is in no way conditioned by our needs. The incomprehensibility of the act is ours, and it stresses our radical contingency. Revelation so described is as incomprehensible to us as is any notion of an absolute beginning or a self-authenticating experience. Revelation is unique; it has no prior conditions of reception and no analogies by which it can be understood, except the analogies God arbitrarily chooses.

Positive arguments: theologies of Being

In contrast to this there are what are generally referred to as theologies of Being. However paradoxical may be the manner and circumstances of revelation, it is held that it is not revelation unless it is received.

And all reception by human minds involves some notion of recognition. Unless in some sense we knew what truth would be like if we had it, how would we recognize truth as truth when we have it? Unless in some sense we knew we essentially belonged to a transcendent reality, how could we surrender ourselves when confronted by a divine encroachment? The methodological starting point of a theology of Being is some form of the religious a priori. It is a simultaneous having-and-not-having being, of belonging to and being excluded from the fulness of life. It is the awareness of an existential discontinuity which presupposes an essential continuity. Hence, revelation is not an "absolute" beginning, rather it is a "new" beginning; it is not "self-authenticating" experience but "fulfilling" or "restoring" experience. And the divine freedom is not freedom to do anything he will but the freedom to do what he wills.

Thesis: Preliminary Statement and Development of Conceptual Tools

Obviously, a theology of Being gives an affirmative answer to the possibility of the religious question. It is the position of the present writer that this approach is the more adequate of the two in dealing with the recurrent and persistent theme of continuity-and-discontinuity which we see in both philosophical and theological discourse. Further, this is the basic position of the two men, Jonathan Edwards and Paul Tillich, with whom we will be concerned in this inquiry. To find out why they take this position, how they develop it, and what strengths and weaknesses it has in relating the concepts of being and meaning, is no little part of the purpose of this inquiry.

Recapitulation

What, precisely, is being affirmed thus far?

First, that the condition of awareness of radical contingency of both being and meaning is intrinsic to the human situation generally. It does not argue against the condition of awareness that the actual awareness did not consciously arise in all its depth and clarity until an actual moment in historical time and within a special group. Unless life were actually contingent prior to any revelation there is no revelatory experience, no matter how awesome and overpowering, that could convince a person or a group that it is so. Life precedes knowledge; being precedes meaning; and the knowledge or meaning must be related to the condition intrinsic to life or being.

Second, though there is the condition of cognitive knowledge of radical contingency there is no similar condition of producing the reality of the answer. When life itself is the question there is no possibility of producing the answer from within. The answer must be given from beyond and received as the answer. It does not argue against the universal relevance and applicability of the answer that it is given at a particular time and received by a special group.

Third, the relation between the question and the answer is dialectical. If the condition of the religious question is universal we should expect that general experience, both the history of religious and metaphysical speculation, would be in some sense preparatory of the answer, providing the forms of its reception and explication, and exercising a legitimate continuing critical function. However, though the condition of the question is universal, the full and true awareness of the question is coincident with, and dependent upon the answer. The answer is critical of and contributes to the adequate shaping of the question since without it the questioning will be partially false, partially contradictory, always inadequate and inconclusive.

This summary describes the methodological positions of both Tillich and Edwards. Tillich's "method of correlation" is the correlation of "existential questions" and "theological answers" in such a way that the continuity-and-discontinuity of the two poles is taken into account. Edwards' method can best be described as the complementarity of reason and faith. Faith alone gives that to which reason or general experience intrinsically aspires; and faith gives that to which reason or general experience aspires but inevitably ruins by trying to complete itself on its own terms. Natural man finds his fulfilment as natural man in God, but abandoned to his own resources he finds neither the security nor the fulfilment of his being.

Intrinsic vs. extrinsic meaning

There is in these last words the intimation of something deeper and more basic than just methodological concerns. We must make this explicit. The decisive difference between theologies of Act and theologies of Being is that the former subordinate being to meaning while the latter subordinate meaning to being. Where Act is primary, life in the world is seen as having no intrinsic interest, value, or fulfilment. Meaning is the meaning or purpose for being, not of being; it is wholly extrinsic and prior to actual being. The world exists solely because God has willed to be with and for that which is not himself. Its value consists solely in that God is with and for it. Fulfilment is the act in which God is with and for it. The meaning of the world, somewhat like that of a musical instrument, consists in the uses to which it is put and for which it was designed and consummated. Of course, the being of the world must possess some adaptability for its use, but little or nothing is gained by examining the

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instrument. This is not the point where one begins inquiry into the meaning of being.

On the other hand, where Being is primary, life in the world is seen as having intrinsic interest, value, and fulfilment. Meaning is the meaning or purpose of being. Being itself is valuable and fulfilled being must be included in the answer even if it is not achieved by direct pursuit. In other words, God's end in creating and man's true end in being are seen as converging lines. The analysis of life is relevant and necessary if for no other reason than it rules out false answers--such as fideism and legalism--which promise life but actually destroy it. Both Edwards and Tillich are ontological theologians if by that it is meant that being is the proper context in which the question of meaning arises and is answered.

The basic duality of cosmological presuppositions

There is another way of approaching the differences between theologies of Act and Being which sheds further light on the basic orientation of the men who are the subjects of our inquiry. This has to do with cosmological conceptions. In the section above where we noted the philosophical objections to the religious question, the question was raised as to whether we have any right to talk about being as an ordered whole, a cosmos, a universe. The universe, it is maintained, is a "basic metaphor" imposed by minds upon the temporal flux of existence which knows no order or totality. There is a provisional truth to this, though it is so badly stated as to be wholly misleading. Our ideas of cosmos--e.g., the mechanistic or teleological postulates, or some other--are basic metaphors. Even the idea of the flux is a basic metaphor. But "cosmos," "the universe," is not on a par with these. It is the presupposition of all attempts to project a viable metaphor. This does not mean that cosmos is necessarily some static order, that we live in a "block universe." The universe may well be in process, changing and evolving; but still it is the universe that is so characterized. We can never know the whole of reality, but we cannot divest ourselves of the notion of reality as a whole. This is not just a demand of reason; it is the precondition of mind. And mind is an experienced part of reality. Tillich is certainly right in pointing out that the self-world polarity is the basic ontological structure and the presupposition of all others.[1]

But how is the wholeness of the world conceived? This is a different question than, What is the nature of the universe?--whether it is mechanism, flux, or something else.

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[1] Paul Tillich, Systematic Theology (3 vols.; University of Chicago Press, 1951-63), I, 168-71. This work will hereinafter be abbreviated "ST" followed by the appropriate volume number.

The question of how the wholeness is conceived precedes the question of how it is characterized. There are two basic cosmological themes or models which, both in individual variations and in combination, appear over and over again in mythology and in philosophy and in theology. The one we can designate as the chaos/cosmos theme; the other the macrocosm/microcosm theme. The former is typical of a theology of Act, the latter of a theology of Being.

The chaos/cosmos theme

The chaos/cosmos theme conceives wholeness in terms of limit or finitude; it emphasizes the fragility of finite being. Cosmos, or the world as a whole, is like an oasis in the desert or like a plantation in the wilderness. It is a conception of totality that is defined by limits or boundaries. Beyond those bounds lies the trackless waste or the howling wilderness. Chaos is the designation for primordial being, infinite, undifferentiated, unknowable, dark, foreboding, menacing. There are no analogies from the structure of cosmos to chaos because chaos by designation is that which has no nature or structure. It is no-thing.

Cosmos as limit.--As important as the menacing character of chaos is in this theme, it would be a mistake to overlook the way it functions in relation to cosmos. Although it is the antithesis of cosmos, there would be no cosmos without it, for cosmos is understood precisely in terms of limit. Chaos transcends cosmos in that it lies beyond the pale, but it determines the cosmos in that it gives definiteness and substance to the boundary. Should the countervail of chaos be taken away, cosmos would crumble into pieces. That which has lost its limit becomes no-thing; it is swallowed up in chaos. Cosmos and chaos are strictly polar concepts; the one is not without the other.[1]

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[1] Two outstanding contemporary theologians who emphasize the concept of limit as essential to any conception of the world as a whole are Thielicke and Barth. "One can conceive of the wholeness of the world, and therefore its continuity, only if one recognizes that this world has a limit and that there is a transcendence that begins at this limit. The wholeness of a thing always consists in limitedness" (Thielicke, Nihilism, p. 62). Thielicke gives a beautiful characterization of the anxiety and feeling of constriction inherent in limit by drawing upon the parallel in the mythological background of Greek cosmology where the Olympian gods overthrow the Titan Oceanus, banishing him to the horizon of the world, thus clearing room for cosmos. "So when we realize that in the Greek conception the measureless nothing is a world in opposition to this world, we also understand that here again there was a consciousness of being surrounded by something dreadful, an alien and incomprehensible dominion which can suddenly come flooding into the ordered world. For some day the protecting dam may break and one day the Olympians, the creators and warders of the dam, will be forced to depart. One day the twilight of the gods must come." (Ibid., pp. 120-21).

For Barth, Limit and Grace are synonymous. For his extensive use of the chaos/cosmos theme see his section on "Creation as the External Basis of the Covenant," Church Dogmatics, III/1, 94-228, where he discusses the first creation saga, Gen. 1:1-2:4a. The creation begins with the pushing back above and below of the waters of the primeval ocean and the separation of light and darkness. Room must be made for cosmos. It is not created by impos-

When this theme is transposed and used as a model for explicating the relationship between the world and God, or between contingent being and its transcendent cause or ground, then there are certain features that inevitably follow and which we should be prepared to find.

Finite-infinite cleavage.--The first of these is the incompatibility of the finite and the infinite. Just as there are no structural analogies between cosmos and chaos, so there are none between finite and infinite. The infinite is the antipode of the finite; it does not include the finite within itself.[1] Usually the positive or dependence

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ing form on prime matter. Chaos has no being, not even relative non-being. It represents the excluded possibilities. To it God utters an undialectical No, and in the space cleared God speaks an undialectical Yes to cosmos. And this setting of bounds or limits is grace. Yet for all its undialectical non-being, chaos for Barth is still palpable and ponderable enough to pose a continual threat to cosmos. Cosmos subsists because God has said Yes to it. But it is a threatened subsistence because it is not self-subsistent. This will be overcome only in the covenant consummated in the Incarnation, when God himself enters and unites himself with the cosmos and thus the power of the threat of chaos is broken.

Barth, of course, would never agree that chaos serves as a positive limit or countervail to cosmos. But this is where he has had to strive to modify the basic theme to make it acceptable to the Christian doctrine of God. He is well aware that chaos and cosmos are polar concepts. Any Yes simultaneously posits the realm of the excluded possibilities, any Limit the Unlimited which bounds it be being left out.

[1] It is not necessary that the infinite or the chaos side be identified with the divine. Greek religion identified cosmos with the divine and conceived of the gods as on the side of cosmos countervailing the menace of chaos. This

aspect is emphasized rather than the negative or menacing aspect. Without the limit of the infinite (and this is usually seen as the arbitrary self-restraint of the infinite rather than any power of resistance residing in the finite) the finite could not be.

External relations.--A second observation follows closely upon the first. Relations between the finite and the infinite are external relations. Limit is a prime example of an external relation, and this characteristic of over-againstness runs throughout. This model of the finite-infinite relationship has no difficulty with miracle or extraordinary providences. In relation to the system of nature these are external interventions. But above all, emphasis upon externality and objectivity appears in its conception of revelation, the self-disclosure of the infinite to the finite. The finite has no capacity for the infinite.

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subjects the gods to fate, however. They are in contest with powers which they neither created nor of which they can ultimately dispose. This has never been acceptable to Christian theology.

The chaos/cosmos theme has not been uniformly dominant in the history of Christian thought, but where it has been given prominence, as in late medieval Nominalism with its emphasis upon the primacy of the divine will and in the Reformed tradition with its emphasis upon the divine freedom, it is the chaos side that is identified with the divine. From man's side, that is, from within the cosmos, the divine is inscrutable, unpredictable, and incomprehensible. The infinite cannot be subjected to the canons of the finite.

Mystery as the unknowable.--A third feature of this model is its definition of mystery. Mystery lies in what we do not know. It is not that which the finite does not yet know but which it might know, like the intricacies of the order and harmony of the cosmos. Mystery is that which is not known because it is incomprehensible, impenetrable to the structures and powers of finite reason. One accepts mystery as that which transcends the rational order only after coming to the limits of reason. It is non-rational, but not anti-rational. On the contrary, without the horizon of mystery there would be no bounds to the rational order, nothing finite which because of its finitude is amenable to rational grasp and analysis.

Strengths and weaknesses.--The strength of this theme or model is the seriousness with which it takes the radical contingency of the cosmos. If cosmos were secure, that is, regarded as ultimate and eternal, then it could take within its stride the contingency of the individual exemplars of its orders and structures. The species would be eternal though the individuals would not. But this model goes a step beyond that to assert that it is the cosmos itself that has no aseity.

The weakness of this theme is its dualism. In order to obtain a conception of the world as a whole or as a universe it must posit a duality of principles. In a faith that can accept a duality (or plurality) of ultimate principles this might not be so crucial. But neither biblical monotheism nor the demands of reason have ever been happy with this.

The macrocosm/microcosm theme

Cosmos as organic centeredness.--The chaos/cosmos theme is only one way of trying to conceive of the world as a whole. It can conceive of a whole only in terms of sharply defining its limits. Another way of conceiving wholeness is by an internal center of relatedness or principle of organization. This is the basic vision of the macrocosm/microcosm model. Unity according to this model is not a matter of sharply circumscribing external boundaries; it is a matter of inner integrity and spontaneity. The prime example or referent for this is organism. An organism, whether it be an amoeba or a man, has the characteristic of responding as a whole no matter how localized the stimulus might be. When a finger is pricked it is the whole self that says "ouch" and not just the local cells that have been damaged. This internal functional unity cannot be precisely circumscribed in terms of spatial limits. The loss of a limb, for instance, does not diminish the personal unity of a man. Neither does the substitution or addition of a vital organ, such as in the case of a successful kidney transplant, change or add to the capacities of the personal center.

The spiritual powers of man cannot be circumscribed any more than the physical locus of the organic center can be determined precisely. It is the very essence of reason to drive beyond all boundaries, to transcend the given, and to seek synthesis beyond antitheses. This is not the desire to know the sum of all things, which is impossible, rather it is the drive to see the infinite multiplicity of things under a unified perspective. It is an internal principle of unity that has no outer limits or boundaries, needs none, and indeed will tolerate none.

That principle or power which integrates the self is either the same or at least analogous to the principle or power which integrates the world. This is why we can call it the macrocosm/microcosm theme. Man in his personal-organic integrity is the epitome or miniature (microcosm) of the universe or the world as a whole (macrocosm). The world as a whole is not conceived as the sum of all things but as an organic center of unity which comprehends all things in their indeterminate multiplicity and endless variations.

Like the chaos/cosmos theme it is not necessary that this theme of macrocosm/microcosm be used as the model for explicating the relationship between the world and God or between contingent being and its transcendent cause or ground; but when it is, there are certain features which follow and which we should expect to find.

The analogy of the temporal and the eternal.--The first of these is that there is a basis of analogy between the world and God. The sharp cleavage is not between the finite and the infinite, but between the temporal and the eternal. The finite/infinite distinction belongs to both orders. There are elements or analogies of the infinite in man and the world. Man as spirit, as having the freedom of indeterminate self-transcendence, is a type of infinity that is inherent in created being. And there are elements or analogies of finitude in God. The divine embraces itself and the finite, it includes both itself and the created order in its macrocosmic integrity and perspective. This does not mean that the world is "a piece of God," but it does mean that the world is "in God."

Internal relations.--A second feature is that relations between the temporal and the eternal are internal relations. It is by going within the microcosm, into the structures or powers of its unity, that the a priori ground of macrocosmic unity is recognized. The soul by going within itself finds the ground on which it meets God before it turns to the external world. This does not mean that there is no doctrine of revelation in this model. But it does mean that revelation is not conceived as casting stones from afar; rather it is inward illumination, the elevation of the faculties of reason and reorientation of the will. God works internally in and through, and not just externally upon, the created order.

Mystery as the inexhaustible.--In the third place, the definition of mystery is greatly different here from that of the chaos/cosmos theme. The locus of mystery lies in that of which we are immediately aware and not in that which is unknowable. The classic example is Augustine's meditations upon the nature of time in the eleventh book of the *Confessions*. If no one asks him, he says he knows what time is; but if he is called upon to explain it, he cannot. Mystery is that quality of inner infinity or inexhaustibility of that which is immediately present and rationally penetrable. And rather than being characterized by impenetrability to reason, the sense of mystery, of inner inexhaustibility, grows precisely in direct proportion to rational grasp and penetration. Mystery is not exhausted or dissolved by knowledge.

Strengths and weaknesses.--The strength of this theme or model is the seriousness with which it takes the demands of reason for a genuine wholeness and in its recognition of the a priori grounds for any concept of totality. If the grounds of the experienced personal-organic center of unity were completely insecure, that is, subject to radical annihilation, then it is inconceivable that our contingency should bother us greatly, or at all. We could wholeheartedly and without any reservations embrace the philosophy of eat, drink, and be merry, for tomorrow we die. As appealing as this thought often is, it is a project that the race in every age has found difficult--nay, impossible--to carry off. We are anxious about losing our life, as the former theme so eloquently expresses. But equally so, we are anxious that there may be no losing of it, as this latter theme admonishes.[1]

The weakness of this model is its monism. In a philosophy of religion that can accept at least incipient pantheism this is no problem. However, this has never been acceptable to the creationist faith of biblical religion.

The position of Edwards and Tillich.--Rarely is it the case that a philosopher or theologian is a pure type if for no other reason than that he wants the benefits of his basic model without its obvious defects. But with the several qualifications which we shall have to delineate we can say that both Edwards and Tillich fall within the macrocosm/microcosm group in conceiving the totality of the world.

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[1] "To sleep, perchance to dream, ay there's the rub" broods Hamlet as he contemplates the "solution" of suicide. (Act III, scene i, line 65).

The Problem of "Being"

At the outset of this introduction we made clear the sense in which we will be dealing with "meaning" in this inquiry. But step by step we have been led into ever deeper involvement with the concept of being. The meaning of life involves the Whence and Whither of the World-as-a-whole. It is the meaning of being that we are asking, and we have taken the position that being is quite properly the basic context in which the question of meaning arises and is answered. Now, we must make clear the signification of the term "being" and see if it, in similar fashion, drives us toward the concept of meaning and where it leads us to focus the basic problem of the relation of being and meaning.

The facets of being

The question of being has two facets which are distinguishable in thought. First there is the wonder that anything is rather than not. Why is there something and not nothing? Second, there is the wonder that a thing is in such and such a mode rather than some other. Why does it present itself in this particular manner and not some other?

Entity:
being, simply considered

Let us call the first facet the question or wonder about entity. "Entity" is a word that is abstract enough to suggest that we are pointing to being, simply considered. For the moment we are not interested in qualities, attributes, or relations, just the fact that something "is." Allowing this usage, we can see that from the standpoint of entity being has only one conceivable alternative--non-entity or absolute non-being. There is a sense in which we can say that something either is or it is not, and there are no degrees in between.

Further, let it be clear from the outset that by "entity" we do not mean solely or even primarily existence in the sense of something that occupies space and persists through time. Entity, as here used, precedes the distinctions between essence and existence, potentiality and actuality, ideal and real. These are all modes of entity, of being, simply considered.

The wonder about entity implies the awareness of the radical contingency of everything finite. Nothing that we encounter in the world or within ourselves, including our own lives, has an inherent necessity that it be. What is the power that holds our soul in life, and suffers not our foot to be moved? This is obviously not the kind of question that can be satisfied with explanation in terms of systems of secondary causation. It raises the question of primary causation.

Modality: being, concretely considered

Let us call the second facet the question or wonder about modes. If entity is being, simply considered; mode is being, concretely considered. This latter includes all the determinations of concreteness, both those of internal structure and of external relations to other concrete beings. We never encounter entity--being, simply considered. In fact, it is only a definite pattern of determinations that we perceive. "Mode" is a term sufficiently comprehensive to cover all such determinations, whether they be structures, powers, or relations. Unlike entity, the conceivable alternatives to the modality of any given being are indeterminate. The ways that a thing is not like other things, or not like itself at other times, is an inexhaustible catalog. The conceivable alternatives to any given modality are best termed as relative non-being. The possibilities of variation both in kind and degree are indeterminate.

Relation of the facets to the distinction between being and meaning

From what has been said thus far it is enough to see that the concepts of being and meaning are related to these definitions of entity and mode, respectively. It is understandable how the question of being should become simply equated with the wonder about entity, and likewise that the question of meaning be treated as synonymous with the wonder about modality. However, if such a split is made, with its resulting pair of simple equations, then any discussion of the relation between being and meaning is foredoomed to frustration and failure. The distinction between entity and mode does not cut on the same plane as that between being and meaning. Entity and mode are logical abstractions from being--the one signifying being, simply considered; and the other being, concretely considered. Entity and mode are separable in thought but not in reality. Both considerations belong to the question of being. Entity is logically prior to mode, but that does not make them separate realities. To forget that one cannot talk of being apart from a serious consideration of its modality (that is, to talk as if being simply had to do with entity) is the fallacy of any philosophy, such as nihilism, which wants to consider being as given and meaning as problematical, probably even illusory. On the other hand, meaning has entity. To forget that one cannot talk of meaning apart from a serious consideration of its entity (that is, to talk as if meaning simply had to do with modality) is the fallacy of any philosophy which wants to consider only meaning or value as basic and dismiss the question of being as "metaphysical" (that is, "nonsense").

That being as such has modality and meaning as such has entity are quite the crucial observations here. This does not tell us what the relation between being and meaning is, but it does assure us that they are relatable. We are not trying to put together incommensurables. In theology the concepts of being and meaning are generally associated with the Christian doctrines of creation and redemption, respectively. Creation posits the being of the world, thus setting the stage. The history of redemption, from the fall to the final consummation in the last day, is the drama. But if what has been said above is valid, we cannot make so simple a division between the provinces of being and meaning, assigning the one to nature or creation and the other to history or redemption. Being as such has modality. This means that there is a legitimate question of intrinsic meaning in creation. And meaning as such has entity. This means that there is a legitimate question as to the ontological status of redemption.

Illustration from the doctrines of the fall and grace

These problems have a peculiar poignancy in connection with the doctrines of the fall and of grace. The fall is a sort of stepchild in theology. Although it is conceived as historical it does not properly belong to the story of redemption; rather it is the necessary presupposition of the drama. Christian insistence upon the universality of the fall would suggest that it belongs to the stage setting, that logically it belongs to the structure of creation as such. But such an ascription would impugn the goodness of creation. Being, as it comes from the hand of God, is good. Being has a meaning that is prior to and does not comprehend the fall. This ambiguity of the status of the fall points up the necessity of finding a meeting place for the provinces of being and meaning.

Unlike the fall, grace is a child that everybody wants to adopt, but it is difficult to decide who has the rightful claim. Grace is the heart and theme of the drama of redemption. Yet one thing that orthodox Christianity has insisted upon is that it is not merely a matter of modality. Grace is not a possibility or a potency of created being, to say nothing of fallen being. It is a gift, a "new creation." Still, it is regarded as the fulfillment or end of creation. This ambiguity of discontinuity/continuity points up, at the other end of the spectrum, the necessity of finding a meeting place for the provinces of being and meaning.

The primacy of the doctrine of creation

The foregoing discussion has shown the legitimacy in talking about the problematical relation of being and meaning. The terms are relatable, but an adequate conceptual grasp of the relation is far from easy, and in no sense is success guaranteed.

Having noted that the doctrines of sin and grace are the places where the problematical relation is most poignantly felt, this would suggest that either one or both of these doctrines would be the natural place where the resolution should be sought. But unfortunately the points of greatest poignancy and clearest theological focus are not necessarily coincident. Something of the way these doctrines have been elaborated in the history of theology can best illustrate that fact. In each case let us begin at the center, where there is maximum agreement among theologians, and move to the periphery, where consensus proportionately dissolves.

The heart of the doctrine of sin is the universal fall of mankind. But man is only a part of the total creation. There is an inherent pressure at the center to relate the doctrine to ever wider systems of coherence. Are animate and inanimate nature affected by the fall? And is the involvement one that results from nature's participation in the rebellion or is it one of suffering the consequences of man's disruption of the original harmony? Is death the wages of sin or is it natural in unfallen creation? And what about the stories of the transcendent fall of the angels, which are elaborated to account for the possibility of the presence of temptation in the Garden of Eden? Nor does the pressure stop with the totality of the cosmos, "the heavens and the earth." It is transposed into the doctrine of God and his will in creation. This is expressed in the debates over predestination; and within that, the controversies over infra- and supra-lapsarianism.

Unlike the fall, the doctrine of grace, at its center, does not even involve all mankind, only the elect. But like it there is an inherent pressure to relate it to wider and wider circles of coherence. Is nature redeemed in Christ? And what about the eschatological symbols of the new heavens and a new earth? Are all men affected by the cross-resurrection? This is, in various forms, the pressure of universalism. And these pressures pass the bounds of the cosmos and are transposed into the doctrine of God and his will or end in creation. This is expressed in the debates over theodicy.

At the places of utmost poignancy, the relation of being and meaning can only be stated in the starkest paradoxes. With respect to sin we could point to the phrase which Reinhold Niebuhr has made current coin: Sin is inevitable, but not necessary. And turning the phrase around, we could state the corollary with respect to grace: Grace is necessary, but not inevitable. But paradoxes need a larger and deeper context if they are to be grasped in their profundity and not seen as simple, impossible contradictions. It is the experience of poignancy that drives us to look for the place of clearest theological focus. And all roads lead ultimately to dimensions of cosmic proportions, and beyond that to God; more specifically, to God's end in creation.

The doctrine of creation is more abstract and, let us admit it, more abstruse than many another we might choose. But the degree of abstraction is not directly proportional to the degree of irrelevancy, as we in America are prone to believe. It is at the highest levels of abstraction that our deepest and most fundamental questions and commitments in life lie most clearly exposed.

All that needs to be recognized for the purposes of this inquiry is that the doctrine of creation is the place of clearest theological focus for stating the relation of the concepts of being and meaning. The debate over whether the doctrine of creation is a latecomer in the elaboration of theology is not particularly germane. Our interest is systematic and not genealogical. In any complete theology the doctrine of creation is the symbol "which points to the profoundest understanding of the dimensions, the tragedy, and the potentialities of human life, a symbol essential not only to the Christian faith, but also to a full apprehension by any man of the meaning of human existence."[1]

Elements of the doctrine of creation

The elements of the doctrine of creation may be listed under three heads: (1) the primary definition of God, (2) the relation between God and the world, and (3) the meaning and purpose of the creation for both God and man.[2] When we examine first Edwards and then Tillich on these three points we shall see, on the level of clearest focus, just how they conceive the relation of being and meaning.

The Comparability of Edwards and Tillich

We have said enough already to justify the claim that Edwards and Tillich are capable of being compared fruitfully. Both men accept the religious question substantially as we have posed it. Both are philosophical theologians. Both are ontologists. That these characterizations are much more readily apparent in the case of Tillich than in Edwards must be admitted. To some extent, in the popular mind at least, Edwards is still thought of only as a hell-fire revivalist preacher and a reactionary theologian fighting a rear-guard action to keep Calvinistic orthodoxy alive in a day when it should have been given a quiet and decent burial.[1] The revival of interest in the Puritan period in America, in general, and in Jonathan Edwards, in particular, spearheaded in the last generation by such able scholars as Herbert Schneider and Perry Miller has borne fruit in a reappraisal of Edwards. The most notable evidence of that is the new Yale edition of Edwards' Works, now in process. When executed, this will be the first complete and critical edition in well over a hundred years.[2] That Edwards was a philosophical theologian of great stature and ability is a reputation well established in scholarly circles. Perhaps the most readily available as well as the latest attestation to that fact is Douglas J. Elwood's The Philosophical Theology of Jonathan Edwards.[1] That ontology is the synthetic core of his theology has been thoroughly expounded and documented in Thomas Anton Schafer's work, "The Concept of Being in the Thought of Jonathan Edwards."[2]

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[1] Langdon Gilkey, Maker of Heaven and Earth: A Study of the Christian Doctrine of Creation (Garden City, New York: Doubleday & Company, Inc., 1959), p. 22.

[2] Ibid., Chapter I.

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[1] Even so recent (1959) an anthology as Vergilius Ferm's *Classics of Protestantism* (New York: Philosophical Library, 1959) includes, as the two representative selections of Edwards, his sermon, "Sinners in the Hands of an Angry God," and excerpts from *Freedom of the Will*.

[2] The 4 volume edition of 1881 was a reprint, with some additions, of the Worcester edition of 1808-1809, which was reprinted several times. The only other attempt at a complete edition was the standard 10 volume one edited by Dwight in 1829-30.

In this dissertation the following abbreviations will be used: "*Works*" refers to the *Works of President Edwards*, ed. Sereno E. Dwight (10 vols.; New York: S. Converse, 1829-30); "*Works (Worcester)*" refers to the *Works of President Edwards*, Reprint of the Worcester Edition (4 vols., New York: Leavitt and Trow, 1843-44). Since so few of the volumes of the new edition of the *Works of Jonathan Edwards*, gen. ed. Perry Miller (New Haven: Yale University Press, 1957-) are yet available, these volumes will be referred to by individual title: *Freedom of the Will* refers to volume I, ed. Paul Ramsey, 1957; and *Religious Affections* refers to volume II, ed. John E. Smith, 1959.

These are positions that do not have to be argued and won anew. Still, there is a basic difference between the way Edwards wrote and the way Tillich wrote that will require a difference in the ways in which we will have to approach the ideas of the two men in order to compare them. What is explicit in Tillich is only implicit in Edwards. Edwards produced nothing comparable to Tillich's Systematic Theology. In none of the writings which he published himself did he share with his readers the metaphysical foundations or philosophical orientation which were so determinative of his mind. Whereas Tillich almost never missed an opportunity to lay bare his basic orientation and method, Edwards rarely ever seized one. Yet it is all there to be discerned; and his private and, what were to him, unpublished writings yield ample confirmation that it was conscious to him. This state of affairs will require a more indirect approach to Edwards' ideas than is requisite in the case of Tillich. No "proof text" method will suffice in getting to the heart of Edwards' thought. The best method--as Perry Miller's intellectual biography, Jonathan Edwards,[1] has shown--is to recreate or make explicit the interior dialogue in which Edwards' positions were hammered out. By repeating that method in our examination of Edwards we shall not be bringing to light anything that is not already known, but we will be attempting to make patent, credible, and vivid what is really there.

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[1] (New York: Columbia University Press, 1960).

[2] (unpublished Ph. D. dissertation, Duke University. 1951).

It is not enough to show that these two men are comparable. What is it about them that would make such a comparison worth while? Edwards was the first, Tillich the latest, theologian on the American scene to attempt to deal with the problem of meaning ontologically. Both see the theologian's role as involving the relating of theological answers to their contemporary thought forms. Both seek to make theology relevant to culture as well as acknowldege that culture is relevant to theology. That Tillich had little or no genetic connection with the school of New England Theology of which Edwards was the fountainhead only makes the comparison of the two more interesting and their similarities more significant. Is Tillich's "ontologism" something alien to our heritage or is it a recall to our real, indigenous theological beginnings?

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[1] (New York: Meridian Books, Inc., 1959). This work was copyrighted in 1949 by William Sloane Associates, Inc., and reprinted by arrangement with William Morrow & Co., Inc.

There is another reason, less provincial. Both Edwards and Tillich consciously wrestled with the problem of relating orthodox theology to the modern world. Between them lies the Kantian era with its dichotomy between being and meaning which has been so fateful for modern theology. Between them is the rise and decline of Schleiermacher's attempt to re-establish ontological theology without taking sides in the split. Between them lies the rise and decline of Liberal Theology which generally accepted the rejection of metaphysics and emphasized a value-oriented theology. But above all, between them lies the post-World War I Crisis Theology, spearheaded and dominated by Barth, which rediscovered and maximized the discontinuity everywhere between orthodox theology and any and all world-views. Nothing can ever return to just what it was before. In what ways is Tillich *different* from Edwards so that he could regard the ontological method as again viable in view of what had intervened. What did Tillich have to take into account that for Edwards was not yet a problem? In view of their likenesses and differences, is there the possibility and promise of a new-old departure in contemporary theology?

CHAPTER II

BEING AND MEANING IN THE THEOLOGY OF JONATHAN EDWARDS

The Man and His Works

Life

Jonathan Edwards, 1703-1758, was a fourth generation New England Puritan.[1] He was educated at Yale and spent most of his adult active years as pastor of the church (Congregational) at Northampton, Massachusetts. This was between the years 1729 and 1750. Northampton was the most influential pulpit outside of Boston, and it dominated the ecclesiastical life of the Connecticut River Valley. These were the years that spanned the Great Awakening, and Edwards played a catalytic role in the New England phase of that first great American religious revival.

Upon being dismissed from the church at Northampton Edwards removed to Stockbridge, Massachusetts, where he served as minister to the white settlers and missionary to the Indians. He remained there in virtual exile for eight years until he was invited to become president of the College of New Jersey (now Princeton). However, he had only been in Princeton a few months when he died as a result of a faulty smallpox innoculation.

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[1] No attempt at a full biography will be made here. In addition to Miller's intellectual biography, Jonathan Edwards, to which I have already referred, see Ola E. Winslow, Jonathan Edwards (New York: The Macmillan Co., 1940).

Formative influences

Puritan orthodoxy

Edwards was nurtured on Puritan theology. His father was a minister, Harvard educated, and pastor of the church in East Windsor, Connecticut. His maternal grandfather was Solomon Stoddard, who ranked with Increase and Cotton Mather in the ecclesiastical leadership of New England. The aging Stoddard hand-picked Edwards as his associate pastor and successor designate at Northampton.

The "New Learning"

The first two decades of the eighteenth century were the time when the Enlightenment was first making itself felt in the American colonies. Edwards' mind was shaped by the categories of the New Learning, which means the ideas of Newton and Locke. By the time he entered Yale at the age of thirteen he had already read Newton's Opticks and shown remarkable powers of observation, abstract thought, and concise expression in writing.[1] His youthful but extremely important works, "Notes on Natural Science" and "On the Mind," date from his undergraduate years at Yale and show not only how he was influenced by Newton and Locke, respectively, but also how he shaped and modified these new currents in his reception of them.

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[1] Miller, Jonathan Edwards, lists his essay "Of Insects" during this early period, also his "short

Mysticism

To the formative influences also belong Edwards' conversion experiences, which can only be described as mystic rapture. But it was mysticism cast in a decided Calvinistic mold. The central feature of it was described by him as coming to love and delight in that doctrine which formerly had rankled in his mind more than any other: the utter and absolute divine sovereignty. Thomas Anton Schafer has described both the nature and the effects of these experiences succinctly:

> Here is the center of Edwards' piety: a direct intuitive apprehension of God in all his glory; a "sight," a "sense,"a "taste" of his majesty and beauty. This alone confers worth on man and this alone bestows salvation on him. What such a God as this does must be right; he can be truly known only in the mystic vision of his loveliness. The acceptance and affirmation of God as he is and does, and the love of God simply because he is God, became the positive elements in all Edwards' preaching.[1]

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demonstration that the soul is not material, and analyses of the rainbow and of colors"" (p. 37).

[1] Schafer, pp. 22-23. Another ample and adequate description, drawing upon primary sources, is that of Herbert Schneider in The Puritan Mind (Ann Arbor: University of Michigan Press, 1958), pp. 107-11.

Circumstantial influences

In addition to the formative influences Edwards' life and thought was also shaped by those events in his career in which he was an active participant.

The Great Awakening

An event of first magnitude was the Great Awakening of the 1740's. The preparatory phase in New England of that revival had occurred in Edwards' own church at Northampton in 1734-35. His account of this earlier phase was the Faithful Narrative.[1] While this work could hardly be called one of his major writings, it is important as a biographical datum for a number of reasons. First, due to its enormous popularity it brought Edwards international fame. Within four years it had been translated into German and Dutch and run through several printings in England and Scotland as well as in America.[2] In the second place, coincident with and consequent upon its popularity was the influence it had on shaping revivalism. It led people to great expectations as to the possibility of revivals, the signs of their appearing, and the pattern which conversion experiences would take.[1] But above all, the Faithful Narrative shows us something about Edwards himself. Here, as in so many places, the evaluation of Perry Miller is unsurpassable:

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[1] Full title: "Being a faithful narrative of the surprising work of God in the conversion of souls in Northampton and neighboring towns and villages in New England, in a letter to the Rev. Doctor Coleman of Boston, on November 6, 1736."

[2] See T. H. Johnson, The Printed Writings of Jonathan Edwards: A Bibliography (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1940), pp. 5-7.

> No anthropologist ever reported more objectively on the fertility rites of a jungle tribe, for Protestantism had not yet seen, though it had often aspired to, so perfect a union of the hot heart and the cool head. Edwards made no secret of why he could maintain detachment from events in which he was so deeply implicated: he had a technique for analysis, the Lockean psychology. He was as empirical as Boyle or Huygens, and wrote the Narrative as though for the Transactions of the Royal Society.[2]

This combination of the "hot heart" and the "cool head," or of simultaneous passionate involvement and critical detachment, is a quality that deepened and enlarged with the years. Edwards later showed that he could be fiercely polemical, but never partisan--if we understand by the latter one who is unreasoning, blind, or fanatical.

It was the visit of George Whitefield in 1740 that precipitated the phase that swept the entire Atlantic seaboard. Already deeply involved, Edwards became the leading spokesman for the New Light faction, or the pro-revival group within Congregationalism. This pitted him against Boston's influential Charles Chauncy, who was the champion of the Old Light or anti-revival group.[1] Not only emotional excesses but the whole place of "affections" in true religion were in controversy. Edwards' first major treatise, the Religious Affections of 1746, was an acute analysis and critique of this issue.

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[1] Schafer, p. 48.

[2] Miller, Jonathan Edwards, p. 139.

Larger theological controversies

The controversy over the individualistic and emotionally laden piety of the Great Awakening was symptomatic of larger theological issues at stake. The humanitarian impulses of the age led to an international dialogue concerning the revision of some of the staples of Protestant orthodoxy: the sole divine causality, the moral agency of man, and the human predicament apart from grace. It was to these larger issues that Edwards, during his Stockbridge period, addressed himself in his treatises on Freedom of the Will and Original Sin. These were polemical pieces aimed at undercutting the arguments advanced in support of "Arminianism," which was the term that became the standard bearer of efforts to revise and qualify the classical tenets of "Calvinism."

Writings

Religious Affections, Freedom of the Will, and

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[1] See Chauncy's Seasonable Thoughts on the State of Religion in New England (Boston: Rogers & Fowle, 1743).

Original Sin are among those writings which must be considered in any understanding of Edwards' thought. To these three must be added two dissertations, the Nature of True Virtue and Concerning the End for which God Created the World,[1] which, though not published until seven years after his death, belong to the core of his public influence. Unlike the first three, these dissertations are not polemical; they show Edwards in a more reflective-philosophical stance.

To this core there have been added from time to time some writings which are valuable in interpreting Edwards' mind, but which he either never intended to publish or else did not consider ready for publication. The youthful "Notes on Natural Science" and "The Mind" **mentioned above** in connection with the early period of his life are good cases in point. These writings, which more than any others established Edwards' reputation as a philosophical thinker of the first order, did not appear until 1830, in the Dwight edition of Edwards' Works. Since these early writings show the development of Edwards' brand of philosophical Idealism they have an important bearing in showing the relationship of his latest writings--True Virtue and God's End in Creation--to his total thought from beginning to end. It is generally recognized that there is hardly a major idea that appears in the later writings of Edwards that is not foreshadowed and treated in "The Mind."[1]

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[1] These works will hereafter be referred to as True Virtue and God's End in Creation, respectively.

An important source of corroborative detail in explicating the core of Edwards' published works is the "Miscellanies."[2] Beginning during his days at Yale and continuing throughout his life, Edwards kept extensive private notebooks in which he recorded his observations and thoughts as they came to him. He gave each entry a title and a number, and he kept a running index of the miscellaneous observations. From this interior monologue he drew many of the ideas that were later incorporated in his published writings. Most of the rich ore from this mine has been extracted for publication from time to time, the various selections depending upon the contemporary issues and interests of the various editors who have worked it over. It is the consensus of those who have had access to the manuscripts that the as yet unpublished "Miscellanies" do not require any revision of the picture of Edwards we get from the published writings, but they are valuable for further illumination of what we already know.[1]

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[1] Schafer, p. 13. In this essay, references to "The Mind" are made to the text of it published in The Philosophy of Jonathan Edwards From His Private Notebooks, ed. Harvey G. Townsend (University of Oregon Monographs, Studies in Philosophy no. 2; Eugene, Oregon: The University of Oregon Press, 1955). This anthology is hereinafter abbreviated: Townsend.

[2] The most valuable collection of these private notes for the purposes of this essay are to be found in Townsend (see above footnote). This collection includes many of the "Miscellanies" that are not available in Dwight's edition of the Works.

Much the same estimate as was made of the "Miscellanies" holds, though in a lesser degree of importance, with regard to Edwards' sermons. However, very little of the homiletical material is useful for our purposes in this study. Some of the sermons were published during his lifetime; many more have become available to us in the various editions of his collected works. There is a germinal relation between some of the homiletical material and his later published writings. Religious Affections began as a series of sermons preached at Northampton. Also the projected "History of the Work of Redemption," about which he wrote the trustees at Princeton shortly before his death, was in substance to be an expansion of a series of sermons he had preached at Northampton.

The Major Theological Alternatives

One cannot see a person in context if he restricts his attention to the immediate circumstances of the person's life. Already in surveying Edwards' life we have alluded to themes which call for further historical and systematic elaboration. Among these are Calvinism, Arminianism,

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[1] Schafer, Preface. Cf. Townsend, Introduction, p. xxi.

Puritanism, the Covenant theology, and--since the movement is so often associated with the ideas of Newton and Locke--deism. These movements constitute the major theological alternatives available to Edwards. The logical as well as historical place to start is with Calvinism.

Calvinism

There are ways of defining Calvinism that are so narrow that the only person whose thought could be included under that designation is John Calvin himself. Obviously, this will not do. We must seek to delineate those distinctive characteristics which make Calvinism a recognizable form of piety in the history of the modern world, and we must specify those doctrines which were forged to express and protect this distinctive strain of piety. Further, we must beware of caricature, which is so easy and such a favorite sport among those of us who were not born and bred to the tradition. A caricature exaggerates those features that are actually prominent, but it does so in a way that makes them appear ludicrous.

Calvinism is a strain of piety that has its roots in the writings of Augustine, and behind that, in the letters of Paul. But rather than begin from that end, let us approach its interior meaning through the words of a contemporary Calvinist who is aware of all the dangers mentioned above. Joseph Haroutunian writes:

> Whereas the language of Calvinism is in disrepute, the elements of good sense in Calvinism must always remain wherever there is good sense. Piety is not dead. So long as men refuse to shut their eyes to the world, so long as they recognize their connection with and their dependence upon a world which supports them and often ignores their personal welfare, so long as they find happiness in self-denial and a love which grows out of wisdom, so long as their sense of the tragedy of life persists and can be transmuted into victory over the world,--there will be the essence of Calvinism.[1]

Toughmindedness: "total depravity"

In the first place, Calvinism is a toughminded piety. It looks unflinchingly at all the aspects of life, not just at the pleasant or the beautiful or the uplifting. It comprehends the misery as well as the grandeur of the human situation. Or better put, it knows the grandeur because and in the measure that it comprehends the misery of the human estate. "Total depravity" has ever been one of the hallmarks of Calvinism. We must see this as a recognition of and an emphasis upon the ambiguity of all the powers and aspiration of life, even the best. It is the same awareness as that to which Paul refers when he says, "So I find it to be a law that when I want to do right, evil lies close at hand."[1] Nowhere is this ambiguity--or, as Haroutunian calls it, this tragic sense of life that persists--more apparent than in religion. All men according to Calvinism are incurably religious. They are endowed with a sense of divinity and a moral conscience. And yet, as Paul knew only too well, unless religious zeal be "enlightened," unless its wellspring is a source beyond all human capacities, then it is a zeal which only and inevitably crucifies the Lord of glory. There are no wars quite like religious wars, no intolerance like religious intolerance, no fanaticism like religious fanaticism. The history of religions is embarrassingly eloquent on this score. But to the tough-minded piety of Calvinism this is no surprise. This persistent tragic aspect of all of life's powers and aspirations can only be transmuted into victory by the grace of God.

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[1] Joseph Haroutunian, Piety Versus Moralism: The Passing of the New England Theology ("Studies in Religion and Culture; American Religion Series," Vol. IV; New York: Henry Holt and Co., 1932), pp. xxiv-xxv.

Theocentricity

In the second place,--but first, last, and always foremost in importance--Calvinism is a God-centered piety. For all its shrewdness or perspicacity with regard to the foibles of unaided human nature and its sinful corruption it is really not interested in man as such or this world as such. So conscious is this piety of the utter dependence of man and the world upon a source and a power and a purpose that are not in and of either the world or man, that its focus is on the object of faith and not the religious states of the believer. To call this "otherworldliness" would be more misleading than helpful. Otherworldliness can be just as man-centered as this-worldliness, especially so if it is characterized by anticipations of transcendent self-fulfilment and eternal bliss. Calvinism is God-centered because it sees God as the source, power, and end of this world. Soli deo gloria (to God alone be the glory), these are the watchwords of this piety. In the words of another contemporary interpreter:

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[1] Rom. 7:21

> Calvinist theology is informed throughout with an adoring sense of the transcendence, the sole and absolute causality, of God, before whose infinite majesty, incomprehensible essence, boundless power and eternal duration, man is utterly insignificant, save to illustrate the operation of God's grace in redemption.[1]

When the consuming concern is for the absolute divine sovereignty, then the faithful can accept, in Haroutunian's words, "their connection with and their dependence upon a world which supports them and often ignores their personal welfare."[2] There is a striking absence of any hint of utilitarianism in Calvinist piety. God does not exist for man, rather man exists for God. Faith is not a boon to make the circumstances of life easier, rather it gives the power "to find happiness in self-denial" and the "wisdom" to accept serenely--yea lovingly--the hand of God in everything that comes to pass.

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[1] J. S. Whale, The Protestant Tradition: An Essay in Interpretation (Cambridge, England: Cambridge University Press, 1962, c1955), p. 136.

[2] Supra, p. 62. (Italics mine.)

Predestination

Under the twin headings of tough-mindedness and theocentricity we can best approach the interior meaning of predestination in this piety. In a world which in all its aspects is utterly dependent upon God and over which he is absolute sovereign, there is no accounting for anything apart from ultimate reference to the divine will. If there is any security in life, either in terms of being or meaning, then it lies in the power and disposition of him who is its author and the disposer of its destiny. In a world where all of man's aspirations, decisions, and actions are ambiguous, the only way this "sense of the tragedy of life . . . can be transmuted into victory over the world" is through God's unambiguous decision, his eternal decree. Predestination, then, has to do with the grounds of certainty. Its interior meaning is security in a life where every conceivable ground is sinking sand. It cannot be stressed too strongly that predestination is neither in origin nor essence a speculative doctrine; it is this piety's way of handling the problem of assurance. And it is an assurance that is grounded in God and his will, never in man and his powers either after or before conversion.

To be sure, to trace the grounds of the believer's election and his consequent happiness to the sole causality of God in his eternal decree before the foundation of the world also involves the correlate that the unbeliever's misery and the justice of his damnation must also ultimately be referred to the same source. This is the hard side of the doctrine, from which this tough-minded piety has never shrunk. Needless to say, the doctrine of "double predestination" to election and reprobation has been the most sensitive spot in the career of Calvinism's relations to the burgeoning humanitarianism of the modern world. More about this presently, but at this point it is necessary to see that for Calvinism to give an inch with regard to the sole causality of God--even if such modification were motivated by the milk of human kindness--would mean not that more people would have the opportunity of being saved but that the grounds of assurance of any and every believer would be undercut.

The cosmological motif: chaos/cosmos

So far we have sketched those aspects of Calvinism that are characteristic emphases of this strain of piety, but in so doing we have not shown in what way it is distinctive. Calvinism has no monopoly on piety. More than anything else, that which makes Calvinism distinct is the doctrinal form in which these characteristic emphases were expressed. And here it is not that any new doctrines were introduced but the way the standard ones were reformulated. Behind every doctrinal expression stands a cosmological presupposition that is almost a pure expression of the chaos/cosmos model.[1]

Finite-infinite cleavage

First of all, the basic cleavage is between the finite and the infinite. There are no analogies between man's being and God's being, for the latter is ineffable and incomprehensible. All that can be said of God's being is negative: he is not finite, not material, not divisible.[2] All that we can know of God is his will toward us, and that only insofar as he accommodates it to our finite capacities. The whole emphasis upon accommodation, of which so much is made,[3] is expressive of and protective of the radical incompatibility of the finite and the infinite.

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[1] *Supra*, pp. 28-33.

[2] Cf. Edward A. Dowey, Jr., *The Knowledge of God in Calvin's Theology* (New York: Columbia University Press, 1952), p. 5.

[3] *Ibid*., pp. 3-17.

External relations

Consistent with the emphasis upon the finite/infinite cleavage is the fact that relations between God and the world are conceived as external relations. A strong doctrine of revelation with emphasis upon the objectivity and authority of Scripture are characteristic of Calvinism. The Word is spoken to man from beyond. There are several places where a superficial reading of Calvin would seem to controvert the system of external relations, but a closer reading shows that such is not the case. One of these is the statement of the correlative character of the knowledge of God with our self-knowledge. Another is the conception of general revelation. A third is the doctrine of the internal testimony of the Holy Spirit. A brief word about each of these points will be sufficient to show that though they involve subjectivity they are still definitely within the framework of external relations.

The correlative character of self-knowledge and God-knowledge.--Calvin does say in the opening chapters of the first book of the Institutes that there is an intimate connection between the knowledge of ourselves and the knowledge of God and that only by knowing the one can we know the other. When we look to see what he means by self-knowledge we find that it consists in the awareness of our lack of aseity and utter dependence upon God for everything we have and are. This is an external relation. And what he means here by the knowledge of God is the vision of the divine perfections which, by comparison and contrast, reveal our misery and make it impossible to remain complacent in it. Comparison with an objective standard is also an external relation.

General revelation.--General revelation in Calvin is two-fold, objective and subjective. Objectively God reveals himself through nature and history. The natural order argues for a wise and powerful Maker, and the course of history argues for a just and merciful Governor. Were it not for sin, empirical observation and a posteriori reasoning would be sufficient to warrant the conclusions that the creation is neither the product of chance nor is it self-created. The universe is a "book," "theater," or "mirror" wherein are displayed God's attributes of eternity, power, wisdom, goodness, truth, righteousness, and mercy.[1] But here it is important to note that there is no movement from the internal structures and orders of the world to some analogy of the internal workings of the mind and heart of God. Rather, the argument is external from the existence of the "beautiful mansion" of the world to the necessity of a divine "Architect." And the natural order, which results from the constancy of the workings of God's will within nature, does not preclude the possibility of miracle, for God's will is in no way limited by or exhausted in the natural order.

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[1] Dowey, pp. 72-81.

Paralleling what nature and history reveal objectively through experience is what the sense of divinity and conscience reveal subjectively through immediate intuition. The sense of divinity convinces us that there is a God who ought to be adored; the conscience convinces us that there is a moral law that ought to be obeyed. Under the dominion of sin man has not the will to worship God or obey him, but his natural sense remains sufficient to leave him not ignorant of his duty and hence without excuse.[1] But here note that what both the sense of divinity and the conscience have to do with are the contents of consciousness, not its structure or principle of unity. It is a conception that is very close to the notion of innate ideas. The only way one can argue from the contents of consciousness (innate or otherwise) is to an external original of those ideas. This is an external relation. Further, what the sense of divinity and conscience enjoin--namely, worship and obedience--are both external relations.

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[1] Dowey, pp. 50-72. This is an especially good exposition of Calvin's concepts of sensus divinitatis and conscientia.

Internal witness of the Holy Spirit.--The conception of the internal witness of the Holy Spirit was mentioned as a third possibility of seeing a contradiction of the system of external relations in Calvinism. Rather than being a breach in that system, it is a great protector of the system of external relations. This is especially evident when we remember how thoroughly Calvin and his followers wanted to dissociate themselves from those spiritualist sects of the Reformation which claimed that the spirit of man was a spark of the divine light or Spirit within the soul of every man, a spark that only needed to be awakened or kindled. In Calvinism everywhere the internal witness of the Spirit is strictly correlated to what is given externally through the Word. The work of the Spirit is not to disclose but to convince and to confirm--to convince the soul of the authority of the Word and to confirm the soul in its trust in the promises offered in the Word. This internal testimony of the Spirit is given gratuitously, at no point is it continuous with the spirit of man.[1] Both the gift of the Spirit and that to which it testifies and illumines are external relations.

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[1] "The illumination which brings the certainty of faith is supernatural. Although subjective in so far as it is an internal illumination, it comes from outside and is in no sense an accomplishment of man." (Dowey, pp. 182-83). To this statement Dowey appends a footnote (no. 176, p. 183) which cites B. B. Warfield's concurrence in this judgment stating that "here Calvin differed from Castellio, for whom the Spirit was man's own 'spirit.'"

Mystery as the unknowable

Not only in the cleavage between the finite and the infinite and in the emphasis upon external relations does Calvinism conform to type, but also in its understanding of mystery it reflects the chaos/cosmos model of cosmology. Mystery is what we do not and cannot know of God.[1] What he does make known of his will and intent through his activity in creation and redemption is clear and comprehensible. At least his will and intent toward us is sufficiently clear and certain for our needs, if not to satisfy our idle curiosity. But what God is in himself and why he does things the way he does, that is, what are the secret counsels of his will,--these are God's mystery, to pry into which is impossible, and to try is blasphemous.

The ontological problems of Calvinism

It would seem that by strict adherence to this cosmological model Calvinism would have insulated itself against the possibility of any intrusion of ontological speculation with respect to God. That such was the intent can hardly be denied. But in spite of this intent a couple of doors were opened which, though man was sternly admonished not to enter therein, nevertheless remain doors that beckon entry. One of these has to do with mystery, so we shall consider it first.

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[1] "The mystery belongs to the unknowable side of the known God." (Dowey, p. 17).

The integrity of God

For all its insistence upon the clarity and comprehensibility of what we can know, Calvinism did not obscure the fact that human existence both with and without grace is full of logical contradictions and antinomies. Part of this is due to the distortion of sin; but not all. There are those deeper paradoxes of Scripture which faith does not dissolve. Now, to trace these to the inscrutability of the divine will is one thing; the chaos/cosmos model can handle that. But to say further that these contradictions and antinomies are resolved on the level of the divine mystery is another thing altogether. Granted, piety can be satisfied with no less; but the point is that the chaos/cosmos theme cannot say so much. Dowey has said that "clarity of individual themes, incomprehensibility of their interrelations . . . is a hallmark of Calvin's theology."[1] Yes, but however incomprehensible the interrelations are to us, it is still the presupposition of piety that they are in fact interrelated in the mind of

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[1] Dowey, p. 40.

God.[1] Whence comes this assurance? Strictly on the basis of the finite/infinite cleavage it is legitimate for the finite to call mystery that which it absolutely cannot know, but it is not legitimate to use "mystery" as a cover for knowledgeable assertions (such as the integrity of God!) which may not be investigated. By knowing more about the divine mystery than the definition of mystery allows (but not more than faith needs) the way was opened, and entry was made mandatory, for later Calvinism to find a rationale for this state of things.

The goodness of God

Another door to ontology that was simultaneously posited and barred is implicit in the concept of General Revelation. It is one thing to know both from the empirical observation of nature and the internal sense of divinity that there is a God, but it is another to acknowledge that he ought to be adored.[2] And similarly, it is one thing to reason a posteriori from history and acknowledge on the basis of conscience that there is a moral law, and another to affirm that it ought to be obeyed. Although worship and obedience are demands for external relations, the legitimacy of the demand cannot itself be based on purely external relations. When the being of the finite is radically excluded from the being of the infinite, then one has a legitimate basis for a dialectical dependence of the one upon the other, but no basis for a submissive dependence of the finite upon the infinite. In fact, on a strict basis of the chaos/cosmos cleavage, if the cosmos loses its power of resistance to chaos, instead of being more firmly established it loses its being altogether. Calvinism has from the beginning insisted upon the existential character of faith and the knowledge of God.[1] But to say that relation to God not only determines man's being or not-being, but also that the positive faith relation is essential to man's well-being, is to say no more than piety demands but more than that for which the basic cosmological motif can provide a rationale. Hence, another task is set for later generations.

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[1] "Logical contradictions for him [Calvin] are only apparent contradictions to sinful reason, it is always assumed to be resolved on the level of God's mystery and then only when human efforts to understand have been exhausted" (Dowey, p. 39).

[2] In our own day men like Sartre assert that even if there were a God he would have to be ignored!

Summary and prospect

These two doors, then, cover ontological assertions about God which piety needs but which the cosmological model cannot allow, or at least for which it cannot vouch. The one is that the divine being must have rational integrity, however much it transcends our ability to fully comprehend. The other is that the divine being must be such in himself and so related to our being as to elicit legitimate obeisance. Without the one we could not rely upon him. Without the other we dare not trust him. The former is a need of theoretical reason; the latter is a need of moral reason. These two demands or tasks were dealt with separately in deism and in Arminianism, respectively. They were dealt with conjointly in the Covenant or Federal theology. To these movements we are now ready to turn. We shall deal with them primarily in the terms with which they presented themselves to the thought world of Jonathan Edwards in the first half of the eighteenth century, not in terms of their development and elaboration subsequent to his death.

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[1] Dowey, pp. 24-31.

Deism

The impetus of natural philosophy

Deism is commonly associated with the concept of natural religion. It is coincident with the Enlightenment emphasis upon natural science and rationality. Calvinism had held that the natural order represents the arena of the activity of God's stable will. Since there is no direct approach to the mind of God, one reasons a posteriori from the experienced world to the will of God reflected in his acts--nature's regularities and orders. Now, if you substitute the term "laws of nature" for "God's stable will" you have a program of observation, experiment, and discovery that is very congenial to the scientific spirit, reasonable in its method, and modest in its goals. Of course, why the laws of nature are as they are and not otherwise is unanswerable unless one posits a wise and powerful First Cause; but once that is done, rational inquiry can proceed with its own modest task for which it is competent. And the more that is known of the laws and harmonies of nature the greater seems the temptation to restrict God's total will to his stable will, to the laws of nature. The inner tendency of deism, though often it was not consciously intended, was reductionistic. It sought to reduce the divine mystery to First Cause, the supernatural inventor and mechanic of the world machine. A lot about a movement can be learned from the things it opposes. Mystery and miracle were two such ideas. Mystery implies that God's will is not exhausted in the natural order. Miracle implies that God's activity in nature is not restricted by the laws of the natural order. The reaction of deism to these two ranged from embarrassment to intolerance.

Newton cannot be regarded as the father of deism, perhaps not even as a deist himself, but the fact remains that his philosophy of science gave it a respectable foundation and a formidable impetus. "The representation of the universe as a vast machine set in motion by an Efficient Cause and run according to immutable laws"[1] was just the sort of platform it needed, especially in its later, more militant stages in Revolutionary and post-Revolutionary America.

The impetus of humanism

There is another, more humanistic side to deism besides the impetus given it by the growing interest in natural science. This side emphasizes not so much the laws of nature but reasonableness. As we have seen, Calvinism had a place for something like, if not identical with, the doctrine of innate ideas. All men have a sense of divinity which tells them that there is a God who ought to be worshipped, and a conscience which tells them that there is a moral law which ought to be obeyed. These elements, but without the distorting effects of original sin, were lifted into prominence in deism. Lord Herbert of Cherbury, who is regarded as the father of English deism, advanced the ideas early in the seventeenth century that there are certain innate ideas, or "common notions," which are present to reasonable men in all ages and in every stage of civilized development. These are that there is a Supreme Being, who ought to be worshipped, and whose worthy worship is virtuous living. Further, it is held as self-evident that men are capable of significant moral effort and that there is a judgment after this life with appropriate rewards or punishments. God, freedom, immortality--these ideas which we have come to associate with Enlightenment religion--are all here clearly enunciated, and not on the basis of revelation but on self-evident reasonableness. Deism did not like historical revelation and particularity any better than it cherished mystery and miracle. All religious beliefs and cultic practices were to be brought before the bar of reason. In the fire of reason superstition and particularity are burned off as dross, and the pure gold of universal religion is thus refined.

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[1] Herbert M. Morais, Deism in Eighteenth Century America (New York: Russell & Russell, 1960), p. 54.

One would think that John Locke's destruction of the concept of innate ideas would have dealt the death blow to this side of deism, but actually he did it a service. The crucial point was not that there are innate ideas but that all religious notions be brought before the bar of reason. Hitherto they were judged by the standard of the common notions; henceforth the common notions themselves--God, freedom, immortality--had to justify themselves before the bar.[1]

Deism as a liberalizing undercurrent

With Newton's self-contained and (at least, internally) self-explanatory world and with Locke's empirical psychology which could be used to hold all notions of the "other world" within the bounds of reasonableness, the theoretical foundations of a militantly reductionistic deism were ready to hand. But all this had not yet firmly congealed in Edwards' lifetime. Edwards was well aware of "Deism" as a party with a well-articulated philosophy in England, and he rejects it as denying the whole Christian religion.[2] Still the deistic influence (using the lower case "d" to distinguish it from the reductionistic philosophy, "Deism") in Edwards' context was not that which it later became in Revolutionary and post-Revolutionary America. Rather it was a liberalizing undercurrent, popular among the genteel and the sophisticated who kept their reservation about supernaturalism to themselves, or something to be latched upon by some clergymen who saw in it a boon to explicating what God reveals of himself in nature. A good example of the former group was Benjamin Franklin. A representative of the latter group was Cotton Mather. It is interesting to note that Herbert Morais dates the beginning of the deistic period in America with the year 1713. This was the year of the publication of Cotton Mather's Reasonable Religion, which is described as "the first work on deism published by an American."[1] It is hard for us to conceive that this man who is here called a deist is the same Cotton Mather who just twenty years prior, at the time of the Salem affair, had exercised such credulity with respect to witchcraft. But the explanation is disarmingly simple. He never considered himself as anything

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[1] Morais comments on Voltaire's reaction to d'Holbach's System of Nature (1770) in which the latter suggested that the time had come to dispense with the "myth" of God. The book "was bitterly assailed by the thoroughly frightened Voltaire who felt that if the idea that God existed was done away with, the concept of a future state would likewise have to go. This would mean the removal of a powerful check upon the actions of the 'canaille' who chiefly did good either because they hoped to be rewarded or feared to be punished. Thus, the prudent Voltaire concluded that if God did not exist, it would be necessary to invent Him." (p. 48). This is a perfect example of the common notions trying to justify themselves before man's reason--and utility!

[2] In 1739 in the original notes for his proposed "History of the Work of Redemption" he wrote of "Deism" as follows: "Indeed they own the being of God; but they deny that Christ was the Son of God, . . . and they deny the whole Scripture. They deny that any of it is the word of God. They deny any revealed religion, or any word of God

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at all; and say that God has given mankind no other light to walk by but their own reason. These sentiments and opinions our nation, which is the principal nation of the Reformation, is very much overrun with, and they prevail more and more." [Works (Worcester), I, 467].

[1] Morais, p. 8.

but an orthodox theologian. The lessons to be learned from the exceeding regularity of God's general providence--the natural order--in no way precluded the possibility or necessity of God's special or extraordinary providences. And granted his frame of reference, there is no inconsistency. Mystery and miracle were to him just as empiracal as gravity. Unless and until the deistic undercurrent became explicitly reductionistic, orthodoxy had no difficulty in absorbing it and using it. Calvinism was never in principle hostile to the rise of natural science.[1] In fact, its emphasis upon external relations gave empiricism a theological warrant and a practical urgency.

Arminianism

It was a different story with Arminianism. If the revisionist and/or reductionist potentialities of deism were not fully materialized in Edwards' time, the same cannot be said of Arminianism. Its dangers to orthodox Calvinism had been thoroughly underscored for a hundred years--ever since the Synod of Dort in 1618-19. In dealing systematically with Arminianism we are not confined to the explicit statements or beliefs of James Arminius nor to the Dutch Remonstrance of 1610. Rather we are interested in that complex of ideas and motivations to which that document gave initial public expression and of which that man's name has become symbolic.

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[1] Dowey, pp. 139-40.

Protest of moral reason

Arminianism designates the protest of moral reason within the ranks of Calvinism. The protest was intramural; and given the necessary but insupportable ontological assertions in the system of doctrine, it was bound to arise. Calvinism not only asserted the sole causality of God with respect to double predestination but also that, in ways not in the least analogous to the canons of our moral reason, God is also just and good. Further, it held that man is entirely morally responsible for his ruined estate but in no sense an agent in his salvation. In short, it boils down to a conception of God as possessing sole causal agency, but with only nominal (that is, "mysterious") moral accountability; and man with full moral responsibility, but with only a nominal (that is, pre-fallen) causal agency. Surely, the men of the Age of Reason can be sympathized with, if not pardoned, for finding this an intolerable state of affairs.

The solution: conditionalism

The force of the spirit of Arminianism was to go to work on both ends: to revise the doctrine of God so as to make him more understandably moral, and to revise the concept of man so as to allow him the power of some significant decision with regard to (but never, of course, with initiating) his salvation. This is conditionalism. God's agency is conditioned by the canons of moral reason and man's salvation is conditional upon some form, however limited, of human agency. It is understandable, then, that Arminianism stuck at the notion of "irresistibility."[1]

The issue at stake

Standing, as we all do, on this side of the final triumph of the humanitarian spirit, it is difficult for some of us to see what the fuss was all about. We wonder what kind of perverted and pedantic theological mind could oppose a movement no noble and so necessary as Arminianism. But doubtless if we were more sensitive of the Existentialist morass of our own century we would be less ready to celebrate as unambiguous progress the triumph of the humanitarian spirit in the eighteenth and nineteenth centuries. For with the triumph of moralism came the eclipse of piety. "When men refused to make God's will their own, when, on the contrary, they make their own ideals the standard of excellence, the idea of the sovereign God was doomed."[1] This is the terrible price modern man has paid for his more sanguine self-estimate and his more "moral" God. For, as we have stated earlier, the crucial issue at stake in the confession of sole divine causality is assurance. If our salvation depends solely upon God, then some, at least, can be saved. If it depends upon ourselves, then we are all hopelessly lost. If it depends partly upon God and partly upon man, working conjointly, then--well, a chain is no stronger than its weakest link. This the Dortian theologians saw with uncompromising clarity. And so did Edwards. If we should want a graphic illustration of the momentousness of the issues at stake in the Arminian controversy, we could do no better than contrast the triumphant ring of Paul's words in Romans 8:31, "If God is for us, who is against us?," with the brave but rather fond modern slogan, "man for himself."

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[1] Paul Ramsey states the core issue clearly and succinctly by saying, "As irrestibility was the distinguishing mark of Calvinism, so was conditionalism of Arminianism " (Introduction to Freedom of the Will, p. 3).

Implications of deism and Arminianism

Since both deism and Arminianism were liberalizing tendencies trying to soften the rigors of original sin and total depravity, thus raise man's self-estimate of his capacities, we may ask anew why the one movement was regarded as benign even in its more mature stages and the other stamped as malignant from its very inception. The answer lies in the fact that whereas deism revised and tamed the God of Calvinism it did not require an alteration of the basic scheme of God's transcendence and his sole causality. Arminianism challenged the scheme on both points. If God, no matter how greatly he is conceived, is brought within the framework of moral coherence and moral accountability alongside man, then he is reduced to the status of _a_ being alongside other beings. And if he is regarded as only one factor--even though the principal and initiating factor--in the agency of salvation, then there is no such thing left as "sole" causality. This, so Calvinistic piety sensed from the outset, was no way to conceive the relations between man and his Maker.

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[1] Haroutunian, p. 42. That the present writer is dependent upon and in substantial agreement with the thesis of Piety versus Moralism should be obvious to anyone who is familiar with Haroutunian's book, but a conscious public acknowledgment is in order.

There is another salient observation to be made at this juncture. Deism sought to soften the effects of original sin primarily with regard to man's intellect, Arminianism primarily with regard to man's will. Religiously speaking, the former is not nearly so serious as the latter. So long as a presupposition of Calvinism was the medieval psychology in which will and intellect were regarded as two discrete faculties whose interrelation is problematical, then modification of the effects of sin upon the intellect did not have immediate and inescapable implications for the will. To be sure, Calvin had a profound sense of the "total" effect of sin--total in the sense that all the faculties were distorted or depraved, not in the sense that any or all of them were completely effaced,--but since there was no psychology which held together the unity of the soul, it was difficult to keep the separable faculties from being treated separately. The new psychology of Locke, which ended the reign of the faculty psychology, was one of the most decisive features which required and enabled Edwards to deal with these problems in a way that had neither been tried nor was possible before. But this is to anticipate things.

The Covenant or Federal Theology

The Covenant or Federal Theology most likely developed independently of Calvinism, yet it is closely enough related to it that both are regarded as branches of the Reformed Tradition in Protestantism in contradistinction to the Lutheran Tradition. The kinship of all branches of the Reformed Tradition lies in the common assumption of the chaos/cosmos model of the God-world relation. This is clearly evidenced in the common allegiance to the non capax doctrine (the finite is incapable of bearing the infinite) in contradistinction to the Lutheran capax position. Thus the Covenant Theology which developed in the German-speaking Swiss cities and in the Rhineland[1] was heir to all the ontological problems incident to the chaos/cosmos themes that we outlined under "Calvinism."

The intrinsic pressures which in Calvinism aided the rise of deism and occasioned the Arminian controversy were equally present in all branches of the Reformed Tradition. But the Covenant Theology dealt with them in a different way. Part of its genius was its seizure upon the doctrine of accommodation. God in his freedom and unfathomable wisdom and mercy condescends to deal with his creatures on the level of their finitude and sin. He accommodates his wit and his will to our capacities and needs. This has the double virtue of not limiting or emptying the mystery of the divine being on the one hand, and on the other hand of providing areas where, because of the divine self-limitation, God acts in regular, calculable, and accountable ways. In history, or the sphere of moral reason, the divine condescension takes the form of the Covenant, or of the series of Covenants, hence the name for this theology.

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[1] See Leonard J. Trinterud, "The Origins of Puritanism," Church History, XX (March, 1951), 37-57. He maintains that the Covenant Theology has its roots prior to Calvin's time in the thought of such men as "Zwingli, Jud, Bullinger, Oecolampadius, Capito, Bucer, Martyr, and a host of other leaders in the Reformation movement in Zurich, Basil, Strassburg, and other Rhineland cities." (p. 37). However, it was not until about 1580, in the works of the two Heidelberg theologians, Zachary Ursinus and Caspar Olevianus, that we find "the final formulation of the covenant scheme." (p. 43).

In nature, or the sphere of theoretical reason, the condescension is in terms of the concept of "technologia." The former is the way in which the problems which Arminianism later posed were anticipated and dealt with; the latter, those of deism. There is, according to this school, a provisional rationality, both theoretical and moral, in God; but it is a rationality that is ascertainable only because God wills it, not because it is essential to his nature. And God wills it only "for us men and for our salvation," not because he has to.

Moral rationality: the conditional covenant

The system of covenants was subject to much elaboration, but basic to the whole scheme were the Covenants of Works and of Grace. In the former God elected to deal with Adam as the federal head or representative embodiment of the whole race. The terms of the Covenant of Works stipulated that man's (that is, Adam's) obedience was to be tested, and conditional upon successfully passing the test he was to be accorded the heritage of eternal life. But Adam failed, and "in Adam's fall we sinnéd all." This emphasis upon the federal solidarity of the race is crucial, hence the alternate name for this school of theology. In the Covenant of Grace God elects to deal with a chosen remnant of the fallen race. The historical inception of this covenant is usually traced back to Abraham, who is regarded as the federal head of the elect. This covenant presupposes the ruin of the Covenant of Works and stipulates that God will accept faith in the Christ (anticipated in the Old Testament times, acknowledged and received in the New Testament period and in the Church) in lieu of perfect obedience to the terms of the first covenant, thus re-opening the way to the heritage of immortality, which was the conditional promise of that first covenant.

Conditionalism is a prime feature of this theological strain from the outset. Trinterud sees it as the key distinction between it and Calvinism proper:

> For Calvin . . . the covenant of God is God's promise to man, which obligates God to fulfill. Moreover, in the incarnation, death and resurrection of Christ God did actually fulfill that promise to which his covenant bound him. . . . Therefore, covenant and testament are identical. In the covenant theory of the Rhineland and of the English reformers the covenant is a conditional promise on God's part, which has the effect of drawing out of man a responding promise of obedience, thus creating a mutual pact or treaty. The burden of fulfillment rests upon man, for he must first obey in order to bring God's reciprocal obligation into force.[1]

To the above quotation Trinterud immediately observes that "theologically, of course, the difference between these two views is of the greatest moment."[2] Even so strong a judgment borders on understatement. If the will to respond in obedience to the conditional promise *is not itself God-given*, or "gracious," then there would be little or no difference between this and medieval catholic piety.[1] No wonder, then, that "predestination" became such a burning issue in the English Reformation during the Elizabethan period.[2] The conditional covenant *coupled with a strong doctrine of predestination* could pass muster as a viable "non-Calvinistic" expression of the Reformed tradition. But conditionalism *without predestination* would be indistinguishable from what has come to be termed "Arminianism" in the Calvinistic fold.

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[1] Ibid., p. 45.

[2] Ibid.

It cannot escape notice that conditionalism (in whatever form) and predestination do not go well together--in fact, they tend to undercut each other. And it is not surprising that by Edwards' time conditionalism had so prevailed in the Covenant Theology that Puritanism had degenerated into a pretty crass moralism. Further, even though this conditionalism of Puritanism may and most likely did have a different origin from Arminianism proper, nevertheless in Edwards' parlance--and in that of his contemporaries--the issue of "conditionalism" versus "efficacious grace" was not improperly posed as that between "Arminianism" versus "Calvinism."[1]

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[1] Trinterud indicates as much in a footnote on his use of the loose term "Augustinian theology": "Man's outgoing love to God had its roots in man's nature (mysticism, reason, nature), but could reach its object only when God gave--*solely to those whom he had predestinated*--that supplementing, completing aid (revelation, grace) without which man's efforts truly to love God were always defeated by the flesh--i. e. lust, pride, etc. . . . Whereas in the Roman Church the adherents of this Augustinian tradition asserted that this supplementing aid, or grace, came through the sacramental-penitential means of grace, the Protestant adaptation of this Augustinianism asserted *that it was by an inward change, a conversion of the heart, that man was enabled to love God*." (p. 55, footnote No. 8. Italics mine.)

[2] Trinterud is right in asserting that a person did not have to be a "Calvinist" in order to have heard of or subscribe to the doctrine of predestination, yet he does somewhat begrudgingly admit that "in Elizabethan England Calvin was indeed frequently credited with, or damned for, giving classical form to this doctrine " (*Ibid*., p. 46).

Theoretical rationality: technologia

Whereas the system of covenants could handle the problem of the meaning of life in its historical dimension it was not adapted to account for the meaning of the existence of life in the first place. In terms of the distinction made in the first chapter,[1] it was devised to give a rationale for modality, entity presupposed. For God to accommodate his dealings to finite and sinful men presupposes that, at least in idea, there exists that "other" to which he will accommodate; and further, that the nature of that "other" dictates the means of the accommodation, if there is going to be any. Among the Federal theologians the Puritan, at least, had a recourse in this emergency. That was the doctrine of "technologia," to which we must now turn.

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[1] In the "Author's Preface" to Freedom of the Will Edwards, though stating his reservations about labels and disclaiming slavish dependence upon John Calvin--or *any* man--still accepts the terminology of "Arminianism" versus "Calvinism." And in his treatise on "Efficacious Grace" he makes it plain what he understands by the distinction: " . . . There are two things relating to this doctrine of efficacious grace, wherein lies the main difference between the Calvinists and Arminians as to this doctrine. *First*, That the grace of God is determining and decisive as to the conversion of the sinner, or a man's becoming a good man, and having those virtuous qualifications that entitle to an interest in Christ and his salvation. *Secondly*, That the power and grace and operation of the Holy Spirit, in or towards the conversion of a sinner, is immediate: that the operation goes so far, that a man has habitual holiness given him instantly, wholly by the operation of the Spirit of God, and not gradually, by assistance concurring with our endeavors, so as gradually to advance virtue into a prevailing habit" [Works (Worcester), II, 567]. This thoroughing rejection of conditionalism makes it proper to designate Edwards a "Calvinist"; and, if Trinterud is right about the non-Calvinistic origin and temper of Puritanism, it makes Edwards at this point at odds with his Puritan heritage in the Covenant Theology.

This doctrine is so complex in its refinements and so full of archaic technical terms (of which "technologia" is a prime example) that its full explication is the despair of any but the professional historian of sixteenth and seventeenth century intellectual currents. But fortunately for us its basic premises can be simply stated.[2] The idea of the world in all its contents, connections, and sequences, pre-existed in archetypal form in the mind of God. The work of God in creation and providence is the unfolding of this archetypal complex in its projection upon the coordinates of space and time. The archetype includes not only the plan of what is to be created--that is, the contents of the world and their interconnections--but also the logical sequences of the unrolling of these contents; hence it is a divine method and rule of thought and action as well as a blueprint.

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[1] Supra, pp. 38-40.

[2] See Perry Miller, The New England Mind: The Seventeenth Century (Boston: Beacon Press, 1961), pp. 161-80. This work is hereafter cited as New England Mind, I to distinguish it from his The New England Mind: From Colony to Province, which is volume II of the series.

The human mind, according to this view, is not furnished with any innate contents, nor is it capable of perceiving the archetypal plan in toto. But it is endowed with rationality, a capacity for logical thinking and progression. And if the mind is informed by and trained in the right method, it is capable of ascending "from singulars, by analysis,"[1] to a greater and greater comprehension of the archetypal plan. "By the necessities of our finite nature we must look upon objects first and from them extract the rules, but 'the thing indeed is made to the rule, and not the rule to the thing, though we first see the thing.'"[2]

The two Platonizing strains

If all this sounds like a rather heavy dose of

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[1] *Ibid*., p. 162. [2] *Ibid*., p. 166.

Platonism injected into the basic chaos/cosmos duality it is because that is just what it is. But this is to be distinguished from that concurrent seventeenth century English cultural movement known as "Cambridge Platonism," which evolved in basic hostility toward Puritanism. Puritan technologia got its Platonism from the sixteenth century revolt of Peter Ramus against the Aristotelian logic of medieval scholasticism. It emphasized the ethical and epistemological side of Platonism rather than the aesthetic and mystical, as in Cambridge Platonism. But we need to say a little more about each of these "Platonizing" strains separately before the force of the contrast can be felt.

Technologia: no break in the system of external relations.--Technologia provided a framework asserting the correspondence between man's reason and the rationality of objective reality, thus enabling man to think God's thoughts after him. But it was conceived as a correspondence which did not break the scheme of external relations. In the first place, though the archetype of the world preexists in the mind of God, it is not the mind of God. It represents only one set of possibilities out of an indeterminate number of such sets. Why God chose to give futurity to this pattern rather than another is inscrutable. But since he has, and since he does all things perfectly, man may discern in the accomplished fact the rule God employed in bringing the fact to pass. Were man to discover all that the "book of nature" is capable of teaching him, he would genuinely know a part of the divine wisdom, but only an infinitesimal part. In other words, he would know the "enacted will" but not the "secret will" of God. The similarity between this way of simultaneously preserving the divine mystery and still carving out an area of rationality in the divine mind and that same method in the Covenant scheme is apparent.

There is a second way of seeing that the scheme of technologia did not break the system of external relations. For all the capacity of man's reason to think God's thoughts after him, man's reason is not innately furnished with a method. He must discern the method in the facts of experience. In other words, technologia sends man to read the book of nature, not to look within himself, to find God.

So far, this infusion of Platonic realism did not radically alter the Calvinistic and Reformed scheme of the finite/infinite cleavage, though it did make explicit things that were not at all explicit in Calvinism. There was a difference in spirit, too. Technologia did not send man to read the book of nature simply to learn that God is its author and governor, or to promote worship and obedience. It bade man to discern the method and the intent of God in creation and providence in order that man might imitate and employ that method in the practical affairs of ethical living and subduing nature to his own uses. God did not create without a purpose, and man was not given the power of discerning the rule of God without the mandate to put it to good use. Theory and practice were inseparable to the Puritan mind, and theory was to be learned for the sake of good and effective practice.

Technologia: how it differed from Cambridge Platonism.--These same things cannot be said of the Cambridge Platonists. This movement was antithetical to the basic scheme both of Calvinism and Puritanism. In its basic dictum that reason is the candle of the Lord it sought to replace (or reject) the chaos/cosmos model with the macrocosm/microcosm one. Reason in man and in God is the same, or at least differing only in degree and extent. Man approaches God intuitively by going within himself. Man's reason is elevated to behold God contemplatively in the fullness of his beauty and perfection. The divine transforming light shines upon the world through the mind of man and is not refracted to the mind of man through external created objects as in technologia. This strain of Platonism owes perhaps more to Plotinus than to Plato, and it was a great influence on the thought world of Edwards, but enough has been said to show its contrast to the epistemological realism and practical urgency of that strain which was mediated to him through the Puritan concept of technologia.

Evaluation and prospect

Now, we must make some evaluation of the Covenant or Federal theology particularly in its New England expression to show in what sense it is valuable as a preparation for understanding Edwards. The first thing we must say about it is that it was a hybrid. It took its rationale for redemption from the biblical concept of the covenant. This was always its heaviest emphasis and its strongest point. But it also took its rationale for creation from a form of Platonic realism. Perry Miller has well documented the thesis that New England Puritanism owes as much to Peter Ramus as it owes to Augustine and Calvin.[1] Now, there is nothing wrong with hybrids except that in many cases they are sterile with respect to offspring. Such was the case with New England Puritanism. Once the ore from both mines had been extracted, as was done thoroughly in the seventeenth century, there was little else left to say; and the two had not been brought any nearer a theoretical synthesis. What had held them together was the strength and vitality of Puritan piety and the fact that they were contemporaneous viable cultural phenomena in the seventeenth century. Once the situation on both counts changed, as it had by Edwards' time, the marriage (if one may be allowed to change the metaphor again!) was really over, though few if any would admit to it. How to find a basis for a synthesis utilizing both the New Learning and the new, individualistic, emotion-laden piety of the Great Awakening was part of Edwards' task.

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[1] New England Mind, I, p. 116. The whole chapter on "The Instrument of Reason" is the documentation (pp. 111-153).

In the second place, whereas both covenant and technologia were tailored to fit the conception of God in the Reformed Tradition, that is, not theoretically to infringe upon the divine sovereigny and mystery, their introduction resulted in some significant innovation with respect to the doctrine of God. Heretofore the chaos/cosmos theme had been used to explicate the God/world relation; now it was transposed and used to explicate the doctrine of God. Cosmos, in terms of both theoretical and moral reason, now exists in God in eternal archetypal idea prior to, and presumably posterior to, the existence of the created world. God acts in creating and within the created order _according to counsel_. He looks to the archetype for his rule and guide in creating; he looks to the covenant for his rule and guide in redeeming. And though his choice of counsel is regarded as arbitrary, his action in nature and history is no longer conceived as capricious. Now, just what is the status of this counsel for the divine will? It is in God; it is of

God; but Puritanism felt it necessary to stop short of saying that it is constitutive of the divine being. It remained for Edwards to take the next step--the logical step--of identifying this counsel with the Logos, the Son, God's eternal idea of himself. This is, of course, to step into all the dangers and problems of pantheism. How he could do this and still be called a Calvinist and the greatest Puritan of them all is something we shall have to try to see.

There is a third observation which follows upon the second. Not only was the chaos/cosmos theme transposed into the doctrine of God, but also a limited form of the macrocosm/microcosm theme was introduced into the God/world relation. Heretofore Calvinism and Puritanism had allowed the use of the macrocosm/microcosm theme with respect to the relation between man and the world, that is, as an intra-cosmic affair. But now, with the archetype of cosmos projected as something stable within the mind of God, there is a basis for a limited participation by man in the divine life, even if it is just thinking God's thoughts after him. Moreover, man's well-being, his eupraxia ("good conduct"), is identified with discerning and imitating the divine method. This is an addition to and a modification of the Calvinistic requirements of worship and obedience. This was a step toward furnishing an ontological foundation for man's well-being, a way of legitimizing the demand for man's submission to the divine. It remained for Edwards to add that the foundation of virtue or eupraxia in the divine as well as in human life lay in "consent to being-in-general."

Newton, Locke, and Idealism

Prefatory Remarks

Thus far we have made many references to Sir Issac Newton and John Locke and the "New Learning" of which the ideas of these two men were constitutive. We have alleged the decisive influence of their ideas in determining the mind of Jonathan Edwards. Further, we have raised some tantalizing questions as to how Edwards was able to digest them while consciously remaining a Calvinist of the orthodox Dortian stripe. Attention to these matters can no longer be postponed.

Methodological restriction

Here, as in the case of the major theological alternatives open to Edwards, a self-evidently necessary restriction must be allowed. A systematic exposition of either Newton or Locke, or both, is out of the question within the confines of this study; and were it possible, it would only lead us afield. We are concerned with the ideas of these two great makers of the modern mind only insofar as they were grist for the mill of Edwards' fertile mind. For this purpose two essays will suffice. One is to show what leading motifs of Edwards' philosophical theology he owes to each of these two men. The other is to specify how he modified their ideas in his reception of them.

Edwards' use of sources: synthesizing transformation

Like every great creative mind, Edwards was neither slave nor parrot of his sources. His reception of them was simultaneously a transformation of them. This applies equally to his theological heritage as well as to his contemporary cultural situation, which means the New Learning. And what makes him such an exciting study is that his was a synthesizing transformation. He was, as is hoped will be apparent when we are done, a "theologian of culture" of classic proportions, bringing into snythesis received elements, both old and new, which most thinking men of his age regarded as hopelessly incompatible. Herbert Schneider states in the form of a studied conclusion what Edwards must have regarded as a task and a method:

> In addition to his belief in Biblical authority and theological tradition, Edwards employed rational inquiry thoroughly and fearlessly. He succeeded in reinforcing his faith, not by clinging to an antiquated science, nor by protesting against the growth of science, but by pushing to its logical conclusions the best science of his day.[1]

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[1] The Puritan Mind, p. 142.

Guidelines: distinction between the inner and the outer

There are some broad guidelines which, if stated in advance, can help us thread our way through what is here important in Newton and Locke. Stated as simply as possible, the first and basic guideline is the contrast between the "outer" and the "inner." By "outer" is meant being--including man, the world, and God--as externally constituded and related, as viewed from the outside looking in or on. By "inner" is meant these same phenomena as internally related or constituted, as viewed from the inside looking out. How Edwards conceived the outer he owes to Newton; how he conceived the inner he owes to Locke. This is not to say that there were not other cultural movements in the air which Edwards breathed which also wrestled with these themes. There were; some of them have already been pointed out; some have not. On the side of external relations there were Calvinism, deism, Puritan technologia, and the whole thrust and spirit of modern natural science. On the side of internal relations there were the "experimental" piety of the Great Awakening; Cambridge Platonism; Puritan mysticism; the "Moral Sense School" of Shaftesbury, Hutcheson, and Butler; Quaker "enthusiasm"; and last but not least, Arminianism. The point is that if we grasp the basic framework or mind-set that Edwards consciously acknowledged as having received from Newton and Locke, we can then see, if we should wish to pursue it farther, how and to what extent he received these other influences. Further, as a second guideline, if we note how Edwards transformed what he received from Newton and Locke, we can see how in hiw own Idealism he was able to synthesize the outer and the inner, regarding them as co-extensive, but subordinating the outer to the inner.[1]

What Edwards Received from Newton

Mechanism

Sir Issac Newton's chief claim to fame lies in bringing to consummation the mathematical interpretation of nature. Thenceforth the physico-mathematical method had universal application. The far-reaching importance of this can hardly be overestimated. As John Herman Randall puts it:

> The significance of this lay in the proof that the physical laws which hold good on the surface of the earth are valid throughout the solar system. What Galileo divined, what Descartes believed but could not

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[1] That these guidelines are Edwards' own is evidenced by a sketch, found in his private notes, of a proposed treatise entitled, "The Natural History of the Mental World, or of the Internal World. . . ." The very first notes are as follows: "Introduction. Concerning the two worlds--the external and the internal: the external, the subject of natural philosophy; the internal, our own minds; how the knowledge of the latter is in many respects the most important; of what great use the true knowledge of this is, and of what dangerous consequence errors here are, more than in the other." (Townsend, p. 69).

> prove, was both confirmed and made more comprehensive. This meant, on the one hand, that the secrets of the whole world could be investigated by man's experiments on this planet; and on the other, that the world was one huge, related, and uniform machine, the fundamental principles of whose action were known. One law could describe the whirling planet and the falling grass blade; one law could explain the action of every body in the universe.[1]

That Edwards felt the full force of this and accepted its implications, there is ample evidence. For example, one of the topics on which he proposed to write reads as follows:

> To show how the motion, rest, and direction of the least atom has an influence on the motion, rest, and direction of every body in the universe. And to show how, by that means, how that everything that happens with respect to motes and straw, and such little things, may be for some great uses in the whole course of things through eternity. And to show how the least wrong step in a mote may in eternity subvert the order of the universe.[2]

Obsolescence of the chaos/cosmos theme

This means, in the terms that we have been using heretofore, that chaos is in principle effectively and irrevocably banished from the creation--nay, from being itself. The chaos/cosmos theme, either in its classic Calvinistic version or in its Puritan modification, was no longer a live option for Edwards in conceiving the God/world relation or even of the nature of the divine being. Now it is all cosmos. Cosmos--order--is the very structure of reality. Mystery can no longer be defined as what is "left over" after cosmos has reached its limit or come to the end of its tether. And miracle can no longer be understood as an irruption in the natural order. Edwards understood and accepted this, too. Continuing immediately where we left off in the above citation we find:

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[1] John Herman Randall, Jr., *The Making of the Modern Mind* (Rev. ed.; Boston: Houghton Mifflin Co., 1940), p. 259.

[2] *Townsend*, p. 18, footnote 23.

> And to take notice of the great wisdom that is necessary in order thus to dispose every atom at first that they should go for the best throughout all eternity, and in the adjusting, by an exact computation and a nice allowance, to be made for the miracles which should be needful. . . . And to show how God who does this must necessarily be omniscient and know every last thing that must happen through eternity.[1]

Newton may have allowed the divine Mechanic to tinker with and adjust the world-machine once it was in process, but Edwards did not. In a more modern idiom we would say that if "miracles" at any point along the trajectory were deemed necessary, then they would have to be programmed and fed into the guidance system before the launch button was pushed. Thus did Edwards, if we hearken back to the judgment of Herbert Schneider, not only not resist this aspect of the best science of his day, he pushed the Newtonian mechanism to its logical conclusion. We may also ask, since this is part of the aforesaid Schneider thesis, how did he use this to reinforce his faith? The answer lies in the fact that this is one of the ways in which Edwards affirmed the sole divine causality. This is essential Calvinism, but it is here affirmed on a totally different cosmological basis from that of John Calvin.

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[1] Ibid.

Reaffirmation of sole divine causality

In affirming--really, re-affirming--sole divine causality Edwards had to go against the stream of all the various theological currents of his day. Everywhere the burgeoning humanitarianism of the age was pressing for qualification of divine causality in favor of some human initiative. So, in this connection it is pertinent for us here to lay to rest one unfortunate and incorrect judgment that appears frequently in Edwardean scholarship. That is, that Edwards was regretably "shackled" by the outworn idiom of Calvinistic theology.[1] Edwards never found basic

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[1] An excellent expression of this judgment is to be found in Raymon Clinton Miller's unpublished doctoral dissertation (Temple University, 1945) entitled, "Jonathan Edwards and His Influence upon Some of the New England Theologians." Miller states, "In using metaphysics, Edwards was a pioneer on a new track, and had he only launched out into pure philosophy, he might have freed himself from the shackles of the traditional Calvinistic theology." (p. 191). And again, "He lacked the imagination and the flexibility to get outside the Calvinistic system and view it from enough detachment to judge it. More than most men he was a prisoner of his own ideas. His bondage is a tragic pity." (pp. 194-95). F. I. Carpenter in his article, "The Radicalism of Jonathan Edwards," New England Quarterly, IV (October, 1931), 631, refers to Edwards' Calvinism as "an inherited cloak for his thinking, and often an ill-fitting one at that." Ola E. Winslow, in her otherwise excellent biography, Jonathan Edwards, pp. 78-79, repeats the "shackle" theme.

Calvinism a "shackle." In fact, he had to resurrect it because there were no terms currently in use which were adequate to the depth of his piety. Had Edwards been shackled to any contemporaneous popular theological idiom he could have been neither a true Newtonian nor a true Calvinist.

Naturalism

In addition to the banishment, in principle, of chaos there is a second observation to be made about Edwards' acceptance of the Newtonian world-view. In the discussion of deism we raised the question of whether Edwards was aware of the reductionistic potentialities of Newton's philosophy of nature. We know from events subsequent to Edwards' death that deism in Revolutionary and post-Revolutionary America became militantly reductionistic--that is, naturalistic and atheistic. The "Occam's razor" with which they cut the string to the balloon of supernaturalism was Newton's self-contained and self-explanatory world. Man, they felt, no longer needed a supernatural world for explanatory purposes. Efficient causation was enough. Nor did he need it as a carrot-and-stick incentive for virtuous living. Prudence, enlightened self-interest, was a sufficient rationale for morality. Was Edwards, in the first half of the eighteenth century, sensitive of these implications, which became explicit in the last half of that century? And if so, how did he react to them?

Obsolescence of literalistic supernaturalism

The answer to the first question is: He was. When space and time are accepted as absolute, as was one of the cardinal principles of the Newtonian system, then to push God to the "edge" of ordered space is to locate him nowhere; and to push him back in the causal sequence to some primeval "beginning" is to find him in no time. Newton, and the moderate deists as well, still spoke of God (Supreme Being, First Cause) as though the language had some legitimate supernatural reference. And there is no reason to impute insincerity to them. Edwards, too, continued to speak, preach, and write "in the old way," but we know from his private notebooks he no longer considered this a viable literal representation of things. Since he kept this a life-long secret there may very well be grounds for charging him with insincerity or, at least, with deception. But this is a question which we must hold in abeyance until after we finish discussing Locke as well as Newton. Then, when we have seen the total picture of his Idealism, we will be better equipped to make a judgment.

Non-reductionistic naturalism

The point is that Edwards here again pushed Newton's science to its logical conclusion and drew the correct theological implications from it. Supernaturalism, in the sense of a literal world above or behind the world, was no longer a live option. The distinction between nature and supernature as discrete "places" external to each other had to give way to some form of naturalism. But Edwards, in contrast to the later militant deists, was not a *reductionistic* naturalist. The system of nature embraces all that exists; and God is co-inherent and co-extensive with all that is. The distinction between "nature" and "supernature" must now be thought out on the lines of the distinction between the outer and the inner. This distinction is more closely akin to that of two perspectives of being rather than of two beings. Admittedly this skirts within a hair's breadth of pantheism, but let the reader not be precipitate in branding Edwards as such. He at least deserves his day in court before sentence is passed. He was not naive; he knew the philosophy of Spinoza and did not consider himself aligned with him.

The best way to document the assertion that he was aware of the naturalistic implications of Newtonianism, and also answer the question of how he reacted to them, is to see how Edwards dealt with the concepts of space and time. These two perennially crucial philosophical categories hold keys to what we have been talking about in this second observation.

The category of space

Edwards accepted the notion of absolute space without modification. In a context where he was discussing the necessity of the concept of being--that being is the presupposition of the question of being and nothing--we find the following interesting and highly significant passage:

> This infinite and omnipresent being cannot be solid. Let us see how contradictory it is to say that infinite being is solid. For solidity is surely nothing but resistance to other solidities. Space is this necessary, eternal, infinite, and omnipresent being. We find that we can with ease conceive how all other beings should not be. We can remove them out of our minds and place some other in the room of them, but space is the very thing that we can never remove and conceive of its not being. . . . . And it is self-evident, I believe, to every man that space is necessary, eternal, infinite, and omnipresent. But I had as good speak plain. I have already said as much as that space is God. And it is indeed clear to me that all the space there is, not proper to body, all the space there is without the bounds of creation, all the space there was before the creation, is God Himself. And nobody would in the least stick at it if it were not because of the gross conceptions we have of space.[1]

This crucial passage, to which we will have occasion to refer again in other contexts, is sufficient to show that Edwards was cognizant of the implications of Newtonian naturalism pushed to its logical conclusion. God is not "outside" or "alongside" space, for that would be to banish him to nowhere.

But it is equally important to see that Edwards did not conceive God as "in" space, for that would reduce God to the status of _a_ being alongside other occupants of space.

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[1] "Of Being," _Townsend_, pp. 1-2. See also "The Mind," No. 9, pp. 29-3) for a re-iteration of this.

In one of the "Miscellanies" under the caption of "God's Nature" he makes it clear that he rejected this.

> That is a gross and an unprofitable idea we have of God, as being something large and great as bodies are, and infinitely extended throughout the immense space. For God is neither little nor great with that sort of greatness, even as the soul of man--it is not at all extended, no more than an idea, and is not present anywhere as bodies are present. . . . So 'tis with respect to the uncreated spirit. The greatness of a soul consists not in any extension, but its comprehensiveness of idea and extendedness of operation. So the infiniteness of God consists in His perfect comprehension of all things and the extendedness of His operation equally to all places. God is present nowhere any otherwise than the soul is in the body or brain; and He is present everywhere, as the soul is in the body. We ought to conceive of God as being omnipotence, perfect knowledge, and perfect love, and not extended any otherwise than as power, knowledge, and love are extended, and not as if it were a sort of unknown thing that we call substance, that is extended.[1]

This second passage is an essential complement to the first, else the statement that "space is God" might be misconstrued as a simple equation. Space and God are co-extensive (Tyranny of words! Spatial analogies cannot be avoided) and co-inherent. By this analogy of the soul and body or brain Edwards shows that he means, in the words of Thomas A. Schafer, that space is "the divine sensorium."[2]

The category of time

Edwards accepted absolute time; but the way he transformed it was, on the surface, so radical that Newton himself probably would not have recognized it as continuous with his own conception. Now, in saying this we have set ourselves a double task. First, we must specify the exact nature of Edwards' transformation; and second, we must show how, beneath the surface, it is not only continuous with Newton's conception but is that conception carried to its logical conclusion.

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[1] No. 194, Townsend, pp. 183-84.

[2] Schafer, p. 187.

Continuous creation.--The answer to the first task can be stated very simply: Edwards affirmed the doctrine of continuous creation. Every moment the world in toto is created--or re-created--anew out of nothing. This is one doctrine that he affirms so consistently and so constantly, in both his private notes and in his published works, early as well as late, that it would be as tedious as it is unnecessary to collect all the references.[1]

On the surface the dissimilarity between this conception and that of Newton is shocking. Absolute time in the Newtonian view is that of a natural chronological continuum that persists or projects as indefinitely into the future as it does in the past. Eternity is everlastingness. Immutability--whether it be of atoms or of mathematically expressed natural laws or of God--is persistence through the temporal continuum without in the least being affected by it. And now Edwards comes along and denies that there is any natural continuum at all. Time is chopped up into discrete instants which have no natural connection with each other. Eternity is that which is both latent and patent in every present moment. Immutability is the fixed rule of succession (logical, not chronological) of ideas in the divine mind as God instantly or simultaneously conceives the total creation "from beginning to end."

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[1] For example, "It's most agreeable to the Scripture to suppose creation to be performed every moment." ("Misc., No. 346," Townsend, p. 130.).

The analogy of cinematography.--A useful analogy--and one that would have delighted Edwards--is to be found in twentieth century cinematography. The viewer experiences the projection of a motion picture film as a continuum, but actually the film is made up of discrete frames and scenes that are juxtaposed to one another and projected in rapid succession. The real continuity lies in the script which the director (here we would say, the author-director) had before him in "shooting" the scenes. And the communication of the composite idea--the total impact--of the author to the viewer is what this indirect means is all about; that is its purpose or reason for being. At some point in the sequence there is the "moment of truth," the right moment, when the latent composite idea becomes manifest to the responsive viewer. To the good director, the true artist, the composite idea is latent in every scene, else when they are spliced together there neither would nor could be a "total" impact.

Mystical-aesthetic versus ethical-activistic stances.--The analogy is a suggestive one, and on the whole it is faithful to Edwards' conception. But like all analogies, once its "total impact" has been registered it is better not to press it any farther. It is no accident, however, that an aesthetic analogy should suggest itself and be supremely useful, for this conception of time requires giving the paramount place to aesthetic intuition as over against, say, ethical action. Ethical action--and hence, ethical analogies--would presuppose the ability of the agent to freely bind contiguous moments of time together into some sort of purposeful project. This real, significant, free time-binding ability of the moral agent is all-important from the ethical-activistic starting point. But Edwards came down on the mystical-aesthetic side.[1] This is not to say that he was unaware or unappreciative of the inexorable demands of the ethical-activistic élan or spirit. To do it justice--no more, and no less--was the struggle of his life. This is what the Arminian controversy was all about, and he gave it the best of his considerable ability for the best part of a lifetime. And if we may anticipate a judgment which we will later have to explicate, he "out-Arminianized" even the fondest Arminian. The point here is, however, that given his conception of time, then he had no live option but the mystical-aesthetic starting point he took. Every moment must hold all the contents and all the meaning of eternity. It does so actually for God; it does so potentially to created spirits--that is, to those to whom God communicates the immediate (that is what is meant by "mystical") vision (that is what is meant by "aesthetic") of his fullness.

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[1] This is the thesis and, from his point of view, the major defect or criticism of Edwards by Donald Hosea Rhodes in his excellent and judicious work, "Jonathan Edwards: Experimental Theologian," (unpublished Ph. D. dissertation: Yale University, 1945). See pp. 220-26, "Characterization and Comment," first section.

Coincidence of continuous creation and absolute time.--Now, to the allegation that with respect to time, as was the case with space, Edwards pushed Newtonian science to its logical conclusion. Once the initial shock of the surface dissimilarities has been withstood, the deeper similarity--nay, co-incidence--of their conceptions becomes apparent. In the Newtonian conception of absolute time, basic reality--say, the law of gravity, for example--is true and holds just the same at four o'clock as it did at two, just the same in June as in January, and just the same in 1721 A.D. as in 4004 B.C. The chronological continuum can and does neither add nor take away anything with respect to fundamental reality. But what is this but to say that in every present moment the whole of fundamental reality is present, partly patent, partly (or mostly) latent? If the temporal continuum itself is neither productive nor destructive, then wherein does "everlastingness" differ from the eternal "now"? There is no fundamental difference except that Edwards' conception had a nicer economy of conceptual effort, and this is just what the Newtonian spirit professed to love. The Enlightenment has become notorious, as students of the history of ideas have lamented since the dawn of the Romantic era, for its aestheticism and for its a-historicity. That Edwards is "accused" of this is confirmatory of how acutely he read the temper of his times. He not only read more acutely than most of his contemporaries, he also pushed the insights of science to their logical conclusion and raised the question of their ontological foundation.

Problematic implications.--This is not the last word on Edwards and time, but it is the first and all-important word. Continuous creation!--how disarmingly simple it sounds. And Edwards tossed it off as a kind of an aside, as something self-evidently true. In discussing the existence of God, he says, "Indeed, we every moment see the same proof of a God as we should have seen if we had seen Him create the world at first."[1] And again, when discussing the existence of the world and its laws, he says, "So, were our thoughts comprehensive and perfect enough, our view of the present state of the world would excite in us a perfect idea of all past changes."[1] To which could be added, and all future destiny. How disarmingly simple it sounds, but how fraught with far-reaching implications! Does this not wreak havoc with Newton's mechanism and its basis, efficient causality? And since in the first observation so much was made of Edwards' reliance upon Newton's having banished chaos for his (Edwards') reaffirmation of sole divine causality, does this not plunge Edwards into a hopeless tangle of self-contradiction? It is well to raise these questions and hold them in mind, though we must postpone the answer until we can deal fully with the categories of substance and causality, which means the way Edwards received and transformed the ideas of John Locke.

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[1] "Misc., No. 125," Townsend, p. 76.

The movement toward Idealism.--It is well to raise these questions here, however, because therein we can see the necessity from the Newtonian side for Edwards to move toward Idealism. If there are internal difficulties in the Newtonian system (and there are), then Edwards cannot be blamed for "creating" them. He may just very well deserve the credit for being the first to discover them by pushing the component conceptions to their logical conclusions. To be more specific about the actual internal difficulties of the Newtonian system, gravity is a cardinal case in point. The mathematical formulation of the universal law of gravity is the keystone in the Newtonian arch of the universal applicability of the physico-mathematical method. It is also the greatest "scandal" in the system that supposes efficient causality to be adequate for every explanatory purpose, for how can efficient causality admit of action at a distance? If Edwards' analysis of time has laid bare the inadequacy of natural efficient causation it is because it was latent there all along.

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[1] "The Mind, No. 34," Townsend, p. 40.

Summary

In summary, then, "mechanism" and "naturalism" are the two decisive influences on Edwards' mind-set that he owes to Newton. But he transformed both. He could not accept a materialistic mechanism, not because he was a theologian, but because of its internal contradictions. He could not accept a reductionistic naturalism, again not because he was a theologian, but because it was not adequate to life as it es experienced. Experience!--when we talk about that we are ready to turn to John Locke.

What Edwards Received from Locke

Background

Emphasis upon experience is the natural transition from the outer to the inner. That Edwards should be preoccupied with it from his earliest years in something he came by honestly, for it lay close to the heart of his Puritan heritage, even in its decadent form. "Head religion" was nothing without "heart religion." Only those who felt the things of religion deeply and could give a convincing public account of the experienced workings of grace upon their hearts and lives were candidates for "owning the covenant" and thus for being gathered into the Church. Every concession to dissipate the protective standards of the pure-church idea (really, ideal!)--such as the Half-way Covenant, which had to do with church membership; and Stoddardeanism, which had to do with admission to the Lord's Supper--had been hard fought and slow in being accepted. It is safe to say that even those who decorated these concessions with theological and biblical warrant knew that they were bowing to practical necessity more than they were striking a blow for the kingdom of God.

The experimental piety of Puritanism: objectivity

There is one important characteristic of classic Puritan experimental piety which needs to be specified, for it is different from the experimentalism that arose with and is associated with the Great Awakening. Puritan piety always had a strong objective cast. It was a community affair. This was not just sociological; it was theological. God had dealt with the elect as a federal unit in the Covenant of Grace. Men entered the Covenant one-by-one--that is, they were touched and called severally--, but always it was understood that their status before God and their assurance of being heirs of the promises lay in their being incorporated into the visible union of the elect. Their experimentalism was strictly correlated with the objective, historical, social reality of the Covenant, a reality which preceded them and which, through the preaching of the Word and the inscrutable workings of the Holy Spirit, begot them anew. Not only was this experimentalism-with-means characteristic of the process of Christian initiation, it was also the dominant feature of the extraordinary and occasional seasons of rapture which the saint might hope and pray for during the course of his earthly exile. To some, mystical raptures were given. Puritanism, and Calvinism in general, did have a place for mysticism. It had a theological warrant in the doctrine of the internal witness of the Holy Spirit. But it was accorded as genuine piety only insofar as it was strictly a mysticism-with-means--that is, it was strictly correlated with the Word, sacraments, and church order. One has to add "church order" even though a Puritan's Puritan would have regarded it as a redundancy, for church polity, so it was believed, was nothing but scriptural! We need only recall that the furor raised during the Anne Hutchinson affair was not only because her piety tended toward antinomianism and the claim of new revelations, but that she held conventicles in her home. For this, she and her followers were derisively dubbed "Familists." Such a practice was proof positive that her experience was not authentic because thus to circumvent church order was not theologically or scripturally decent and in order.[1]

The experimental piety of the Great Awakening: individualism

For whatever reasons (which only the social scientist would be fully competent to specify), the experimental piety of the Great Awakening did not manifest this same objective cast, either in fact or in aspiration. Setting aside all the excesses and abuses such as emotionalism, perfectionism, spiritual pride, individual claims to "new revelations," private "leadings" of the Spirit, etc.---all of which might well be adduced as corroborative detail, but the use of which might lay us open to the charge of judging the movement on its accidents rather than its essence--, we can fairly say that the emphasis on experience in the Great Awakening was consciously and unapologetically individualistic. The "New Birth," on which so great an emphasis was laid, was conceived not as an entrance, singly, into a new state of things, a new divine-historical "constitution" or "body," but rather as an atomistic transaction between God and each individual soul. It was not at all generally agreed that one individual, be he layman or cleric, had the right to question the authenticity of another's deeply felt and professed experience. True religion was considered (to use a repulsive phrase that is still current coin and which shows how deeply and extensively the Great Awakening has influenced the American ethos) a private affair between the individual and "his God." But even deeper and more basic than the question of "right" was the fact that there was no consensus as to criteria for such judgment, either to their existence or to their possibility. To be sure, everyone acknowledged allegiance to "the Bible" and to "Christ," but without a commonly acknowledged exegetical tradition and a uniformly accepted creed these "objectivities" tended to become--at least in selectivity for emphasis--what each individual or special group wanted to make of them. Personal experience became more and more the touchstone of scriptural interpretation. Even such verities as the older Puritans believed self-evident and nothing but scriptural--for example, the stricture against untrained lay preachers--were rejected and trampled under foot in the name of experience, or of the instant qualifications which the New Birth supplies. Predestination, which in both the Lutheran and Reformed traditions had been regarded as a prime scriptural doctrine, was in some quarters either denied or more often consigned to limbo. And with respect to the Person and Work of Christ, "to feel the blood applied" became subconsciously, if not consciously, all the Christology one needed. If it is too much to say that the Great Awakening was anti-creedal (it was too full of new vitality to have to depend upon negativities), it is fair to say that it sat loose toward all creedal confines. Even where creeds were retained for old times' sake there was little doubt among the regenerate that they had the authority to change them, and few qualms about actually revising them.[1]

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[1] See Schneider, pp. 60-65 for a brief but good account of the Hutchinson episode.

The alternatives

This may sound like the Awakening was chaos. Actually that was not the case, especially not at first. There was enough residual form in the churches to give it substantial initial direction. But the new movement's checks were not internal and inherent, and apprehensions grew as excesses emerged and became more and more common. There were several reactions one could make toward the impending chaos. One could wallow in it, as did James Davenport, a popular evangelist who was himself mentally unbalanced. One could reject the movement out of hand, as did the "Old Lights," championed by Boston's influential Charles Chauncy. Or one could refurbish some older ecclesiastical tradition and use it as a dike to try to hold the torrent within bounds, as was the method of most all of the responsible leaders who were themselves involved in the revival, the "New Lights," as they were called. The three options seemed to be radical endorsement, conservative rejection, or some form(s) of compromise.

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[1] This was the same era in which the Methodists excised "he descended into hell" from the Aposltes' Creed. The omission itself may not be of any great consequence, but the fact that it could be done so unobtrusively, with no great hue and cry from within or without, is indicative of the temper of the times.

Edwards' position and task

Edwards could not find himself in any of these stances. Although he was definitely on the side of the New Lights, "compromise" just was not the way his mind worked. Besides, any kind of refurbished tradition would be imposing external restraints rather than searching for intrinsic criteria. He did not believe that this new wine could be put into old wineskins. Further, to make matters more complicated and his task more difficult, he went all the way with the individualistic character of the new piety, along with the most radical; and at the same time he went all the way with the insistence upon objective criteria, along with the most conservative.

It is certainly an anomaly, and more than a little ironical, that after accepting Newton's mechanism which banished chaos from the outer universe Edwards should find incipient chaos on the doorstep of the inner life. His was the task of finding objective criteria for subjective personal experience. One thing we can say for this man is that he never tackled small problems. Herbert Schneider maintains that Edwards' achievement lay in resurrecting the defunct grand design of the New England theocracy by internalizing it and individualizing it.[1] This was certainly true, especially insofar as the theocratic ideal was all-embracing. But to the extent that the theocratic ideal was still a New England experiment, one suspects that Edwards required an even broader canvas. He needed a critique not just of religious experience, or even of New England religio-political experience, but of all experience.

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[1] "The gospel of the divine sovereignty, of election, of predestination, and of the Covenant of Grace, which New England Puritans had constructed into a social and political philosophy, was now transferred to the inner life of the soul." (The Puritan Mind, p. 106).

The role Locke played in Edwards' development

Now, if this rather long background has served its intended purpose, we are ready to see just how crucial was the role Locke played in Edwards' life and thought. Locke was important not because he introduced the philosophy of experience to Edwards, for to the latter experimentalism was a cultural *fait accompli*, historically (the Puritan heritage), personally (his own mysticism), and later professionally (the Great Awakening). Edwards was in the morass of experimentalism all his life! No, Locke was no introducer of new problematic conceptions to Edwards, rather he was the bringer of light and order to the dark and troubled waters in which Edwards had to swim. Locke's *Essay Concerning Human Understanding* was a project with a two-fold purpose: "to inquire into the original, certainty, and extent of human knowledge, together with the grounds and degrees of belief, opinion, and assent."[1] In our own terms this means, on the one hand, asserting or acknowledging that *all* the contents of the self are derived from experience; and, on the other, that whatever grounds we have for making valid discriminations (for example, truth and falsity, fact and fantasy, degrees of certainty, etc.) must be inherent in the nature of experience itself. Its comprehensiveness of scope and its critical method--these two aspects of the form of the Lockean philosophy made an indelible stamp upon Edwards, and he never forsook them even when he differed with and modified the content.

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[1] John Locke, *An Essay Concerning Human Understanding*, ed. A. C. Fraser (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1894), Vol. I, pp. 14, 26; as cited in Radoslav A. Tsanoff, *The Great Philosophers* (New York: Harper & Bros., 1953), p. 345.

Experience as the source of all ideas

First, let us consider the comprehensiveness of experience. Locke talked about "the mind" and its "ideas," but we had better use the terms "the self" and its "contents," for Locke's terminology has a thinness of ring to the contemporary ear that does not do him justice. A human being is born with the operational capacity for experience of both the inner and the outer, but until he has actually had experience he can in no sense be called "a self." This is the famous *tabula rasa* doctrine which rejects all inborn contents or "innate ideas," including self-awareness. The basic units of experience are of two kinds: outer encounter and inner intuition. The former is "sensation," some kind of encounter that involves one or more of the five senses. The latter is "reflection," or self-awareness; we are immediately aware of ourselves as reacting toward (that is, perceiving, thinking, willing, feeling) the contents which sensation provides.

The certainty of the simple ideas

An important point of Locke's analysis is that the self is passive in the reception of these basic units of experience ("simple ideas"). One simply has sense data, the kind appropriate to the context in which he is at the moment. In having impressions of color, texture, temperature, taste, weight, size, etc., the self is not active, but the passive recipient of whatever inner impressions or registrations the outer has the power to produce or induce upon encounter. And likewise with inner intuition, one is passive with respect to self-awareness. Once he has sense data, the self cannot help but be aware of himself as having it. The self is active in perceiving, thinking, willing, emoting, etc., with respect to his sense data, but he is passive with regard to the immediate awareness that these synthesizing and reacting operations are going on within himself. Thus in terms of both the outer encounter and the inner intuition which follows upon it and is really coterminous with it, experience is built up out of basic units or building blocks that are passively--that is, irresistibly and certainly--received.

Where Edwards differed from Locke

Of course, Locke went on to make distinctions within sensation between "primary," "secondary," and "tertiary" qualities of bodies, but this part of Locke was no more convincing to Edwards, as a teen-age college student, than it was to Bishop Berkeley or many another since. The cardinal point here in our understanding of Edwards is to see where he acquired the firm and fixed conviction that experience was all-embracing of the contents of the self and hence of one's conception of the world; and that at the root of all experience, no matter how complex and composite, there lay an "objectivity" (the irresistibility and certainty of the basic units, which were passively received, even though this in itself did not specify what the nature or source of that "objectivity" was) which validated and mandated a critique of all experience. To this extent, and in this respect, Edwards was a Lockean. This he received; practically everything else he transformed.

The key role of sensation

In considering the comprehensiveness of experience we could not help but refer to the implicit criteria for a critique of experience, but since this was so decisive for Edwards it deserves to be underscored. Sensation--the "simple ideas of sense"--is the bed-rock of whatever we can mean by "certainty." To be sure, inner intuition or self-awareness--the "simple ideas of reflection"--is no less certain, but insofar as it is conditional upon there being sensation, we must say that sensation has the prior status. The farther we remove from sensation, unless the logical connections or inferences are air-tight, the farther we remove from the maximum degree of certainty, and hence, the greater the likelihood of error and self-deception. And further, we must remember that sensation, for both Locke and Edwards, has a public reference. It is physical and, hence, presumably available to anyone who encounters it. Dreams, visions, hallucinations, and the like are sensible, but they are private and ephemeral and have no status as certainty at all. Such phenomena may accompany experimental certainty, as Edwards was to argue in the *Religious Affections*, but in themselves they have no evidential value whatsoever.[1]

A criterion for distinguishing true and false piety.--In light of this emphasis upon sensation, one wonders, at first, how Edwards used this aspect of the best science of his day to strengthen his faith. The answer is two-fold, negative and positive. First, negatively, he used it in his pitiless criticism of the emotional excesses of the revival. This does not mean that he was anti-emotional. The opposite was the case. But he excoriated any attempt, suggestion, or even implication that "raised affections" were in a class by themselves and thus exempt from the same type of criteria that should be applied to any other claim to knowledge.[1] Of course, there are differences between grace and gravity. The one is Spiritual, the other natural. The one is an experience vouchsafed only to the elect, the other an experience common to all. But there is one thing they share in common: insofar as either has any ground of certainty it must trace its genealogy back to sensation. This is what he means in Religious Affections by calling grace "a new simple idea."[2] And that there be no equivocation as to whether he means a simple idea of sense, he says in his treatise "On Efficacious Grace" that the action of the Spirit on man is physical; and hence, what is done physically is efficacious and irresistible.[3] The negative or critical function of the appeal to sensation was of inestimable value in strengthening the faithful in that it gave sure footing to the immense and complicated job of distinguishing true from false piety in the revival.

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[1] See all the "negative signs" and especially the Fourth Sign of gracious affections wherein he rejects all affections "which don't arise from any light in the understanding." (pp. 266-91).

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[1] Although the Religious Affections (1746) remains the monumental and most concentrated effort of Edwards in this connection, his concern for and attention to this problem was no "one shot" affair. It appears as early as 1734 in his published sermon, "Divine and Supernatural Light," and in other sermons such as "True Grace Distinguished from Experience of Devils." In the Faithful Narrative (1737) there is evaluative material in an unsystematic way. Concern and systematic treatment grow in "The Distinguishing Marks of a Work of the Spirit of God" (1741) and in "Some Thoughts Concerning the Present Revival of Religion in New England" (1742). One could also cite in this connection his "Observations on Efficacious Grace."

[2] p. 205.

[3] Works (Worcester), II, 569.

A new basis for snythesis.--Turning to the positive use of the appeal to sensation in strengthening faith, it meant for Edwards the confirmation of the truth that at no point does God deal with or communicate to man without means. Experimentalism-with-means and mysticism-with-means had been, as we have seen, the genius of Puritanism, and in this respect it was essential Calvinism with its insistence upon the doctrine of accommodation. Edwards, in his unwavering and never-breached insistence upon sensation as the doorway to the self and its contents, was re-affirming basic Calvinism, but on a totally different epistemological and psychological foundation. The Puritans, and Calvin before them, had laid primary emphasis upon Scripture as the historical-revelational means with and through which the internal work of the Spirit was correlated. Word-and-Spirit was their way of binding together the outer and the inner in the authentic, existential knowledge of God. They had, of course, allowed some use of "the book of nature" as the means of obtaining some non-saving knowledge of God (that is, his existence; some of his attributes; and, according to Puritan technologia, his method of "good practice"--eupraxia), but this "natural philosophy" was secondary and definitely subordinate to the historical-revelational means.

The relation of the "two books" (Scripture and Nature) had never been satisfactorily or systematically worked out, although the solution lay, as all confessed, in the inscrutable fact that God who is Redeemer is also God the Creator. Now, Edwards, with his all-embracing experimental psychology and his unexceptional sensationalist epistemology which he received from Locke, felt that he was in a position to do what no one prior had been fully equipped to do. There were no longer "two books" whose status relation to each other was problematical. There was ultimately only one book: the outer. There was ultimately only one means of the mediation of all knowledge: sensation. The outer encompassed everything that was empirically encountered or encounterable in both history and nature. This is why he could not even conceive that there could be a basic dichotomy, much less incompatibility, between revelation and reason.[1] This is why, to take an outstanding case in point, he argued the case for original sin on the basis of

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[1] "As the system of nature and the system of revelation are both divine works, so both are in different senses a divine word, both are the voice of God to intelligent creatures, a manifestation and declaration of Himself to mankind." ("Misc., No. 1340," Townsend, p. 233). This whole, rather long, reflection on "Reason and revelation" (pp. 219-35), is an extensive elaboration of the above theme. A distinctive feature of Edwards' position is that whereas the "two books" parallel each other in some respects, for the most part they complement each other. His position is not simply that since they parallel each other entirely, we may choose either one to the exclusion of reliance upon the other.

"Evidences . . . from Fact and Events"--meaning empirical observations and rational inferences drawn therefrom of the general history of mankind--just as surely and as confidently as he argued from the empirically received pronouncements of Scripture.[1]

Edwards' mysticism

So far, very little has been said directly about Edwards' mysticism except why he had to take the mystical-aesthetic stance and the brief characterization of his piety by Schafer at the beginning of this chapter: "a direct intuitive apprehension of God in all his glory; a 'sight,' a 'sense,' a 'taste' of his majesty and beauty." The use of the sensationalist vocabulary--and this was the rule in all his mystical utterances--is itself sufficient justification for why his mysticism must properly be considered here in connection with Locke. Edwards is one of the few writers who could use the word "sweet" without making the modern reader cringe. The reason is that he means by it something palatal and not the effeminate sentimentality into which our use of the word has degenerated.

Edwards' mysticism was a mysticism-with-means. If there is *any* point where we might expect to find a breach in his sensationalist epistemology it is here. But it does not happen. There is an excellent paragraph in Perry Miller's *Jonathan Edwards* that sums the whole matter up in a very brief compass, and which largely uses Edwards' own words:

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[1] "Original Sin," Works, II, Pt. I (pp. 309-405) deals with all the evidences from facts and events, while Pt. II (pp. 406-512) deals with the direct Scriptural proof.

> The boy had walked in his father's pasture, looking upon the sky and clouds until "the appearance of every thing was altered" and "there seemed to be, as it were, a calm, sweet, cast, or appearance of divine glory, in almost every thing"; he used to sit and view the moon, "singing forth, with a low voice, my contemplations of the Creator." His mind became "greatly fixed on divine things; almost perpetually in the contemplation of them," until his inability to express what he felt became a torturing clog and a burden: "The inward ardour of my soul, seemed to be hindered and pent up, and could not freely flame out as it would." Then he read Locke, and the divine strategy was revealed to him. *God's way, Locke made clear, is indirection, which is the only way, because speaking the unspeakable is impossible; God works through the concrete and the specific*, and the mind (Edwards would add, the regenerate mind) must know enough "to stop when it is at the utmost extent of its tether." The way to cope with the problem was not to raise questions and multiply disputes, . . . but "to take a survey of our own understandings, examine our own powers, and see to what things they were adapted." Otherwise, we shall either come to a "perfect scepticism" or else "let loose our thoughts in the vast ocean of Being; as if all that boundless extent were the natural and undoubted possession of our understandings, wherein there was nothing exempt from its decisions, or that escaped its comprehension."[1]

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[1] p. 53. (Italics mine.) To the reader who is familiar with Miller's work it may seem an impertinence to use him to explicate Edwards' mysticism since "mystic" is the one term he steadfastly refuses to use in describing Edwards. He believes that it is more misleading than helpful (cf. pp. 68, 193). This is because he will allow no

By seeing Edwards' mysticism-with-means in its proper connection with Locke's sensationalism it means that we do not have to take sides in the debate over whether his was a "nature-mysticism" or a "Christ-mysticism."[1] For like the "two books" problem was solved, God deals with us through the total "outer," which means just as truly

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real alternative to defining mysticism but "the merging of the finite individual with a distinctionless divine" (p. 193). Of course, if he is right and there is no legitimate use of the term "mysticism" without implying this, then Edwards was certainly no mystic. But the present writer rejects this equation of mysticism with out-and-out pantheistic absorption. There is an impressive tradition in Western Christendom, in the Augustinian line of succession, which is mystical and not pantheistic. This is often called "Christ-mysticism." Its favorite text is the bride-bridegroom analogy of the Song of Solomon, also repeated in Ephesians, where there is expressed the most intimate kind of com-(m)-union but without fusion or merging. It should be no surprise to find that Edwards was very fond of "Canticles" (Song of Solomon)--cf. Dwight's biography, Works, Vol. I, pp. 60-61, where he draws heavily upon what he calls Edwards' "personal narrative." Edwards belongs to this Augustinian strain (cf. John E. Smith, "Editor's Introduction," Religious Affections, p. 25, footnote 6 et passim), and Miller himself is insistent upon the Augustinian cast of Puritanism in general and Edwards in particular (cf. New England Mind, I, p. 5, and all of chap. i, "The Augustinian Strain of Piety"). Miller's description cited above could be used as a classic characterization of what the present writer means by the composite term "mysticism-with-means," even though Miller eschews it.

[1] Schafer in his "Concept of Being in the Thought of Jonathan Edwards" acknowledges the presence of the nature symbols, but insists that his was primarily a "Christ-mysticism." Henry Bamford Parkes in Jonathan Edwards: The Fiery Puritan (New York: Minton Balch & Co., 1930), p. 36; and Arthur Cushman McGiffert, Jr. in Jonathan Edwards (New York: Harper & Bros., 1932), p. 30, both come down on the "nature-mysticism" side, although they disagree in their exposition of it. Parkes would have us

through nature as through history. There was for him no longer any valid basis, nor any urgent necessity, for so narrowly circumscribing the means of grace (that is, to Word, sacrament, church order) as had theretofore been supposed. To the regenerate, all of God's works--Bethlehem's star as well as the Christ-child in the manger; the darkness at noon as well as Calvary's cross--bespoke the same message: God's "majestic meekness" and "awful sweetness."[1] To the unregenerate--well, it really did not matter how they divided errors.

Sensation: the guard against pantheism

There is yet another very pertinent observation that needs to be underscored. Taking what he did from Locke, and holding it as consistently as he did throughout life,

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believe Edwards was a pre-Romantic Romantic; McGiffert more correctly sees that Edwards had none of the feeling of kinship with nature which is expressed in the Romantic poets; his was a stylized, symbolical appreciation of nature. If one had to think in these either/or terms, then the thesis of Gerhard T. Alexis, "Calvinism and Mysticism in Jonathan Edwards," would be something far more like the truth. His thesis is, that whereas Edwards' mysticism began on the nature side, that is, independent of a strict correlation with theological doctrine and the drama of salvation, it steadily moved toward and arrived at what should be called a "Christ-mysticism" (see pp. 107-21). His whole thesis can be summarized by saying that the snythesis of mysticism and Calvinism was Edwards' life-long task and his greatest achievement.

[1] Edwards' personal narrative in Dwight's memoir, Works, I, 61.

there can no longer be any validity or seriousness to the charge that Edwards was a pantheist. We will have to deal with this charge--really, calumny--in much greater detail when we come to Edwards' terminal thought in "God's End in Creation," but the heart of the matter can be substantiated on the basis of what has already been said about his initial thought. Pantheism, whatever else it may entail, essentially involves the obliteration of or at least a final breach in the sharp distinction between God and the world, between the Uncreated Spirit and finite, created spirits. Edwards' empirical psychology and sensationalist epistemology are a perpetual guard against this, even for the saints in glory and the angels in heaven.[1] God communicates to man first, last, and always through means.

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[1] In his projected "Natural History of the Mental World" we find the following note: "32. Angels. Separate spirits. How far the angels and separate spirits--being in some respects in place in the third Heaven where the body of Christ is, their moving from place to place, their coming down from Heaven then ascending to Heaven, their being with Christ at the day of judgment, their seeing bodies, their beholding the creation of the material universe, their having in their ministry to do with the bodies of men and with the body of Christ and other material things, and their seeing God's works of providence relating to the material universe--how far these things necessarily imply that they have some kind of sensation like ours, and whether these things do not show that, by some laws or other, they are united to some kind of matter?" (Townsend, p. 72). Again, "53. Whether there could have ever been any such thing as thought without external ideas--immediately impressed by God either according to some law or otherwise; whether any spirit or angel could have any thought if it had not been for this; here particularly explain what I mean by external ideas." (Ibid., p. 73).

Hearkening back to the Miller citation just above, we can see that it is all there. "God's way . . . is indirection, which is the only way. . . ." It is this insistence upon means that preserves the distinction. It was adopted at first, perhaps, to keep from falling into "perfect scepticism," but it entailed what just may have been an un-asked for blessing: the safeguard against being swallowed up in the abyss of "the vast ocean of Being." Edwards saw clearly, and avidly embraced, the entailment. He had a doctrine of participation of the created in the uncreated life, but "not that the saints are made partakers of the essence of God, and so are 'Godded' with God, and 'Christed' with Christ, according to the abominable and blasphemous language and notions of some heretics."[1]

The synthesizing possibilities of the new psychology

In the earlier discussion and evaluation of deism and Arminianism we anticipated something which we are now prepared to consider.[2] There we indicated that the new psychology which Edwards received from Locke enabled him to deal with the traditional will-intellect problem in a new way. Traditional psychology had regarded the soul as possessed of at least three main faculties: reason, will, and appetite. The first two were distinct operations of the rational soul; the last was relegated to the sensitive soul as a function of the "animal spirits." "Passions," "emotions," "affections" are other names for the appetites. In addition to this faculty, the sensitive soul was also the seat of the faculties of sensation and, by extension, of imagination and memory. These distinguishable operations of the soul or self tended to be **regarded** as separate and independent faculties or agents, each with its own locus in the brain or the body. To the extent that this tendency went unchecked--and there was nothing internal to the conception to check it--the theory of the commerce between these faculties and their hierarchical ranking became problematical. The medieval debates over the primacy of the will or the intellect is a good case in point. The perennial controversy over "the freedom of the will" is another. Only if the will were considered an agent, a substantive capable of taking predication, could the controversy arise.

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[1] Religious Affections, p. 203.

[2] Supra, p. 87.

The end of the faculty psychology.--With the mind-body dualism which Locke took over from Descartes this whole psychology had to be overhauled. Now all these discrete or semi-discrete faculties were dumped into one hopper: "the mind." Not even the appetites or affections could be assigned to bodily or animal spirits because "body," whether it be conceived as extension (Descartes) or as atomic particles of matter (Newton), had the characteristics of being inert and insensate. Locke saw this state of affairs and had a profound sense of the unity of the self.[1] All the "faculties" are powers or operations of the one "mind" or self as they are simultaneously called into play in sensation. Unfortunately, Locke, and Edwards following him, still continued to use the term "faculties" with respect to the understanding and the will, but they were both clear in their own minds that they were not using the term in the old way. This fact of the continued usage of the term caused some of their opponents to misunderstand them and some of their followers to misinterpret them.[2]

The unity of the self.--How did the experimental psychology conceive the unity of the self? It is one thing to assert that the new situation made some kind of conception of the unity of the self necessary and another to see just how it was actually done. The answer lay, as in the case with experimental certainty, in the conception of the basic units of experience, the "simple ideas." A simple idea of sense is affecting. It is by its very nature vigorous and lively. It is not that one first has a sensible impression and then he reacts toward it. That would be considering sensation something inert or neutral upon which first cognitive, and then, conative reactions were superimposed. But that is not the way we experience, say, a pin prick. The "ideal apprehension and sensible knowledge"[1] of pain is a sensation that involves cognitive and conative operations simultaneously and co-inherently. Unless one is affected by a sense of withdrawal from the pin point he has not yet perceived pain. The movement away or revulsion is a not inconsiderable component of idea understood. And unless the experience immediately cognizes which direction is "away" from the pin point he still has not preceived what is happening. "Ideal apprehension and sensible knowledge" involves the total self, passively and actively, cognitively and conatively. One cannot separate the basic unit of experience from its affect. Its source is nothing other than some external power to affect, and its perception is to be affected, both cognitively and conatively. Thus it is in the basic units of experience, the "simple ideas," that the foundation for the unity of the self lies. As (not "after") a man perceives he is affected. As he is affected so he is thinking and acting. The components of basic experience may be separated for analysis; but the distinctions are abstractive, not real. And the components of the arc of experience may be arranged consecutively; but the sequence is logical and not chronological.

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[1] For a close and well-documented exposition of Locke, and Edwards' relation to Locke, on this point, see Paul Ramsey's "Editor's Introduction," Freedom of the Will, pp. 47-65.

[2] This is well represented in Edwards' controversy with Chauncy over the place of the emotions or affections in religion. For Edwards, following Locke, it was the mind, not the body, that was the true seat of the affections. Chauncy, on the other hand, was insensitive to Edwards' new psychology and still regarded the passions as blind, animal impulses, dangerous unless controlled by reason. Thus the two opponents really talked past each other because there was no common ground as to the meaning of the terms each was using. See Schafer, pp. 53-54.

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[1] These are Edwards' terms, see especially "Misc., No. 782, Ideas. Sense of the heart," Townsend, pp. 113-126. Needless to say, his use of "ideal" here does not mean abstractly imagined perfection--the "ought" as over against the "is"--as we are wont to use the term; rather he means the most concrete and basic unit of experience.

The existential character of perception.--In modern parlance we would call what Edwards terms as "ideal apprehension and sensible knowledge" existential knowledge. It is the only kind of knowledge that presupposes an authentic encounter with "the outer" and simultaneously involves the total, hence unitive, engagement of "the inner." Of course, Edwards, no less than we, would be quick to admit that not all our knowledge is existential. The mind can and does think in terms of "signs" or labels without the presence of the "actual ideas" (for example, it can reason about "pain" without the sensible presence of it). This is "cogitation" or "speculation."[1] This is "dry light" which neither involves the will nor can it determine the will. On the other hand, the affections can be raised or stimulated by fantasies, imagination, and the like. This is blind emotion or passion. It is heat without light, and it can so overbear the will as to make the self a patient rather than an agent. The point is that both of these are removals from basic experience and true affections, so it is no wonder that in the degree of removal there is greater and greater danger of the dissolution of the unity of the self and greater liability to error.

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[1] See "Misc., No. 782," Townsend, pp. 115-117.

Application: "Religious Affections."--Edwards was to put this new psychology to good use in the Religious Affections. There he was to argue that "true religion, in great part, consists in holy affections."[1] By "affections" or "heart knowledge" he did not mean blind emotion, but rather the center and unity of the self, the basic orientation or disposition of the self, as it is determined by the way it perceives the outer world. It involves both heat and light. And by "holy" or "gracious" affections he meant that "new sense of the heart," that new basic orientation, which is the correlate of the experience of the "new simple idea" of grace, the perception of God in and through the outer world.

Application: "Freedom of the Will."--Further, he made use of the new psychology in his treatise on the Freedom of the Will. He followed Locke in holding that to put the question of whether the will is free or not is to pose the question in a fundamentally wrong way. It is the self, not the will, that is free. Freedom means the self's ability to do what it wills or to act accordingly as it is affected. It is absurd, he held, to ask whether "the will" were free to will otherwise than it does. If the self willed otherwise it would mean that it was otherwise affected. The self wills as it is affected, and it is affected as it preceives. All that is requisite for moral responsibility is that the will be in, or consent to, the deed and not how the basic inclination of the self is caused or determined.[1]

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[1] Religious Affections, p. 95.

The category of causality

Earlier we postponed consideration of Edwards' conceptions of substance and causality until this point. The reasons therefor should soon, if not already, be apparent from the foregoing discussion. Let us begin with causality. As we have stated earlier, the physico-mathematical method was the aspiration and, with Newton, the achievement of modern science. This meant that thenceforth the only kinds of causal explanation that had scientific legitimacy were mechanical and mathematical ones. Or, in terms of what it ruled out, teleological or purposive explanations for finite natural events were rejected. The teleological argument or form of explanation still remained as possibly applicable to the creation as a whole, the entire system of nature, but it was definitely rejected as an explanation of finite events within the system.

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[1] "Edwards follows Locke in asserting that ability and freedom are terms which can apply only to the man, not the will. Man is free, for he can do as he pleases. To ask whether he can please as he pleases is absurd. The nature of volitions and their underlying motives is the object of moral approbation or disapprobation, not the cause. God himself, who is morally perfect and is adjudged most free, is in his volitions most bound by what his wisdom approves as best, by 'the necessary perfection of his own nature.'" (Schafer, pp. 63-64).

The two types of causality.--The fact that we hyphenate the term "physico-mathematical" should not obscure the fact that these are really quite diverse understandings of the nature of causality. The physical or mechanical causality has to do with matter and motion--the actuating or imparting of motion from one body (the cause) to another (the effect) upon contact (the spatio-temporal causal nexus). This is "efficient causation," and the chronological sequence is all-important. When we use the phrase "cause and effect" it is this physical or mechanical model that we have in mind.

The mathematical--or more strictly, the "logico-mathematical"--conception or causal connection is something else, indeed. It is the kind of necessary connectedness that could never be empirically observed or inferred but is only arrived at rationally. For example, given the definition of a triangle, it "follows"--that is, it can be rationally demonstrated through geometry--that the sum of the angles equals a straight angle. Temporal sequence has nothing to do with this conception of necessary connection; the causal relation is timeless. The effect is consequent (logical) and not sequent (chronological). This type of causal explanation is better referred to as "ground and consequent" in contradistinction to mechanical "cause and effect."[1] It is sometimes referred to as the explanatory principle of "sufficient reason."

The problematic relation of the two types.--The fact that these two diverse forms of causal explanation correspond to each other in the investigation of nature was one of the most exciting discoveries of modern science. But like the body-mind dualism of which it was a variant, why the two correspond was a problem that no one could explain to the satisfaction of all others. And, as we alluded in the case of Newton and gravity, there was at least one significant and embarrassing case where there was a mathematically expressible connection between natural phenomena without any discernible mechanical connection. Action at a distance involved the double scandal to cause-and-effect description in that not only was there an apparent lack of mechanical contact to transmit the force but also the temporal sequence was irrelevant. Gravity is a mutual and concurrent attraction of bodies which is a function of their masses and the distance between them. Without chronological sequence mechanical causation falls to the ground. On the other hand, without the universal force of gravity one could in no sense talk of the "system" of nature. The mutual attraction of all the particles of matter was the chief thing that distinguished Newtonian atomism from that of Democritus. In the latter's conception of unrelated atoms in motion in the void, all collision and connection was fortuitous. "System" by definition was denied. It was universal gravity that gave Newton's atomism the right to be called a "system."

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[1] See Wilhelm Windelband, A History of Philosophy, Vol. II (New York: Harper & Bros., 1958), p. 418, where he develops this distinction in his exposition of causality in Spinoza.

There is another side to the problem. The ground-and-consequent form of causal relation was internal and mental. It could show, by analysis and logical construction, the necessary inner connectedness of ideas once they were entertained, but it could neither account for the origin of those ideas nor guarantee the outer, factual existence of anything corresponding to those ideas. In short, it worked effectively in describing and extending our knowledge of matters of fact, but it could neither produce nor guarantee matters of fact.

What we have been describing, in a very elementary way, is the basis of the whole empiricist/rationalist dilemma that has plagued so much of modern philosophy.

That the two somehow belonged together was evidenced by the fact that the physico-mathematical method worked and produced astounding results. But how or why these two forms of causal explanation corresponded was extremely problematical.

Edwards' synthesis.--What was Edwards' position in the face of these problems? First of all, he is one with the Rationalists in asserting

> that nothing ever comes to pass without a cause. What is self-existent must be from eternity, and must be unchangeable: but as to all things that begin to be, they are not self-existent, and therefore must have some foundation of their existence without themselves. That whatsoever begins to be, which before was not, must have a cause why it then begins to exist, seems to be the first dictate of the common and natural sense which God hath implanted in the minds of all mankind, and the main foundation of all our reasonings about the existence of things, past, present, or to come.[1]

The causal category is a priori. As he says elsewhere, we do not arrive at it "by ratiocination or any kind of argument. This is an innate principle, in the sense that the soul is born with it--a necessary, fatal propensity so to conclude, on every occasion."[2] Since we are discussing this in relation to Locke, it is well to point out here that by a priori or "innate principle" it does not follow that he is departing from Locke's ban on "innate ideas." By calling the causal category an "innate principle" he is not calling it a pre-furnished "idea" of which we are aware apart from experience. It is simply the way the mind works in reasoning, a constitutive operation of the understanding as it is brought into play in experience and which is necessary in order to have the kind of experience we do have.

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[1] Freedom of the Will, p. 181.

[2] "The Mind, No. 54," Townsend, p. 54.

Edwards was aware of Hume's skepticism.[1] There are occasional expressions in his writing that seem to indicate that in fact he shared that skepticism. For instance, he could say that "there is a _habit of mind_ in reasoning. We are wont every day, from our very infancy, to argue causes from effects after the same manner, in general."[2] But whatever reservations Edwards had about the cause-and-effect connection stemmed from a different motive from Hume's and in no way reflected a similar hesitancy about the ground-and-consequent connection. Edwards, as we have seen in connection with his conception of time, had already had his reservations about a materialistic natural mechanism. Existence in one moment of time was incapable of producing its own or any other existence in a succeeding moment of time. And, _strictly speaking_, no temporally antecendent event could be the "cause" of a temporally subsequent "effect" in which latter time the former event was no longer in existence. "Hence we learn that there is no such thing as mechanism if that word is taken to be that whereby bodies act each upon the other purely and properly by themselves."[1] However, in saying so much it is not to be inferred that Edwards rejected mechanical cause-and-effect out of hand. We do, phenomenally, experience time as a chronological continuum; and on that basis there is, he held, a provisionally valid basis for the "habit of mind" of thinking of constant conjunctions of natural events mechanistically, as if bodies acted upon each other "purely and properly by themselves." The point not to be forgotten is that mechanism--cause-and-effect connection--has a phenomenal, not metaphysical, validity. Strictly speaking, the only causal connection that has metaphysical validity is the ground-and-consequent relation. What we call "the laws of nature" are really "the stated methods of God's acting with respect to bodies and the stated conditions of the alteration of the manner of His acting."[2] Recalling the analogy of the motion picture which we used in explicating Edwards' conception of time, the real connection lies in the script and not between the succession of frames projected.

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[1] See, for example, "Misc., No. 1297," _Townsend_, p. 216, where he refers to Hume by name and summarizes his position, without evaluation.

[2] "Misc., No. 268," _Townsend_, pp. 78-79. (Italics mine.)

Mechanism: the shadow of the substance.--Recalling the dire question which we raised in that earlier connection as to whether Edwards' conception of time did not undercut the Newtonian mechanism which he accepted and depended upon, we can now see how he resolved the problem in his own mind. "Natural philosophy" with its mechanistic explanation for all outer phenomena was not wrong. But it was but the phenomenal "shadow" of the real "substance" which is the inner ground-and-consequent connection. The whole outer world is quite properly conceived along the lines of external relations, but at the same time the whole outer or natural world is the "image" or "shadow" of the inner, spiritual world. It was created for the purpose of communication of the Uncreated Spirit to finite, created spirits, and it is a necessary medium for that communication. But precisely because it was created for a purpose other than, and more ultimate than, itself, it is metaphysically subordinate to the inner.

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[1] "Of Being, Corollary 16," Townsend, p. 19.

[2] "Of Being, Corollary 15," Townsend, pp. 18-19.

The ground-and-consequent model of perception.--It is one thing to reduce the cause-and-effect relation to the status of a phenomenal image or projection of the ground-and-consequent relation, but it is a different and somewhat more difficult task to show how the ground-and-consequent relation makes contact with the outer world of matters of fact. This relation, as we have noted, is essentially internal and mental. Its form is the hypothetical proposition: If A, then B. Given the definition of a triangle, then a certain relation about the sum of its angles follows. But, strictly speaking, it has nothing to tell us as to how we come by the notion of a triangle. The empiricist's answer to the latter question was that we come by the notion through experience, usually meaning some kind of cause-and-effect relation involving sensation. The rationalists would retort that we never experience perfect triangles, so the empiricist line of argument would entail an effect greater than any possible cause, which is absurd. Hence, ideas like the perfect triangle must be innate, our attention to or consciousness of which is perhaps occasioned by sensation, but in no sense caused by it.

Edwards could not find himself consistently in either of these alternatives. That kind of empiricism, while it had the virtue of making inner ideas dependent upon some outer cause, involved irrational notions of a mechanistic kind of perception. That kind of rationalism, while it had the virtue of insisting that the cause be adequate to the effect, involved the unacceptable notion of "innate ideas" and, hence, of a real independence of the inner from the outer. His task was to find a third way that involved a real--not illusory or even occasional--dependence of the inner upon the outer, and at the same time avoid the pitfalls of mechanism. Here, when we talk about the necessity of "dependence of the inner upon the outer," we may seem to be involved in an inconsistency with what we said earlier about his subordinating the outer to the inner in the sense that he regarded the outer, mechanistic, cause-and-effect relation as the phenomenal shadow of the inner, metaphysical ground-and-consequent relation. The inconsistency is verbal and not substantial. In the one case he is specifying the relative metaphysical status of the two forms of causal relation: the natural world is the phenomenal image of the spiritual world and exists for the purposes of the latter. This has primary reference to God, the Uncreated Spirit. In the other case, the present one, he is referring to created spirits and asserting that the "mind" or self has no contents but what it has first received via contact with the outer physical world. The former had to do with the order of being, the latter with the order of knowing.

The status of "the outer" in Edwards' thought is somewhat subtle, but very important. We will have to deal with it more extensively later in connection with the total picture of his Idealism, but at this point it is needful to anticipate that discussion by saying that just because he regards the outer as phenomenal--as the "image" or "shadow" of the inner--it does not mean that he regards it as illusory or unreal or unnecessary. God needs the outer frame of things, or system of nature, in order to communicate mediately to finite spirits. And man needs the outer in order to have any ideas or contents at all; hence, to be communicated to. The outer, in itself, may not be as it seems or or as we experience it--that is, the color is not in the flower, nor the sweetness in the honey, nor the pain in the needle; but the power to produce color, taste, pain, and the like in us is not imagined or projected by us. It is "there," external to us, real, efficacious, and irresistible.

Now, as to how he conceived of a third way between a mechanistic empiricism and an idealistic rationalism. We noted that his task was to find a way that involved a real--not illusory or even occasional--dependence of the inner upon the outer, and at the same time to avoid the pitfalls of mechanism. The answer, as at every other crucial point, lay in the conception of the basic units of experience, the "simple ideas." Ground-and-consequent, not cause-and-effect, was, he believed, the best analogy for describing what actually takes place in "ideal apprehension and sensible knowledge," or in existential encounter. There can be no "causes" leading to "effects"--perhaps we should say, "affects"--in which the "causes" are temporally prior and hence, no longer existent. To try to press the cause-and-effect analogy in describing experience is to rend asunder what we actually experience as all of one piece. But it is different with the ground-and-consequent analogy. Simple ideas are affecting, and they point simultaneously in two directions: (1) to the external power to affect, and (2) to the experience of being affected, both cognitively and conatively. The "ideal apprehension" points toward the external ground, which is the power sufficient to affect; and the "sensible knowledge" points toward the internal consequent, which is the experience of being so affected. The external ground is contemporaneous with the internal consequent. Whatever it may be in itself, the power of the ground is sufficient to account for the consequential affect. And as the external power is the ground of the consequent internal affect, so the affect is the ground of the consequent understanding and will. As a man perceives, so he is affected; as he is affected, so he thinks and does. At least, this is what is in the basic units of experience. The farther one abstracts from this the more liable is he to the dissolution of this unity; but, then, the farther is he from reality.

Summary: Edwards' definition of "cause."--All of the foregoing is reflected in Edwards' rather carefully worded published definition of "cause." He states that his use of the word signifies

> any antecedent, either natural or moral, positive or negative, on which an event, either a thing, or the manner and circumstance of a thing, so depends, that it is the ground and reason, either in whole or in part, why it is, rather than not; or why it is as it is, rather than otherwise; or, in other words, any antecedent with which a consequent event is so connected, that it truly belongs to the reason why the

> proposition which affirms that event, is true; whether it has any positive influence of not.[1]

The use of the word "antecedent" is nicely ambiguous here, and one cannot help but believe it was consciously intended. An antecedent can be taken to mean a temporally prior cause, if one is thinking in terms so "gross"--or perhaps it would be more charitable to say, so "practical"--as to take the phenomenal for the really real. But a closer reading will show that Edwards has not actually committed himself to anything other than the contemporaneous "ground" (antecedent) in the ground-and-consequent analogy.

The notion of "privative cause."--There is an element explicit in the above definition that we have not considered heretofore. It is Edwards' conception of privative "causes" or grounds. Obviously there can be no consequent where the total ground is privative or nil, but there can be consequents where a thing is as it is because of the absence of certain elements in its ground. In natural phenomena he would cite, as an example, the absence of the sun's warmth as a privative cause of the dew forming at night or of water freezing in the winter. The absence of warm sunlight is a necessary condition, but it is not a "positive efficiency" like the case of the sun causing dew to evaporate or ice to melt. In the moral sphere he was to use this notion to account for universal depravity. The absence or withdrawal of saving grace, leaving only common grace operative in the ground of natural man, is the privative cause of the universal tendency to sin, but it does not make God the positive efficiency in the actual sinning. However, the presence of saving grace does make God the positive efficiency or ground of salvation.

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[1] Freedom of the Will, pp. 180-81.

The category of substance

It was well that we dealt with Edwards' notion of causality before turning to an explication of his notion of substance, for just as he saw the ground--the external power to affect--in the ground-and-consequent analogy of sensation as the metaphysical root of our phenomenal notion of mechanical cause-and-effect, so he saw that same "ground" as the metaphysical root of our phenomenal notion of substance. In the external power to affect, exerted in place and according to a fixed constitution or order of succession, the phenomenal notions of "cause" and "substance" coalesce. But this is to begin with his conclusion rather than to show how he moved to that conclusion.

The prevailing notions of "substance."--Ever since Descartes the commonly accepted notion of substance in modern philosophy was that of something that was independent or subsisted by itself and, hence, was the substratum of whatever dependent qualities or attributes it actually had or was capable of bearing. In terms of the entity/

modality distinction of the first chapter, substances are the basic and irreducible kinds of entity or being, simply considered. Created substances, according to the Cartesian system, were reducible to two kinds of entity: consciousness and extension, or mind and body. Since Newton and Locke were the mediators of this tradition to Edwards, we had best stick close to their conceptions of these substances.

Edwards' revision of Newton.--Newton was Edwards' chief mentor with respect to physical substance or "body." In his system, physical substance was not just "extension" but filled space--atoms, indivisible particles of inert physical stuff or mass. This conception could lead to a metaphysical materialism, but Edwards saw in it another equally possible, or equally rational, metaphysic. To him it appeared that all we can mean by indivisibility is solidity, or resistance to penetration and to annihilation. Resistance or power to resist exerted in place, then, is of the essence of what we mean by physical substance. That power, he held, is none other than the will of God presently exerted. But also, the substratum aspect of the notion of substance implies the persistence of entity through time and change. How could Edwards, with his denial of absolute time as a natural chronological continuum, account for this phenomenal aspect of substance? The answer lay, he held, in the fact that the resistance exerted in one moment of time could not be regarded as numerically the same resistance as that exerted in a preceding or succeeding moment of time. How there is experienced continuity or persistence does not depend upon any inner connection between the preceding and succeeding acts of will but rather upon the "stable idea" or establishment of the ideal succession which informs those temporally successive acts of will. What is meant in the popular dictum that Nature makes no leaps is really that there are no hiatuses in the logical sequence of ideas in God's mind with respect to the composite establishment or archetype which is his total "stable idea" of the world. An adequate understanding of physical substance, then, must account for both the exertion of resistance and the continuity in the way it is successively exerted. This, in Edwards' terms, meant that all that was essential to the notion of physical substance--and, by extension, the whole system of nature--was God's stable will as informed by and executing his stable idea. Entity, then, is a function of the immediate exertion of the divine will; modality is the function of the rule by which that will is determined successively; and they both belong together inseparably, since what God thinks, he does.

The "ideal" or "spiritual" (if they are the only terms capable of signifying "non-materialistic") conception of nature was just as rational a way of accounting for the basic notions with which natural philosophy had to deal as any materialistic metaphysics, and it was more viable in that it did not involve any of the irrationalities of a consistently materialistic mechanism. Further, since we have made such a point of it in previous examples, this way of conceiving physical substance enabled him to see that there was no natural "scandal" involved in the law of gravity. Now, all the forces of nature could be integrated into a single, intelligible system. Physical substances, at bottom, are powers to resist, exerted according to an established rule in the mind of God. Gravity is a power to attract, again exerted according to a mathematically calculable establishment. Both are but different determinations (or components of the composite and complex determination) of the one will of God, exerted according to the divine establishment or world-idea.[1]

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[1] "The Mind, No. 61," *Townsend*, pp. 60-63, is the best single source of Edwards' expression of his above mentioned ideas of physical substance. His basic vision is well summarized in the concluding paragraph: "The reason why it is so exceeding natural to men to suppose that there is some latent substance, or something that is altogether hid, that upholds the properties of bodies is because all see, at first sight, that the properties of bodies are *such as need some cause that shall every moment have influence to their continuance, as well as a cause of their first existence*. All therefore agree that there is something that is there and upholds these properties. And it is most true, there undoubtedly is. But men are wont to content themselves in saying merely that it is something. But that something is He 'by whom all things consist.'" (Italics mine.) The

Edwards' revision of Locke.--Though there was a definite movement in Edwards away from a metaphysical materialism from the Newtonian side which was independent of, and possibly even prior to, his reading of Locke, it was nevertheless Edwards' reading of Locke on substance that was the decisive hinge in his turn toward Idealism. Locke held that physical substances are things which are partly knowable and partly unknowable. The basis for this lay in his distinction within "simple ideas" between primary and secondary qualities of bodies. Primary qualities are those--for example, solidity, size, number, motion or rest, etc.--which are constitutive of bodies and, hence, must be presumed to exist independent of our perception of them. The secondary qualities are those--for example, color, sound, taste, smell, etc.--which are not only dependent upon being preceived but also are variable according to the states of the organ of perception. To use the

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reference to causality (see italics) confirms what has herein been called the coalescence of the roots of the phenomenal notions of "cause-and-effect" and "substance" in the ground or power which creates and supports all our ideas. For essentially the same exposition as appears above of the relation between Edwards and Newton on physical substance see James H. Tufts, "Edwards and Newton," *Philosophical Review*, XLIX (November, 1940), 609-22. He points out that the chief difference between the two was that Newton had a more deistic notion of Creation, that "being once formed, it may continue by those Laws of Nature for many ages," whereas for Edwards, "the constant exercise of the infinite power of God is necessary to preserve bodies in being." (p. 615).

proverbial illustration, to the jaundiced eye all things are yellow. He also distinguished a third class of qualities, though originally he regarded this as a subclass of the secondary. These tertiary qualities are powers a body has to affect other bodies, like the power the sun has to make wax turn white or the power of fire to make lead fluid.

Primary qualities--the "Newtonian" attributes, since they are the only qualities of interest to the mathematician and the physicist--are held to be resemblances; secondary qualities are thought to be resemblances, but are not; and tertiary qualities are not resemblances, nor are they thought to be. The decisive break, of course, was between the primary and the secondary, for here lay the basis for distinguishing between appearance and reality. The secondary qualities are admittedly phenomenal; but not so the primary ones, for they were regarded as real correspondences between outer things and our inner ideas of them. It is upon this latter notion that the whole survival of the doctrine of real physical substances depended. Because of the primary qualities physical substance must be supposed to be real; because of the secondary qualities our knowledge of it is partly phenomenal.

Edwards saw that this metaphysical distinction between primary and secondary qualities would not hold and, hence, that all our notion of physical substance is phenomenal.[1] He states this beautifully and succinctly in "The Mind" where he writes:

> If we had only the sense of seeing, we should not be as ready to conclude the visible world to have been an existence independent of perception as we do; . . . . we know that things that are objects of this sense . . . are merely mental existences because all these things, with all their modes, do exist in a looking glass, where all will acknowledge they exist only mentally.
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> It is now agreed upon by every knowing philosopher that colors are not really in the things--no more than pain is in a needle--but strictly nowhere else but in the mind. But yet I think that color may have an existence out of the mind with equal reason as anything in body has any exsitence out of the mind, beside the very substance of the body itself, which is nothing but the divine power, or rather the constant exertion of it. For what idea is that which we call by the name

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[1] It should be noted in passing that there once was a fashion in Edwardean scholarship to say that there must be some connection and dependence of Edwards upon Berkeley at this point. The motive for the assertion was more psychological than documentary. The allegation seemed mainly to stem from the psychological argument that it was incredible that this backwoods boy in the isolated American provinces could be so brilliant--hence, there must be some dependence of his ideas upon someone else--namely, Berkeley, who made substantially the same criticism. In view of the subtlety, brilliance, and originality so much in evidence in all of Edwards' published works this is indeed a strange attitude to take. The consensus of contemporary scholarship is that there is no connection or dependence, that the two men worked independently, though concurrently, along somewhat the same lines. The view of the present writer is (1) that for the present purposes it would make no difference if there were a dependence, but (2) that the burden of proof lies upon those who allege a dependence, (3) there is no internal necessity in the study of Edwards to seek one, and (4) there is as yet no documentary evidence to lead one to suspect that prior to or at the same time of Edwards' youthful criticism and revision of Locke he was acquainted with Berkeley's work.

> of body? I find color has the chief share in it. 'Tis nothing but color, and figure which is the termination of this color, together with some powers, such as the power of resisting and motion, etc., that wholly makes up what we call body. And if that which we principally mean by the thing itself cannot be said to be in the thing itself, I think nothing can be. If color exists not out of the mind, then nothing belonging to body exists out of the mind but resistance, which is solidity; and the termination of this resistance with its relations, which is figure; and the communication of the resistance from space to space, which is motion--though the latter are nothing but modes of the former. Therefore, there is nothing out of the mind but resistance. And not that neither, when nothing is actually resisted.[1]

There _is_ a valid basis for distinguishing between qualities--one class is a function of motion or power, which is perceived as resistance; the other class is a function of light, which is perceived as color or visibility. But there is _no_ valid basis for making a _metaphysical_ distinction between the two--calling the one "primary" or real, the other "secondary" or phenomenal--for "the ideas we have by feeling are as much mere ideas as those we have by the sense of seeing."[2] Just as there is no color or visibility where there is no perceiving mind, so there is no resistance where there is no mind perceiving it as resistance. "The world is therefore an ideal one; and the law of creating, and the succession of these ideas, is constant and regular."[3]

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[1] "The Mind, No. 27," _Townsend_, pp. 36-37.

[2] _Ibid_., p. 36.

[3] _Ibid_., p. 37.

What it takes to have a "world": the ontological elements.--In order to have the kind of phenomenal world we do have, three things are chiefly necessary: light, resistance or power, and the perceiving mind. Without light our world would be conceived as vastly different from what it is. We would stumble upon resistances, but it would be like running into an invisible wall in the broad daylight, something uncanny and occult. Without resistance there would be nothing to lead us to suspect that the world were anything but a projection or a reflection of our own minds, like looking into a mirror. Without light and resistance the world would be indistinguishable from the void. But without the perceiving mind there would be no world at all. Mere fantasms and forces do not make a world.

Edwards loved to ponder these three things. They were the genuine mysteries of the created world. Not "mysteries" in the Calvinistic sense of what is absolutely unknowable, but in the sense of being known, yet inexhaustible. There is an inner infinity to them--the wonder increases in proportion to rational penetration of them. Take light, for example. It does not add anything quantitative to resistance, but it does have the power of making visible and understandable what would otherwise remain invisible and occult. And because to have a world depends upon it being perceived this must be regarded as a "substantial" quality. This was to become a very useful and powerful symbol of grace to him. Grace is a "divine and supernatural light" that does not add to our natural knowledge of things--that is, revelation does not give new propositional knowledge of the factual sort--but it does make visible the hidden things of God. It casts all of life into a new perspective and gives the self a new inclination. Grace is a "substantial" change.

Conclusion: spirit ontology.--The pondering of these mysteries, which were occasioned by his analysis of the notion of "substance," led him to a final conclusion about substances. Just as visibility and resistance cannot subsist by themselves but must be seen as subsisting in the perceiving mind, so with light and power; they must be seen as subsisting in God. They are emanations and exertions of his understanding and his will, respectively. Thus he concluded:

> It follows from hence that those beings which have knowledge and consciousness are the only proper and real and substantial beings, inasmuch as the being of other things is only by these. From hence we may see the gross mistake of those who think material things the most substantial beings and spirits more like a shadow, whereas spirits only are properly substance.[1]

Summary and Estimate

Thus, by rehearsing the cultural dialogue by which he came to it, we have finally laid bare the heart of Edwards'

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[1] "Of Being," Townsend, p. 8.

Idealism. His was a unique and original synthesis of the physics of Newton and the psychology of Locke, which, as we must yet show, he believed not only compatible with but necessary to an adequate (which to him meant orthodox Protestant or Reformed) theological rationale.[1] But before we turn to its theological use let us recapitulate the major philosophical characteristics of his Idealism and point out, again from a philosophical standpoint, where it is ambiguous and, hence, most vulnerable.

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[1] There is a remarkable consensus in contemporary Edwardean scholarship as to this judgment, though all scholars do not characterize it explicitly in terms of Newton and Locke. For two who do, see Tufts, "Edwards and Newton," where he concludes that "Newton's world of atoms and forces and Locke's world of ideas are thus united in the Idea and Will of deity." (p. 622); and Miller, Jonathan Edwards, p. 98, where he says, "It appears that Edwards saw exactly where the modern problem is centered, upon this incompatibility of Newton and Locke, of the objective and the subjective, of the mechanical and the conscious. The effort of his life was to unite the two."

I have chosen to designate the basic theme as a synthesis of "the outer" and "the inner." This terminology includes the explicit Newton-Locke characterization, but it also allows us to see that this same basic theme has a number of other possible variations. Alexis pursues it in terms of the synthesis of "Calvinism and Mysticism in Jonathan Edwards." Rhodes in "Jonathan Edwards: Experimental Theologian" is primarily interested in ethics and, hence, discusses it in terms of a possibly unstable and unresolvable equilibrium between the "love of complacence" and the "love of benevolence." (p. xxvi). Schafer is interested in ontology and characterizes the basic theme in Edwards' terms of "emanation and remanation," procession and return (pp. 103-104). Douglas J. Elwood speaks of Edwards' "third way" between theism and pantheism (Chap. I, pp. 1-11).

Subordination of the outer to the inner

First, metaphysically or in the order of being, the outer has been subordinated to the inner. The world exists in God's mind in "uncreated idea" prior to its existence in "created idea" or its phenomenal existence in man's perception as a result of the constant exercise of God's will *ad extra*. The phenomenal world is grounded in the constant exercise of God's will and ordered by the logical sequence of ideas in God's mind, which is the sole counsel of his will. This means that the applicability of the mechanistic interpretation of natural phenomena is unexceptionable, and further that it is true, provided that one does not make the mistake of regarding phenomenal "substances" as real, metaphysical "things" or of regarding "cause-and-effect" as the inherent ability of those "things" to subsist and to act upon each other. The outer is real; it is "there," though it is not in reality as it seems or appears to us. However, for all practical purposes we do not err in regarding it as if it actually were just as it seems.

Was Edwards a "deceiver"?

With this, we can answer the question we raised earlier as to whether Edwards was a deceiver. For practical purposes--and like the good Puritan he was, theory existed only for the sake of good practice--it made little or no difference that he preached and often wrote "in the old way." To burden his reader-hearers with the subtleties of a metaphysical strictness beyond their average competence was neither necessary nor helpful. However, he never regarded the practical warrant for, and advantage of, popular modes of thought and graphic language as license for loose thinking and careless expression. Behind and informing his words, even--nay, especially--those of "Sinners in the Hands of an Angry God," lies the whole weight of his metaphysical strictness.[1]

Perception the sole source of our ideas

Second, **epistemologically** or in the order of knowing by finite spirits, the inner is made causally dependent upon the outer. We have no knowledge but what relates to our ideas or the contents of our consciousness, and we have no ideas or contents but those derived from experience. Experience, with its constituent mental operations of conative and cognitive affect (the cognitive including the a priori principle of sufficient reason, "that what begins to be has a cause, and also that it has a cause proportionable and agreeable to the effect"[1]) accounts for the root of all that we can know certainly, both of the phenomenal world and ourselves.

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[1] Edwin H. Cady in "The Artistry of Jonathan Edwards," New England Quarterly, XXII (March, 1949), 61-72, discusses this very sermon in evidence of his thesis that Edwards was a literary artist and rhetorician of the first magnitude. "His problem of expression was precisely that of a metaphysical poet: to find a means to drive out into effective form his overpowering sense of an inward reality" (p. 71).

The primacy of spirit

Third, and last, the snythesizing ingredient is a spirit ontology. "Spirits only are properly substance."[2] And being or spirit is the dynamic union or mutual "consent" of light and motion, or of visibility and resistance, or of understanding and will, or of meaning and being. Nothing "is" but the Uncreated Spirit and created spirits, and those things that subsist by these.

The outer, or the natural world, cannot subsist by itself. It is doubly dependent. On the one hand it is causally dependent upon the idea and will of God (Spirit); and on the other hand it is consequentially dependent upon being perceived by finite spirits. Only perceiving being has any real substance.

The analogy of being

The analogy of being between finite spirits and the Uncreated Spirit is that of the microcosm/macrocosm model:

> That the first supreme and universal principle of things from whence results of the being, the nature, the powers and motions, and sweet order of the world

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[1] Freedom of the Will, p. 183. [2] Supra, p. 168.

> is properly an intelligent willing agent such as our souls, only without imperfections, and not some inconceivable, unintelligent, necessary agent, seems most rational; because, of all the beings that we see or know anything of, man's soul only seems to be the image of that supreme universal principle. . . . 'Tis only the soul of man that does as that supreme principle does. This is a principle of action, has a power of motion in itself as that first principle has, and which no unperceiving being in this lower world has. Man's soul determines things in themselves indifferent, as motion and rest, the direction of motion, etc., as the supreme cause does. Man's soul has an end in what it does, pursues some good that is the issue of its actions, as the first principle doth. Man's soul makes, forms, preserves, disposes, and governs things within its sphere as the first principle does the world. Man's soul influences the body, continues its nature and powers and constant regular motions and productions, and actuates it as the supreme principle does the universe.[1]

Problematic aspects

There are two sensitive points in Edwards' Idealism--or to be more precise, his spirit ontology--that pose problems for his theological use of it. One point is a certain ambiguity having to do with the metaphysical status of space. The other point has to do with the existential status of finite spirits. Since these issues will be with us to the end of the inquiry we had better isolate and consider their roots now.

The ambiguity about space

The ambiguity about space is that Edwards could not unequivocally decide whether space is phenomenal or real;

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[1] "Misc., No. 383," Townsend, p. 81.

or to state it in other terms, whether space is the same for God as it is for us. He had no such qualm about time, as we have seen. Phenomenal time, or time as we experience it, is that of a natural chronological continuum; but for God (and to the regenerate man, in a fragmentary, limited way) it is different. Real time is the eternal "now," and what we experience as temporal succession is to God the logical succession of ideas. In other words, there is a qualitative difference between phenomenal and real time, or between time and eternity. Now, the question with respect to space is not whether there is a phenomenal aspect to space, for obviously we do have an idea of it in our minds, but whether there is any qualitative difference between the way we experience it and the way it really is. Edwards could not conceive any, and there are all kinds of motives in his philosophical theology not to want to find any. Without absolute space--meaning that it is the same for God as well as for man--theological naturalism would be difficult, if not impossible. Unless the outer and the inner are co-extensive we are back into all the problems attendant to the chaos/cosmos model, which we explored in the first part of this chapter.

Space and the "otherness" of world.--Edwards began, as we saw, by conceiving space as "necessary, eternal, infinite, and omnipresent being,"[1] and thus asserting that God and space are co-extensive, if not strictly identical. But then he had qualms about calling space "a being" and retreated to the position that it is an a priori idea or principle with the same status as the principle of sufficient reason. Since "the existence of all exterior things is ideal," it follows that,

> therefore [space] is a necessary being only as it is a necessary idea--so far as it is a simple idea that is necessarily connected with other simple exterior ideas and is, as it were, their common substance and subject. It is in the same manner a necessary being as anything external is a being.[2]

This is a remarkable statement for two reasons. One is that he gives the "idea" of space an a priori status, which means that it is not merely empirical. The other is that it must be constitutive of the external causes or ground of resistance--"as it were, their common substance and subject." We do not experience just resistance and then give it some kind of projected location external to us, rather we experience it as resistance-in-place. This means, as he explicitly states, that for us space has the same external status as God--or rather, God's activity--does. But what is this except to say that space is the a priori condition or medium of God's activity. He does not create "place" by willing or acting, rather he acts (insofar as he acts at all *ad extra*) *in* place.

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[1] Supra, p. 111.

[2] "The Mind, No. 9," Townsend, pp. 29-30.

This position, had it been held consistently, would not have been acceptable to the doctrine of creation *ex nihilo* to which he subscribed. Space would then be a co-eternal and co-existent principle with God, a given medium *in which* he acts rather than something that results *from* his creative activity. On the other hand, unless this position were maintained, the distinctive feature of Edwards' synthesis of the outer and the inner would be radically endangered. Unless there is some medium objective to both God and man through which (of necessity), and by means of which (in fact), God communicates to man, then experimentalism-with-means is circumvented and all is swallowed up in subjective immediacy. So, with respect to absolute space, Edwards could not accept the consequences of either consistently affirming it or consistently denying it. Unless God acts in space he acts nowhere. Unless space is in God he is not the Creator. Earlier we said that Edwards' conception was that space and God are "co-extensive and co-inherent." This just describes the ambiguity that is there; it does not resolve it.

Space and the "otherness" of spirits.--There is another point of departure which led to the same ambiguity about space. This was to begin with the inner rather than the outer. He on occasions spoke of space as if it were just as much a phenomenal idea as any other of the contents of the self. He had particular difficulty in conceiving how _minds_ could be _in place_ when place is an idea in the mind. "For we are to remember that the human body and the brain itself exist only mentally, in the same sense that other things do. And so, that which we call place is an idea too."[1] But then he realizes that this gets him into trouble because, pursued consistently, this involves the conclusion that without the objective medium of space God's _will_ is reduced to the status of something phenomenal, that all we have left is "mental acts of the deity" appearing immediately as ideas in our minds.[2] When he gets near this (unacceptable) conclusion he instinctively, though only momentarily, retreats behind the curtain of the inadequacy of language for the ineffable divine mystery.[3]

The _locus classicus_ of the difficulties and ambiguity of his thinking with respect to place and minds is the following tortured paragraph:

> It is not proper at all, nor doth it express the thing we would, to say that bodies do not exist without [that is, outside of] the mind. For the scheme will not allow the mind to be supposed determined to any place in such a manner as to make that proper; for place

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[1] "The Mind, No. 34," _Townsend_, p. 39.

[2] "The Mind, No. 35," _Townsend_, p. 40.

[3] _Ibid._, pp. 40-41.

> itself is mental, and within and without are mental conceptions. Therefore, that way of expressing will lead us into a thousand difficulties and perplexities. But when I say, the material universe exists only in the mind, I mean that it is absolutely dependent on the conception of the mind for its existence, and does not exist as spirits do, whose existence does not consist in, nor in dependence on the conception of other minds. We must be exceedingly careful lest we confound ourselves in these by mere imagination. It is from hence I expect the greatest opposition. It will appear a ridiculous thing, I suppose, that the material world exists nowhere but in the soul of man, confined within his skull; but we must again remember what sort of existence the head and brain have. The soul, in a sense, has its seat in the brain and so in a sense the visible world is existent out of the mind, for it certainly, in the most proper sense, exists out of the brain.[1]

It is difficult to tell just what Edwards does mean here, but certain things do seem to be asserted clearly enough:

1) The phenomenal distinction between the outer and the inner is not illusory.

2) The point of reference for such a distinction is always the perceiving self.

3) The phenomenal world or "material universe" is not a subjective projection, but it subsists only (but not solely) in being perceived by finite spirits. Being perceived is a necessary, but not a sufficient, condition.

4) But--and this is the crucial point here--other spirits or selves are not thus dependent upon being perceived for their subsistence. This is a different status

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[1] "The Mind, No. 51," Townsend, p. 52.

of location or otherness than that of the phenomenal world. Edwards says that he expects great opposition to his Idealism from these other selves. This is a different kind of resistance from that involved in perception of the world. Interpersonal encounter and communication between selves presupposes a kind of otherness or spatiality that is absolute and not only phenomenal. Without this the self, the neighbor, and God would be in reality one and the same placeless center of consciousness. In short, the spatiality phenomenally experienced in perception of the world is the "shadow" or "image" of the absolute "spatiality" of inter-spirit encounter which, though always mediated by the phenomenal world, is a qualitatively different form of resistance of otherness.

A possible line of resolution.--We have already cited Edwards as saying,

> The greatness of a soul consists not in any extension, but its comprehensiveness of idea and extendedness of operation. So the infiniteness of God consists in His perfect comprehension of all things and the extendedness of His operation equally to all places. God is present nowhere any otherwise than the soul is in the body or brain; and He is present everywhere, as the soul is in the body.[1]

This suggests that the Uncreated Spirit is the archetype of all spatiality. Space is not a "given" for God; rather it is the divine Spirit. It is not an "idea" in the divine mind; it is not a "product" of the divine will; rather, it is the way one characterizes the conjunction or mutual "consent" of ultimate meaning and power, or of "perfect comprehension of all things" and "extendedness of operation to all places."

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[1] "Misc., No. 194," cf. supra, p. 112.

To hold the position that the Uncreated Spirit is the archetype of all spatiality, the locus in which everything that "is" takes place, is a better way of handling the problem of the metaphysical status of space than we have seen heretofore; but it is not without its problematic aspects. If all that is takes place within divine Spirit, then how can there be distinctions between spirits (Uncreated and created)? Even more acutely, how can there be opposition (appearing "ridiculous") and "distance" between spirits? This leads us directly to the second sensitive point.

The ambiguity about the status of finite spirits

The semantic problem: "nature and spirit."--The relation of finite spirits to the Uncreated Spirit is the second point of ambiguity. Part of the trouble arises from the fact that he characterizes the relationship differently according to the different contexts in which he mentions it. When he speaks of "nature and spirit" in the context of the body-mind problem, the decisive line of demarcation, as we have seen, is between the outer as phenomenal and the inner as substantial. Spirits, only, are real substance; nature is the image or shadow of spiritual things. This way of drawing the line puts created spirits and the Uncreated Spirit together as far as metaphysical status goes, and it leads to the characterization of the relationship between the two spirits as one of degree rather than kind.

But when he talks of "nature and spirit" in the context of the nature-grace problem, the line of demarcation is drawn on a different plane altogether. Here nature is all that is "outside" of God, alienated from him and left to its own devices; spirit is all that is "in" God and animated by the divine life. Natural man is the whole man, not just his phenomenal or bodily aspects. He is a psychosomatic unity in the same sense that the New Testament speaks of "carnal" or "sensual" man, meaning carnally minded or having carnal affections. Carnality is a function of what man-without-God inevitably and spontaneously consents to, whole-heartedly embraces, and delights in. Spiritual man, by contrast, is the one in whom the Holy Spirit dwells and enlivens. The conception has nothing to do with immateriality or incorporeality. The spiritual man, as one in whom the Spirit dwells, irresistibly and spontaneously consents to, embraces, and delights in God and the things of God.[1] This way of drawing the line puts natural man and spiritual man into radically opposite camps as to existential status, and hence the difference between existential man and Uncreated Spirit is one of kind, not degree.

A possible line of resolution.--Edwards does use the same pair of words--nature and spirit--to describe two radically different kinds of distinction. But as the two distinctions do not cut on the same plane they are not necessarily incompatible. In the first case "nature and spirit" refer to the metaphysical distinction between the phenomenal and the real. "Spirits only are properly substance." The created spirit (man) and the Uncreated Spirit (God) are related as microcosm to macrocosm. But in the second case "nature and spirit" both refer to man, the created spirit. Here natural man is really 'fallen spirit.' As such he is radically outside of the divine life in a way that suggests the chaos/cosmos model. He is excluded from the infinite (chaos) and left to his own finite resources (cosmos).

Finite spirits, then, are "in" God by virtue of metaphysical status as spirits and "outside" of God by virtue of existential status as "natural" men. As natural man he does not cease to be finite spirit, neither does he cease to be dependent upon the Uncreated Spirit. But his relation to the Uncreated Spirit is external.

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[1] The "First" distinguishing sign of truly gracious and holy affections is a context in which this distinction is clearly drawn and extensively characterized. See especially Religious Affections, pp. 197-203.

Summary and prospect

We have seen that these two sensitive points--the metaphysical status of space and the existential status of finite spirits--are not unrelated, and the problems intensify the more the interrelation is considered. There is a spirit-space problem with respect to his doctrine of God. There is ambiguity, or at least a duality, in Edwards as to whether God is conceived as "highest being" (spirit) or "all-inclusive being" (space).[1] How he worked this out is the problem of his primary definition of God: God is being-in-general.

There is a spirit-space problem with respect to Edwards' conception of the immanence and transcendence of God. In what sense is the world, and particularly natural man, "outside" of God or of the divine life when God is the source and substance of all that is? This is the problem of his conception of the relation of God and the world: pan-en-theism.

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[1] Schafer, in discussing this duality in Edwards' thought, expresses the problem systematically as follows: (1) with respect to God as the totality of being, "If 'God is being' is a strict identification, then God is the totality of all manifestations of existence, and all entities are related to him as parts to a whole." (p. 136); (2) with respect to God as the highest being, "God may be thought of as a particular being participating in being to such a degree (an infinite degree) as to be preeminently being, but not so as to swallow up the being of all other things into his own." (pp. 136-37).

Finally, there is a spirit-space problem within the concept of a spirit ontology itself. In what sense is there an "otherness" inherent in any concept of life? The unity of self-relatedness cannot be conceived as a barren numerical unity. There is a procession-and-return, a going "out" of the self and a reunion with the self, which is the dynamics and the project of life itself. How Edwards dealt with this is his conception of God's end in creation: emanation and "remanation."

Now we are ready to make the transition from Edwards' philosophical system to his theological uses of it, and we can see just what direction that transition must take and the major themes we must discuss. In one sense we are done with the predominantly cultural-philosophical side of Edwards and ready to begin the predominantly theological side. But in another sense it is not so. Edwards the philosopher, as we have abundantly seen, was always Edwards the theologian; and Edwards the theologian remains to the last Edwards the philosopher. This is what it means to call him a "theologian of culture" of classic proportions. Man's cultural interests and his religious interests are not to be compartmentalized and hermetically sealed off from each other. If so, then both lose their seriousness and their dignity, the things that make them significant and worth-while, necessary and urgent.

The Primary Definition of God

God as Being in General

Edwards' primary definition of God is "Being in general." Why ontology? In order to answer this in terms of Edwards we must do three things. First, we must show that he regarded being-in-general as the ultimate category, the *prius* of all thought. Second and third, we must show that he regarded being-in-general as the first principle of explanation for both man's scientific and religious experience, respectively. These three tasks are not all on a par. The first task has a different status from the other two, which are more or less on a par with each other. The first is an awareness that *forces itself upon us*. We do not first arrive at the "conclusion" that being-in-general is the ultimate category because we are looking for reasons to explain something else. Without the presupposition of the one, ultimate, integrative category we would not be the kind of creatures that we are--namely, creatures who are impelled to ask for reasons, to ask the questions of the grounds or reasons for being and meaning. In other words, integrity is the presupposition of the quest for integrity. We would not seek it had we not lost it. And at the same time we would not be aware that we had lost it if it did not stand over us in every present moment as a demand essential to the being and meaning in our lives.

The other two are not on a par with the first in that they require that we go out of ourselves rather than go within ourselves. We are confronted with the positive or given fact that there is something and not nothing, and that it is thus and not otherwise. We ask the questions of the What and the How. And we ask the questions of the Why and the Wherefore. Both sets of questions arise out of experience and the encounter with the outer that it presupposes. Both sets of questions reflect the basic character or stigma of all finite experience--namely, its contingency.

Distinctions among the levels of reason

It is evident that what we are distinguishing here are the three familiar avenues of philosophical theology: ontological reason, cosmological reason, and teleological reason, respectively. The decisive break is between the first and the second, for in comparison with ontological reason both cosmological and teleological reason belong in the same class. Their principle is the principle of sufficient reason; their method is discursive, not intuitive. Nevertheless, once the fundamental likeness of the latter two has been duly noted, it is important to recognize that there is a logical priority of cosmological over teleological reason. Teleological reason would not arise unless contingent being were presupposed, for it asks the question of the meaning of contingent being.

If we were good Ramist logicians, or what amounts to the same thing, good Puritan rhetoricians, we would lay out the relation of the three levels of reason in something like the following scheme of dichotomies:


Being in general
Ontological:
necessary being
contingent being
Cosmological:
non-existence
existence
Teleological:
chance
design

With respect to teleological reason, non-being is meaninglessness (chance). With respect to cosmological reason, non-being is non-existence (the possibility of being otherwise or not at all). But with respect to ontological reason, non-being is inconceivable. The distinction between the levels, the dependence of a lower level upon that which precedes it in the hierarchy, and the dichotomies or disjunctions appropriate to each level are all-important. It is when a person confuses the levels and misapplies the dichotomies that all kinds of insoluble, pseudo problems arise. The chance/design dichotomy is inapplicable to non-existence since it is absurd to ask whether what is not is by chance or by design. But it is equally inapplicable to necessary being, although many fancy themselves posing a "real" question when asking whether God is "free" to do or not to do, or to do something other than that which his nature determines that he will. The No that must be spoken against this false, chaotic notion of "freedom" is not an answer that puts God "in chains" or makes man superior to God, but a rejection of the applicability of the question. God's freedom is not chaotic; his action is neither by chance nor by compulsion but rather it is that he is not conditioned or determined by anything external to himself. God's freedom is his absolute spontaneity.[1]

Likewise, the existence/non-existence dichotomy is inapplicable to being-in-general although people still ask the pseudo question of whether God "exists" or not. Edwards was quite lucid on this point:

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[1] Edwards generally prefers the term "arbitrary" to "spontaneous," but the way he defines it clearly shows that he means the latter. "When I speak of arbitrary operation, I don't mean arbitrary in opposition to an operation directed by wisdom, but only in opposition to an operation confined to, and limited by, those fixed establishments and laws commonly called laws of nature. . . . [God] acts as being limited and directed in nothing but His own wisdom, tied to no other rules and laws but the directions of His own infinite understanding." It is God's absolute spontaneity which is the ground of the laws of nature ("Misc., No. 1263," Townsend, pp. 185-86). I believe that the term "spontaneity" is preferable and requires less explanation and qualification to the modern reader. Further, it is less ambiguous than "freedom."

> A state of absolute nothing is a state of absolute contradiction. . . . When we go to expel body out of our thoughts . . . we must think of the same that the sleeping rocks dream of. And not till then shall we get a complete idea of nothing.
>
> . . . .
>
> When we go to enquire whether or no there can be absolutely nothing, we speak nonsense in enquiring. The stating of the question is nonsense because we make a disjunction where there is none. Either being or absolute nothing is no disjunction, no more than whether a triangle is a triangle or not a triangle. There is no other way but only for there to be existence. There is no such thing as absolute nothing. There is such a thing as nothing with respect to this ink and paper. There is such a thing as nothing with respect to you and me. There is such a thing as nothing with respect to this globe of earth and with respect to this created universe. There is another way besides these things having existence, but there is no such thing as nothing with respect to entity, "being" absolutely considered. We don't know what we say if we say we think it possible in itself that there should not be entity.[1]

What ontological reason clarifies

A thing is what it is, and it cannot be what it is and not be what it is at the same time. Being-in-general is the *prius* of all thought, all distinctions. It cannot be that and be one part of a disjunction at the same time. It is important to see just what ontological reason does establish and to distinguish that from what it does not establish. God as being-in-general, as we have seen, was not conceived by Edwards as _a_ being, for that would put him in disjunction with other beings. Nor, in the strictest sense, can he be equated with necessary being, for that would put him in disjunction with all contingent being. Being-in-general precedes the disjunction between necessary and contingent being and underlies and upholds both. It is even improper to call being-in-general the ultimate category since "category" implies something definitely circumscribed. Being-in-general is more properly designated as something like a cipher or a pointer that indicates the presence of that which transcends all powers of conceptualization since it is the _prius_ of all conceptualization. It is the "category" of the Infinite, which upholds, includes, and transcends everything that is.

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[1] "Of Being," *Townsend*, p. 9.

Being as one and inescapable

Ontological reason establishes the _inescapability_ and the _unity_ of the conception of the Godhead. That is all. These are formal prerequisites, not material designations. For what the being of the Godhead is like and what the nature of his unity is, ontological reason has no directives.

That Edwards' term "being in general" is fundamentally as we have described is well attested by his following reflection on the "Unity of the Godhead," which is worth quoting in full:

> The unity of the Godhead will necessarily follow from God's being infinite; for to be infinite is to be all, and it would be a contradiction to suppose two alls, because, if there be two or more, one alone is not all but the sum of them put together are all. Infinity and omneity, if I may so speak, must go together, because, if any being falls short of omneity, then it is not infinite. Therein it is limited. Therein there is something that it don't extend to or that it don't comprehend. If there be something more, then there is something beyond. And wherein this being don't reach and include that which is beyond, therein it is limited--its bounds stop short of this that is not comprehended. An infinite being, therefore, must be an all-comprehending being. He must comprehend in himself all being. That there should be another being underived and independent, and so no way comprehended, will argue him not to be infinite, because there is something more, there is more entity. There is some entity beside what is in this being, and therefore his entity can't be infinite. Those two things put together are more than one; for they taken together are a sum total, and one taken alone is but a part of that sum total and therefore is finite. For whatsoever is a part is finite. God, as He is infinite and the being whence all are derived and from whom everything is given, does comprehend the entity of all His creatures; and their entity is not to be added to His, as not comprehended in it, for they are but communications from Him. Communications of being ben't additions of being. The reflections of the sun's light don't add at all to the sum total of the light. 'Tis true mathematicians conceive of greater than infinite, in some respects, and of several infinities being added to one another; but 'tis because they are in some respect finite, as a thing conceived infinitely long may not be infinitely thick, and so its thickness may be added to. Or if it be conceived infinitely long one way, yet it may be conceived having bounds or an end another. But God is in no respect limited, and therefore can in no respect be added to.[1]

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[1] "Misc., No. 697," Townsend, p. 262.

The point of contact between ontological and cosmological reason: "necessary being"

Ontological reason establishes, or rather clarifies, the "category" of the Infinite. Being-in-general is one and it is inescapable--that is, it is the presupposition and context of all being and meaning. But, like the notion of infinity itself, it is an incomprehensible unity and an incomprehensible all-inclusiveness to which it points. How can the "incomprehensible" be represented to the finite mind? This is where the concept of necessary being mediates between ontological and cosmological reason. We said that strictly speaking it is inappropriate to equate necessary being with God, for that concept is one part of a disjunction. God is being-in-general, which precedes the disjunction necessary/contingent. Still the attributes of necessary being have traditionally been regarded as divine perfections, and in this Edwards was no exception. These attributes are also formal, not material. They are: (1) eternity--the same in all time, unchanging, immutable; and (2) omnipresence--in all space. These attributes, like the whole hypothetical notion of necessary being, are in polar relation to contingent being. They simply negate or remove the limits from finite categories. As logically necessary, though existentially hypothetical, antitheses of contingent being they structurally belong to cosmological reason. But as negations of the categories of contingent being they symbolically point to that which ontological reason clarifies--namely, the incomprehensible unity and incomprehensible all-inclusiveness of the Infinite. "Eternity" as applied to God does not really add an attribute; rather it points to, in terms of the temporal category of cosmological reason, the oneness of the Infinite. Likewise "omnipresence" does not add an attribute; it is the finite spatial symbol of the all-comprehensiveness of the Infinite. Edwards reflects an awareness of both the traditional necessity and yet the strict inappropriateness of the equation of necessary being with God in the following statement:

> Our notions we have of the divine nature are so imperfect that our imperfect idea admits of a disjunction, for whatsoever is not absolutely perfect doth so. [In] everything that is imperfect there is a dependence or contingent existence implied in the nature of it, and we can conceive of its being a part of a disjunction. There is a "thus" and an "otherwise" in the case. As soon as ever we have descended one step below absolute perfection, possibility ceases to be simple: it divides and becomes manifold. Thus, for instance, we can't conceive of God without attributing succession to Him, but that notion brings along with it contingent existence and introduces with it a manifold possibility.[1]

So we attribute succession to God, but deny change--which really means that we negate succession. This is the way the notion of "eternity" functions. We attribute space to God, but deny his being in any special place--which means that we negate space. This is the way the notion of

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[1] "Misc., No. 650," Townsend, p. 82.

"omnipresence" functions. In summary, we attribute existence to God, but deny contingency--which really means that we negate existence. This is the way the notion of "necessary being" functions. Time, space, existence--all of these are categories of finite or contingent being--properly belong to the province of cosmological reason. But by the simultaneous attribution-and-negation of these categories--and there are no others!--we point to the ever-present (or, at least, ever-presupposed) ontological awareness of the Infinite, its incomprehensible unity and its incomprehensible all-inclusiveness. This is what we mean in saying that the hypothetical concept of necessary being, with its hypothetical attributes of eternity and omnipresence, mediates symbolically between ontological reason and cosmological reason.

What cosmological reason contributes

So far we have explored the avenue of ontological reason and the first of the three transcendentalia (Being is one; Being is truth; Being is good) which are inherent in every ontology.[1] We have discharged the first of our tasks in answering "Why ontology?" by showing that being-in-general is Edwards' designation for the awareness of the presence of the Infinite, with its formal attributes or perfections of unity and all-inclusiveness. Now we must turn to his use of cosmological and teleological reason to show that and how he regarded being-in-general as the first principle of explanation for both man's scientific and religious experience, respectively; or in more traditional terms, how being-in-general is the Truth itself and the Good itself.

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[1] Schafer reminds us that there are three modes of being which are the starting points for every metaphysics of being: "a) Identity: a thing is what it is. ['Being is one'] b) Sufficient Reason: everything which is, to the extent that it is, has a sufficient reason for its being and its being what it is. ['Being is truth'] c) Finality: potentiality tends to actuality, or, every agent acts in view of an end. ['Being is good']" (p. 104).

We need spend little time here on most aspects of Edwards' use of cosmological reason for that is what we have already explored extensively in his relation to Newton and Locke and his synthesis of the two in his spirit ontology. Cosmological reason deals with all the categories and contents of experience. All experience bears the mark of contingency. It deals with all the contents of the self, including self-awareness, which are not from eternity and self-subsistent but have a beginning in time and are dependent. It is contingent being, predicated on contingent experience, which drives us to ask the question of the ground and goal of life. Cosmological reason stands most immediately involved in experience, and it looks in both directions: to ontological reason for the ground of being, as we have seen in the concept of "necessary being"; and to teleological reason for the goal or meaning of being, as we have yet to explore.

Unlike ontological reason, cosmological reason has to do with both formal and material knowledge of God. The formal attributes which it contributes are omniscience and omnipotence. The material knowledge is that God is "personal." These are implicit in Edwards' conclusions about the idea and will of God being the ground of all our being and knowledge. From experience of the contingent world we may infer necessary, self-subsistent, omniscient and omnipotent being.[1] And from the word of revelation we may infer an extraordinary speaker who has "an understanding, will and design"--that is, a purposive, personal being.[2]

Being as spirit

We can see that whereas ontological reason clarifies the basis of the analogy of being in the incomprehensible unity and all-inclusiveness of the Infinite, it is cosmological reason that provides the content of the analogy (the spirit ontology) and clarifies the proportionality of the analogy (in the simultaneous predication and negation of the categories). Since only intelligent being is substantial being, it follows that the incomprehensible unity of the Infinite must be thought out along lines analogous to finite, personal self-relatedness--namely, in terms of self-awareness (or self-objectification; idea) and self-affirmation (or self-acceptance; will). The proportionality must be thought out on the basis that whereas for the finite self all its contents, including self-awareness, are contingent and dependent; for the divine life the contents are inherent and constitutive. In other words, on the basis of the material knowledge of being-in-general which cosmological reason provides, the incomprehensible unity must be thought out in terms of the dynamic unity of life and not in terms of some barren or abstract mathematical oneness. And the incomprehensible all-inclusiveness must be thought out as analogous to the fullness of life and not in terms of some barren or abstract mathematical notion of summation or infinity.

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[1] Freedom of the Will, pp. 181-82.

[2] "Misc., No. 254," Townsend, pp.77-78. This is also repeated word for word in Edwards' "Observations Concerning Faith," Works (Worcester), II, 627.

Edwards' definition of truth

Since cosmological reasoning is scientific reason it involves the basic notion of truth. What was Edwards' definition of truth? Any theory of truth--whether it be a correspondence theory or a coherence theory or a pragmatic theory--involves three elements. Two of those elements are the terms in the proposition that affirms something about their relationship to each other. The third element is some implied or conscious standard or criterion by which the mind judges the proposition to be correctly stated. In Edwards' first definition of truth, which Harvey G. Townsend believed to have been penned under the direct influence of Locke, he stated it thus:

> Truth is the perception of the relations there are between ideas. Falsehood is the supposition of relations between ideas that are inconsistent with those ideas themselves, not their disagreement with things without. All truth is in the mind, and only there. It is ideas, or what is in the mind alone, that can be the object of the mind. And what we call truth is a consistent supposition of relations between what is the object of the mind. Falsehood is an inconsistent supposition of relations. The truth that is in a mind must be in that mind as to its object and everything pertaining to it. The only foundation of error is inadequateness and imperfection of ideas; for if the idea were perfect it would be impossible but that all its relations should be perfectly perceived.[1]

This is an interesting statement in that he undercuts in the last sentence what he has affirmed in the first part of the paragraph. Error or falsehood as an "inconsistent supposition of relations" can only be accounted for by inadequate and imperfect ideas. By what purely internal criterion can we judge an idea to be inadequate and imperfect? Inadequate to what? And if the possibility of error must be accounted for by reference to a criterion that is not implicit in either of the terms related or to principles constitutive of reason (such as "consistency" or the law of non-contradiction), then what does this imply about truth? Truth presupposes the adequacy of perception, and perception refers to the outer.

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[1] "The Mind, No. 6," Townsend, pp. 28-29. For Townsend's judgment, stated above, see his footnote 11, p. 29.

Edwards does not abandon this statement, but he does recognize that it has to be expanded. No coherence theory of truth is satisfying unless it implies, consciously or unconsciously, that the greater the coherence the greater the adequacy of reference to reality-as-a-whole. Edwards mends the gap by saying:

> Truth, in general, may be defined after the most strict and metaphysical manner: the consistency and agreement of our ideas with the ideas of God. . . . Truth as to external things is the consistency of our ideas with those ideas or that train and series of ideas that are raised in our minds according to God's stated order and law. Truth as to abstract ideas is the consistency of our ideas with themselves--as when our idea of a circle, or a triangle, or any of their parts, is agreeable to the idea we have stated and agreed to call by the name of a circle, or a triangle. And it may still be said that truth is the consistency of our ideas with themselves. Those ideas are false that are not consistent with the series of ideas that are raised in our minds by, [i.e.,] according to, the order of nature.[1]

This expanded definition is in accord with his position that all our ideas are raised in our minds by God's activity mediated to us through the outer. It solves the problem of a referential criterion, but it does so at the expense of the possibility of error! Since "God is truth itself,"[2] and since God is the source of all our ideas, then how can we distinguish between one idea and another as to its degree of adequacy? Or rather, how can any of our ideas be inadequate? He seems to admit this difficulty, though in a backhanded way, in what he says in "Corollary 3" to the above definition:

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[1] "The Mind, No. 10," Townsend, p. 30.

[2] "The Mind, Corollary 1," Townsend, p. 30.

> Therefore, if we had perfect ideas of all things at once, that is, could have all in one view, we should know all truth at the same moment, and there would be no such thing as ratiocination, or finding out truth. And reasoning is only of use to us in the consequence of the paucity of our ideas and because we can have but very few in view at once. Hence it is evident that all things are self-evident to God.[1]

Error is not the inadequacy of any particular idea or set of ideas, rather it is that we do not simultaneously comprehend all ideas--that is, that we are not God! Be that as it may, it still does not account for "inconsistent supposition of relations" between any two terms that are themselves perfectly adequate to their source.

That Edwards himself was dissatisfied with the definition of truth thus far is evidenced a little later in the same youthful treatise ("The Mind"):

> After all that has been said and done, the only adequate definition of truth is the agreement of our ideas with existence. To explain what this existence is, is another thing. In abstract ideas it is nothing but the ideas themselves; so their truth is their consistency with themselves. In things that are supposed to be without us, it is the determination and fixed mode of God's exciting ideas in us. So that truth in

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[1] Townsend, pp. 30-31.

> these things is an agreement of our ideas with that series in God. It is existence and that is all that we can say. It is impossible that we should explain a perfectly abstract and mere idea of existence; only we always find this, by running of it up, that God and real existence are the same.[1]

Here he is abandoning the position that error is simply due to the paucity of our ideas. But he is not abandoning the position that truth ultimately has an ontological reference and criterion.[2] How and why God, who is the truth itself, can be the source of all our ideas and at the same time some of them be false or inadequate ideas--that is, at variance with the truth as it is in God--is something he cannot explain. It just "is."

Problems and portents.--These youthful (but by no means therefore to be dismissed as "sophomoric"!) reflections on truth are not Edwards' last words on the subject. It is fitting that he should reach an impasse in trying to define truth on the level of cosmological reason alone, because in the final analysis his definition of truth is not just that of coherence and correspondence but of participation. The ideas we have of natural things are representations, which are more or less adequate to that which is represented. But the ideas we have of spiritual things, the "substance" of which the natural is but the "shadow," are not representations but the thing itself. We may have an idea of God's greatness which, insofar as it is humanly possible, corresponds or is adequate to the subject; but we can have no real idea--that is, "ideal apprehension and sensible knowledge"--of his goodness or his love without loving him with all our heart and soul and mind and strength. The whole truth is a uniting of wills as well as, or even surpassing, a meeting of minds. It is internal consent as well as external agreement. This leads us to Edwards' understanding of grace, and with it, more properly into the province of teleological reason.

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[1] "The Mind, No. 15," Townsend, pp. 32-33.

[2] We must not be misled by Edwards' use of the word "existence" here. He is not as careful in his terminology as we would wish him to be, for he most often makes no distinction between "existence," "being," and "entity." The context here makes it plain that his reference is ontological and not just ontic. **Schafer** notes that Edwards makes no careful distinction between essence and existence. "The former he seldom uses, and the latter he equates with 'being' and 'entity.' Though he occasionally implies a distinction between the 'what' and the 'that' of being, he tends to use the word 'being' for both" (p. 96).

The point of contact between cosmological and teleological reason: "grace"

"Grace" in anybody's theology is a difficult and somewhat ineffable subject. But since Edwards never shrank from the effort to utter the ineffable, we must not be cowards in the face of this task in expounding his views. Two difficulties or confusions immediately confront us. Above, we said that grace belongs to the province of cosmological reason, that it is experimental knowledge and, in fact, is the sum and substance of all material knowledge of God. Now, are we not confusing the issue by shunting it off to teleological reason? The other difficulty is that since grace is fundamentally a _relational_ concept--how one being is disposed toward another--does that not all the more argue for its being treated under the head of cosmological reason, that it belongs to the truth of things as they are _externally_ related? Let us clear up these matters first.

Grace _does_ belong to the province of cosmological reason in its _outward form_. The goodness of God is material knowledge inferred from the design we encounter in all aspects of experience, the fitness of the parts to the whole. It is impossible for us to recapture the exhilaration that the discovery of universal design--Newton's world machine--occasioned in the Enlightenment, but Alexander Pope speaks for the period in the couplet:

> Nature and Nature's laws lay hid in night:
> God said, _Let_ Newton _be_! and all was light.[1]

And the confidence this engendered in the way of obtaining natural knowledge of the goodness and wisdom of God was exuberant, as Pope in his _Essay on Man_ expresses:

> All are but parts of one stupendous whole,
> Whose body Nature is, and God the soul.
> . . . .
> All Nature is but art, unknown to thee;
> All chance, direction, which thou canst not see;

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[1] Cited in Randall, p. 275.

All discord, harmony not understood;
All partial evil, universal good:
And, spite of pride, in erring reason's spite,
One truth is clear, whatever is, is right.[1]

Though this view is not in all respects coincident with his own, Edwards did not doubt that the argument from design would lead any unprejudiced mind to *assent* to the proposition that being-in-general is good, that God's activity is directed toward ends that are framed by an infinite wisdom. In this respect, grace, which is God's goodness, is material knowledge; and it belongs to the province of cosmological reason, which means that it is the possible or potential knowledge of every man. But equally certain was he that no amount or degree of *assent* to God's goodness could pass for *consent* to the goodness of God. Assent belongs to cosmological reason, consent to teleological. Assent is acknowledgment of the truth of a representation; consent is love toward and delight in the thing itself. Assent involves the mind, without existential commitment. Consent engages the *mind and heart* in the total orientation of the self. The latter, only, is saving grace; the former is a fruit of common grace.

Grace and truth.--Consent does not add to the fund of propositional knowledge about God, not even about his goodness. It does not provide reasons, causes, or explanations in place of, or in opposition to, those which cosmological reason provides. In this sense the New Learning was right in banishing teleological explanations for finite events within the system of nature. But insofar as it brings to completion or fulfillment _the self_ who employs cosmological reason it is the essence and sum and end of all material knowledge. It is the substance of what all material knowledge is but the shadow. Grace, then, as it surpasses the province of cosmological reason, is self-fulfilling knowledge. It is life-giving knowledge in which the knower participates in the known through mutual consent, involving love ("benevolence") and delight ("complacence"). As such it belongs to the _telos_ or fulfillment of being and not just to discursive knowledge about being, or scientific knowledge.

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[1] *Ibid*.

Grace is a boundary concept mediating between cosmological and teleological reason in much the same way as the concept of necessary being mediates between ontological and cosmological reason. Their functions are the same, but their status is different. Necessary being belongs to the _structure_ of cosmological reason but points beyond it to that which precedes, upholds, and transcends all structures, including the reasoning self. Grace belongs to the _matter_ of cosmological reason but it points to that which transforms and fulfills all life through the ineffable and incomprehensible union of the self with being-in-general.

What we are saying here is just another way of explicating what we emphasized in Edwards' mysticism-with-means. If one cuts grace loose from its footing in cosmological reason--that is, in experience, the simple ideas _of sense_--then the mysticism soars to unadulterated pantheism and the self is lost in the vast ocean of being. _But Edwards never does that_. On the other hand, unless the mystical-intuitive element in grace transcends the ordinary subject-object or disjunctive nature of cosmological reason and brings the two together in a living union--"heart knowledge"--then the whole truth is never consummated. Admittedly these are difficult notions. But it is safe to say that he who has no patience with mysticism-with-means, or he who can see no real difference between that and outright pantheism, has not the capacity to even try to understand Jonathan Edwards. The pilgrimage of reason--or truth--or life itself--is one that begins in undifferentiated, all comprehensive unity; then proceeds to differentiation and disjunction; and then is consummated in reunion. But the end is not a reabsorption of the externally differentiated back into the undifferentiated One. Rather it is a dynamic unity involving the internal, spontaneous, mutual consent to each other. And the paradigm of this "pilgrimage" is being-in-general, the divine life itself. Here again we anticipate Edwards on the Trinity.

Grace and the Spirit-spirit relation.--Now to the second objection or confusion: that grace is fundamentally a relational concept--how one being is disposed toward another; that it belongs to the truth of things as they are externally related. Since this is the most sensitive point with any theology of Act (for example, Barth's oft repeated public statement that God is for you, not in you) or any interpretation of New Testament agape as absolutely disjunctive with all other forms of love (for example, as Nygren has made famous), it is important to see where Edwards stands here. Edwards' position is one of continuity-and-discontinuity. As gracious, God is both for and in man. The discontinuity is that there is no direct transition from nature to grace. No amount or degree of external assent to God's greatness and goodness can pass for or make up the lack of internal consent to the greatness and goodness of God. Consent is an internal love of and delight in God, a "sight" or "taste" or "relish" of his sole and absolute sovereignty. And only God can give this consent since it is the love with which only he is capable of loving himself. God in the Spirit continually acts upon all men, upholding, restraining, and assisting natural man. This is common grace and it is an external relation, emphasizing discontinuity. But there is continuity in that in saving grace the Spirit indwells and acts from within the spontaneous center of the self. The giving is an external act, but the gift is an internal relation. In saving grace

God consents to himself in and through the creature.

Grace and self-fulfillment.--But there is a deeper, more fundamental continuity than just that of continuity in the life in grace once it has been bestowed. The consent which grace gives does not negate the natural personal spontaneity, nor does it displace it; it restores and fulfills natural man to his true beginnings and original righteousness. We shall have to say more about this when we come to the second main point, the relation between God and the world; but the thing to note here is that there must be an ontological foundation for what is externally given and internally consummated in grace. Grace belongs to man's original condition (but not his "essential" nature) and is essential to his well being. We raised the problem much earlier in connection with Calvinism as to how the demands of obedience and worship are legitimated. It is one thing to know that there is a God, and another to acknowledge internally that he ought to be adored. It is one thing to assent to the existence of a universal moral law, and another to acknowledge internally that it ought to be obeyed. No conception of external relations can legitimate the demand for one being to subordinate himself to another. Edwards saw this clearly:

> A command of any being can't be the prime foundation of obligation because there must be something prior, as a reason why a command is obligatory, and why obedience is due to it. If anyone should ask me why

> I am obliged to obey God more than the king of France, it would not be proper for me to answer, because God commands me to obey Him. There is something prior to God's command that is the ground of, and reason why, His command obliges.[1]

This "something prior" is the ontological foundation of all consent. "To be," on any level, necessarily involves consent to being. Or in other words, self-relatedness, which is the irreducible description of "intelligent beings" or "spirits," necessarily involves self-affirmation, consent to the self, as well as self-objectification. The ontological foundation or prius of all consent, or of all goodness, is not some external relation between two beings, but rather the all-inclusive self-affirmation of being-in-general, being's consent to being. Without this ontological prius no being could safely consent or be legitimately required to consent to another. When the creature consents to God he is consenting not to some alien being but to that which supports, includes, and transcends his own being. And unless and until he consents to being-in-general his own self-affirmation is incomplete, and his act of affirming his incomplete self is self-distorting and ultimately self-destructive. It is this ontological prius--this deepest and most ultimate continuity--that legitimates the dynamics of grace.

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[1] "Misc., No. 566," Townsend, pp. 243-44.

What teleological reason consummates

Teleological reason quite properly belongs solely to the sphere of internal relations. It deals most immediately with the means-end connection and the relation between act and potency. When the law of internal relations is projected upon external relations it is obviously done so only by way of analogy and it adds nothing to our scientific knowledge of the way things are externally related. A clock, we say, has the purpose of telling time, and for that end it is eminently better suited and more accurate than a sundial. But the purpose is not that of the mechanism, rather it is that of the maker or user of it. And though that end may explain why it was made at all, it still does not add to our knowledge of the mechanics of the interrelation of the various parts. The "use" of a thing, or of all things singly or together--the practical concern which so dominated the Puritan mind--was not regarded as a property resident in the thing, but only with reference to the agency that is the ground and goal of the thing's coming to be and being thus and not otherwise.

Teleological reason has to do with the internal dynamics of agency, with the manner in which the will is determined. It is related to and relevant to the outer in that the manner in which the will is determined has consequences or effects in the way the outer is disposed; and unless that connection were presupposed, there would be no real agency--an act would be to no effect. But the point is that this latter connection is a cosmological problem. Edwards' answers to it were the ground-and-consequent analogy of sensation and the ability or freedom of the self to do what it wills. Since cosmological reason is logically prior to teleological reason, teleological reason presupposes some such state of affairs. Then it asks the further question of how "the ground" itself is determined so that it produces the consequents that do necessarily result from it. This internal dynamics by which the basic orientation of the will is determined--or we could say, by which self-relatedness is consummated--either in man or in God, is the proper locus of teleological reason. This is the heart of the problem, and it were better to deal directly with it than get bogged down in the quagmire of lesser problems incident to its analogical use in cosmological affairs.

"To be" as an end in itself

In "perceiving beings" or "spirits"--and spirits, only, are properly substance--"to be" is an end. In fact, it is the end of all subordinate ends and acts. Being, or more properly, life, is not some static givenness. It is a dynamic self-relatedness involving self-awareness (understanding) and self-affirmation (will). "'Tis evident," says Edwards, "that there are no more than these three, really distinct in God--God, and His idea, and His love and delight. We can't conceive of any further real distinctions."[1] And this irreducible description of the entity (being, simply considered) of the divine life is the basis for the natural image of God in man. "There is, in resemblance to this threefold distinction in God, a threefold distinction in a created spirit--namely, the spirit itself, and its understanding, and its will or inclination or love. And this indeed is all the real distinction there is in created spirits."[2] It is this last term describing the entity of fundamental reality--namely, self-affirmation--that makes it necessary to say that "to be" is an end. There is no life at all without self-affirmation, so the end of self-affirmation is "to be." Yet unless the self is able to affirm its true self, life miscarries or misses its mark. So it is in the quality of self-affirmation and what determines it that we find the proper locus of virtue and vice, goodness and evil. Goodness is a predicate of wills, not of things.

> Man is as if he were two, as some of the great wits of this age have observed. A sort of genie is with man, that accompanies him and attends wherever he goes, so that a man has conversation with himself. That is, he has a conversation with his own idea, so that, if his

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[1] "Misc., No. 259," Townsend, p. 259.

[2] *Ibid.*, pp. 259-60.

> idea be excellent, he will take great delight and happiness in conferring and communing with it. He takes complacency in himself, he applauds himself. And wicked men accuse them[selves], and fight with themselves as if they were two. And man is truly happy then, and only then, when these two agree. And they delight in themselves and in their own idea and image as God delights in His.[1]

Self-affirmation and "the Good"

Thus far we have not had occasion for a direct specification of Edwards' ethical thought though we have been talking about it ever since we began to give heed to grace and teleological reason. We must now show not only what Edwards' conception of goodness is, but also how his definition of it leads necessarily to the ontological reference, that being-in-general is the Good itself.

The dynamics of self-relatedness.--Every will is determined or disposed toward the self's own idea of itself. This kind of "self-love" is not a description of virtue or vice but simply a description of living being.[2] There is no such thing as a neutral, uncommitted will; for wherever there is life there is a self consenting to or willing its own being. And this self-affirmation (a much less misleading term than self-love) is not compelled; it is spontaneous. Therein lies the self's moral accountability. Still, though not compelled, this spontaneity is determined by the self's idea of itself, since that is all it has to affirm. And in turn, the self's idea, like all the contents of the self including self-awareness, is dependent upon experience or perception. This, in turn, is dependent upon the idea and will of God. And the will of God exerted _ad extra_ is dependent upon his inner consent to his own idea of himself.

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[1] "Misc., No. 94," Townsend, pp. 255-56.

[2] "That which is often called self-love is exceedingly improperly called love. For they do not only say that one loves himself when he sees something amiable in himself (the view that begets delight), but merely an inclination to pleasure and adverseness to pain they call self-love. . . . Now how improper it is to say that one loves himself because what is agreeable to him is agreeable to him and what is disagreeable to him is disagreeable to him--which mere entity supposes! So that this they call self-love is no affection, but only the entity of the thing, or his being what he is" ("The Mind, No. 1," Townsend, p. 26).

The difference between virtue and vice.--In view of the necessity of self-affirmation, the only leeway for determining virtue and vice lies in the self's idea of itself, the object of self-affirmation. As Edwards reflects in the citation immediately preceding, "a man has conversation with himself" or "with his own idea." And "_if his idea be excellent_"--that is, if there is a fitness or correspondence between his idea of himself and the truth about himself--then he will find "happiness" or fulfillment in affirming it. "And man is truly happy then, and only then, when the two agree."

Virtue as "benevolence to being in general"

But, as we noted, the truth about himself is that he is dependent upon being-in-general. "If every intelligent being is some way related to being in general, and is a part of the universal system of existence; and so stands in connection with the whole; what can its general and true beauty be, but its union and consent with the great whole?"[1] Any image which does not reflect this dependence is a false image. And any affirmation of a false or inadequate image must of necessity be self-distorting as well as a dissent to "the great whole"; in other words, it is vicious and sinful. True virtue, or true happiness, or true self-fulfillment, then, "most essentially consists in *benevolence to being in general*. Or perhaps, to speak more accurately, it is that consent, propensity and union of heart to being in general, which is immediately exercised in a general good will."[2]

The primary object of virtuous consent

Edwards goes on to specify a primary and a secondary object of virtuous consent, whose order is irreversible:

> The first object of a virtuous benevolence is being, simply considered; and if being, simply considered, be its object, then being in general is its object; and what it has an ultimate propensity to is the highest good of being in general. And it will seek the good of every individual being unless it be conceived as not consistent with the highest good of being in

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[1] "True Virtue," *Works*, III, 95.

[2] *Ibid*., p. 94.

> general. . . .
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> Further, if being, simply considered, be the first object of a truly virtuous benevolence, then that object who has the most of being, or has the greatest share of existence, other things being equal, so far as such a being is exhibited to our faculties, will have the greatest share of the propensity and benevolent affections of the heart.[1]

What he is saying here corresponds to what we discussed under the heading of ontological reason: The first object of virtuous consent must be to the presence of the Infinite, with due regard for its oneness ("the highest good of being in general") and its all-inclusiveness ("the most of being,""the greatest share of existence"). The difference is that whereas ontological reason does perforce lead us to assent to the "category" of the Infinite, consent is possible only on the basis of an existential perception of the Infinite. Such an intuition is inconceivable to anyone who has not experienced it and ineffable to anyone who has. It is "mystical" or "ecstatic." Like all perceptions, it cannot be produced or willed into existence. It just happens. It is given. All of this Edwards would be the first to insist upon. But he would also maintain that just because we cannot produce it, either by taking thought or by high resolve, it does not follow that we do not need it. This is precisely the plight of natural man: Grace is necessary, but it is not inevitable!

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[1] Ibid., p. 97.

The secondary object of virtuous consent

> The second object of a virtuous propensity of heart is benevolent being. A secondary ground of pure benevolence is virtuous benevolence itself in its object. When any one under the influence of general benevolence, sees another being possessed of the like general benevolence, this attaches his heart to him, and draws forth greater love to him, than merely his having existence: because so far as the being beloved has love to being in general, so far his own being is, as it were, enlarged; extends to, and in some sort comprehends being in general: and therefore, he that is governed by love to being in general, must of necessity have complacence in him, and the greater degree of benevolence to him, as it were out of gratitude to him for his love to general existence, that his own heart is extended and united to, and so looks on its interest as its own. It is because his heart is thus united to being in general, that he looks on a benevolent propensity to being in general, wherever he sees it, as the beauty of the being in whom it is; an excellency that renders him worthy of esteem, complacence, and the greater good-will.[1]

This corresponds to what we have noted in the discussion of cosmological reason: being-in-general is not something static; it is _living_ being; God as Spirit is at least personal being. As such, he who consents to entity consents to _self-related_ entity. Being-in-general, in order "to be," consents to its own entity. And since God's idea of himself is perfect or excellent, his consent to himself is absolute love and absolute delight or happiness. In God, consent to entity and consent to benevolent being are coincident. Still, for God no less than for man, moral beauty or true virtue consists in consent to being-in-general. Virtue in God is his "self-love" or self-affirmation. Virtue in man is his God-love, which is the only true basis for his (man's) "self-love" or self-affirmation. Edwards states all of this succinctly in his definition of happiness:

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[1] _Ibid_., p. 98.

> Happiness strictly consists in the perception of these three things: of the consent of being to its own being; of its own consent to being; and of being's consent to being.[1]

The first is self-affirmation, or simply "to be" in a particular sense; the second is love to God; the third is God's love of and delight in himself, or, as Edwards denotes it, God's "holiness." It is "to be" in the general sense. In the Uncreated Spirit all three are coincident, all three objects of consent are the same. In created spirits the first is dependent upon the second, and the second entails the third.

Qualitative sameness;
quantitative distinction

From the standpoint of the created spirit looking toward the moral beauty of its object,

> it must be noted, that the degree of the amiableness of true virtue primarily consisting in consent, and a benevolent propensity of heart to being in general, is not in the simple proportion of the degree of benevolent affection seen, but in a proportion compounded of the greatness of the benevolent being, or the degree of being, and the degree of benevolence. . . . As a

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[1] "The Mind, No. 1, Corollary 2," Townsend, p. 27.

> large quantity of gold, with the same quality, is more valuable than a small quantity for the same metal.[1]

This proviso is added because, whereas moral beauty or true virtue in God and man is the same thing *qualitatively*--that is, it is consent to being-in-general--it is still true that God's holiness infinitely surpasses anything man is capable of because his consent is an *infinite* consent; he has "more being" with which to consent than man because he comprehends the whole system of which man is only a small part. Thus virtue in man does not add to the sum total of virtue because, even though it is qualitatively the same as God's virtue, it is still but a pale, finite shadow of the infinite virtue of God which precedes it and encompasses it and transcends it.

Resolution of the ambiguity in the doctrine of God

This may seem an unnecessarily fine point to make, but a moment's reflection will prove that it is all-important in giving us an insight into how Edwards resolved in his own mind what we called earlier the basic problem of his doctrine of God. In discussing the ambiguities in Edwards' Idealism we indicated that there is a spirit-space problem, or at least duality, with respect to his doctrine of God. Is God conceived as "highest being"

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[1] "True Virtue," *Works*, III, 99.

(spirit) or "all-inclusive being" (space)? If either or both of these were literal designations of being-in-general, then we would have an insoluble problem. If being-in-general were literally equivalent to "highest being" (which is actually just another designation for "necessary being"), then God's consent to himself could not include man's true virtue. Necessary being and contingent being are disjunctive and mutually exclusive. On the other hand, if being-in-general were literally equivalent to "all-inclusive being" (which is actually just another designation for the sum of all contingent existence), then man's true virtue would, of necessity, result in an increment to God's virtue. But being-in-general is literally neither of these; it precedes, encompasses, and transcends these conceptual symbols. The finite mind must employ both of these conceptual symbols if one is to philosophize or theologize at all. But the point is that no amount of consent to these symbols--as if they were literal designations--is the same thing as consent to being-in-general. A man may give his whole heart to a conception of a Being who is wholly other, or disjunctive with the being of this world. But there neither is nor can be any true virtue in it. Likewise, if it were conceivable for a man to know the sum of all existence, and give his whole heart to it, there would still be no true virtue in it. Either of these commitments would give man extensive--even complete--knowledge of "natural beauty" or "natural agreement," which is justice. But "cordial agreement" or "moral beauty" is the consent that spontaneously follows upon an existential perception of that which surpasses all conceptualization. Being-in-general is the Infinite, the incomprehensible. God may be symbolized, but he cannot be conceptualized. Here again, we are on the threshold of the mystical or the ecstatic. But this is where Edwards would have us be, for being-in-general is a mystical notion; its perception is the ecstasy of perception; and consent to it is rapture. And nothing less than this is, according to Edwards, true virtue.

Summary

All three of the *transcendentalia* point to something essential in the richness of being-in-general. Ontological reason points to the oneness of being. But it is an incomprehensible oneness. It is neither numerical unity (indivisibility) nor summation (totality). Cosmological reason points to the plurality, or at least the duality, of being-in-general. "One alone without any reference to any more cannot be excellent; for, in such a case, there can be no manner of relation no way, and therefore no such thing as consent."[1] And consent or agreement on the basis of cosmological reason is identity or similarity. Thus the unity of being-in-general is harmony or truth (correspondence). Teleological reason points to the fact that there is no living unity or subsistence unless the relation surpasses truth (which is an external relation) and becomes "cordial consent," the internal, mutual consent of the parts to each other. This perfect self-affirmation is the goodness of being-in-general.

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[1] "The Mind, No. 1," *Townsend*, p. 26.

God as Trinity

We have anticipated Edwards on the Trinity from so many different angles that a few statements should suffice to bring all the intimations into some conceptual whole. Perhaps Edwards' most concise statement on the subject is as follows:

> And this I suppose to be that blessed Trinity that we read of in the Holy Scriptures. The Father is the deity subsisting in the prime, unoriginated and most absolute manner, or the deity in its direct existence. The Son is the deity generated by God's understanding, or having an idea of himself and subsisting in that idea. The Holy Ghost is the deity subsisting in act, or the divine essence flowing out and breathed forth in God's infinite love to and delight in himself. And I believe the whole divine essence does truly and distinctly subsist both in the divine idea and divine love, and that each of them are properly distinct Persons.[1]

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[1] An Unpublished Essay of Edwards on the Trinity, ed. G. P. Fisher (New York: Chas. Scribner's Sons, 1903), p. 110. I have taken the liberty of regularizing the capitalization and of spelling out the abbreviations used in the manuscript.

It might be argued that this conception, like all psychological analogies of the Trinity, does not adequately provide for the subsistence of the Son and Holy Spirit. Is it not basic to Edwards' Idealism that an idea exists nowhere but as it is perceived in some mind? Then how could God's Idea (Son) be subsistent in distinction from himself (Father)? Edwards' answer lies in his conception of the difference in the mode of God's being in contrast to that of created spirits. In the latter all the contents of the self are communicated ideas whose subsistence depends not only on being perceived but also in being continually or repeatedly communicated by God. Hence, no self-objectification of ours can be subsistent because what it objectifies is not originally constitutive of our being but continually dependent upon the idea and will of God. But with God it is different. His contents are constitutive, not communicated from outside himself. Hence, no idea God could have of himself would be true unless it were a subsistent idea. "An absolutely perfect idea of a thing is the very thing; for it wants nothing that is in the thing, substance nor nothing else."[1] In having a reflexive idea of himself God generated a reduplication of himself. The two are in essence the same but in subsistence different.

Edwards admits that this line of thought is less than convincing in the case of the Person or subsistence of the Holy Spirit.[1] How can love, which is a relation of mutual consent between the Father and Son, be considered as subsistent? The best he does on this score is the following:

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[1] "Misc., No. 94," Townsend, p. 253.

> The Holy Spirit is the act of God between Father and the Son infinitely loving and delighting in each other. Sure I am that, if the Father and the Son do infinitely delight in each other, there must be an infinitely pure and perfect act between them. . . . This is certainly distinct from the other two. The delight and energy that is begotten in us by an idea is thus distinct from the idea, so it cannot be confounded in God, either with God begetting, or His idea and image--or Son. It is distinct from each of the other two, and yet it is God. The pure act of God is God, because God is pure act. . . . And I believe it will be plain to one who thinks intensely, that the perfect act of God must be a substantial act. We say that the perfect delights of reasonable creatures are substantial delights; but the delight of God is properly a substance, yea, an infinitely perfect substance, even the essence.[2]

Doubtless the best evidence Edwards advanced for the subsistence of the Spirit is the experimental one, not a theoretical one. The "new sense of the heart" which the indwelling of the Spirit gives is a substantial transformation of natural man. It involves both the illumination of the mind and the reorientation of the will. God's love is not just a psychological act. The subsistence by which God indwells and enlivens the heart has the whole substance of God in it, grace and truth, light and life.

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[1] Unpublished Essay on the Trinity, p. 114.

[2] "Misc., No. 94," Townsend, p. 256.

The Relation Between God and the World

The good thing about having to go into such detail to explicate a theologian's primary definition of God is that, in so doing, one has to anticipate the way he handles all other aspects of his theological system. In one way or another we have already said what needs to be said about Edwards' view of the relation between God and the world. We can now briefly lift these elements into focus and go immediately to the problems involved in them.

Summary

Let us summarize in a series of propositions:

1) Being-in-general, as the Infinite, supports comprehends, and transcends all existence. The world is in God, but he transcends it infinitely. This is pan-entheism.

2) All problems of the relation between God and the world can be resolved into the problems of the relation between the Uncreated Spirit and created spirits; spirits "are the only proper and real and substantial beings, inasmuch as the being of other things is only by them."[1]

3) The analogy of being is self-relatedness. The entity of God and man is structurally the same--God's self-relatedness is the macrocosm, man's the microcosm.

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[1] "Of Being," Townsend, p. 8.

4) The difference in modality of God's being and man's being is that for God all possible ideas are inherent and constitutive while for man all his actual contents are dependent upon being communicated to him by God via the medium of the outer. God immediately intuits all ideas; man perceives such as are communicated to him seriatim.

5) God's is an absolute spontaneity; man's a secondary spontaneity--not in the sense that his inner dynamics is any less genuinely spontaneous, but that it is contingent upon the contents of his consciousness, all of which are derived from experience.

6) Left to himself--that is, without grace or the ecstatic perception of the Infinite--man's spontaneity will of necessity consent to that which is less than being-in-general, which consent to a part is a dissent to the whole, and which, as dissent to the Infinite, is an infinite dissent and worthy of damnation.

The Components of Finitude

Edwards' strongest points are his keen insight into the nature of spontaneity or the dynamics of self-relatedness and his doctrine of communication. With these two terms we can frame the question of Edwards' conception of the relation of being and meaning in finite spirits.

Finite spirit: concurrence of spontaneity and perception

Spontaneity is the "natural image" of God in man. This means simply that below the level of self-relatedness there is no possibility of real entity or subsistent being. But in man, since he has no innate ideas, this spontaneity is only a potency to be. He has no actual being, not even self-awareness, until he has had experience, which means the communication of contents from God through perception. In the analytical terms which we developed in the first chapter we can say that man's being is doubly dependent upon God. He is dependent upon God's creative act for his entity (spontaneity) and upon God's communicative act for his modality (concrete contents). This double dependency is absolutely simultaneous. Without communication man's being is only a potency; without spontaneity there is no one with whom or to whom to communicate. There is a logical priority of spontaneity over communication, or of entity over modality; but in the very nature of the case man's being can allow no such chronological priority. Furthermore, neither one of the terms can be reduced to a function or product of the other. Potential spontaneity generates no contents, and spontaneity itself is not a product of communication. An idea cannot perceive an idea.[1]

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[1] "An idea is only a perception wherein the mind is passive or, rather, subjective. The acts of the mind are

World: concurrence of nature and finite spirit

Consistent with, and confirmatory of, the above description is Edwards' view that there are only two absolutely spontaneous--that is, *ex nihilo*--acts of God *ad extra*. The one is the creation of the outer, the general system of nature; the other is the soul.[1] It is interesting to note that Edwards frequently speaks of the creation of the outer as though it preceded the creation of souls. This is doubtless due to his uncritical acceptance of the first Genesis story of creation where man is not created until the sixth day. But, strictly speaking, his Idealism will not allow this. There is no natural world

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not merely ideas. All acts of the mind about its ideas are not themselves mere ideas." ("The Mind, No. 67," *Townsend*, p. 66). Spontaneity, or *the acts* of the mind, does not come into play until the *mind has* ideas, and further, those acts will themselves occasion ideas--the simple ideas of reflection--but the spontaneity itself is not an idea. It is not communicated, but created.

[1] "Misc., No. 1263," *Townsend*, pp. 187-89. At first, Edwards concedes that only "the creation of the matter of the material world" is "absolutely arbitrary" or *ex nihilo* (p. 187), but later (p. 189) he acknowledges that "intelligent minds" are, also. This latter is confirmed in other observations, viz., "Misc., No. 541," *Townsend*, pp. 150-51, where he says, "the soul of man, is most immediately and directly from Him, so that here second causes have no causal influence at all. Second causes have something to do in bringing the body into being, but they have no influence here; but the soul is directly breathed from God." With respect to the soul, Edwards is a creationist, not a traducian.

that is not perceived *by created spirits.*[1] This is such a distinctive and crucial feature of his Idealism that we dare not overlook it. As he says over and over again, *man*, not God, is the world-soul. "Men, or intelligent beings, are the consciousness of the creation, whereby the universe is conscious of its own being, and of what is done in it, of the actions of the Creator and governor with respect to it."[2] Things do not exist in the created mode because God *perceives* them thus, but because he *wills* them thus *ad extra* to be perceived by created spirits. God perceives all things *ad intra* in the perfect mode of "uncreated idea," of which the willed expression *ad extra* is but a shadow or image, and which created mode adds nothing to the "uncreated idea."[1]

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[1] There is a hint in Edwards that he conceived *the angels*, the first of created spirits, as fulfilling the role of "world-soul" until the creation of man. See his outline notes of the proposed "Natural History of the Mental World, No. 32," *Townsend*, p. 72, where he speaks of the angels as "beholding the creation of the material universe." Here, in contrast to what is said above, he seems to be saying that the created inner preceded the created outer. But, as we have noted in the same connection before, Edwards could not conceive of the angels having thought without external ideas (See No. 53,p. 73). The difficulties inherent in his trying to conceive the outer as preceding temporally the inner, and vice-versa, are insuperable--a fact confirmatory of the above statement that his Idealism will allow neither, but only a *concurrent* creation of both.

[2] "Misc., No. 1," *Townsend*, p. 195. Cf. No. 3, p. 193; No. 87, p. 128; also "The Mind, No. 51," which, for all its confusion is at least clear on this point: "But when I say, the material universe exists only in the mind, I mean that it is absolutely dependent on the conception of the mind for its existence. . . ," (*Townsend*, p. 52). This, it should be noted, is different from Pope's idea that Nature is the body and God the soul of the world.

God's creativity: concurrence of creation and revelation

This way of conceiving things preserves the distinction between God and the world both as to entity and modality, thus avoiding pantheism. At the same time it makes the created outer dependent upon the constant communicative will of God and the created inner dependent upon the continuous creative will of God. Furthermore, since man's being is absolutely dependent upon the conjunction of the two wills, or two acts of the same will, it means that revelation and creation are concurrent phenomena. Without general revelation--what God communicates to all men in the general system of the world and its laws--there can be no finite existence at all; there could only be a potency for existence. In short, being and meaning are conjunct and concreated in finite life. Life is the confluence of the two.

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[1] "Things as to God exist from all eternity alike, that is, the idea is always the same and after the same mode. The existence of things, therefore, that are not actually in created minds consists only in power, or in the determination of God that such and such ideas shall be raised in created minds upon such conditions" ("The Mind, No. 36," Townsend, p. 41). From the standpoint of being-in-general ideas may be grouped in three concentric circles. Starting with the outer or all-inclusive circle there are all possible ideas. Within that is the circle of those ideas to which God has given "futurity," the "uncreated ideas" or the archetype of the world. The last and smallest circle contains the "created ideas," those ideas actually being communicated at any given time (Cf. "The Mind, No. 40," Townsend, p. 42 and Schafer, pp. 143-44).

The Quality of Finite Life

Original righteousness: concurrence of the natural and moral images

Thus far we have been talking about how Edwards conceived of created spirits as dependent, yet real. Now, what about their created goodness, or in more traditional terms, the goodness of creation. Man, according to Edwards, was created with a two-fold image of God, the natural and the moral.[1] The moral image, which as we discussed under the head of teleological reason consists of consent to being-in-general predicated upon the ecstatic perception of the Infinite, belongs to man's original state but not to his essential equipment for life. It is prescriptive for man's *well-being* but not constitutive of his being *per se*. It corresponds to the fullness of life. Strictly speaking it is not an "image" but the thing itself--a participation in the divine self-affirmation. Neither is it, strictly speaking, "created" although its bestowal or infusion or supervention upon natural man is concurrent with the original creation and is the goodness of that creation. The best brief description in Edwards of how he conceived the moral image's relation to the natural image is found in a paragraph where he reflects upon the dynamics of natural man without the moral image, and contrasts the two states. In commenting on "Sin and original sin," he says:

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[1] "As there are two kinds of attributes in God, according to our way of conceiving of him, his moral attributes, which are summed up in his holiness, and his natural attributes, of strength, knowledge, etc. that constitute the greatness of God; so there is a twofold image of God in man, his moral or spiritual image, which is his holiness, that is the image of God's moral excellency (which image was lost by the Fall); and God's natural image, consisting in man's reason and understanding, his natural ability, and dominion over the creatures, which is the image of God's natural attributes" (*Religious Affections*, p. 256; cf. *Freedom of the Will*, p. 166, especially footnote 3, wherein is cited the correlative passages from "Original Sin" and "True Virtue").

> The best philosophy that I have met with of original sin and all sinful inclinations, habits, and principles . . . is that it is self-love, in conjunction with the absence of the image and love of God--that natural and necessary inclination that man has to his own benefit, together with the absence of original righteousness. Or in other words it is the absence of that influence of God's spirit, whereby love to God and to holiness is kept up to that degree that this other inclination is always kept in its due subordination; but this being gone, his self-love governs alone and, having not the superior principle to regulate it, breaks out into all manner of exorbitancies, and becomes in innumerable cases a vile and odious disposition and causes thousands of unlovely and hateful actions. There is nothing in the actions we call sin, but only the same self-love that necessarily belongs to that nature, working and influencing without regulation from that superior principle that particularly belongs to our nature and that is necessary in order to the harmonious exercise of it. This original and necessary inclination to ourselves, without the governor and guide, will certainly, without anything else, produce or rather will become all those sinful inclinations which are in the corrupted nature of man.[1]

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[1] "Misc., No. 301," Townsend, pp. 242-43.

Sin: life without the moral image

The created spirit can and does subsist without the moral image, though this subsistence in sin is doubly dependent upon the continuous creation and general revelation of God; but without the moral image this natural created spirit can neither be true nor good. In the loss of the moral image in the Fall the created spirit loses "the way and the truth and the life" of happiness and wholeness and self-fulfillment. He loses neither being nor meaning absolutely, but both are inevitably and ineluctably caught up in the dynamics of self-destruction. He can do nothing but affirm himself on the basis of a limited system of meaning, which self-affirmation is bound to be dashed upon the rocks of the general system of meaning which transcends his natural, limited self-relatedness. And even if his private system be "general" enough to embrace _the whole world_, even if it leads him to assent to _universal justice_, and even if it leads him to acknowledge the usefulness and necessity of subordinating his own private interests to _the general welfare_ of all mankind, still it is a limited system in that it is a system whose underlying and unifying principle is _self-reference_.[1] "A natural man may love others, but 'tis some way or other as appendages and appurtenances to himself; but a spiritual man loves others as of God, or in God, or some way related to Him."[1]

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[1] _True Virtue_, chaps. iv-viii, is the place where Edwards gives extensive and exhaustive attention to all those natural principles, viz. self-love, conscience, instincts, reason, etc., which have something of the general

God and the World

Immanence and transcendence

Earlier we noted that the basic problem of Edwards' conception of the God-world relation is: In what sense is the world, and particularly natural man, "outside" of God or of the divine life when God is the source and substance of all that is? Or, in other words, how does his pan-entheism state the immanence and transcendence of God with respect to the world? We can now answer this in terms of man's original state thus: created spirits are outside of God by virtue of their real subsistence in the created mode; they are in God by virtue of the source or power and the goal of that subsistence. In the natural or fallen state the created spirit has lost its goal or the perception of and consent to his true end, being-in-general. With the loss of the ultimate reference or ultimate meaning

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nature of true virtue in them, but which differ from true virtue in its nature (consent to being-in-general) and its object (being-in-general). "What they are essentially defective in is, that they are private in their nature; they do not arise from any temper of benevolence to being in general, nor have they a tendency to any such effect in their operation" ("True Virtue," chap. vii, Works, III, 142).

[1] "Misc., No. 821," Townsend, pp. 240-41.

comes a real diminution of his being. He perceives less than he needs to for fullness of life and he gives his unlimited consent to that which is neither worthy of nor capable of bearing such unlimited consent. His condition is not one of benign ignorance but of a vicious and malignant idolatry. Unless he had lost the moral image he would not sin; but because he cannot lose the natural image of God he will do nothing but sin, and that inordinately. The same dynamic relationship between being and meaning is at work in both grace and sin. Even in sin he is still related to God as the power of being and meaning. But he is existentially "outside" of the divine life because both his being and meaning are contracted, distorted, self-contradictory and self-destructive. In short, he is "outside" by virtue of his spontaneous dissent to his true end.

Resolution of the problem of conditionalism

Much earlier, in connection with Edwards' revision of Newton's category of time, we stated that although Edwards had to adopt the mystical-aesthetic stance he was not unaware or unappreciative of the ethical-activistic spirit that was principally manifest in his day in Arminianism. Further, we made the cryptic assertion that he "out-Arminianized" even the fondest Arminian. We can now see how and in what sense this is the case. Arminianism sought to divide the field between God's agency and man's agency. Further, it sought to delineate the canons of morality in such a way that they would be equally applicable to God and man. Edwards' conception of the God-world relation addresses itself to both demands.

"God produces all, . . .
we act all"

First, as to the matter of agency, there can be no division of the field. But in creation no less than salvation man is agent and patient:

> . . . We are not merely passive, nor yet does God do some, and we do the rest. But God does all, and we do all. God produces all, and we act all. . . . We are, in different respects, wholly passive, and wholly active.[1]

God creates entity and communicates all contents (or withholds some!); in this sense he is sole causality. But man acts all by virtue of his spontaneity. In affirming the content of his experience he is wholly active--his consent springs wholly from internal principles. What he cannot do is produce the content of his experience any more than he can create himself. In sin and in grace "God produces all, and we act all." In sin, the absence of true virtue is due to a privative cause; in grace, the presence of true virtue is due to an efficient cause. And all causality is God's. Yet man's full consent is in whatever he does voluntarily regardless of how that choice is determined. Therein lies his responsibility and accountability. No man is compelled to sin even though in the nature of his depraved (really, deprived) condition it is inevitable. He has the "natural ability" (the equipment) to love God even though he has the "moral inability" (the lack of the ecstatic perception of being-in-general) so to do. He can if he will, but he cannot will so to will.

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[1] "On Efficacious Grace," Works (Worcester), II, 580.

The single standard of morality

As to the second Arminian demand--that God be subjected to the same canons of morality as man--it is precisely because Edwards did conceive true virtue or moral beauty the same in God and man that he had to reject the Arminian "solutions." The Arminian spirit would not have it that what is vicious in man--say, self-regard--is virtuous in God; nor what is virtuous in man--say, self-denial--is not applicable to God. The validity of this protest is predicated upon the chaos/cosmos cosmology where God and man are two beings set over against each other. Regardless of the disparity in greatness, moral reason demanded that the two be equally subjected to a third--the universal system of morality and justice. Edwards, with his macrocosm/microcosm cosmology, saw the way to answer the demands for moral consistency without subjecting either God or man to some heteronomous authority. Precisely because true virtue in whomever it is found is consent to being-in-general, it follows that self-regard in God is coincident with it while any self-regard in man that does not proceed from a prior consent to God is vicious. And for the same reason, self-denial would be an inconsistency in being-in-general while in man it is only a due recognition of his true position in the total scheme of being. The appropriate acts which follow from the same principle of true virtue will differ according as God is the whole while man is but a part of the whole.[1] The position in the scale of being (always a proportion of greatness and goodness) is the context which determines the appropriate expression of the one principle of true virtue. A saint will love a fellow saint more than he will a sinner because there is more fitness in the former as an object of his regard. This is also the basis upon which Edwards repeats what is to many the horrid doctrine that part of the joy of the saints in everlasting glory is to rejoice in beholding the everlasting torments of the damned.[1] Regardless of whether one has the stomach for this degree of tough-mindedness, it would be a gross error to attribute the motive of this to rancor. According to Edwards' view, virtue rejoices in the power of being-in-general _to_ _be_, absolutely; and in the _fitness_ of being's power to reject that which rejects or dissents to being. The justice of eternal damnation is but the reverse side of the absoluteness of moral beauty. Sentimentality with respect to the former indicates a proportional lack of seriousness with respect to the latter.

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[1] These ideas appear extensively in both True Virtue and God's End in Creation, but for a good statement of them--and one which makes specific reference to the latter treatise--see "Misc., No. 1028," Townsend, pp. 140-49. In this reflection he does just what the Arminians would have us do--that is, he supposes, for the sake of argument, a "supreme arbiter" in the matter and finds that "in adjusting the degree of regard, these two things are to be considered conjunctly, viz., greatness and goodness, or the degree of existence and the degree of excellence" (pp. 141-42).

Problem: How to Account for the Fall?

There are two loose ends to this section on the relationship between God and the world and the status of created spirits that we must tie up before going to the final one. These are: (1) the transition from original righteousness to sin; and (2) Edwards' conception of the immortality of the soul.

For all the insight Edwards contributes to the inner dynamics of self-relatedness, his theory of the way the will is determined still cannot account for the Fall. But that does not make him unique as it is the ultimate irrationality of all orthodoxy. The "first sin" is inconceivable; it is impossible! Edwards rejects all the understandable alternatives. One such would be that God withdrew the moral image thus leaving man abandoned to his own resources. But Edwards holds that the loss of the moral image was the consequence of original sin, its just punishment, not its cause. Another would be that man never possessed original righteousness, that it was only a conditional promise, not a gift or fact of history. This he rejects, too. He tries to soften the inconceivability of how man with the actual perception of the Infinite could actually consent to less by calling original righteousness "sufficient grace" rather than "confirming grace"--a solution similar to Augustine's posse non peccare and non posse peccare; or of God's "permissive decree"--a conception inconsistent with either efficient or privative causation; or by talking of man's being deceived--a conception inconsistent with his idea of universal moral necessity.[1]

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[1] Cf. "The End of the Wicked Contemplated by the Righteous: Or the Torments of the Wicked in Hell, No Occasion of Grief to the Saints in Heaven," Sermon XIII, _Works (Worcester)_, IV, 287ff.

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[1] All of these conceptions are discussed extensively in his treatise on Original Sin. This summary is indebted to Schafer, pp. 226-30. He says, "This, then, is the crux of the problem: assuming the perfect righteousness of man's original nature and the conformity of all his love, inclination, and will to the goodness of things in proper proportion, how can a sufficient reason be found for the fall? If Edwards insists on universal moral necessity, he can have universal depravity or original righteousness (as a fact

We meet with the same ultimate irrationality at the other end with regard to the transition from sin to grace in the elect. Edwards had a very "high" doctrine of the means of grace, especially of the necessity and the efficacy of preaching; but still there is no direct transition. Here, in contrast with the Fall, every effort is made to insure the divine efficiency; but still the perception of the Infinite in and through the finite is an inconceivable notion. Like sin, grace presupposes itself. And Edwards was content to leave it at that.

Observation: Edwards on Immortality

The second thing we must note is Edwards' peculiar rationale for the immortality of the soul. We can state Edwards' total scheme thus: God has neither beginning nor end; the outer--the general system of nature--has both a beginning and an end; but souls have a beginning but no end. The reason therefor is theocentric, not anthropocentric:

> 'Tis certain that God did not create the world for nothing. 'Tis most certain that, if there were no intelligent beings in the world, all the world would be without any good at all; or senseless matter, in

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of history), but not both. If he attempts to keep all three, he must make God the intervening efficient cause of man's first sin" (p. 226). His concluding estimate is: "Edwards' doctrine of the will, required alike by his theology and his metaphysics, breaks on the impossible task of accounting for both original righteousness and the fall" (p. 228).

> whatever excellent order it is placed, would be useless if there were no intelligent beings at all, neither God nor others. For what would it be good for? So, certainly, senseless matter would be altogether useless if there were no intelligent being but God, for God could neither receive good Himself nor communicate good. . . . Wherefore, it necessarily follows that intelligent beings are the end of creation, and that their end must be to behold and admire the doings of God and magnify Him for them, and to contemplate His glories in them. Wherefore, religion must be the end of the creation, the great end, the very end. . . . It follows from this that we must be immortal. The world had as good have been without us as for us to be a few minutes and then be annihilated. . . .[1]

The whole logic hinges on the axiom that "No end is worthy of an infinite God but an infinite end."[2] The soul's annihilation cannot even be entertained as punishment, for "If it be put out as a punishment, it can never know that it is punished, never reflect on the justice of God or anything of that nature."[3]

This is an interesting line of reasoning in view of what we said earlier about Edwards and the category of time. There the implication was that since every moment must contain, latently or patently, all the contents of eternity, time itself was productive of nothing new. Now, this latter view does not say that "time" itself is productive of the new, but it does assert that if God creates anything at all *in time*, then it is an irreversible step. If God is moved to "other" himself *ad extra*, it can be for no transient reason. It has eternal consequences and must spring from an eternal motive. When we get to considerations of this kind we are ready to turn to the third major section of the doctrine of creation.

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[1] "Misc., No. gg," Townsend, pp. 236-37 (Cf. Nos. 1, 20, 1006, pp. 195-97).

[2] "Misc., No. 1006," Townsend, p. 196.

[3] "Misc., No. 20," Townsend, p. 196.

The Meaning of Creation for Both God and Man

Recapitulation and Prospect

We have seen that man in his original state is a product of creation, communication, and infusion.

Spirit as a product of creation (natural image)

As self-related or spontaneous spirit he is a created image of the dynamic *structure* of the divine life itself. This creative act *ad extra* has a beginning but no termination. This does not mean that we have something here whose termination is inherently inconceivable or self-contradictory. It simply means that its termination would be tantamount to its not having been at all. It would mean that *God* acts without an end or aim appropriate to his own eternal being--a proposition which Edwards rejected as self-contradictory and inconceivable. Further, let it be clear that when we say this creative act *ad extra* is irreversible we do not mean that God has created a spirit which subsists in the same mode as himself. The irreversibility of this act is quite compatible with Edwards' idea of continuous creation. The continuity of any being, as we have emphasized, lies "in the script" or logical sequence of the divine ideas and not in the power of one projected image to function causally with respect to what comes after it. The irreversibility must lie in the "ideal constitution" of created spirits in the divine archetypal plan. The irreversibility must be understood in terms of the divine end or aim in creation. As we stated above, only an infinite end is worthy of infinite being.

Spirit as a product of communication (general revelation)

But the created spirit is only a potency, a power of being, without communicated contents. Hence the act *ad extra* of general revelation is *constitutive* of man's actual being. The general system of nature, the outer, is concreated and concurrent with the original creation of souls. Yet it is a means to an end and can be dispensed with once the end has been achieved. It is necessary for man to perceive *sensible* ideas to have any contents at all, but a recurrent perception is not requisite. One does not have to continually perceive red to have an idea of redness. Once is enough. Hence, when God's use of the outer is through it will be dismantled like a machine at the Latter Day.[1] The system of nature has a beginning and a termination because it is a means to an end which is not itself. In saying this we must be careful not to imply that it is, therefore, insignificant. The outer--nature and history--is contributory of and the necessary means to the contents of the created spirit. But the essential life of created spirits is not everlastingly confined to natural and historical existence. It must begin there, but it cannot terminate there if it is to have any ultimate significance. The meaning of life is historical in terms of its stuff or material, but it is transhistorical in terms of its destiny.

Fulfilled spirit as a product of infusion (moral image)

In the third place we noted that created spirits in their original state or intent are products of infusion. The indwelling of the Spirit is not constitutive of the created spirit's being per se, but it is determinative of that spirit's well being. The Holy Spirit--either in the original "moral image" or in the "new sense of the heart" in saving grace--does not add anything quantitative to either the entity or modality of created life, but he is the super-added principle--and the only principle--by which that life functions in qualitative harmony and proportion to the general system of being, or being-in-general. Life in the Spirit is the ecstasy of both man's spontaneity and his contents. It is the ecstatic synthesis of his natural being and meaning and the end or fulfillment of his being. As the "ecstatic synthesis" it means that man's trans-historical destiny cannot be comprehended solely in terms of a "post-historical" destiny. It is his original historical destiny from the foundation of the world and that which gives impetus to the whole of history from the Fall to the end of the world.

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[1] "For God will not leave the world to a gradual decay . . . . but will Himself destroy the world, will roll the heavens together as a scroll, will change it as a man puts off an old garment and wears it not till it gradually drops to pieces, and will take it down as a machine is taken down when it has answered the workman's end" ("Misc., No. 1263," Townsend, p. 189).

> To answer this end, [God] hath created and disposed of mankind, to this the angels, to this the earth, to this the highest heavens. God created the world to provide a spouse and a kingdom for his Son: and the setting up of the kingdom of Christ, and the spiritual marriage of the spouse to him, is what the whole creation labours and travails in pain to bring to pass.[1]

The Consummation as Restoration

However, history is the story of redemption, of the recovery of that which was lost. There is some ambiguity in Edwards on this point since he says often that redemption is greater than creation:

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[1] "History of the Work of Redemption; Containing the Outlines of a Body of Divinity in a Method Entirely New," Works, III, 426.

> This shows us how much greater the work of redemption is, than the work of creation: for I have several times observed, that the work of providence is greater than the work of creation, because it is the end of it; as the use of an house is the end of the building of the house. But the work of redemption . . . is the sum of all God's works of providence; all are subordinate to it: so the work of the new creation is more excellent than the old. So it ever is, that when one thing is removed by God to make way for another, the new excels the old.[1]

In one sense what Edwards is saying here is applicable to the original state of creation. The **infusion** or supervention of the moral image is a greater work than the creation of the natural image and is the end of it. In the beginning as well as at the end, providence is greater than the act of creating. But in another sense he is asserting that saving grace is greater than original righteousness. It evidences greater wisdom and power for God to overcome or reconcile distorted and self-destructive life than to create life in the first place. That is true enough, but does it exhibit greater goodness? That is the question. We can answer: Yes, it does exhibit a greater sovereignty of God's goodness than that of which pre-fallen man could possibly be aware; but it does not extend or enlarge the goodness of God, which from eternity was infinite consent to being-in-general. We can say that redeemed man does have a deeper awareness of the greatness of God (his natural attributes) than would be possible without the Fall, but from the very nature of the case the experienced perception of goodness (God's moral attributes) is invariable. In redemption God's goodness may have a more extensive embrace, but it is not qualitatively better.[1]

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[1] Ibid.

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[1] It is interesting and noteworthy that when Edwards reaches the conclusion of his "History of the Work of Redemption" he extols, as fruits of the divine providence the "majesty and the power" of God, His "glorious wisdom," His "faithfulness" and "mercy"; but he nowhere mentions the work of Redemption (providence) as issuing in an increment to God's goodness (Works (Worcester), I, 513-16). This is not just an "argument from silence"; there is a consistent reason in Edwards for it. "Goodness," for Edwards, "is the exercise in communication of happiness" ("Misc., No. 96," Townsend, p. 194). "But to no finite being can God either incline to communicate goodness so much as he inclines to be happy Himself, for He cannot love a creature so much as He loves Himself; neither can He communicate all His goodness to a finite being. . . . Wherefore, God must have a perfect exercise of His goodness, and therefore must have the fellowship of a person equal with Himself" (Ibid., pp. 194-95). He is saying that, without the creation and history of providence there would be no occasion for God to exercise His attributes of greatness, power, wisdom, etc.; but He does not need the creation to exercise His perfect and infinite love and delight. In theological parlance we would have to say that for Edwards the Trinity is "transcendent" and not "economic." Uncreated Spirit in its fullness precedes and embraces created spirit and is the Alpha and Omega for the latter. Edwards will not have it that God creates or redeems out of need. "God being infinitely happy, he [the creature] cannot desire to communicate his happiness to Him--which is nothing to the happiness God enjoys" ("Misc., No. 97," Townsend, p. 195). Still, even though God's goodness has aseity and is incapable of increment, Edwards wants to assert that the divine life and fullness is not insensitive to or unconcerned with the finite spirit. Continuing immediately after the foregoing citation, he says, "But in the Gospel God is come down to us, and the person of God may receive communication of happiness from us. The man Christ Jesus loves us so much that He is really happier for our delight and happiness in Him" (Ibid.).

God's Goodness: the Alpha and Omega

It is the peculiar nature of God's goodness that enables Edwards to arrive at a religious and philosophical answer to the question of the ultimate meaning of life, of the ultimate relation between being and meaning. Let us state how this is so:

Goodness as aseity

1) God's goodness is uncreated. It has neither beginning nor end. It is capable of neither increase nor diminution. Hence, it is capable of serving as a First Principle--something that explains all things but itself needs no explanation.

2) Its reality does not depend upon being perceived by men. It is objective to man's mere existence. This is something that one could not say about communication or revelation, which depends as much on being received as being given. Communication presupposes the creature, at least in idea, so it could not be the first principle of the creature's existence.

3) It is not of the world, but it is in the world. It is not some hypothetical reality. Though it is not experienced by all, it is experienced by some. It has a definite locus in nature and history: the visible union of the elect, whose being witnesses to its reality even in the rejection of that witness.

4) Though it is transhistorical in its reference, its relevance is to the stuff of life. It is the fulfillment of the being and meaning of *this life*.

Goodness as prime mover

We must be careful and strict to note that it is only in connection with God's *goodness* that Edwards uses the term *emanation*. Finite spirits do not "flow out" of being-in-general; they are created *ex nihilo* by a willed act of God. Neither does communication or revelation emanate from the divine life; it, too, depends upon a special determination of the divine will. But goodness is different. It is not a particular determination of the divine will, but the divine will or self-affirmation itself. We must not be misled when Edwards speaks, as he often does, of the "communication" of the Spirit to the creature. This is not the kind of communication of which we have just spoken: general revelation. This "communication" of the Spirit is to the divine life as effulgence is to the sun or as the overflowing of water is to a fountain--two of Edwards' favorite metaphors for the divine goodness. The distinction between the temporal acts of creation and communication, on the one hand, and the eternal emanation of goodness, on the other, is evident:

> 'Tis a very proper question to ask what attribute moved God to exert His power; but 'tis not proper to ask what

> moved God to exert His goodness, for this is the notion of goodness--an inclination to show goodness.[1]

This goodness, then, since it is God's internal and eternal end before it is man's, must be the term in which the ultimate relation of being and meaning is stated.

Explication: "God's End in Creation"

All of this is the explicit burden of Edwards' *Dissertation Concerning the End for which God Created the World*. What originally and in-and-of-itself moved God to exert his power to give existence to the creature?

What reason dictates

It cannot be that God needed the creature in order to his own subsistence, for being-in-general is absolutely self-subsistent.[2] It cannot be for the purpose of the divine self-realization, for the pure actuality of the divine being and perfection must be conceived as prior to any divine operation.[3] It cannot, in the first instance, be an inclination to do good to the creature, for this presupposes the existence of the creature, either in intention or foresight, whereas the question is: What moved God to intend the creature and give him futurity? It is the creature's being for which a sufficient reason is sought. God's disposition or goodness toward the creature, once he is created, needs no explanation.[1]

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[1] "Misc., No. 87," *Townsend*, p. 128.

[2] *Works*, III, chap. i, sec. 1, No. 1, p. 13.

[3] *Ibid.*, III, chap. i, sec. 1, No. 2, p. 13.

What may be inferred from fact

The above are some of the things that reason dictates with respect to any candidate for the answer. Then Edwards turns to the consideration of what things are actually the result of creation which are simply and originally valuable per se, since "we may justly infer what God intends, by what he actually does; because he does nothing inadvertently, or without design."[2] Those things which are good in themselves and which are the actual result of creation and which could not have been attained without creating are, he finds, four in number: (1) It gives the opportunity for the exercise of the attributes of God's wisdom and power. This activity is in-and-of-itself excellent and valuable. (2) It provides a means by which God's perfections can be known and (3) loved. (4) Finally, "as there is an infinite fulness of all possible good in God, . . . and as this fulness is capable of communication or emanation ad extra; so it seems a thing amiable and valuable in itself that it should be communicated or flow forth."[1]

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[1] Ibid., III, chap. i, sec. 2, No. 4, pp. 20-21.

[2] Ibid., III, chap. i, sec. 1, No. 6, pp. 17-18.

Conclusion

These considerations led Edwards to the stated conclusion

> that a disposition in God, as an original property of his nature, to an emanation of his own infinite fulness, was what excited him to create the world; and so that the emanation itself was aimed at by him as the last end of the creation.[2]

The congruence of God's end and man's end

Now we may fairly ask how God's end and man's end are related. Strictly speaking, what God aims at in creating--namely, the emanation of his fullness--is something in which he has no interest, for interest implies a want. God's goodness overflows because that is its nature. But man's aim in true virtue does include his best interest, since it is self-fulfillment. However, Edwards saw that these two are not incompatible. God delights in man's love even though he does not seek it as the original ultimate end. Furthermore, God's inclination to emanate is inclusive of man's true interest. On the other hand, man's self-fulfillment is not achieved by direct pursuit. He fulfills himself only by glorifying God, consenting to being-in-general. Or, to put it another way, God aims at emanation, and remanation (which is constitutive of man's well being) is the fitting by-product:

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[1] _Ibid._, III, chap. 1, sec. 2, No. 4, p. 20. For the discussion of all four points, see pp. 18-21.

[2] _Ibid._, III, chap. 1, sec. 2, No. 4, p. 21.

> The emanation . . . of the divine fulness . . . has relation . . . both to God, and to the creature. . . . In the creature's knowing, esteeming, loving, rejoicing in, and praising God, the glory of God is both exhibited and acknowledged; his fulness is received and returned. Here is both an _emanation_ and _remanation_. The refulgence shines upon and into the creature, and is reflected back to the luminary. The beams of glory come from God, and are something of God, and are refunded back again to their original. So that the whole is _of_ God, and _in_ God, and _to_ God, and God is the beginning, middle, and end of this affair.[1]

Looking at it more particularly from the standpoint of man's interest, he says:

> There are many reasons to think that what God has in view in the increasing communication of himself throughout all eternity, is an increasing knowledge of God, love to him, and joy in him. And it is to be considered that the more these divine communications increase in the creature, the more it becomes one with God; for so much the more is it united to God in love, the heart is drawn nearer and nearer to God, and the union with him becomes more firm and close, and at the same time the creature becomes more and more conformed to God.
>
> The image is more and more perfect, and so the good that is in the creature comes forever nearer and nearer to an identity with that which is in God. . . . It will forever come nearer and nearer to that strictness and perfection of union which there is between the Father and the Son; so that in the eyes of God, who perfectly sees the whole of it, in its infinite progress and increase, it must come to an eminent fulfilment of Christ's request, in John 17:23, "That they may all be _one_, as thou, Father, art in me, and I in thee, that they also may be one in us, I in them, and thou in me,

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[1] _Ibid_., III, chap. ii, sec. 7, p. 84.

> that they may be made perfect in one." In this view, those elect creatures which must be looked upon as the end of all the rest of creation, considered with respect to the whole of their eternal duration, and as such made God's end, must be viewed as being, as it were, one with God.[1]

Conclusion

We have labored long and hard to try to get an inner feeling for and understanding of Edwards' metaphysical thought and his ontological theology. We have seen how he related the concepts of being and meaning ultimately in terms of the goodness of God, being's consent to being. It might even be argued that we have leaned so far backwards to be sympathetic to Edwards' position that we have lost all critical transcendence with respect to it. Such need not be the case. And if we have avoided pettifogging criticism (which was intentional) it was to direct our attention to the problems of Edwards' central vision. These problems, in my view, center in the form and the matter of Edwards' doctrine of "consent."

First, as to its form, consent to being-in-general is mystical and ecstatic. This is altogether understandable in view of Edwards' own experiences and the fact that he lived and wrote in the glow and after-glow of the Great Awakening, one of those mighty--and rare!--outpourings of the Spirit in the course of human history. But what about those of us whose lot it is to be born between the times? Is there no genuine participation in the Spirit and in the fellowship of the saints possible to us? How is it possible that we can be tremendously illumined by Edwards' thought, even sympathetic with his aspirations, and yet remain in that low and lifeless state of "affections" which would, in his judgment, only render us fit to glorify God in our eternal damnation?

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[1] Ibid., III, chap. 1, sec. 3, pp. 25-26.

These questionings are not cavils. Neither must they be misinterpreted. One would not wish gracious consent to be *anything less* than Edwards described or experienced. But what happens to the continuity of the Church during those extraordinarily long seasons of history when it *is* less, and not just in particular cases but as the general rule? This is the nemesis of the "pure church" idea. One cannot help but have some sympathy with Edwards' dismissal from Northampton, for he was insisting upon Awakening standards for admission to church membership when the Awakening was over--and *he* knew it! But his theology could not handle, in any *positive* way, being or living between the times. It left a legacy of growing hypocrisy--of people under pressure to claim for their experience more than the facts warranted because the definition of true piety offered them no power to accept themselves--*and consent to God*--in terms of their own peculiar historical destiny. It is ironical that a theological vision which sought to explicate the meaning of life in its highest reaches and most exalted state should insulate and deflect us from searching for--and finding--a positive meaning of life in its usual, prosaic state, or even at its lowest ebb.

In the second place, with respect to its matter, there is little or no feeling in Edwards for the tragic loss of the excluded possibilities in life. Consent is toward that which is all-positive and all-amiable in spite of the fact that every act of will is a narrowing down, an affirmation of "this" and not "that." This is obscured in the divine life by the free use of the adjective "infinite." When one talks about an "infinitely" perfect idea and an "infinite" consent, somehow it is made to sound as though the ascription of "infinity" solves all problems and removes all ambiguities. But on the finite level there can be no such obscuring of the issues. And the problem is not one of finitude, but rather the inherent ambiguities of all self-relatedness. No being's self-idea is all positive. It is defined as much by what it intentionally excludes as by what it includes. And no self-affirmation is all positive because it, if it is to be whole, must not only affirm the positive but accept the permanent loss of the excluded possibilities.

There are traces of this in Edwards' doctrine of God, but they are not taken seriously. God intuits all possibilities, but those ideas which are given "futurity," those that are called "uncreated ideas," are less than all possibilities. The "uncreated idea" represents the archetypal plan of the world from beginning to end. The suggestion is that this represents something like the notion of all compossible ideas or "the best of all possible worlds." Insofar as this is identified with the Son or Logos element in God, one wonders how this narrowing down affects the equality between the First and Second Persons of the Trinity (that is, how can there be consent or agreement between "all possibles" and "all compossibles"?). There is an even further narrowing down with respect to the Third Person. The Logos, as all compossibles, contains the idea of the elect and the idea of the damned. So the substantial act of mutual consent in God--which is Edwards' definition of the Holy Spirit--is a positive consent only to the elect. So the Father consents only to the elect among all the compossibles in the Son, and the Son consents only to the elect among all the possibles in the Father. This is the only basis for "fitness" or "equality," which is basic to Edwards' notion of excellency. That is, if consent is all-positive and only positive in its nature. Edwards wants only the positive content, and his ontology is not conceived so that being-in-general's consent to its own being includes the acceptance of responsibility for the excluded possibilities. As we noted, Edwards obscures this narrowing down in the divine life by a rather free use of the adjective "infinite." There is a serenity about the divine consent to being that hides the true and essential anguish of all self-relatedness. In terms of the creation, his theodicy is that somehow the bliss of the elect saints makes all the anguish of the excluded possibilities eminently worth-while. It would not do to ask the damned what they think of all of this! But lest we be accused of sentimentality and tender-mindedness, let us assume that at the Judgment Day the damned are so convinced of the justice of their punishment that they willingly (one dares not, even for the sake of argument, assume "gladly") go to eternal torment for the greater glory of God. What then? Does not the ontological problem remain? It posits an eternal split within being-in-general which, on the basis of Edwards' all-positive notion of consent, is fundamentally and inherently irresolvable.

These considerations lead us to the conclusion that there is something defective about Edwards' key concept of "consent." Whether this is inherent in all ontological theologies, or whether it is the peculiar stamp of Edwards' Enlightenment "aestheticism" is something we shall have to watch for as we turn now to our second exemplar of the method, Paul Tillich.

CHAPTER III

BEING AND MEANING IN THE THEOLOGY OF PAUL TILLICH

The Man and His Works

Life

Paul Tillich, 1886-1965, has characterized his life and thought as that of standing on the boundary between two worlds.[1] In the broadest and most comprehensive sense these "two worlds" are seen by him as two eras or epochs, one dead or dying, the other struggling and groping to be born. The former has been variously designated as the "Modern" period or the "Protestant-Humanist" era. The latter has yet to find its full realization or distinctive self-designation other than it will be "post-Modern," a term that simply disignates succession and not character. It is present more as crisis and demand than in substance and power.

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[1] See the autobiographical chapter, "On the Boundary," in The Interpretation of History, trans. N. A. Rasetzki and Elsa L. Talmey (New York: Charles Scribner's Sons, 1936). As in the case with Edwards, no attempt at a complete biographical sketch can be made here. Fortunately, Tillich has done for us what Edwards never essayed--that is, on several public occasions he has consciously tried to express and relate the genesis of his thought to the circumstances of his life and times. In addition to the above, see his "Author's Introduction" to The Protestant Era, trans. James Luther Adams (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1948) and his "Autobiographical Reflections" in The Theology of Paul Tillich, ed. Charles W. Kegley and Robert W. Bretall (Library of Living Theology, Vol. I; New York: Macmillan, 1952). Two excellent secondary sources on the same subject are Walter Leibrecht, "The Life and Mind of Paul Tillich," in Religion and Culture: Essays in Honor of Paul Tillich, ed. Walter Leibrecht (New York: Harper, 1959) and James Luther Adams' concluding essay in The Protestant Era titled "Tillich's Concept of the Protestant Era," pp. 273-316.

Tillich's background is German Lutheran. His father was a minister and sometime superintendent in the Prussian Territorial Church. He was educated at Breslau and Halle, where he evidenced a decided interest in the philosophy of Schelling.[1] He was ordained in the Evangelical Lutheran Church in 1912 and served as an army chaplain during World War I. After the war he held an uninterrupted series of academic positions both theological and philosophical at the universities of Berlin (1919-24), Marburg (1924-25), Dresden and Leipzig (1925-29), and finally at Frankfurt (1929-33). From the last post he was summarily dismissed upon the accession to power of Adolf Hitler, whose rise Tillich had so strenuously opposed. He came to America and served as Professor of Philosophical Theology at Union

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[1] Two of his earliest writings are his theses on Schelling. The first was for the degree of Doctor of Philosophy at Breslau, *Die religionsgeschichtliche Konstruction in Schellings positiver Philosophie, ihre Voraussetzungen und Prinzipien* (Breslau: H. Fleischmann, 1910). The second was for the Licentiate of Theology at Halle in 1912, *Mystik und Schuldbewusstsein in Schellings philosophischer Entwicklung*, which can be found in the *Gesammelte Werke* (Stuttgart: Evangelisches Verlagswerk, 1959-), Band I. This last will hereafter be referred to as *Werke*.

Theological Seminary (1933-55), as University Professor at Harvard (1955-62), and until his death as the John Nuveen Professor of Theology at the Divinity School of the University of Chicago (1962-65).

Formative influences

Protestant orthodoxy

Tillich's father was an aggressive proponent of conservative Lutheranism of the classical period of Protestant orthodoxy. He was a perfect model of Lutheran paternalism, which was the ideal of pre-War Prussian society. To disagree with him (disobedience was unthinkable!) was to incur inexorable consciousness of guilt, so thorough was "the identification of the parental with divine authority."[1] Tillich' break-through and the means by which it was achieved were decisive formative influences.

> There was only one point at which resistance was possible: namely, by using the very principles established by my father's authoritarian system against this system itself. And this was the way I instinctively chose. In the tradition of classical orthodoxy, my father loved and used philosophy, convinced that there can be no conflict between a true philosophy and revealed truth. The long philosophical discussions which developed belong to the most happy instances of a positive relation to my father. Nevertheless, in these discussions the break-through occurred. From an independent philosophical position a state of independence spread out into all directions, theoretically first, practically later. It is this difficult and painful

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[1] "Autobiographical Reflections," Kegley and Bretall, p. 8.

> break-through to autonomy which has made me immune against any system of thought or life which demands the surrender of this autonomy.[1]

Break-through is not total rejection. In breaking with orthodoxy Tillich was paradoxically prepared for receiving and internalizing its central themes of guilt and redemption. How was this so?

The ambiguity of life.--First, he was forced to acknowledge that autonomy is not an unambiguous good. To achieve it is a gain and a loss. To stand on one's own feet is gain. Such is the end or telos of maturation. But to achieve it means cutting oneself off from the creative matrix which nurtures and legitimates one's life. Thus Tillich can say that

> the immemorial experience of mankind, that new knowledge can be won only through breaking a taboo, that all autonomous thinking is accompanied by a consciousness of guilt, has been a fundamental experience of my life.[2]

The priority of the divine.--Second, this tragic sense of the ambiguity and fragmentariness of even the sublimest and most necessary of human efforts opened him to receive the profound significance of the Reformation doctrine of justification by grace through faith. This was mediated to him by his great teacher at Halle, Martin Kaehler. There is a permanent "in spite of" character to God's acceptance of man. Guilt and all other forms of negativity are not removed in reconciliation. There is no return to Eden. Rather, they are taken in, borne, and thus conquered in the divine life. And with respect to man's relation to God, God alone has the initiative. Since all our thinking and doing is ambiguous and fragmentary, neither thought nor activity is the way to reconciliation with God.

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[1] Ibid.

[2] Interpretation of History, p. 23.

Romanticism

The first twenty-eight years of Tillich's life belonged to "the nineteenth century," which as a cultural designation did not come to an end until the outbreak of war in August, 1914. This was the "old" era with its outward "stability," "liberalism," and "unbroken cultural traditions."[1] It was in this context that he found the Romantic overtones of Schelling's philosophy of Nature so congenial.

The fundamental principle of Romanticism was its conception of the relation of the infinite to the finite. Unlike Edwards' background, Tillich's _began_ with the microcosm/macrocosm motif. "The finite is in the infinite potentially; the infinite is in the finite actually. They are within each other."[2] In the train of this basic principle follows the whole gamut of Romantic themes--such as organicism, historicism, emotional and aesthetic intuitionalism.[1]

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[1] "Autobiographical Reflections," Kegley and Bretall, p. 3.

[2] Paul Tillich, _Perspectives on 19th and 20th Century Protestant Theology_, ed. with introd. by Carl E. Braaten (New York: Harper & Row, 1967), p. 77.

Mysticism

Closely related to Romanticism is the mystical strain in the formative influences on Tillich's life. It was both nature-mysticism and Christ-mysticism. The "mystical participation" in nature--the"aesthetic-meditative attitude towards nature as distinguished from a scientific-analytical or technical-controlling relation"--was something he shared with all Romanticism.[2] The Christ-mysticism was the sense of being caught up and participating in the tradition and the living presence of "the holy" in the Lutheran parish where his father served as pastor.

> It is the experience of the "holy" which was given to me at that time as an indestructible good and as the foundation of all my religious and theological work. When I first read Rudolf Otto's Idea of the Holy, I understood it immediately in the light of these early experiences, and took it into my thinking as a constitutive element. It determined my method in the philosophy of religion, wherein I started with the experiences of the holy and advanced to the idea of God, and not the reverse way. Equally important existentially as well as theologically, were the mystical, sacramental and aesthetic implications of the idea of the holy, whereby the ethical and logical elements of religion were derived from the experience of the presence of the

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[1] Ibid., pp. 76-90. Cf. "Autobiographical Reflections," Kegley and Bretall, pp. 4-6.

[2] "Autobiographical Reflections," Kegley and Bretall, pp. 4,5.

> divine, and not conversely. This made Schleiermacher congenial to me, as he was to Otto, and induced both Otto and myself to participate in movements for liturgical renewal and a revaluation of Christian and non-Christian mysticism.[1]

Circumstantial influences

World War I

If there is an event which bids fairest to be called the experiential root of Tillich's term "abyss," World War I was that event. Both the initial promise, which informed the first few months with a sense of ultimate meaning, and the subsequent disillusionment and utter disaster, in which all structures of meaning crashed and were dissolved, are well reflected in the following remarks:

> Together with my whole generation, I was grasped by the overwhelming experience of a nation-wide community--of the end of a merely individualistic and predominantly theoretical existence. . . . [But] the first weeks had not passed before one's original enthusiasm disappeared; after a few months I became convinced that the war would last indefinitely and ruin all Europe. Above all, I saw that the unity of the first weeks was an illusion, that the nation was split into classes, and that the industrial masses considered the Church as an unquestioned ally of the ruling groups. This situation became more and more manifest toward the end of the war. It produced the revolution, in which imperial Germany collapsed.[2]

This experience is very important for our grasping the essential co-involvement of being and meaning for Tillich. Being (here, the sense of powerful bonds of community) and meaning (here, the sense of national destiny) rose together;

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[1] *Ibid.*, p. 6.

[2] *Ibid.*, p. 12.

they were completely interdependent and mutually creative and sustaining. And together they went down into the abyss. The old cosmos--with all of its powers of being and meaning--slipped into the abyss: the utter, irretrievable "no more." The Church remained, but as Tillich reports, it was estranged from the new masses. It could not communicate with them. Moreover, it was suspect of being what the Marxists said it was: merely an ideological support for the old order; only now its irrelevance was underscored by its being a dead ideology, a system of meaning attached to no living social body, a rationale for nothing.

His discovery of art

It was during the war period that Tillich discovered art. Originally he turned to it to gain respite from the otherwise unrelieved horrors of the war. However, this was not escapist entertainment. He was not interested in covering the horrors of reality with "dishonest beautification." Rather, he saw in modern art, particularly expressionism, something at once prophetic and revelatory:

> In expressionism and surrealism the surface structures of reality are disrupted. The categories which constitute ordinary experience have lost their power. The category of substance is lost: solid objects are twisted like ropes; the causal interdependence of things is disregarded: things appear in a complete contingency; temporal sequences are without significance; . . . the spatial dimensions are reduced or dissolved into a horrifying infinity. The organic structures of life are cut into pieces which are arbitrarily (from the biological, not the artistic, point of view) recomposed:

> limbs are dispersed, colors are separated from their natural carriers.[1]

In this sense, art was expressing visually the abyss of nihilism which the war was manifesting experientially. But there was a difference. In _expressing_ nihilism _aesthetically_ there is a paradoxical overcoming of nihilism. There is manifest by its _import_ (_Gehalt_) a power of being-- or the "courage to be"--which is more ultimate than the nihilism so honestly portrayed by its _content_ (_Inhalt_).[2]

This experience with art became the root of his whole conception of a "theology of culture." It not only legitimated, but mandated, an analysis of all cultural forms from the standpoint of their import. It later appears as "the central proposition" of his philosophy of religion: "Religion is the substance of culture, culture is the expression of religion."[3]

Religious Socialism

The events of the period from 1919 to 1933 were decisive in shaping Tillich's life and thought. What Tillich says of the postwar years characterizes the theme of the whole period. Speaking of the Berlin period (1919-24) he says:

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[1] _The Courage to Be_ (New Haven: Yale University Press, 1952), pp. 146-47.

[2] "The creators of modern art have been able to see the meaninglessness of our existence; they participated in its despair. At the same time they have had the courage to face it and to express it in their pictures and sculptures." (_Ibid._, pp 147-48). Cf. James Luther Adams, "Tillich's Concept of the Protestant Era," _The Protestant Era_, pp. 298-99.

[3] _The Protestant Era_, p. xvii.

> The political problems determined our whole existence; even after revolution and inflation they were matters of life and death. The social structure was in a state of dissolution, the human relations with respect to authority, education, family, sex, friendship, and pleasure were in *a creative chaos*. Revolutionary art came to the foreground, supported by the Republic, attacked by the majority of the people. Psychoanalytic ideas spread and produced a consciousness of realities which had been carefully repressed in previous generations. The participation in these movements created manifold problems, conflicts, fears, expectations, ecstasies, and despairs, practically as well as theoretically. All this was at the same time material for an apologetic theology.[1]

"Creative chaos" is the most apt over-all description of the milieu of the Religious Socialist movement. "Religious Socialism" was not a political party, certainly not in our sense of one party alongside and in competition with others. Rather, it was the overpowering and empowering vision of a total reconstruction of society commensurate with the demands and opportunities of the times. It was "socialism" precisely because the social fabric was the one thing that was in a state of disintegration and under demand for renewal. It was "religious" in that it sought to bring the aspirations and illusions of all the emerging socialist forces under the constructive and critical aegis of the Christian faith, and particularly of Old Testament prophetism. It was "theology of culture" in action as well as theory, and in the midst of it were forged some of the most significant and distinctive terms of Tillich's thought, such as, "kairos," "the demonic," "theonomy," "the Gestalt of grace," "the Protestant Principle" as constructive as well as critical paradox.

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[1] "Autobiographical Reflections," Kegley and Bretall, pp. 13-14. Italics mine.

The central motifs of the Religious Socialist period can be summed up in two statements. The first is that "the key to the interpretation of history is historical activity."[1] The second is that a new meaning of history, or of life, must be expressed in a new society.[2] Marx was right in saying that any understanding of reality which does not change reality is a false understanding, an ideology. Meaning in history and the meaning of history are not things that are "given" or even "found." They are created. Historical activity is meaning-creation. Further, and this is the burden of the second statement, this meaning is not suspended in thin air. It is embodied in the new social reality which is both the ground and the product of the historical activity. A new state of things is actualized.

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[1] The Protestant Era, p. x.

[2] This is regarded by James Luther Adams as the key to the integrity of Tillich's thought. Cf. The Protestant Era, p. 315.

The flight to America

Tillich's removal to America when he was 47 years of age was certainly a major event in his life. It would be absurd to suppose that a new country, a new language, new experiences, and different circumstances did not condition his mind as well as his life. But the transition did not mark any decisive turn in the structure of his thought. The conditioning was in the areas of style, breadth, and emphasis rather than in substance. This was the occasion for theological reflection, cosmopolitan dialogue, and consolidation.[1]

Writings

Tillich's writing was voluminous and varied, and his literary production covers the full range of his adult life. There are academic theses, books, tracts, essays, journal articles, lecture series, sermons--just to mention the major categories.[1] Even his earlier writings are now being made available in the standard edition of his Gesammelte Werke, published by the Evangelisches Verlagswerk in Stuttgart. His most comprehensive work, of course, is his Systematic Theology. Unlike the bulk of his work, this was no occasional piece.[2] He began to formulate it as early as 1925.[3] His mind had the ability to attend to two levels with equal facility and simultaneously: analysis of the concrete and synthesis of the parts into a systematic whole. The Systematic Theology gives us in mature and distilled form the perspective that has informed all of his writings. For the purposes of this study this, alone, could suffice; and, for the sake of convenience, wherever there is the possibility of multiple sources for citation the Systematic Theology reference will be employed.

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[1] Mircea Eliade would have us believe that Tillich was on the threshold of a major revision of his thought at the very end of his life. This is alleged to be the result of Tillich's journey to Japan, in particular, and his encounter with primitive and oriental religions, in general. I see little evidence for this even in Tillich's last public lecture, "The Significance of the History of Religions for the Systematic Theologian," to which Eliade so enthusiastically refers. At any rate, this is one of those might-have-been's concerning which we do not have to decide. See Mircea Eliade, "Paul Tillich and the History of Religions," in Paul Tillich, The Future of Religions, ed. Jerald C. Brauer (New York: Harper & Row, 1966), pp. 31-36.

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[1] For a bibliography that is complete through the year 1959 see the one compiled by Peter John in Leibrecht, pp. 367-96.

[2] "The bulk of my literary work consists of essays, and three of my books, Religiöse Verwicklung, The Interpretation of History, and The Protestant Era, are collections of articles which themselves are based on addresses or speeches. This is not accidental. I spoke or wrote when I was asked to do so, and one is more often asked to write articles than books. But there was another reason: speeches and essays can be like screws, drilling into untouched rocks; they try to take a step ahead, perhaps successfully, perhaps in vain. My attempts to relate all cultural realms to the religious center had to use this method." ("Autobiographical Reflections," Kegley and Bretall, pp. 14-15).

[3] Ibid., p. 14.

The Background and Context of Tillich's Career

No man can be understood apart from his times, but "his times" obviously include much more than immediate biographical experiences and circumstances. To this larger context we must now turn. Here, though, we must severely discipline our attention or else the task becomes hopelessly unmanageable. We cannot rehearse a cultural history of the nineteenth and early twentieth centuries! We cannot even essay to "tally up all Tillich's philosophical debts."[1] That would be a limiting principle of dubious value since, in his breadth and comprehensiveness, Tillich appropriates at least some aspect of almost "everything" in the cultural history of mankind. But such a consideration is not a sufficient justification for not taking it as a limiting principle, for any complete understanding of Tillich would have to essay just that no matter how difficult and unending it might be. Our limiting principle must be topical. We are concerned with the relation of being and meaning in Tillich's thought and specifically with those sensitive areas of his system where this relation is most clearly manifest, the doctrines of creation and consummation. Though these are not isolated from the total system they are nevertheless isolable for topical attention. This is no structurally foolproof principle of limitation, but it is a disciplined attention to which we must hold fast or else we will stray off into byways that are interesting in themselves and tremendously significant, but which are not particularly germane to the question at hand.

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[1] The phrase is that of Ray L. Hart, "Recent Tillichiana--A Review Article," The Drew Gateway, XXXI (Winter, 1961), 98; which article see for a very perceptive exposition of, what he says modestly, "a few items on the ledger sheet" (*Ibid.*). The essays by Adams and Leibrecht, previously cited, contribute greatly to this as do all of the "Introductions" and biographical reflections of Tillich himself, especially the chapter, "On the Boundary," in *The Interpretation of History*. A recent attempt is Alexander J. McKelway, *The Systematic Theology of Paul Tillich: A Review and Analysis* (Richmond: John Knox Press, 1964), especially in the first chapter, "A Short Introduction to the Theology of Paul Tillich."

What we have said about our disciplined attention within Tillich's thought itself must be applied to his cultural antecedents. Being (reality-as-a-whole) and meaning (the whence and whither of reality-as-a-whole) are the notions we are after in the larger context. Of course, we cannot restrict ourselves to only those movements which consciously espouse such notions. We must also attend to those movements which consciously reject them, but only from the point of view of asking such questions as the following: Why do they reject the notions? and, Do they not in some sense affirm the notions in their passionate rejection of them?

There is another restriction which may be allowed for the sake of brevity and clarity. Ideas and movements will be dealt with schematically and not necessarily historically. Our attention will be on logical connections rather than strict attention to chronological sequences. For present purposes such lattitude will do no violence to the material since we are mainly interested in the ideas as they are present in the thought world of Tillich and only incidentally in how they came to be.

Kant's Critical Philosophy

The event which decisively and fatefully recast all the problems of the relation of being and meaning in the modern world was the critical philosophy of Immanuel Kant.[1]

The most general statement we could make is to say that for Kant the realms of being and meaning are rent asunder, the former falling to the province of his Nature philosophy and the latter to his Moral philosophy. However, the issues are more complicated than such a statement suggests. The notions of being and meaning are themselves internally split. Being--or perhaps we should say, "reality"--is split into phenomenal reality, which is amenable to the senses and hence can be known; and noumenal reality (the thing-in-itself), which is supersensible and hence in no sense can be known. Meaning--or perhaps we should say "intelligibility"--is split into two seemingly incommensurable realms of mechanism (applicable to nature) and teleology (applicable to morals). Neither type of reality embraces reality-as-a-whole, and neither form of intelligibility is universally applicable.

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[1] I am chiefly indebted for whatever competence I may have in dealing with the philosophy of Kant to classwork under Professor John Compton of the Department of Philosophy of Vanderbilt University. However, for purposes of documentation I will draw heavily upon Richard Kroner, *Speculation and Revelation in Modern Philosophy* ("Speculation and Revelation in the History of Philosophy," Vol. III; Philadelphia: Westminster Press, 1961). This work has been of inestimable value not only in explicating Kant but also in tracing the post-Kantian development of German Idealism, which is indispensable for this study. If Kroner's work has any weakness at all, it lies in a slight tendency to depreciate Schelling. To supplement him on this I have drawn heavily upon the Introduction by Bolman in [Friedrich Wilhelm Joseph von] Schelling, *The Ages of the World*, trans. with introduction and notes by Frederick de Wolfe Bolman, Jr. (New York: Columbia University Press, 1942). This work will hereinafter be referred to as "Bolman" since it is the introductory chapters to which I will primarily refer. Bolman acknowledges the encouragement and guiding influence of Tillich in the introductory essay (Preface, x) and Tillich cites the work as giving "an excellent description of Schelling's development from an Essential to an Existential philosophy" in *Theology of Culture*, ed. Robert C. Kimball (New York: Oxford University Press, 1959), p. 78 (footnote).

The Nature philosophy

Let us first look at Kant's Nature philosophy, which is the burden of the Critique of Pure Reason. The Newtonian world is contracted. The chaos/cosmos model is reinstated and strictly adhered to. Cosmos is the world for the knowing mind. It is limited by the subject-object structure or discursive character of all cognition; grounded in sensible intuition; conditioned by the a priori forms of sensible intuition--space and time; and synthesized by the a priori categories which are prescriptive for both subject and object. Within it the mechanistic form of intelligibility is unexceptionable.

But bounding **cosmos** or the phenomenal world, and beyond it, is the noumenal world or chaos. Even the spatial metaphors are misleading (though inescapable) because it is a realm which is "no place." It is transcendental rather than transcendent, a terminology which shows the strict polarity of this notion with that of cosmos. The knowing mind must posit the transcendental realm because cognitive experience points beyond itself in all directions: (1) from the subject pole to the self who is the subject of knowledge;[1] (2) from the object pole to the "thing-in-itself," the object in its existential interiority or inwardness--that which never "appears" and hence cannot be caught in the net of conceptual understanding; and (3) from the subject-object polarity itself to the transcendental rules of understanding which, because they are prescriptive for both subjectivity and objectivity, make knowledge possible.[2]

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[1] "Nature is not the all-embracing reality, since the self is not embraced by it. We ourselves, inasmuch as we are the subjects of knowledge, do not belong to nature; we are 'supernatural.' The whole activity of our theoretical faculty transcends the boundaries of the phenomenal world" (Kroner, p. 207).

[2] It is to be duly noted that this prescriptive correspondence of mind and reality is an expression of the microcosm/macrocosm theme. This Principle of Identity, as it is often called, is the presupposition of any knowledge seeking venture. However, the limit of the microcosm/macrocosm correspondence is "Nature." It is strictly an intracosmic or intra-phenomenal affair. Cf. Kroner: "The

However, these pointers to the transcendental realm only posit the _that_ of the noumenal "world" or realm; they do not lead us to the _what_. Chaos remains chaos and as such is utterly impenetrable to the knowing mind. More important still is the caution that the positing of the transcendental realm does _not_ lead us to either the _that_ or the _what_ of transcendent "objects." Transcendental _Ideas_, such as the Soul, the World, and God, are rational extensions of pure concepts, and as such, they may be useful as regulative ideals for the extension of our knowledge _of the phenomenal world_, but they are not metaphysical "objects" whose "existence" can be argued. There can be no cognitive knowledge of supersensible reality. In short, knowledge is not the way to God. All knowledge is knowledge of the finite world.

Problems posed by the Nature philosophy

The most important thing for our present study is what Kant's Nature philosophy does to the notion of reality-as-a-whole. It is this more than any other that has put

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'highest principle' of Kant's epistemology . . . is expressed in the sentence, We assert that 'the conditions of the _possibility of experience_ in general are likewise conditions of the _possibility of the objects of experience_.' The transcendental understanding makes the objects themselves possible, because the objects cannot exist without a logical structure. Kant transformed ontology into epistemology. Reality and logic are bound up with each other" (p. 203).

"metaphysics" in mortal jeopardy and discredited it for most of the modern world. Just as there is a perennial and intrinsic disjunction between the knower and the known, so our knowledge is disjunctive even in its ultimate grasp--the chaos/cosmos polarity. This means that though we reach for the concept of reality-as-a-whole, this is a reach that forever exceeds our grasp, for from within the disjunctive character of mind and its knowledge this disjunction can never be transcended. Knowledge only grasps part of being--phenomenal reality or existence. There is no knowledge of being as such. Ontology is impossible. Reality-as-a-whole is a heuristic concept, not an entity. Therefore to ask the meaning of being (reality-as-a-whole) is as misguided as it is impossible of answering.

The Moral philosophy

In spite of these severe strictures upon theoretical reason Kant, in his total philosophy, still manages to "know" much about the unknowable! What he takes away with the hand of theoretical reason he partially restores with the hand of moral reason. But it is in a different context, based on different grounds, and subject to different rules; hence it does not extend cognitive knowledge. The "postulates" of practical reason--freedom, immortality, God--are not "knowledge" but rational convictions. Unlike knowledge they do not predicate qualities to "objects"; but like knowledge they are position held for reasons and thus can be defended on the basis of universal moral experience.

Kant's Moral philosophy is developed in his Critique of Practical Reason. The contrast between theoretical and practical reason is made sharp and clear.

> What is truth in the realm of the understanding, is goodness in that of the will. But whereas the understanding is interested in knowing the truth about objects, the will is interested in forming itself, in making itself a good will. Theoretical understanding is extroverted; the will is introverted. In the practical field, man is ultimately concerned about himself, whereas in the theoretical field he is concerned with outer objects, with nature, with the phenomenal world. Inasmuch as man is superior to objects, the will is superior to the intellect. . . . The objects are the objects of the thinking ego, but the subject aims at itself. The objects appear to the human consciousness, but as will man is no longer an appearance, he is rather a "thing-in-itself," he is what he is for himself.[1]

There are several items here that need highlighting.

The transcendence of the self as agent

First, the noumenal self--the self as moral agent--which was for the cognitive reason only a regulative ideal, is here acknowledged as experienced in its existential interiority. This is the only noumenal entity of which this can be said, but the significant thing is that it can be said here. The transcendence of at least some aspects of the self over nature is here not just a pointer to the beyond but an experienced fact. In theoretical reason the noumenal self is transcendental; in practical reason, transcendent. But the odd thing is that the noumenal self, of which there is experiential certainty, never "appears" as do natural objects. It is manifest only through activity, not observation.

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[1] Kroner, pp. 217-18.

The duality of the moral consciousness

Second, this self, which is presumably a unity, always falls apart into a duality the instant reflection sets in. Prescriptive for moral consciousness is the duality between the "ought" and the "is." The "is" is man's nature, his past which is given to the present, his phenomenal self. And like all nature it is subject to the calculus by which natural objects are determined--only here instead of masses and motion we are dealing with determinate desires, drives, needs, ambitions, and the like. The "is" is the empirical self, and as such it belongs wholly and without exception to nature and its laws. To the external observer it is assumed that a man's nature determines his will. And this is the only presumption requisite to holding a man responsible for his acts.

But seen from within it is more complicated than this. Counterpoised to the "is" is the omnipresent "ought." Kant calls this the "categorical imperative." It is the unconditional demand to realize oneself as moral agent. This is a man's duty to himself and the dignity of his humanity.

In all cases where a man's will is determined by his nature, where desire overbears duty, the self is patient rather than agent. And this is the formal structure of immorality, no matter what the form or consequences of the act are. Only one's duty to realize oneself as autonomous agent can be constitutive of the good will. This is the formal structure of all morality. "Goodness," or the lack of it, is a predicate of the will _only_ and never (properly) of phenomenal objects, not even the empirical self. It is a matter of how the will is determined; and more specifically, it is a function of whether the will is determined by the transcendent pole of the self as over against the immanent pole, or man's empirical self, or his nature.

This, it should be duly noted, is the critical and decisive severance of meaning from being in Kant's philosophy. It is sometimes referred to as the fact-value dichotomy. Meaning (self-realization) and value (the good will) are, in their root signification, the _triumph_ of the noumenal self over the phenomenal self, of the "ought" over the "is," in determining the will. The good will is not "natural." It never "appears" in nature. It is not the "fulfillment" of nature. Yet it is operative _upon_ nature in and through the acts of the empirical self and has transforming consequences _for_ the course of events.

In view of this inner dialectics of the transcendent and immanent poles of the self in determining the will we can return to what we said about responsibility and see it in a new dimension. Looking at it from the inside, when a person's will is determined by his nature it is never in the consciousness as mere "responsibility" (though that is foundational) but also as "guilt." It could and should have been otherwise. Guilt is the sense of betrayal of one's true self in the ultimate reaches of his autonomy. And practical reason in its moral judgments presumes this in the case of other selves. Without it one does not accord human dignity to the other person but treats him as subhuman or on the animal level.

The dialectics of the moral act

First we observed that in practical reason the self has a foothold in the noumenal realm, and second that the moral consciousness is a duality between the "ought" and the "is." Now third, we must specify how the daulity is composed and the moral act consummated. There are many aspects of the relation of the noumenal self to the phenomenal self that are parallel to the chaos/cosmos motif in the realm of nature. But there is a decisive difference. Whereas the chaos/cosmos motif in the Nature philosophy was a strict polarity (that is, incapable of being either derived or composed), in the Moral philosophy the duality of the noumenal and phenomenal selves is dialectical. The experience of the duality of the moral consciousness can be derived and it can be composed. We know its whence and whither. Its ground is the fact of noumenal self awareness. Animals experience neither morality nor guilt because they give no evidence of experiencing transcendence over their nature. But man does. And internal experience certifies it. Further, the duality can be composed and the noumenal self actualized and consummated in the act that is informed by the good will. The goal of every moral act is its composure in self-realization. The postulate of this is freedom. The "I ought" guarantees the "I can." Freedom is prescriptive for the serious and existential experience of obligation. Furthermore it is the presumption of every human act or project.

The locus of meaning and its relation to being

Here we have a complete meaning relation, a teleology, that has its beginning and end "outside" of nature, which means "beyond" space and time and the laws of mechanism. It only touches nature tangentially. It needs nature only momentarily as both foil and medium. The moral act happens in place at a certain time, but it never appears as such. No phenomenal account or reckoning of an event can acknowledge it as a factor. The teleological aspect only has presence to the interiority of self-consciousness. It has being only in act, and the act is like a geometrical point or a temporal instant. Its "being" does not occupy space or persist through time. It "evaporates." It can only be re-created by another moral act.

The above paragraph is quite the crucial observation for our purposes in this study. *Any* and *every* single moral act is *sui generis*. Its teleological intelligibility is complete. It needs no larger framework or context. It requires no natural time, but only the knife-edge of the instant of decision. It requires no natural space, but only the point at which the tangent intersects the circle. Of course, it *does* need the instant and the point. That is why we can say that the good will is operative *upon* nature. And because the moral act can and does happen, its teleological intelligibility can, *by extension*, be applied as a meaning *for* nature and the course of life within nature. To this we must now turn. And in order to understand how the extension of the teleological postulate can be legitimated we must attend to the two transitional elements of freedom and dialectics.

Freedom and character

Freedom, for Kant, is noumenal causality. Unlike the cause-and-effect relation in mechanism, which is essentially temporal succession, it is the ground-consequent relation, which is nontemporal. Nevertheless it affects nature. It does not create any new psychological forces *ex nihilo*, but it does transform the given configuration of natural motives into a different configuration with a new direction. In this sense every moral act leaves a residue. And the *series* of moral acts by which the transforming of the configuration of psychological forces tends to become habituated results in "character." Character is a "second nature" which is the creation of freedom over a long period of time.[1] If freedom is "the ability to resist desire, *if it is in disagreement with the demand of duty*,"[2] then character is the transforming, disciplining, and habituating of desire so that it is less and less prone to resist the moral law. Character is *in* nature. It becomes a calculable element of the empirical self in the causal nexus of phenomenal relations.

The postulates of immortality and God

But character is not the creature of a single act, nor of a day, nor of a lifetime! The approach of character conformation to its limit of doing "by nature" what the law demands is asymptotic. It wants indefinite temporal extension. Hence, the postulate of immortality. It is reasonable to hope that what is intrinsically possible and actually begun will, in the total scheme of things, be consummated. And such a conviction about the reasonableness of "the total scheme of things" is the same thing as postulating God as "the moral author of nature."[1]

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[1] Cf., Kroner, p. 222 *et passim*.

[2] Kroner, p. 231. Italics mine.

Summary

Thus we can see how Kant, by extending what is rationally implicit in the postulate of freedom, arrives at convictions about the creation and consummation of the world. It is all based on the teleological form of intelligibility, but it is applied externally to nature. Meaning is meaning for being not of being. It is the self that is consummated in its noumenal dimension. Nature or being is posited as the stage setting for this drama. It finally participates in the consummation, but it "drags its feet" all the way!

This is the side of Kant's critical philosophy that was seized upon in the later nineteenth and early twentieth centuries by the philosophy of Values and the "Neo-Kantian" Liberal theology of the school of Albrecht Ritschl. As such it presented itself as a live option in the thought world of Tillich, although Tillich never tires of informing us that he found it uncongenial temperamentally and philosophically impossible.[2]

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[1] Cf. Kroner, p. 228 et passim.

[2] For an example of his criticism of the philosophy of Values, see Love, Power, and Justice (New York: Oxford University Press, 1954), pp.73-74. For one among many excoriations of the Ritchlian school of Liberal Theology see Interpretation of History, p. 32. It is not necessary

Dialectics: the untapped resource

There is another point of potential transition from meaning to being in Kant. One must say "potential" with respect to the critical philosophy because Kant himself did not make much of it. But all of his successors in the great line of German Idealism did, so we must isolate it now at the source. I am referring, of course, to dialectics--more specifically the dialectical composure in the moral act of the duality of the self in moral consciousness. It is difficult--rather, impossible--to think "dialectics" without movement, and that means without time. And the decision which an act embodies and manifests is the cutting into time which pushes the presently experienced daulity into the past as it moves ahead to the future synthesis. Dialectical reason is itself an archetype of temporality, and a dialectical movement which composes noumenal *and* *phenomenal* elements is more than just an archetype: it is a new kind of temporality itself. It is "new" in comparison with the "absolute time" of the Newtonian world view, which was indefinitely extended in both directions. It is *historical* time--time with a point of departure and a goal, a "beginning" and an "end," or better, a

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at this point to go into the details of Tillich's refutation of this position as the subsequent exposition of thought will make clear how *any* non ontologically based and oriented system of meaning and value is antithetical to his system.

ground and a telos. The undeveloped potentialities of this were immense. And Kant was not yet in his grave when Fichte, Schelling, and Hegel started developing them.

Prospects and portents

In a very true sense (even if it may not be chronologically exact) we can see that Kant's Moral philosophy is the hinge upon which the predominantly a-historical Enlightenment pivots into the history-conscious and time-burdened modern period from Romanticism on. Historical time is our demon. German Idealism tried to hold it within the bounds of rationality by dialectical reason; Liberalism by the rationale of progress; Marxism by a secularized version of eschatology; and there are doubtless many others. But nothing could stem the flood until it enveloped and dissolved all rationality and meaning in the form of historical relativism. Historical time--not the horrendous spatial infinity--becomes the new face of chaos. And unlike infinity (space) it is not transcendent, but immanent. Time, as Kant duly noted, is the inner sense.

This, too, is Tillich's milieu. Small wonder that he should write an article entitled, "History as the Problem of Our Period."[1] Tillich's life problem has not been at all unlike that of Edwards, who had to tackle the inner chaos and morass of experimentalism of the Great Awakening. However much the circumstances of the two situations differ, the inner locale and the magnitude of the problems then and now are the same. And the approach of the two men has been the same. Neither turned his back to the chaos. Neither sought to refurbish some older tradition as a dike. Neither sought some transcendent platform from which he could view the flood from above and let it go its way. The way to the answer, so they were constrained to believe and to risk, lay *in medias res*. But this is to anticipate things.

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[1] The Review of Religion, III (March, 1939), 255-64.

Aesthetic and teleological judgment

Thus far we do not have before us the total picture of Kant's philosophy on the relation of being and meaning. After having severed so completely *at their roots* the realms of being and meaning, Kant acknowledges that there is a kind of universal experience in which the two elements appear conjointly. This is the subject matter of his third major work, the *Critique of Judgment*, which considers aesthetic and teleological judgment. The perception of a work of art has to do with cognitive principles, but aesthetic experience is intuitive and not discursive. The perception of living organisms has to do with means and ends, but the relation is not dialectical. "What is always in the future of scientific endeavor and of moral striving seems to be immediately presented to him who perceives the beautiful and who thinks the organic harmony in nature."[1]

The non-discursive character of this experience is in striking contrast to the Nature philosophy. The being of a work of art or an organism is intuited in its wholeness at the outset. Only afterward can it be broken down for the analysis of its parts.

> What is beautiful is perceived as a complete Whole in which all parts are totally united, not as particular things are joined under general laws, but in a concrete harmony, so that the senses and the reason are no longer separated but work together. Because of this harmony which unites our own subjective faculties of apprehension, we judge things to be beautiful. Beauty is not an objective quality, property, or attribute, but the reflex of that subjective balance which enables us to enjoy them. A similar synthesis of the whole and the parts, of means and ends, takes place in the realm of organism. Here too the material is ordered according to a concrete harmony from which life results. This inner fitness and adaption also pleases us because our own faculties of sensation and understanding are working together. Therefore we judge organs as harmonizing with the existence and the processes of the organic whole. It is as if an unconscious purpose had composed this whole, as in the realm of artistic creation a conscious purpose is at work in composing the beautiful.[2]

Also the non-dialectical character of the experience is striking. Meaning seems to be intrinsic to the object as a whole and not applied _to_ it from without.

> Both the work of art and the organism are themselves united intrinsically from within. There is nothing in the work that does not contribute to the beautiful form, as there is nothing in the living being that does

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[1] Kroner, p. 256.

[2] _Ibid._

> not serve the purpose of life. They are not like machines, constructed in order to work for an outer purpose; they are ends in themselves. They themselves integrate the manifold which is united in them. In so far as they are considered in themselves they can be regarded as self-sufficient. Form and content, means and end, are completely interwoven, so that every part of the work can be enjoyed as the end of the whole, as every organ in the organism can be conceived as the end of life as well as its means. Here we perceive not only theoretical objects or practical duties but something that seems to be the image of the absolute.[1]

Summary and estimate

This is as far as Kant would go in attempting a rapprochement of the realms of being and meaning that he had severed in the first two critiques. It goes a long way, and it suggests that it has possibilities of being carried farther than he took it, but Kant resolutely stopped short. Beauty and teleology, he maintained, are delights and satisfactions of the human mind and not qualities resident _in objects_. This is not to say that taste, for example, is purely subjective. No, the balance and harmony are resident in objects as well as perceived by the mind. But beauty is not the harmony; it is the subjective _delight_ in that harmony. The possibility of that delight is the self's transcendence over and reflection upon its own constituitive rational principles. Personality in all of its dimensions lies in self-transcendence over nature. It is noumenal.

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[1] Kroner, pp. 256-57.

Romanticism and the
third Critique

It is not difficult to see how and why Romanticism was not stopped by Kant's strictures. It never accepted Kant's complete depersonalization of nature. (Actually it was not "Kant's," but that which he shared with most all Western thought since Descartes). To be sure, it takes an overactive imagination to conceive of a painting delighting in its own harmony. On the other hand, it takes unusual dullness not to perceive that organisms--especially animals--manifest a joie de vivre. Delight is not an exclusively human quality though it may and undoubtedly does have a peculiarly human dimension. This is a criticism of Kant's Nature philosophy--or a going beyond it--which Schelling in particular developed. And through Schelling's influence this Romantic strain shows up strongly in Tillich. But here again we anticipate things.

Post-Kantian Developments

It has been necessary for us to go into some length to characterize the way Kant has posed the problematic relation of being and meaning. The fruit of such labor, and the test of its validity, is that it should enable us to treat briefly and schematically--yet understandably--the post-Kantian developments in both philosophy and theology which have bearing on our understanding of Tillich. From our interest standpoint, the philosophical developments bifurcate into the Idealist and Existentialist camps depending upon whether one begins with meaning and drives toward being or whether one begins with being and drives toward meaning, respectively.[1] The theological developments bifurcate into theologies of Being and of Act.[2] We will deal first with the post-Kantian philosophical context and second with the corresponding theological one.

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[1] I am aware that this is a very broad and not universally accepted use of the term "Existentialism," but here I agree with Tillich, whose lead I am following, that for historical and systematic purposes the usage is justified. Cf. the introduction to his chapter, "Existential Philosophy: Its Historical Meaning," Theology of Culture, ed. Robert C. Kimball (New York: Oxford University Press, 1959), pp. 76-80. This methodological Existentialism includes not only those men narrowly so designated--as Heidegger, Jaspers, and Sartre--but also the later Schelling, Kierkegaard, Feuerbach, Marx; the "Philosophy of Life" group exemplified by such men as Nietzche, Dilthey, and Bergson; and also important features of the Pragmatism of James and Dewey. What enables us, according to Tillich, to see all these very diverse movements under one perspective is that they all begin by "criticizing the identification of Reality or Being with Reality-as-known, with the object of Reason or thought. Starting from the traditional distinction between 'essence' and 'existence,' they insist that Reality or Being in its concreteness and fulness is not 'essence.' It is not the object of cognitive experience, but rather 'existence' is Reality as immediately experienced, with the accent on the inner and personal character of man's immediate experience." (Ibid., p. 77). They are united in opposition to a common foe: any form of the Identity philosophy which equates thought and being. Since this is the level--and the only level--upon which I am interested, for the purposes of this study, in these men and movements, this principle of dichotomy between "Idealism" and "Existentialism" appears not only legitimate but quite necessary and illuminating.

[2] Cf. chap. i, where this distinction was characterized.

German Idealism

To borrow a line from Robert Frost, "Something there is that doesn't love a wall."[1] German Idealism felt this constraint most keenly and sought to join together what Kant had put asunder. What was needed was a *cognitive* grasp of reality-as-a-whole and an *intrinsic* teleology of the whole manifold of experience. In this the movement felt that it was not going against Kant, but beyond him.[2]

The question was the perennial philosophical problem given its classical expression by Plotinus: How to derive the Many from the One and the fulfillment of the Many in its return to the One. The analogy between this and the Christian doctrines of creation and consummation is apparent. But can the two be correlated? This is an even more fundamental question of the relation of philosophy and theology. German Idealism, particularly in its Hegelian summit, believed that it had solved this problem, too.

The decisive difference between nineteenth century Idealism and anything that had preceded it was the abandonment of any variant of the Neo-Platonist notion of emanation. The new metaphysical principle of movement was not radiation or overflow, but dialectical tension between opposites. The cue for this new philosophical vision was, as we have seen, Kant's Moral philosophy. If dialectics can compose one of the most fundamental dichotomies of human experience--the "ought" and the "is"--why can it not be the model for composing cognitive dualities as well? Of course, the Kantian understanding of the structure of cognitive reason would have to be overhauled or gone beyond, but this is just what Idealism essayed. To catch the dialectical movement of reality-as-a-whole theoretical reason itself must become dialectical. A new Logos-logos correlation--a new conception of the Identity principle--must be forged. A static conception of reason can neither apprehend nor comprehend a dynamic reality.

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[1] "Mending Wall," *The Poems of Robert Frost* (New York: Modern Library, 1946), p. 35.

[2] Kroner, p. 241.

Fichte

The movement begins with Fichte's attempt to get to the a priori principle of unity behind the split between theoretical and practical reason. It is ultimately the same self who both thinks and acts. This ultimate self or "Absolute Ego" must be the first principle of both being and meaning. Fichte consciously and explicitly takes his lead from Kant's Moral philosophy. The Absolute Ego is pure activity in the sense of pure triumph of the unconditioned over the conditioned moments of the will. It has being only in act and hence cannot be comprehended in any static categories. This is the first thesis and the decisive one.[1]

But any triumph of the unconditioned or the Absolute must have a foil over which and a medium in which the triumph is actual. This was the nemesis of Fichte's system. Realizing this, Fichte posited a second thesis: that the Absolute Ego posits the non-ego over which it continually triumphs. This solved one problem, but at the expense of raising a host of other ones which are insurmountable! It does give completeness to the notion of the Absolute Ego. But what is the ontological status of the non-ego? If it, too, is "absolute" (and the Absolute Ego eternally needs resistance in order to be-in-act Absolute Ego!) then the singularity of the first principle is destroyed and we are back in an insoluble duality of first principles. On the other hand, if the non-ego--which is certainly the archetype if not the actuality of all finite being--is given only a provisional reality (and a negative one at that!), then the efficacy of the first thesis to secure both being and intrinsic meaning of finite existence is irretrievably undercut. In short, the World exists by God and for God, but only in the sense that in the positing and negating of the World can God be God! This might conceivably be satisfying to God, but to whom else? Schelling can certainly be understood when he revolted against Fichte's degradation of nature or the finite world to the status of a steppingstone.[1]

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[1] "What makes the system of Fichte modern and post-Kantian is the definition of the divine being as pure activity, in contrast to Aristotle's definition as substance or form. God is Subject, an Ego, a Self, he is not substance or form. It is true that Aristotle had said that the divine form is pure energy, but energy in his vocabulary did not mean ego or subject, but form, as power. And the same is true with respect to all his followers, including Christian Aristotelians" (Kroner, p. 244).

Estimate of Fichte.--Fichte was caught in the toils of the inescapable polarity of the finite and the infinite. One pole simply cannot be reduced to a product and function of the other even with the elixir of dialectics.[2] But there was an important gain in Fichte's efforts, a lesson not lost to Hegel in the early nineteenth century nor to Tillich in our own time. And this is: So long as the relation of God and the World is conceived in spatial terms (infinite/finite or chaos/cosmos) then the problem of the relation of being and meaning is insoluble. The chaos/cosmos model might be made to account for the creation

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[1] Kroner, pp. 258-59.

[2] "Religiously speaking, it is the mystery of Creation which Fichte attacks in his adventurous and audacious speculation. If God is absolute and sovereign, if he is perfect and all in all, why does he create? . . . If one answers that it is because he wants to glorify himself, we might then ask why God needs to be glorified if he is self-sufficient and self-existent? If the answer is that he creates because he wants to be loved and to love, we might say: if he needs love, then he is not without want and in that sense not perfect. Whatever we may answer, the question would remain essentially unanswerable because human understanding is unable to conceive of the Infinite without the contrast of the Finite. It was this mystery which Fichte tried to penetrate by his two supreme principles or theses" (Kroner, pp. 245-46).

(or even generation) of the World, but it can only be made so to do at the expense of any possibility of the consummation (in the sense of teleological fulfillment) of the World. The chaos/cosmos polarity must remain a polarity--in the divine life as well as in life in the world. This polarity is not one of the differentia between the two. Schelling, to whom we must now turn, saw this perhaps more clearly than Hegel. Rather than the infinite/finite polarity the relation between God and the World is more aptly approached in the dialectics of time and eternity.

Schelling I

Preliminary considerations.--Schelling is difficult to treat schematically because his philosophy took a decisive turn in its development. In his earlier period (usually referred to as "Schelling I") he is best seen as standing somewhere between Fichte and Hegel in the development of Idealism. However, in his later period ("Schelling II") he is best understood as anticipating and, to some extent, inaugurating the post-Hegelian criticism and rejection of Idealism.[1] For this reason we will defer

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[1] See Bolman, p. 3. The consensus as to when the shift from "rational dialectic" to "existential dialectic" took place is that it was sometime during the five years from 1804 to 1809. The former is the date of publication of his Philosophy and Religion, the latter of his Philosophical Inquiry into the Nature of Human Freedom. Both works show the strong influence of Boehme upon Schelling, but the former still leans toward the Nature philosophy which characterizes

Schelling II until after our review of Idealism.

Schelling's philosophy of Nature.--Whereas Fichte had developed some of the potentialities of the ethical-activistic side of Kant (Critique of Practical Reason), Schelling I developed the mystical-aesthetic potentialities of the Critique of Judgment. Along with Goethe and the

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the earlier period. Taking the median date, 1806, Bolman says that up until this time he "was largely engaged in the interpretation of the character of the movement of nature and history as limited by human consciousness and reason" (Ibid. Italics mine.). After this he was absorbed with the problem of how one can think "existence," or, as Bolman states it, a shift "to what, for want of a better term, we may call existential dialectic, whereby [he] attempted to find the meaning of existence by reconciling certain features of idealism with existential limitations" (Ibid.). Kroner, taking the earlier date, 1804, as the point of transition, characterizes the later period not too differently by saying that he was absorbed by the problem of "how the finite emanates from the Absolute. . . . With ever-increasing intensity he endeavored to tackle the hardest and toughest mystery the human mind confronts--the mystery of Creation. For more than fifty years, from 1804 to the end of his life in 1854, he was fascinated by this mystery and mobilized all the energy of his dynamic speculative thinking in order to find the right attitude toward this greatest of all riddles" (Kroner, pp. 266-67).

Because of this acknowledged watershed in the emphases of Schelling's thought I consider it a defensible procedure to treat Schelling I here and Schelling II after Hegel. However, this is a decision that is not without its problematic aspects. As both Bolman and Tillich (Mystik und Schuldbewusstsein . . .) insist, there is a continuous thread, an inner integrity, linking both periods. Bolman calls it "Schelling's persistent problem" and states it as follows: "to account for the finite existence of the world and its intelligibility" (Bolman, p. 33 et passim). It was only the answer, not the problem, that underwent change (Ibid.). This should caution us against making too radical a dichotomy between the periods. But there is another problematic aspect which questions not the legitimacy of separating the "two Schellings" but the value of treating Schelling II at all. Kroner states that there is nothing in the later Schelling that Hegel did not anticipate and

Romantics he looked upon Nature not as mechanism but as something vibrant and alive. Organism replaces mechanism.

> At bottom, Nature is itself an ego, though unconscious and not yet knowing itself, an intelligence working instinctively and without a purpose set by a will, ever growing and approaching the goal. And what is the goal? To awake from its slumber, to become conscious in man, to acquire intelligence and will, and to live the life that is ours. Nature and Man are one in their innermost essence and being. Their difference is relative, while their true and absolute reality is the same.[1]

Art as the organon of philosophy.--Of course, the unity of mind and nature is not obvious on the surface of things. It is transcendental and a priori. It is neither an end product of reason reflecting upon itself nor of empirical observation of nature. It is intuited intellectually as aesthetic judgment grasps the import of a work of art. "In art the fleeting glimpse of this harmony is made fully objective, and thus art is the universal organon of philosophy."[2] The Identity or Indifference of

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refute even before Schelling produced it (Hegel died in 1831, twenty-three years before Schelling). (Kroner, p.288). I cite this as evidence in support of my judgment that Kroner tends to depreciate Schelling (Supra [p. 275, footnote]). This is an argument which I am not competent to adjudicate. It certainly cannot be settled on the basis of secondary sources. But I can and will defend my preference for the Tillich-Bolman evaluation of Schelling II over against Kroner on the grounds that what Tillich *thinks* Schelling achieved in the way of going beyond Hegel is more germane to understanding the thought world of *Tillich* than what may or may not have been the actual case.

[1] Kroner, pp. 259-60.

[2] *Ibid*.

mind and nature lies not on the surface but in the "potencies" or powers of being and meaning which are intuited in and through the things that appear to our senses and in our minds. Thus we can see that Schelling I is both naturalistic and mystical, or in a single phrase, his is a mediated mysticism.

Problems of the Identity philosophy.--This scheme, as a beginning point, has an advantage over Fichte's in that it does not reduce one pole of the problem to a function of the other. But it has its own inherent difficulties which became increasingly apparent to Schelling even in the early period. If the Identity or Indifference of the two potencies must be conceived as a priori to their a posteriori differentiation in life and the world as we encounter it, then how can one account for the fact of the differentiation? From any viewpoint one chooses, the actualization of the potencies is a loss. The essential Identity or Indifference on the level of potency becomes an existential differentiation on the level of actuality. Schelling I concedes that there is no logical transition from essence to existence, that existence is a "counter-essential leap" and a "fall."[1]

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[1] Cf. Bolman, pp. 21-24. These are themes which appear in the Philosophy and Religion of 1804 and which show the beginning of Boehme's influence. The following excerpt from that work, cited in Bolman, pp. 21-23, sums up the matter precisely: "In a word, there is no continuous

Schelling's conception of freedom.--Although from the standpoint of the original unity the rationale for falling into existence cannot be given, still the *possibility* of the transition can be accounted for in terms of freedom.

> What is exclusively peculiar to absoluteness is that it invests its counterpart not only with its own nature but even independence. This being-in-itself, this genuine and true reality of what is first envisaged, is *freedom*, and from that first independence of the counterpart flows what comes forth in the phenomenal world as freedom, which is the last trace and, as it were, the seal of divinity envisaged in the fallen world.[1]

This notion of freedom, however, is quite a different thing from Kant's. Freedom for Kant was eminently rational; it was the ability to actualize what one essentially is; namely, to become a moral agent. The above mentioned freedom to actualize oneself in a *counteressential leap* would be a contradiction of terms to Kant. In Kant freedom is the ability to *compose* a duality; in Schelling I it is the cause or occasion of the duality itself.

The fallen character of existence.--It is more than a little ironical that whereas Schelling I began with the

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transition from the absolute to the actual; the origin of the sensible world is conceivable only as a complete break from absoluteness, by a leap. . . . The absolute is what alone is real; finite beings, on the other hand, are not real; therefore their ground cannot lie in a *communication* of reality to them or their substratum, a communication which would have proceeded from the absolute, but can lie only in a *removal*, in a *fall* from the absolute."

[1] Schelling; cited in Bolman, p. 22.

effort to rescue nature from Fichte's degradation of it he arrived at the point where both the self and nature are degraded. Existence is universally fallen. There is no way to salvage the rationality of either meaning or being _from the standpoint of origin_. The only way open is from the standpoint of goal. That goal is conceived as the reconciliation and return of the differentiated to the Identity or Indifference of the origin. And "freedom" is not the means to this; rather, aesthetics.

Influence of Boehme: the tension in God.--We cannot explicate the reconciliation and return without passing over into themes which more properly are the concerns of Schelling II, but as the two periods overlap somewhat it is best to treat it here. In his work of 1809, _Of Human Freedom_, he draws more heavily upon Boehme's theosophic vision of the tension between the Abyss and the Logos in God.

> The absolute or God does not only harbor the Ideas, he is not only Mind, but he is in the first place Will. The Will is not self-sufficient, since it aims at something which it does not yet possess; it has a purpose. To be a will presupposes, therefore, a certain lack in the very essence of God; he cannot be such a perfect One as the Neoplatonists thought him to be. An original duality must be present in him, a tension between desire and the object of desire. . . . The divine essence is only one aspect of the divine being, the other is his existence through which he is actual and active. . . .
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> God generates out of the unconscious will his thinking mind or the Ideas in which the will contemplates its own being. But this duality generates a contradiction that God tries to dissolve. Therefore he creates the world in which he reveals himself and he

> creates man through whom he heals the break between the two elements of his own being, impulsive nature and reason or mind. . . .
>
> Whereas in the transcendental idealism, the human ego finally reaches its goal by creating the work of art, now God reaches his goal by creating man and thereby finally reconciles himself as will to himself as reason. . . . Thus man's redemption is in the last analysis God's own self-redemption.[1]

Summary.--Since all of this is so close to (though as we shall see, not identical with) the thought of Tillich, it would be well worth our while to summarize precisely what is going on here.

first, cosmogony or the generation of the world is seen as a necessary movement in the process of theogony or the self-actualization of the divine life. God "others" himself in nature and man not only for the purposes of self-manifestation but also for self-fulfillment in self-reconciliation. This has Fichtean overtones, but there is a difference. The World is not a "moment" in the dialectics of the Absolute, a steppingstone; rather it has permanent and necessary significance for the divine life. This moves a step closer to a genuine understanding of a meaning of being and not just for being.

Second, the decisive contrast between God and the world is not in terms of the infinite/finite cleavage, but in terms of the relation between eternity and time. The chaos/cosmos polarity is both in God (Abyss and Logos) and in the World (freedom and nature). The relation is that of the macrocosm/microcosm theme. "Eternity and time have the relation of prototype and image."[1]

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[1] Kroner, pp. 268-69.

Third, the transition from potentiality to actuality is tragic. The locus of this is freedom. We noted his un-Kantian conception of that. "The real and vital conception of freedom is that it is a possibility of good or evil."[2] But the self-consciousness in self-actualization of this freedom can only be in the choice of evil. Only in disobedience, in the "counteressential leap" and "fall," does existential freedom actualize its self-conscious independence. There is a conjunction between necessity and freedom in the transition from potentiality to actuality which, although it can be described, is nevertheless an irrationality from the standpoint of origin.

Fourth, though actual existence is fallen it is a gain. For only in the realm of actual existence can the Absolute manifest and reconcile itself. What can take place only in the dimension of the immanent is of infinite weight and permanent significance for the dimension of the transcendent. The reconciliation, unlike the moral victory which has being only in act, is like the work of art that triumphs over the artist. It is a permanent synthesis of the elements of existence and essence, or of the real and the ideal, or of the stuff of sense and meaningful structure. "The purpose of the most sublime science can only be to demonstrate the reality--reality in the strictest sense--the proximity, the living presence of a God in the totality of things and in the particular."[1]

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[1] Bolman, p. 17.

[2] Schelling, Of Human Freedom, cited in Bolman, p. 22.

Hegel

We can say that whereas Fichte, with his ethical postulate, could get an Idealistic system started rationally but ran into irrationalities with respect to its consummation, Schelling I, with his aesthetic postualte, could get the system consummated rationally but only by starting with the irrationalities of theosophic speculation. Hegel, alone, was able to bring the system to its comprehensive rational completeness. The simplicity with which this can be stated belies the inner richness and profundity of his achievement.

> Neither of the opposite poles of life is absolute, taken in itself, neither the ethical nor the aesthetic, neither history nor nature, neither the divine nor the human. "The truth is the Whole." If there is any primacy in Hegel's system, it is that of the truth itself. It is the primacy of the dialectical synthesis compared with the notion of single concepts. . . .
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> The supreme synthesis is conceived by Hegel as Mind or Spirit. The absolute mind is the unity of itself and its opposite: nature. It is the synthesis of subject and object, or thinking and being, of notion and

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[1] Schelling, Ueber das Verhaeltniss des Realen und Idealen in der Natur (1806), cited in Bolman, p. 26.

> intuition. The mind itself accomplishes this synthesis by the energy of its own activity. It enacts itself (as Fichte's absolute ego did) by opposing to itself its counterpart and by reconciling this opposite pole to and with itself. The mind triumphs in the end.[1]

The primacy of being.--In place of Fichte's Absolute Ego Hegel places being as such, as it is "the Absolute in its most abstract, most universal, most fundamental form."[2]

> Everything in some way has the logical character "to be." The category of Being, therefore, is common to everything that can be thought and that has to be thought. Being as such is the supreme principle of Hegel's metaphysical logic. Whatever we may think, it is conditioned by Being and belongs to the realm of Being, whether it is empirical or a priori, finite or infinite, necessary or contingent, Nature or Mind. Being underlies all speculative thought as it underlies all reality and all appearance.[3]

The conceptual nature of the polarities.--But being is a concept. As such it is never present to the consciousness except in contrast to its polar opposite, Nothing. All conceptual--that is, abstract--thought is dichotomous. And this polarity cannot be reduced. In this Schelling I was right and Fichte wrong. The one pole does not produce its counterpole in order to triumph over it. The polar character of conceptual opposites is *sui generis* because without mutual exclusion and limitation there could be no *concepts* at all. On the basis of concepts--that is, the presentational contents of a given state of consciousness--the polarity can neither be derived nor composed.

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[1] Kroner, pp. 283-84.

[2] *Ibid.*, p. 286.

[3] *Ibid.*

Synthesis as a recasting of consciousness.--But Schelling I was wrong when he hypostatized the basic polarity and sought, mystically and aesthetically, to discern the Identity or Indifference of the potencies which underlay the two poles. This, according to Hegel, was unnecessary because the polarity is abstract and conceptual, not real. Concepts are only entities to the consciousness which entertains them as objects for reflection. Therefore it is not the polar contrast of the concepts that needs to be resolved but rather that state of consciousness which needs to be transcended, enlarged, and transformed so that what was in the preceding stage of consciousness seen as an either/or situation is from the succeeding stage a both/and situation. The new conceptual synthesis, in turn, bares its own polar opposite and so the consciousness is forced to recast itself anew, and so on.

Consummation as Absolute Spirit or the concrete universal.--But the process is not endless. Its approximation of the goal is not even asymptotic. In each transformation of consciousness the conceptual aspect moves away from abstractness and closer to concreteness (because it progressively synthesizes abstract and concrete elements) while the consciousness itself becomes more comprehensive in its perspectival synthesis. The end (telos) of this double movement is the concrete universal, or Absolute Spirit. What began as a stage of consciousness in which everything was abstract and disjunct is consummated in the consciousness which itself is the concrete perspectival synthesis of reality-as-a-whole. This, and not any of the stages along the way, is truth.

The beauty and comprehensiveness of the system is unsurpassable. Some of Kroner's passages explicating it are very lucid. For example:

> Abstracted from all details, we may state that the Absolute divides itself and reunites itself again. This is the basic intuition of Hegel's system. Schelling was not able to demonstrate how the Absolute divides itself; he simply stated this basic division. Hegel's logic tries to fill this gap in Schelling's system. It shows that the Absolute divides itself because the Absolute can be thought of as Absolute only if we compose it out of its constituents. If we speak of the Absolute as such, we have already thought of it as being abstracted from the Non-Absolute. But this abstraction contradicts the intention of thinking All in All. The Absolute is the Absolute only if it is not merely abstracted from its opposition but reunited with it; or rather if it is the movement from the opposites to their final synthesis. The abstract Absolute is already its own negation, since the true Absolute is not abstract but concrete. Being abstracted from its concrete content is not Being, but Nothing. Only the synthesis of Being and Nothing can be (or rather become) the true Absolute.[1]

The reconciliation of philosophy and theology.--Since we stated that German Idealism in its Hegelian summit believed that it had solved the problem of the relation between philosophy and theology we must give some attention to it. The Absolute Mind or Spirit, which is the telos of philosophical thought, is, Hegel believed, the same as the God of revelation. The only difference is that revelation gives it in "presentative pictorial" form rather than in conceptual thinking. This has great communicative power, but it can be dangerous, for "this external character of revelation hides the true knowledge of its message and tempts the believer to understand it merely as a historical account instead of comprehending its speculative content."[1] A hint as to how Hegel saw philosophy and revelation as convertible approaches is shown in the following:

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[1] Kroner, pp. 289-90.

> The "drama of salvation" . . . presents in a pictorial manner the movement from Being through Nothing to Becoming which unites Being and Nothing. Creation images the same movement. "Creation is the word which pictorial presentative thought uses to convey the absolute movement which the Notion itself goes through." "Absolute Being would be merely an empty name if in very truth there were an absolute 'fall' from it. The aspect of self-centeredness, self-absorption, really constitutes the essential moment of the self of Spirit." In other words, creation, fall, and incarnation mean the same basic logical or ontological process from the thesis to the antithesis; only the imaginative form changes. The fall is not the fall of man, it is rather originally the self-negation of the Absolute which appears in the story of Adam and Eve in a religious manner, as "an inconceivable historical fact."
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> That the fall seen from the speculative point of view really has this metaphysical meaning, Hegel argues, is confirmed by the incarnation which brings together the Absolute and the individual self and demonstrates metaphorically their intrinsic unity.[2]

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[1] Kroner, pp. 298-99.

[2] Ibid., pp. 299-300.

Summary and estimate.--In summary, we can see that Hegel achieved what the whole movement essayed--namely, he provided a *cognitive* grasp of reality-as-a-whole and an *intrinsic* teleology of the whole manifold of experience. But in order to do this he had to radically recast both the notion of reality-as-a-whole and that of the "logic" of cognition. The new element in this transformation was *time*--more specifically, consciousness of history. What was only portended in Kant becomes fully conscious and a constitutive feature--the genius--of Hegel's system. Truth is relative because it is timely. It is only absolute from the standpoint of the end or *telos*, Absolute Spirit. "The truth is the whole." Reality-as-a-whole, then, is not a notion of spatial inclusiveness. It is not, as the Greeks imagined, a perfect sphere in contradistinction to chaos. Rather it is a temporal-eschatological notion, a notion of the end or *telos* of the process of successive stages of consciousness by which all of experience is brought under one concrete perspectival center. Reality-as-a-whole is the concrete universal, the end of history.

Likewise, the "logic" of cognition is temporalized. Logic is not simply a matter of mathematical relations between static concepts and the propositions which unite them. This is logic under the dominion of space. Rather, the "logic" which actually grasps the dialectical character of reality is itself dialectical. It involves, as a constitutive feature, the successive transformations of the states of consciousness. In short, there is no "cognition" that does not transform the knower in the process of grasping the known. The movement in cognition is not from the potential to the actual, nor yet from the possible to the necessary; rather, it is from the abstract and disjunct to the concrete and comprehensive in the temporally successive stages of consciousness.

There is another way we can summarize the Hegelian achievement in terms of the conceptual tools we have been using throughout this study. For Hegel's system, the chaos/cosmos polarity, which is essentially spatial, is not seen as something prescriptive for reality but rather as descriptive of the more naive stages of consciousness. Polarities like Being and Nothing (cosmos and chaos, respectively) are contrasting concepts not contradictory entities. The movement from the naive to the more sophisticated (if I may use that word here without any pejorative connotations!) states of consciousness is best described as the growing coincidence of the microcosm with the macrocosm. These two perspectival centers--man and God, respectively--began together, then are separated, and then process toward reunion or concentricity, which is Absolute Spirit, the coincidence of being and meaning, the "moment of truth."

If the end is like the beginning, then one may fairly ask: What is gained or achieved in the separation and reunion? The answer cannot be comprehensiveness, for Being as such, the category with which he began, comprehends all. The answer can only be in terms of concreteness. Absolute Spirit (the end) is richer than Being as such (the beginning) because it is concrete rather than abstract. All of this, as we shall see, is where Tillich has some decisive criticism of Idealism's understanding of historical time.

We must conclude Hegel, though, with the observation that, like Fichte and Schelling I, his whole system is ultimately theogonic. This is said in a descriptive sense, not as a term of opprobrium, and certainly not as an excuse for a cheap dismissal of the whole movement. There seems to be an inherent relation between theogony and any attempt to circumscribe ontology within the bounds of a philosophy of consciousness. Being is related to meaning and meaning involves ontology--this much of the Idealist premiss cannot be denied them. But whether being is exhausted or completely comprehended by any system of meanings--this is another matter. The negative answer to this query is the Existentialist protest, the revolt against the philosophies of consciousness. To this we must now turn.

Existentialism

Schelling II

Schelling II is a good example of the transition. We can see evidences of this in his notion of freedom, about which we have already spoken. Freedom is the power to resist the demands and expectations of reason, as its definition as a "counteressential leap" and "fall" shows. However, this freedom is not chaotic. It is under no rational necessity to actualize itself; but *if* it does, then it is under necessity or destined to actualize itself in disobedience. The choice is: obedience without the self-certainty of independence or disobedience with that self-certainty. It operates within structures, but the structures themselves do not rationally determine the decision. That can only be known after the fact. It can only be described, not deduced.

Schelling's criticism of Idealism.--However, Idealism could no doubt comprehend all this in terms of the dialectics of thesis, antithesis, and synthesis. The case for whether Schelling's notion of freedom is really a forerunner of later Existentialism must rest on a prior consideration--namely, whether the dialectical contrasts are *conceptual* (as Hegel maintained) or *real* (Schelling II). It was at this point that Schelling II criticized Idealism. "Real thought is that whereby something opposed to thought is overcome. Where one has only thought, and that abstract thought, for content, thought has nothing to overcome."[1]

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[1] Cited in Bolman, p. 36.

Fichte, we recall, had overcoming, but the opposition was not real since it is projected by the Absolute Ego. Nothing the self creates out of its own resources can really resist the self. Hegel, on the other hand, had mutual exclusion and absolute resistance between the contrasting concepts, but that offers no real resistance to the consciousness, as the succeeding transformation of consciousness shows. Hegel begins, according to Schelling, with abstract concepts but wants to end with a real result. But nowhere is there real opposition.[1]

To the end Schelling II held out for a real, not ideal, resistance of being to thought. This is precisely what made the problem of thinking existence so immensely difficult. In 1841 he wrote,

> The main question always remains: What is this thing-in-itself? If I only knew this, I would believe I know what is properly most worth knowing. . . . Kant asserts that there is *a priori* knowledge of things, but from this knowledge *a priori* he takes just the main thing, namely what itself exists, the in-itself, the character of things, that which truly *is* in them. For

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[1] Bolman, p. 36. If I understand Schelling's criticism aright, then I would have to say that he has not quite understood Hegel aright. Hegel does not begin with abstract concepts alone, but also with the existing *consciousness* which entertains these abstract polarities. This, however, does not destroy the criticism since Hegel does not, so far as I can find, tell us where this original actually existing *consciousness* comes from. Schelling indicates awareness of this when he says, "I can indeed conceive God as end and mere result of my thought, as he was in ancient metaphysics, but I cannot conceive him as result of an *objective* process." (Cited in Bolman, p. 35).

> what happens in things by virtue of the asserted determinations of our faculty of knowledge, _is_ not truly in them--but what is that which finally is in them, even independent of the determinations of our faculty of knowledge? To this Kant has no answer.[1]

Schelling's positive philosophy.--By insisting upon a _real_ resistance of existence to its intelligibility, Schelling II had blocked himself from any kind of Idealist solution. The way left (unless one wanted to surrender completely to ultimate irrationality!) was the way he took in his "Positive Philosophy" of his later years. This way was to find some principle or method of _correlation_ between Idealism (negative philosophy) and Realism (positive philosophy).

The dialectical reason of Idealism _can_ arrive at the ultimate _principles_ of being in the divine ground. There is _continuity_ between the logos structure of the world and the Logos pole or element in the divine life. This is the principle of relatedness between God and the world. But this Logos conception is only possibility not actuality; essence, not existence; "negative," not "positive" or empirical. Therefore reason, having reached the end of its tether, can also know that the Logos is incapable of sustaining itself; so, "in ecstasy," it is forced to acknowledge its own _prius_, the _Unvordenkliche_, pure existentiality which is the ground of all being and thought, the _Ungrund_ and *Abgrund*, the "lord of being."[1] Meaning is subjected to being and thus Kant is overcome, but not without breaking through the tendency in Kantianism to *equate* "being" with "nature" or *finite* being. This "being" which is the *prius* for Schelling II is the chaos which is the power and ground and abyss of cosmos. It is a mystical-ecstatic notion.

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[1] Cited in Bolman, p. 41.

> God contains in himself nothing but the pure conjunctive *that* of his own being. But this, *that* he *is*, would be no truth were he not *something*--something, to be sure, not in the sense of a something which is, but of what is everything. Further, this would be no truth if he did not have a relation to thought, a relation not to a *notion* but to the *notion of all notions*, to the *Idea*. Here is the true place for that unity of being and thought. . . . The unity intended here extends to the highest antithesis. Here, therefore, is also the final boundary, is that *beyond which one cannot pass*. But in this unity priority belongs not to thought; *being* is first, thought only second or following.[2]

This *prius* of all thought is the First Cause of all being. Thus the *correlation* of existence and its intelligibility is secured. Positive Philosophy, or the empirical study of history--especially history seen as the history of religion--not only provides the *demonstration* of the real *prius*, but also its actual *content*.

> [The] real *prius* . . . is known negatively; it is known by the final overthrow of reason, reason's failure, as it were. But reason must be reinstated, science must be reconstructed. Thus from the bare fact of actuality as the abyss of reason, reason must strive to discover the character of its real *prius*, by what follows deductively

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[1] Cf. Bolman, pp. 54, 60 *et passim*.

[2] Cited in Bolman, pp. 46-47.

> from this prius. Then empirically we must find the deduced character of the prius in nature and history, thereby proving that the deduction proceeded from that prius which is the principle of existence or being itself. By such an *a priori* construction and empirical verification, essence or the realm of being engendered by the necessary laws of thought will have won the guaranty that it can encompass existence; in other words, a positive knowledge of existence is now considered possible.[1]

The traits of Existentialism.--All of this is not yet full-blown Existentialism; but since those traits of Existentialism which are decisive for our purposes are clearly foreshadowed here, we may use it for purposes of exposition.

First, when Schelling II refers to "pure existentiality" or "the in-itself, the character of things, that which truly *is* in them," he is referring to the Kantian "thing-in-itself." This is a radical redefinition of "existence." For Kant, noumenal reality is precisely that which does not "exist"--that is, is not subject to the determination of the forms of intuition and the categories of objectivity. Now the nomenclature is reversed. Noumenal reality--more especially, the noumenal self--is considered immanent and designated as *authentic existence*. This corresponds to what Tillich has called "the basic critical drive of Existential philosophy"; namely, "criticizing the identification of Reality or Being with Reality-as-known, with the object of reason or thought."[2]

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[1] Bolman, p. 52

[2] *Theology of Culture*, p. 77.

Second, existence precedes essence. In the words of Schelling II already cited, "priority belongs not to thought; being is first, thought only second or following." Cosmos, or the world for the knowing mind, is a creation of "pure existentiality," not the "lord" of it. Of course, Schelling II meant this in connection with God, the Unvordenkliche; but when this has its analogue in human freedom then the grounds of a non-theistic Existentialism are laid.

Third, existence is not bound by or exhausted in the creation of essence. Schelling II is somewhat ambiguous on this point. It is implicit in his definition of freedom as "a possibility of good or evil." The self has some transcendence over--that is, is not strictly determined by--the structures which it itself has created. The self can contradict its own "essence." This further underscores the provisional and secondary status of cosmos. But in the end he seems to betray this insight by finding empirically "the deduced character of the prius in nature and history." This would seem to indicate that existence pours itself completely into the form-creation which is nature and history. This would jeopardize any real transcendence or form-destructive power of existence. This has led Tillich to the judgment that in Schelling "the speculative urge in his mind conquered the Existential restriction and humility that he had himself postulated."[1]

Fourth, cosmos has the character of being completely conditioned, of being closed. Existential philosophers have many ways of designating cosmos. In the broadest terms it is all that is embraced by the philosophies of consciousness. It is any rational system or attitude, theoretical and/or practical, which claims to embrace reality-as-a-whole. The classic examples are Hegel's all-embracing system or Newton's world which is self-contained and self-explanatory. In it everything has its place and is completely determined, "objectified." It is the product of the nisus of consciousness to "think all in all." The only trouble is that it is intrinsically impossible for any closed system to include the openness and freedom of "pure existentiality."

In other words, cosmos is culture. Existential man is a culture-creating-animal. He cannot live without the products of his creativity and he cannot wholly live in them. This is the profound ambiguity of the Existentialist stance toward culture. Culture-creation is necessary, and yet it is both a temptation and a trap. It is a temptation because man is tempted to flee into "objectivity" to escape from the inexorable demands of his freedom. It is a trap because the more inclusive his cultural creation becomes the more he seems fated to forget that he is free over it. He becomes swallowed up and depersonalized by the product of his own creativity. To either flee into or be caught by the self-enclosed and objective nature of culture is inauthentic existence. It is existence that has become "spatialized" and domesticated. It is pseudo or estranged existence.

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[1] Ibid., p. 87.

From the above considerations we can see why Existentialism as a whole movement has little or no use for the notion of reality-as-a-whole. Any "whole" (cosmos) that can be synthesized by the mind is other than, less than, and antithetical to real existence.

Fifth, we noted that the Kantian noumenal self was considered immanent and designated as authentic existence. This is a paradoxical notion. It is like talking about a "bounded chaos" or an "infinite finite reality." However, the paradox is not insoluble. The noumenal self, freedom, is a type of chaos; but it is not a spatial or quantitative conception of infinity. Rather it is qualitative. It is an inner infinity, an inexhaustibility, a fathomless depth that is compatible with circumstantial circumscription. It is akin to the notion of "mystery" appropriate to the microcosm/macrocosm theme--a depth of existing things that is not exhausted by rational penetration. All Existentialist philosophies are quite conscious of human finitude. The question is, How can this finitude be "known" if its limits are not conceptual? This leads us directly to the sixth and, for our purposes, crucial trait of Existentialism: How does one "think existence"?

Sixth, Existentialism is not irrationalism. Such would be the case if life were regarded as completely unbounded. Existence is limited, but not by its own creation: essence. The limits of life cannot be comprehended conceptually, but they can be apprehended experientially. Life is bounded by birth and death, by guilt and tragedy, by loneliness and emptiness. The awareness of--either in present experience or in memory and anticipation--these boundary situations bares the structure of existence. However, this awareness is not simply cognitive. It engages the whole person. It is anxiety. It is for this reason that "all the Existentialist philosophers and their predecessors have developed ontology in psychological terms."[1] Thinking existence

> demands a special type of concept in which to describe . . . immediate personal experience. These concepts must be "non-objectivating"; they must not transform men into things, but at the same time they must not be merely "subjective." In the light of this double demand we can understand the choice of psychological notions with a non-psychological connotation.[2]

This point is crucial for our purposes in that it shows that whereas some Existential philosophies (notably Kierkegaard!) are "anti-metaphysical" in expression and in intent, they all are metaphysical in fact and in performance. What they reject in the concept of reality-as-a-whole is Idealistic metaphysics; but that they affirm the metaphysical task is implicit in the effort to "think existence." And what is implicit in all is explicit in Heidegger, who, as Tillich has noted, insists that his strange, nonphilosophical-sounding descriptions of the character of Existence are "not 'ontic,' describing merely a particular being, Man, but are rather 'ontological,' describing the very structure of Being itself."[1]

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[1] Theology of Culture, p. 95. Cf. the whole section on "Psychological and ontological concepts," pp. 94-96.

[2] Ibid., p. 94.

Summary and estimate

The influence of Existentialism and its related movements upon theology have been enormous and significant, but we cannot and need not try to trace them all here.[2] Our task is to estimate what insights it has contributed to the ultimate notions of being and meaning and their interrelations.

First, being is finite and open-ended. The chaos pole is internalized. It is the inexhaustible depth and ground and abyss of the cosmos pole, not something alongside it or above it. In other words, being has the character of process. It is finite creativity. It is bounded by Nothing. But this "Nothing" is not the creative chaos (that is internal) but absolute non-being. Being is the striving to be in the face of Nothing. It is not limited by the Nothing, but rather by its own inner failure of nerve or its own tragic self-destruction. However, in the encounter with Nothing man becomes aware of his limits.

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[1] Ibid., p. 95.

[2] For a review of Tillich's estimate of its contribution, see his essay, "The Theological Significance of Existentialism and Psychoanalysis" in Theology of Culture, pp. 112-126.

Second, meaning or the cosmos pole is subsumed under being. Meaning is not something found or given. It is not something a priori that the process actualizes or unfolds. It is created. Cosmos-creation is the function by and in which the creative chaos manifests itself and constitutes itself and extends itself. Meaning creation is the _telos_ of being. It is also its nemesis. Cosmos is both more than and less than the creative chaos which produces it. It both expresses and imprisons creativity. It must continually be broken through in the direction of the creation of the new.

Third, we must note that there is a macrocosm/microcosm relation between being itself and personal existence. Indeed, it is by going within the self that the structure of being is discerned. Tillich has summarized this aspect of Existentialism in the following words:

> While an ontology which claims to have knowledge of Being *a priori* is arrogant, an ontology which restricts itself to the structure of finitude is possible. Such an ontology can be called a doctrine of human nature, but not in the sense of giving any special knowledge of the human race. An ontological doctrine of man develops the structure of finitude **as man finds it in himself as the center of his own personal Existence. He alone of all finite beings is aware of his own** finitude; therefore the way to ontology passes through the doctrine of man. But of course, in traveling this way he cannot escape his finitude. The way to finitude is itself finite and cannot claim finality: such is the limit set upon the Existential thinker. Heidegger concludes his analysis with the statement that the fight against Kant's doctrine of the *Ding-an-sich* was a fight against the acknowledgement of the finitude of our human experience in knowing.[1]

Fourth and finally, there is an inherent relation between Existentialism and historical relativism. No particular creation embraces creativity itself. No essence can emcompass existence. Finite being *encounters* its limits within the horizon of time, but it can find no meaning in that which it does not create. Meaningful projects are an intra-temporal affair; they never grasp the whole of finite existence. The meaningfulness of the ultimate horizon of time, as symbolized by and experienced in the accidents of birth and death, is a question that finite creativity poses; it does not and cannot answer. Human life and its cultural existence are always transitory and fragile flowers in an absurd and hostile "environment": Nothing.

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[1] *Theology of Culture*, p. 98.

Tillich's Ontology: An Overview

Tillich's ontology is a synthesis of Idealist and Existential elements. "Synthesis" is not quite the right term as it suggests a higher composition of disjunct elements in which their disjunctive character is overcome. Such is not Tillich's intention. Therefore, "polarity" is the better term, and it is the characteristic Tillichian one.

Since there is no universal agreement on the use of the terms "polar" and "polarity," a word on Tillich's use of them is in order here. The best analogy is that of a magnet. The "north" pole does not appear without the "south" pole. They are distinct and yet structurally related. The former does not "produce" the latter any more than the latter the former. The duality is irreducible and yet it constitutes a whole. The poles are in tension but they are related as essentially belonging together. Each would not be what it is without the other. With this in mind we can see that the often used term "bi-polar" would be a redundancy for Tillich just as the term "mono-polar" would be an inherent contradiction. Polarity is inherently a duality of co-involved elements. "In every polarity each pole is limited as well as sustained by the other."[1]

For Tillich, being and meaning have this polar relation. And this polarity is constitutive of essential finitude. This is a holding together of what in Idealism and Existentialism have been rent asunder.

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[1] _ST_, I, 198.

In Idealism, as we have seen, the meaning pole--consciousness--was taken as Absolute, the really Real. But absolute consciousness drives toward concrete embodiment, whether it be being-in-act (Fichte) or art (Schelling I) or the concrete absolute (Hegel). Concrete embodiment becomes the end or telos of the ways of Absolute Spirit. Cosmogony is an inevitable and necessary step in theogony.

In Existentialism, on the other hand, "pure existentiality" is taken as the really Real. It manifests itself through meaning creation and strives to "think existence." It is bound to no given situation and yet it cannot break out of finitude. It knows, however, that finitude is not self-sufficient. This is usually expressed in negative terms such as anxiety and despair and ultimate meaninglessness.

Schelling II has sought to correlate the two potencies of being and meaning in a way not unlike Spinoza's solution of the mind-body problem. Both proceed from the Unvordenkliche and thus a "positive knowledge" of existence is guaranteed.

Tillich rejects both the attempt to reduce one pole to a function of the other and the attempt to correlate them as two independent elements running their separate but parallel courses. The latter does recognize the irreducibility of the polarity, but it fails to indicate the co-involvement of the two poles. Let us attend to the three central propositions of his ontology:

First: Being is finite

The polarity of the ontological elements

For Tillich the chaos pole belongs to finitude. In this he is at one with Existentialism. It is the creative chaos, the inexhaustible depth of things, their ground and abyss, their power to be. But this "pure existentiality" is a limiting concept; it is not an entity. It is in a polar relation with cosmos. "To come into being means to come to form."[1] Cosmos is not simply the intentional project of pure existentiality, as though the latter had some prior aseity. To be means to be structured, although this does not entail the notion that this structure is a priori immutable or unalterable. This is what Existentialism has feared and passionately rejected. With this Tillich is sympathetic.

Finite being is not simply the actualization or unfolding of some a priori structure or "plan." This would be ascribing aseity to the cosmos pole. But, Tillich maintains, the rejection of this need not and cannot entail an ultimate historical relativism.

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[1] The Interpretation of History, p. 83.

> Every new form is made possible only by breaking through the limits of an old form. In other words, there is a moment of "chaos" between the old and the new form, a moment of no-longer-form and not-yet-form. This chaos is never absolute; it cannot be absolute because, according to the structure of the ontological polarities, being implies form. Even relative chaos has a relative form.[1]

The "old form" is not immutable but it is fixed. With respect to the new it is the given. The new comes to be by breaking through the old on the basis of the old and in the power of the demand to create the new which fulfils the old. Thus there is a describable structure to the self-alteration of being in history. And where the is even a relative structure there is the legitimacy and necessity of asking the question: For what? What is the telos or inner aim of the process?

On the other hand, the cosmos pole embraces everything that is or has being. Everything that is participates in the logos-structure of mind and reality. In this Tillich is at one with Idealism. "I am an idealist if idealism means the assertion of the identity of thinking and being as the principle of truth."[2]

Cosmos is not "abstraction." It is not an empty form in which some reluctant stuff or prime matter is shaped. Like chaos, it is not an entity. It is a power. It is the power of concretion. As such it is the ground and power of meaning. It is the power to be something. Hence it is fully as constitutive of being as the chaos pole, the ground and power to be at all. To grasp this "Hegelian note" of the Idea as active and intrinsically powerful is necessary if one is to understand Tillich aright.

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[1] ST, III, 50-51.

[2] "On the Boundary," Interpretation of History, p. 60.

Put negatively, this means that "pure existentiality" is not some over-plus of structure, something that inherently eludes the grasp of reason. Cosmos is not the inevitable betrayal of chaos. It is not necessarily a temptation or a trap. Cosmos can express chaos. To recall the Lutheran dictum, the finite is capable of bearing the infinite. The chaos/cosmos polarity is expressed in terms of depth and structure.

Cosmos can adequately manifest and express chaos but it cannot exhaust it. Here Tillich parts company with Idealism. The essential adequacy of structure to depth is not in its denotative power alone, but also in its connotative power. Adequate structure is that form that not only expresses something definite but also is transparent to its own inner inexhaustibility. It is truly expressive as much by its import as by its content. It is self-transcendent or "ecstatic" cosmos. If the chaos pole

> could be exhausted in the form of things, then there would be a direct, rational designable way from the depth of things to their form; then the world could be comprehended as the necessary and unequivocal unfolding

> of the basis of existence; then the supporting basis would pour out entirely into the cosmos of forms; then the depth would cease to be depth, ceasing to be transcendental, absolute.[1]

Tillich steadfastly avoids reducing the polarity to one or the other of its elements. Further, he demonstrates their essential co-involvement, so they are not seen as incommensurables that somehow have to be correlated. Both poles belong to essential finitude so that neither by itself is a direct avenue to God, or to the Absolute, or to Ultimate Reality. The supporting basis of the polarity is not discoverable within being--that is, within finitude. It is a question which finitude itself poses; it does not and cannot answer. But this is to anticipate the theological uses of his ontology.

Tillich calls his basic ontological vision "belief-ful realism" or "ecstatic naturalism." The polarity of the chaos and cosmos elements is evident in such designations. By seeing the polarity of chaos and cosmos as constitutive of finitude he thus avoids making a metaphysical dualism of the two elements (which is the basis of all supernaturalism) or a metaphysical monism of one element at the expense of the other (which is the basis of all pantheism and/or naturalism).

In addition to the co-involvement of the two poles in everything that is, essential finitude can be described as an ongoing dialectical process from self-identity through self-alteration to a new self-identity without loss of continuity with the old. But unlike Hegel's dialectics of history, this movement is not processing toward the concrete absolute. History is not the history of the generation of the Christ! Essential finitude is not the end or *telos* of history any more than it is its beginning. Since the ontological elements are always present and complete for there to be any historical being at all, the "concrete absolute" must be conceived as the "center" of history. But this is to anticipate Tillich's Christology.

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[1] "The Demonic," Interpretation of History, p. 83.

The dialectical process of finitude is open-ended, but it is directional. It has an inner aim. It is directed toward the actualization of potentiality. This is the inherent frustration of finitude--of its being a mixture of being and non-being. No individual life or group or the race as a whole can ever reach in history the goal toward which the process is inner directed. This is not due simply to a deficiency of time or premature death. This is because the actualization of some potentialities necessarily involves the sacrifice of innumerable other possibilities. Any decision to actualize one possibility posits the realm of the excluded possibilities--that is, those possibilities whose actualization is precluded. For these reasons the *telos* of finite creativity, *even in its essential qualification*, cannot be conceived as the end of a temporal process--

not even of an "immortality" conceived as endless time. But this is to anticipate Tillich's doctrines of the Spirit, the Kingdom of God, and Eternal Life.

Summary.--Being is finite. The strict polarity of chaos and cosmos belongs to the description of essential finitude.[1] The co-involvement of the polar elements has the relation of depth and structure. There is a logical priority and dignity to the chaos pole since it is the principle of inner inexhaustibility; but it is not an ontological priority. This is expressed in the oft repeated proposition, "Depth . . . . precedes reason and is manifest through it."[2]

There is no inherent structural deficiency to finitude in its essential qualification. Not even the brevity of life is a structural deficiency. Being as such is good.[3] This means that the polar structure of being is complete and that the polar elements are essentially adequate to each other. Essential finitude is not tragic. It is only under the existential qualification of being that the tragic disruption of the polar harmony takes place. This is what we shall consider in the second major proposition.

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[1] Tillich subdivides the chaos/cosmos polarity into the three sub-polarities of Individualization and Participation, Dynamics and Form, and Freedom and Destiny. This need not concern us at this point since each of these sub-polarities has the same character as is here being ascribed to chaos/cosmos.

[2] ST, I, 79. Cf. Walter Leibrecht's introductory essay, "The Life and Mind of Paul Tillich," Religion and Culture, p. 5 et passim for a good exposition of the centrality of this proposition in Tillich's ontology.

[3] Cf. Theology of Culture, p. 118, for one of the many places where Tillich asserts this.

However, before we leave the overview of this first proposition--being is finite--it is necessary to attend to a problem that has dogged our steps throughout the expositions of Idealism and Existentialism. This is the problem of resistance. Tillich solves this within the structure of essential finitude, but he does it in terms of encounter between one finite being and another, and not in terms of the tension between the polar elements themselves.

The I-thou encounter

Self-awareness and the awareness of finitude presuppose resistance to the self. Kant found it in the resistance of the empirical self to the noumenal self in moral consciousness, Fichte in the Non-Ego, Schelling I in the existential disruption of the transcendental Identity of the potencies of mind and nature, Hegel in the disjunctive character of abstract thought, Schelling II in the freedom of the self to contradict its own essence. In all of these the resistance is posited as between the polar elements of chaos and cosmos. This disrupts the polarity and makes it inevitable that one pole or the other (or their transcendental identity) will be projected on the screen of the infinite or the Absolute in contrast to the opposite pole as being the character of finitude or "the World." In short, the resistance is between nature and supernature.

Existentialism, while correctly rejecting the disruption of the polarity, finds the resistance in the self's encounter with Nothing at the boundary situations. This annihilating nothingness, however, has no positive relation to the polarity.

Tillich agrees with Idealism in that the resistance relates to the polar elements but not in the sense of pitting one against the other. He agrees with Existentialism in that the resistance is an encounter (not a polarity) but not in the sense of an encounter with Nothing. The real resistance that is prescriptive for both self-awareness and awareness of finitude is the encounter of one finite, personal center of being with another. In the I-thou encounter both selves manifest and embody the chaos/cosmos polarity of essential finite being. In each the ontological elements are complete and operative.

As with Existentialism, the encounter for Tillich is existential and not like the essential co-involvement of the elements of a polarity. But unlike Existentialism, the encounter is ontic. "Nothing" offers no more real resistance to the self than "things" (any form of the Non-Ego or the phenomenal world). Only another self resists the self absolutely or unconditionally. This is because he, too, is an ontic polarity of depth and structure. As structure he is encountered as something definite. As depth he has an inner inexhaustibility that infinitely resists reification and domestication. And this I-thou encounter belongs wholly within the bounds of finitude. It is an encounter _between finite beings_.

This issue is such a sensitive and crucial one for modern philosophy and theology that we would do well to explore it further at this juncture. It lies at the root of the argument between "Personalism" and "Ontologism." What is the relation between encounter and the ontological polarity? And if encounter does not have the nature of an essential co-involvement like the two elements of a polarity, then what are its dynamics?

From one aspect the ontological polarity is more basic than encounter because the actuality of two or more ontic polarities is prescriptive for encounter. Only actual entities can encounter each other.

From another aspect, since unconditional resistance is prescriptive for self-awareness and the awareness of finitude, then encounter is the _sine qua non_ of being in its peculiarly human dimension. Tillich is quite aware of this. Encounter is prescriptive for human selfhood, which is the highest form of ontic self-relatedness.[1] This means that it is also prescriptive for the character of "World" in the self-world polarity, which is "the basic ontological structure."[1] Interpersonal encounter is acknowledged as "the common root of morality and culture."[2] It is prescriptive for the creation of both language and technology, which enable man to be man--that is, free from "bondage to the 'here and now.'"[3] Further, since encounter is prescriptive for the awareness of finitude, and the awareness of finitude is prescriptive for the possibility of the religious question, then does it not follow that encounter is the sine qua non not only of what makes man man, but also of anything and everything that concerns him ultimately?

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[1] "Personal life emerges in the encounter of person with person and in no other way. If one can imagine a

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living being with the psychosomatic structure of man, completely outside any human community, such a being could not actualize its potential spirit. It would be driven in all directions, limited only by its finitude, but it would not experience the ought-to-be. Therefore, the self-integration of the person as a person occurs in a community within which the continuous mutual encounter of centered self with centered self is possible and actual." (ST, III, 40-41.)

[1] ST, I, 164. For reasons which will become apparent later in the exposition I have hitherto withheld reference to the self-world polarity. But I anticipate it here because from the citation in the immediately preceding footnote it is evident that without the unconditional resistance which real encounter provides, man's "world" would be something quite different from what we experience. It would literally be chaotic, as chaotic as the self's being "driven in all directions." But in such a case it is improper to talk about "man" or "the self" since neither is actualized without encounter. The point is that, given the self-world polarity, where there is no human self without encounter, there is likewise no human world without it.

[2] ST, III, 58.

[3] Ibid., pp. 57, 61.

This is quite an impressive list of qualities of being whose sine qua non is the I-thou encounter. And in the light of this one can begin to sense the tremendous force and significance and seriousness of the personalism inherently associated with theologies of Act.

Encounter is certainly different from polarity. The crucial questions are: Is encounter constitutive of the ontological polarity? That is, does it make the polarity what it is? Or, is it rather prescriptive for the actualization of higher dimensions of the polarity? That is, is it the sine qua non of certain modal alterations of the being in which the polarity is already given and operative? And if it is the latter, what ontological status does it have?

Tillich certainly takes his stand with the latter alternative. Being in its human dimension[1] is realized only because pre-human beings with the psychosomatic equipment and potentiality for interpersonal encounter have in fact actualized, and do continually actualize, themselves as persons in encounters. A corroborative illustration of this is seen in Tillich's discussion of morality as the constitutive act of personality:

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[1] Tillich calls this life under the dimensions of spirit and history, but for the sake of the present overview the term "humanity" will suffice without going into its inner divisions.

> In man complete centeredness is essentially given, but it is not actually given until man actualizes it in freedom and through destiny. The act in which man actualizes his essential centeredness is the moral act. Morality is the function of life by which the realm of the spirit comes into being. Morality is the constitutive function of spirit. . . . Morality is the function of life in which the centered self constitutes itself as a person; it is the totality of those acts in which a potentially personal life process becomes an actual person. Such acts happen continuously in a personal life; the constitution of the person as a person never comes to an end during his whole life process.[1]

Morality is constitutive of the actualized dimension of humanity (spirit), but encounter is prescriptive for morality and the ontological polarity is prescriptive for encounter. In short, there has been pre-human being in the psychological, biological, organic, and inorganic dimensions for millions or billions of years! Being does not have to produce man; but if it does, encounter is the fulcrum of the transition. To be more precise, being does not have to succeed in the production of man and could continue to be after man's disappearance from the universe. It has the potency and the inner drive and would be unfulfilled without the production, but the production itself is dependent upon encounter for its actualization.

Now, considering the cruciality of encounter, if it is accidental or fortuitous, then we are in serious trouble from the standpoint of ontology. If encounter cannot be comprehended under the rationality of polarity (in which case the parties would lack the power of real, unconditional resistance to each other), then what is its intelligible structure? Here lies the function of ontological love in Tillich's system. Ontological love is a strain toward encounter and the mutual enrichment it brings. It is "the drive toward the reunion of the separated."[1] Encounter implies the power of unconditional resistance. But resistance is negative; it is a withholding of oneself. And like all negativities it lives off the power of the positive: namely, the freedom to give oneself unconditionally. Giving is more ultimate than withholding. Love is the law of life.

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[1] ST, III, 38.

More needs to be said. Whereas love is not a polar relation, it presupposes the ontological polarity at every turn. As a drive toward the reunion of the separated it presupposes the essential belongingness of the actually separated. Beings that were ontologically strange to one another could only collide and mutually annihilate. Only parties who are separate manifestations of the same powers of being and meaning can encounter and mutually enrich. The "law of love" is not some heteronomous command. It is experienced as unconditional demand only because it expresses man's essential nature put against him in his state of existential estrangement.[2] Here again we anticipate considerations to be dealt with under the second major proposition.

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[1] ST, III, 134. [2] Ibid., p. 46 et passim.

Thus far we have discussed encounter and its dynamics, love, only in the interpersonal dimension, or rather as being prescriptive for actualized spirit. This is the test case. But such treatment is less than explicit in showing that this consideration is "ontological" rather than merely "ontic." In Tillich's view of "the multidimensional unity of life" what is explicit and actual in the realm of the higher dimension is implicit and potential in the realms of all lower dimensions.[1] Hence there are analogies of interpersonal encounter right on "down" to the point where essential being becomes granular--that is, actualized in its separateness and individuality. Thus the questions of the status of encounters and the status of love are ontological. The interplay of continuity (polarity) and discontinuity (encounter) is descriptive of and prescriptive for actual being even in its most minute particle or granule. This is the meaning of "ontological" status--those structures and powers that are a priori for being and manifest in every instance of it.

However, it is important to note that encounters, presupposing as they do actual *beings*, are *logically* (but not ontologically) subsequent to the ontological polarity. In being under *the qualification of essence* there is the potency for granularity or particularity but not yet actual entities. There is no encounter between potencies or powers. This means that in essential finitude there is not yet love because there is not yet *separation*. Love is not the "ground" of creation, but its aim. It does not actuate granularization but reunites it. This does not jeopardize the ontological status of love. "Essential being" is not a complete description of anything that is. It is a description of the powers of being and meaning in their completeness and adequacy to each other.

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[1] See ST, III, pp. 11-30. Roughly, the "dimensions" and their corresponding "realms" are those of the inorganic, the organic, and spirit, though there are inner divisions within these. They are rated "lower" and "higher" not on the basis of perfection but of inclusiveness. Each succeeding dimension is inclusive of all the preceding ones.

Second: Existence is estranged

The distinction between essence and existence

Being under the qualification of essence is descriptive of being in its constitutive powers or potencies. It belongs to the essential nature of being to actualize itself. But the transition from potency to actuality is not smooth. It is not even completely continuous in the dialectical sense. Breaking into this transition, and distorting it, is the irrational leap from essence to existence. If we were to represent the transition from potentiality to actuality as an arrow along a horizontal plane, then we would have to complete the description by superimposing a vertical arrow breaking into it on a plane perpendicular to the first line representing the transition from essence to existence. It is this second plane with which we must now try to come to terms, remembering all the while that as we now discuss being _under the qualification of existence_ we are dealing no more with the whole picture than we were in the previous section--being under the qualification of essence. Both belong together in the description of life, which we will consider under the third major proposition.

"Existence," as the term is used by Tillich, has none of the benign connotations of such terms as "actual entities" or "granules," as have hitherto been used in the exposition. It does mean the actualization of the given potencies for granulation, but it also means more. The decisive characterization of existence is that of actual entities in which the polar harmony has been disrupted in the process of transition to actuality. Existence is universally "fallen." This sounds like Schelling II. There is a connection. And there is a difference.

In Schelling II the transition to existence is via freedom as a counter-essential leap. Man chooses ultimate "evil," disobedience to the essence which supports him, in order to realize the limited "good" of the self-certainty of independence. For Tillich it is not quite thus.

Schelling II had to make freedom the finite but unconditional power of resistance to essence. For Tillich this would disrupt the polarity absolutely. Finite freedom is "always" in polar relation with destiny. It cannot be in disobedience to destiny that actualization occurs, but in choosing it. Essential being is destined to actualize itself. But the actualization does not happen automatically or ineluctably. It must be chosen. Man's freedom in its most basic and positive designation is his freedom to choose his destiny. The margin for error or miscarriage, then, lies not in the freedom to choose, itself; nor yet in the choosing of one's destiny; but rather in the simultaneous distortion of both freedom and destiny.

It should be stated, however, that Tillich does agree with Schelling II that freedom is not freedom without the possibility of the counter-essential leap. But the choice of contradicting one's essential nature is not the way humanity is actualized, rather the way it is destroyed. Not even in self-contradiction does man escape his destiny:

> Man is free, in so far as he has the power of contradicting himself and his essential nature. Man is free even from his freedom; that is, he can surrender his humanity.[1]

Freedom-and-destiny is a special instance of the chaos/cosmos polarity in Tillich's terminology. It is one of three such special instances, the other two being dynamics-and-form and individualization-and-participation. In each pair the first term refers to the inexhaustible power of being at all (entity), and the second term refers to the power of being something definite (modality). The crucial thing is to observe the strict polarity of each pair. Each element is both "within" and "outside of" its polar opposite, like concentric circles with different radii or else with the same radius but inscribed on different planes. They are powers that operate in tension with each other but through the same organic center. The elements limit and sustain each other.

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[1] ST, II, 32.

The transition from essence to existence: continuity

Existence is actualized being in which the harmony of the polar elements has become disrupted. Existence is estranged. "Estrangement" is a characteristic Tillichian term because it means the separation of and conflict between elements or parties which essentially belong together. It is the latter part of this statement, though, that we are emphasizing here. There is continuity in the structure of the ontological polarity in the transition from essence to existence. The powers of chaos and cosmos remain what they are and their co-involvement or interdependence remains indestructible. Nothing new is added to the polarity nor is the polarity circumvented in the transition to existence. But something is lost. It is not a structural element but a quality of their interrelation. The polar elements remain complete, but they lose their obvious adequacy to each other. Tension is transmuted into conflict. Cosmos loses its ecstatic character. Structure loses its transparency to depth and depth resists structure as a prison. In brief, existence is the predicament in which Idealist and Existentialist ontologies can be created, where they must be taken seriously, and where they are continually at odds with each other.

This consideration of continuity is important for several reasons:

First, the ontological polarity cannot be made to account for the fact of the transition since it is *structurally* the same under the qualification of existence as it is under the qualification of essence. The polarity is constitutive of both qualifications; it is operative in the transition; but the polarity itself is not the "cause" or origin of the transition. There is no structural deficiency or inadequacy in the polarity as such. This must be held fast. To ascribe tragedy to the polar elements is the same thing as denying their polarity.

Second, when the polarity is transposed from essence to existence *both* polar elements are *simultaneously* transmuted. The distortion does not occur "first" in one pole and then "infect" the other. When Tillich says, as he does, that "fully developed creatureliness is fallen creatureliness," and that "the point at which creation and fall coincide is as much a matter of destiny as it is a matter of freedom,"[1] he is often misunderstood to mean that essence necessarily issues in existence. This is not so. He is not saying that essential freedom aims at and realizes a distorted destiny or that a distorted freedom aims at (and misses) essential destiny. He is saying that a distorted freedom ("aroused freedom") aims at and realizes a distorted destiny ("temptation").[2] More must be said about this presently when we come to consider discontinuity. The point here is that considering the continuity of the polarity, estrangement is structurally underivable. Tillich maintains that this is to "posit the mystery where it belongs."[3] Estrangement is both fact and act. Its universal factuality precedes actualization but is manifest through it. "The leap from essence to existence is the original fact-- . . . it has the character of a leap and not of structural necessity. In spite of its tragic universality, existence cannot be derived from essence."[4]

Third and last, when Tillich says, as he does, that the transition from essence to existence is "irrational,"[5] this must be understood in the context of the continuity of the polar structure of being under both the qualification of essence and existence. The irrationality here does not disrupt the intelligibility of the whole system. Where there is continuity of structure there is intelligibility. What he means by "irrationality" is the factual character of universal estrangement. "The transition from essence to existence is a fact, a story to be told and not a derived dialectical step."[1] The polarity can be used extensively in penetrating the possibility, the motive, the means, and the consequences of the fall.[2] In all this Tillich is very rational. What the polarity is powerless to penetrate is the sheer factuality of it. It is "the original fact."

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[1] ST, I, 255-56. [2] ST, II, 33-36. [3] ST, I, 256.
[4] ST, II, 44. [5] ST, II, 3.

> It is not the first fact in a temporal sense or a fact beside or before others, but it is that which gives validity to every fact. It is the actual in every fact. We do exist and our world with us. This is the original fact. It means that the transition from essence to existence is a universal quality of finite being. It is not an event of the past; for it ontologically precedes everything that happens in time and space. It sets the conditions of spatial and temporal existence. It is manifest in every individual person in the transition from dreaming innocence to actualization and guilt.[3]

In summary, the transition is an ultimate irrationality not in the sense of "How" but of "Why." It is a question which existence inexorably poses but which neither essence nor existence can answer. It belongs to the dimension of the religious question.

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[1] *ST*, II, 29. [2] *Ibid*., p. 31ff. [3] *Ibid*., p. 36.

The transition from essence to existence: discontinuity

The discontinuity between essence and existence cannot be derived _from the polarity_, but it can be described and its implications explored. What is the difference between freedom/destiny under the qualification of essence and under the qualification of existence? And is not some analogy of _encounter_ implied even in the state of potency?

Tillich calls finitude in the state of potency "dreaming innocence."[1] It is a state or "situation" (which is no situation because it is the _prius_ of every state or situation) in which finite freedom is real but untested and in which destiny is implicit but unchosen. Essential freedom is the power to transcend "dreaming innocence" and to "stand out" of potency. Essential destiny is actualization, but not in the simple sense of coming to form. It is rather a coming to form _that remains transparent to the depth of dreaming innocence_. It is actuality that remains transparent to the ground upon which it stands in order to stand out. Essential destiny is _ecstatic_ or _self-transcending_ cosmos.

There is nothing essentially incompatible between such freedom and such destiny. The only trouble is that in fact this is not the freedom or destiny of anything that exists. The transition cuts into the state of potency misinterpreting destiny and corrupting freedom. Here is where no philosophy that wrestles with the problem can escape mythology.[1] It is "a story to be told"; and Tillich, as a philosopher, finds that the myth of Genesis 1-3 is "the profoundest and richest expression of man's awareness of his existential estrangement and provides the scheme in which the transition from essence to existence can be treated."[2] Let us summarize that story in terms of what happens to both freedom and destiny.

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[1] _ST_, II, 33.

"Aroused freedom."--Essential freedom "before" it leaves the state of potency is distorted. This is evidenced by the feature of the divine prohibition.

> Any command presupposes that what is commanded is not yet fulfilled. The divine prohibition [not to eat from the tree of knowledge] presupposes a kind of split between creator and creature, a split which makes a command necessary, even if it is given only in order to test the obedience of the creature. This cleavage is the most important point in the interpretation of the Fall. For it presupposes a sin which is not yet sin but which is also no longer innocence. It is the desire to sin.[3]

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[1] See ST, II, 29-31, "The Symbol of 'the Fall' and Western Philosophy," where Tillich shows that the symbol of "the Fall" is explicit in such pre-Christian philosophies as that of Plato and in much non-theistic or even anti-Christian Existentialism; and it is implicit in Christian and non-Christian idealism and naturalism. The point here is that the symbol is not a creation of the Christian revelation but is present wherever philosophy asks the question about the source of the negativity of existence.

[2] Ibid., p. 31.

[3] ST, II, 35.

"Temptation."--Essential destiny is misinterpreted or misconstrued even in the state of potency. This is evidenced by the figure of the serpent, which Tillich interprets as representing "the dynamic trends of nature."[1] Destiny, instead of being presented as self-transcending finitude, is construed as transcending finitude--of realizing aseity. It is to be "like God."

Aroused freedom aims at aseity and actually realizes a caricature of it: the demonic. Actual existence compulsively oscillates between the illusion of self-sufficient finitude (the demonic in the form of absolutism or idolatry) and the morass of meaninglessness (the demonic in the form of relativism or despair). In the one instance cosmos becomes opaque. In the other chaos becomes aimless and all-consuming. Both are finite caricatures of aseity. Both are "superhumanly" destructive.

The analogy of encounter.--We not only set ourselves to sketch the crucial difference between the freedom/destiny polarity under the qualification of essence and the same under the qualification of existence, we also raised the question as to whether the discontinuity here did not imply some form of encounter. The Genesis story does involve intercourse between man, on the one hand, and superhuman and subhuman figures, on the other (God and the serpent).

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[1] ST, II, 37.

But genuine encounters occur only between actual entities that are on a peer level. This is acknowledged in the story form in that the account is represented as historical, and the superhuman and subhuman figures are portrayed anthropomorphically--God having human form and the serpent having personal traits (language). Mythology cannot speak any other way. But that there is no genuine encounter here (or rather, that the use of the term in this context is highly metaphoric) is attested by the feature that the two figures are the separate and hypostatized elements of the basic polarity. The divine command touches only freedom; the serpent's question touches only destiny. Both together are integral to the story in its "account" of the transition from dreaming innocence to fallen creatureliness. The story cannot be told in terms of one genuine encounter but of two interdependent quasi-encounters.

Conclusion

Existence is estranged and self-contradictory. It actualizes tragic guilt because of the polar element of a distorted destiny. It actualizes moral guilt because it is freedom--albeit an eccentric freedom--that chooses it. In considering the transition from the aspect of discontinuity no less than of continuity we have seen that existence poses the questions of Whence and Why that it cannot answer. But it not only poses these questions in the vertical dimension, it also poses a quest on the horizontal: Where is healing to be found?

The transition from essence to existence is the "backbone" of Tillich's ontological analysis. Likewise, the overcoming of estrangement under the conditions of existence (Christology) is the "backbone" of his theological answers to the questions which the existential predicament poses.[1] In other words, both sin and grace belong to "man in the middle," if I may borrow Bonhoeffer's suggestive phrase.[2] But nothing could better illustrate the fact that the place of existential poignancy is not necessarily the place of keenest ontological and theological clarity. Both are stories which, in order to be told at all, must be told as stories that "begin" in heaven and "end" there. Both point to the doctrines of creation and consummation for their being and meaning.

Third: Life is ambiguous

Being under the qualification of essence and being under the qualification of existence are abstractions. Both say something ontologically and existentially indispensable, but neither alone describes anything that is. It is "life" from which these two aspects have been abstracted. When Tillich speaks of "being" (without qualification) he is designating "life" with its character of concreteness and openness, of essential tensions and existential conflicts, and of its thrust toward self-preservation and self-realization. Any conception of "ontology" that is implicitly or explicitly other than or less than a philosophy _of life_ cannot encounter Tillich or rightly criticize him.

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[1] "A complete discussion of the relation of essence to existence is identical with the entire theological system. The distinction between essence and existence, which religiously speaking is the distinction between the created and the actual world, is the backbone of the whole body of theological thought. It must be elaborated in every part of the theological system." (ST, I, 204.)

[2] Dietrich Bonhoeffer, Creation and Fall, trans. J. C. Fletcher (London: SCM Press, 1959), passim.

Being as process

Life is not potency or actuality; rather it is _actualization_.[1] "Actuality" would imply something finished; "actualization" refers to a continuous, open-ended process. This is the _ontological_ concept of life. "The actualization of the potential is a structural condition of all beings" and manifest in each of them.[2] Here is where Tillich incorporates the theme of being as being-in-act. All being or life is a dialectical movement from self-identity through self-alteration toward a new self-identity without self-loss. This has Idealistic, particularly Hegelian, overtones. There is a similarity. And there is a difference.

For Hegel, as it was for Kant, dialectics composes a duality of antithetical elements. Being-in-act (the Concrete Absolute or the good will, respectively) is the resulting synthesis of the composing act. This makes the dialectical movement something between the polar elements resulting in a synthesis that ultimately overcomes and transcends the polarity.

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[1] _ST_, I, 246.

[2] _ST_, III, 12.

In Tillich it is otherwise. The polarity is prescriptive for and operative in all three "moments" of the dialectical process. But more important is the fact that all three "moments" are descriptive of the actualization of granularity--that is, of the coming to be of any and every particular being. They are prescriptive for actual entity, not a description of its career. These three "moments" are within each other in such a way that they cannot be described as a chronological sequence or series. The dialectical movement is the "pre-temporal" ground of existential temporality. This is such a subtle yet crucial point in Tillich that we dare not proceed unless it is clearly fixed in mind.

In the discussion of Kant's Moral Philosophy we noted that one cannot think dialectics without movement or succession, which means that dialectics is an archetype of time. Moreover, we stated that a dialectical movement which composes noumenal and phenomenal elements is more that an archetype. It is a new form or dimension of temporality. It is historical time--time with a "beginning" and an "end," or a ground and a *telos*.

However, for Kant human history (although not the history of humanity) remains almost wholly "supernatural" (noumenal), as does the good will. It touches natural space-time only tangentially. The dialectical self-realization in the moral act is strictly episodic. The good will has no "substance." It evaporates. It can only be created and re-created *ad infinitum*. Character is the shadow of substance, but it approaches conformation to the good will asymptotically. For the actualization of the Highest Good (the good will "in-substanced") life wants *endless time* (immortality).

Actualization in the transcendent or noumenal realm (and, we remember, for Kant *all* the dimensions of personality are noumenal) is complete and unambiguous in any single moral act. Actualization in the immanent or phenomenal realm--the process of character conformation--is fragmentary yet cumulative. The two "histories" intersect every time a moral act happens; the phenomenal history is the shadow or image of the noumenal because it is actuated by it and strives toward conformity with it; but the two histories do not coincide except in the infinity of everlasting time (natural time). In summary: as far as finite being is concerned, human actualization is begun *in principle* (that is, in reality and in power) but its consummation, like its origin, is trans-historical or "supernatural."

Whereas in Kant the dialectical movement has one foot in the noumenal realm and the other in the phenomenal, in Hegel both feet are planted on the same ground: consciousness. The infinite and the finite, like Being and Nothing, are concepts, not places to stand. There is but one history, which can be viewed either from within or without; and dialectics is the law of it. Dialectics in the objective sense is theogony. In the subjective sense it is the procession from the abstract and disjunct in consciousness to the concrete and comprehensive. Actualization in the stages along the way is real but relative. The Truth or ultimate and absolute actualization is eschatological pantheism, the Concrete Absolute which is "built up" in the dialectical process.

For Tillich, in contrast to both Kant and Hegel, dialectics does not compose antithetical elements like nature and supernature or being and nothing. Self-alteration is different from, but not opposed to, self-identity--at least not to all of it. There is a "yes" and a "no." Actuality is different from, but not opposed to, potentiality--at least not to all of it. There is inclusion as well as exclusion. These are the contrasts with which the dialectics of actualization have to do. Actualization is not something smooth and serene. It is full of tensions and conflicts and risks. And the thing that makes it "dialectical" is decision.

Decision is the prius of actualization and manifest through it. Decision simultaneously separates and unites. It is not all composure, as it was for Kant. Neither is it all creative of antitheses, as it was for Hegel (and Schelling, also).[1] Decision cuts into the state of potentiality, where many alternatives are compossible, in order to elect one (or at most a very few) for actualization. Many things are both/and on the level of potency that are either/or on the level of actuality. Decision separates actuality from the excluded possibilities in potentiality; hence there is a serious difference. But at the same time it realizes the elected possibilities; hence there is union or continuity between the states of potentiality and actuality.

The same could be described in terms of self-identity, self-alteration, and return. Self-identity, even in the state of "dreaming innocence," includes the potency for self-alteration, of "standing out" of potency in actuality. But self-alteration would be no alteration if it included all of the elements of self-identity--or, at least, all of them in precisely the same initial configuration. Alteration involves an adding or a cutting off or a rearranging of the elements of the configuration--or all of these concurrently--in order to realize a change of mode of being. In actualization the decision for self-alteration simultaneously involves a gain and a loss. It elects greater depth at the expense of breadth, or greater breadth at the expense of depth.

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[1] In Hegel, Mind or Spirit enacts itself by "deciding" to oppose itself to its counterpart in order to reconcile this opposite pole to and with itself. (Supra, p. 308.) In Schelling we also saw that freedom is creative of dualities, not the means of composing them. (Supra, p. 303.)

Sacrifice is the character of all life.[1] As an ontological condition, actualization

> includes the sacrifice of the possible for the real, or the real for the possible, as an inescapable process is all dimensions other than that of spirit and as an inescapable decision within the dimension of spirit.[2]

Decision is a "yes" and a "no," a separation and a union, a divergence and a convergence. It is thus simultaneously, not successively. This is the root of the ineradicable ambiguity of life. And under the condition of existence this ambiguity is transmuted into tragedy.

Decision is constitutive of actual entities, not merely something actual entities "do." It precedes actualization but is manifest through it. This answers the question of the substantiality of actualization. Actualization is not just in principle but in fact. Actualization is real but ambiguous in every time. It is not only ambiguous but it is fragmentary. This is not because the potentialities are imperfectly actualized, but because only some potentialities can be fully actualized at the expense of many others. Its consummation--both in the sense of overcoming ambiguity as well as fragmentariness--is eschatological. But eschatological fulfilment is a trans-temporal dimension of every time, not a moment at the "end of time."

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[1] ST, III, 42. See the whole section on "The ambiguities of personal self-integration: the possible, the real, and the ambiguity of sacrifice," pp. 41-44.

[2] Ibid., p. 43.

Decision is the pre-temporal ground of temporality, not an occurrence within time (Kant) or the law of temporal succession (Hegel). There are different "histories" according to the realms appropriate to each dimension of being, but according to the multi-dimensional unity of life they are all included in as well as transcended by human history.

Finally, decision belongs to finitude. It is the *prius* of actualization *of being*--that is, finitude. It does not compose infinite and finite elements. It raises finite potentiality to finite actuality. In short, decision is *not* the way to God. The inherent ambiguity of decision would preclude that even without existential disruption. One is reminded of the profundity of the line in the old prayer: Without Thee we are unable to please Thee.

Actualization and polarity

The terms we have needed to describe actualization--

self-identity and self-alteration, and potentiality and actuality--have the ring of polarities. Tillich does, on a few ungarded occasions, refer to self-identity and self-alteration as a polarity.[1] There is much justification for such usage, but there is less than exactitude in it.

Potentiality/actuality is similar to a polarity in a number of ways. There is a duality. The states are within and outside each other. But they are not _simultaneously_ _adequate_ to each other. This is due to the sacrificial character of life. Decision cuts in between potentiality and actuality in a way that is neither tension nor conflict.

If this is true of potentiality and actuality, how much more is it the case with self-identity and self-alteration, which is really not a duality but a triad--"and return." Self-identity and self-alteration are within and without each other, but they are not concentric. In decision the center is "_moved_." The return is not to the "place" of the initial center and yet it is a return to self-identity.

In spite of the similarities to polarity, actualization is dialectical and not polar. There is continuity. But there is also discontinuity.

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[1] For example, "the personal moves between _the poles_ of self-identity and self-alteration." (_ST_, III, 41; italics mine.)

Actualization and encounter

The terms of actualization have as many similarities to encounter as they do to polarity. And there is the same kind of difference. This is particularly true of the curious duplication of the self in the process of actualization. The self as envisaged, projected, and elected in self-alteration has all of the ontological elements of a complete self, even with a different center. And under the conditions of existence it is meaningful to talk about being "at war with oneself," to be estranged from oneself. Tillich describes man under the law as that existential condition where man's essential nature is put over against himself in the role of one who demands and judges.[1] Encounter with other persons may be, and is, prescriptive for the awareness of the moral imperative, but it is not constitutive of the categorical imperative itself. "Its validity is not dependent upon external or internal conditions."[2] It is meaningful to talk about a man having a duty to love himself, to acknowledge himself as a person.

But in spite of these and many other possible similarities between self-duplication and encounter, it is not genuine encounter. There are not two actual entities, but one. And the root of both duplication and unity is decision.

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[1] ST, III, 44 et passim.

[2] Ibid.

Decision is the prius of actualization. It is the most concrete, immediately experienced, and yet highly dialectical and mysterious manifestation of continuity-and-discontinuity conceivable. With this in mind, we can begin to see how "finite freedom" is at the heart of Tillich's anthropology, and through it, of his ontology.

Actualization and the categories

We have seen that dialectics for Tillich is the pre-temporal ground of temporality. It should be noted that actualization has this relation to all the categories, "the forms in which the mind grasps and shapes reality."[1] The categories have different forms corresponding to the different dimensions of being. "The time of the amoeba and the time of historical man are different."[2] However, one can describe that which gives each of the categories identity, and that is what we want to relate explicitly here to actualization. "That which makes time time, under all dimensions, [is] the element of 'after-each-other-ness.'"[3] Self-identity logically, but not chronologically, precedes self-alteration in the **ground** of actualization. The category of space is basically "beside-each-other-ness."[4] In contrasting self-identity with self-alteration we have had to talk about the "movement" of centers, of their not being at the same "place." Causality "is the relation in which a consequent situation is conditioned by a preceding one."[1] This is implicit in the self's going out of the self. Substance is "remaining unity in change,"[2] which is grounded in "return"--self-alteration without self-loss.

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[1] ST, I, 192. [2] ST, III, 313. [3] Ibid.

[4] Ibid., p. 314.

Actualization and the functions of life

Actualization is not only the ground of the categorical structure of finitude. More important for our purposes is to see the ground-consequent relation between actualization and the basic functions of life. These functions take place within the categorical structure and are descriptive of life as a career. Being is not only given, it is a demand and a task.[3] This task is threefold: self-integration, self-creation, and self-transcendence. In each, all three of the dialectical "moments" of the ground are present--self-identity, self-alteration, and return to one's self. But in each task or function, one of the moments predominates, which gives it its distinguishable character.

Self-integration: the moral function.--"There is centeredness in all life, both as reality and as task."[4]

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[1] *Ibid*. [2] *Ibid*. [3] *Ibid*., p. 30. [4] *Ibid*.

Self-integration is a career, not a finished product at any point in one's lifetime or in any stage in history. It is grounded in actualization--especially, but not exclusively, in the aspect of self-identity. It is operative within the structure of the polarity of ontological elements--especially, but not exclusively, the aspect of individualization and participation. It is occasioned by continual and repeated encounters with other life centers--especially, but not exclusively, that aspect of the other's resistance to being reified and domesticated.

The characteristic movement of this first life function is circularity--"the circular movement of life from a center and back to this center."[1] Its law is self-preservation.

The principle of this function is integrity. "Integrity" is the most potent term available to get at the heart of Tillich's conception of morality. But one cannot help but note that morality is stripped of any and all solipsistic connotations, as it had, say, for Kant.

The existential ambiguity of this function is manifest in the fact that life as we experience it is a mixture of forces making for disintegration as well as for integration. Disintegration oscillates between frigidity and schizophrenia,[1] both being ways in which dynamic centeredness is destroyed.

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[1] Ibid.

All of this that we have sketched relating to personal self-integration--or life "under the dimension of spirit"--is reduplicated on the level of communal self-integration--or life "under the dimension of history." There, self-integration is termed "the state."[2] Its principle is "justice."[3] Its ambiguity is primarily the ambiguity of leadership, since "leadership is the social analogy of centeredness."[4]

However, the "reduplication" is analogous, not univocal. Social cohesiveness is broader than personal but never as deep. It is to do justice to the intricacies and complexities of the difference between the social and personal careers of actualization that Tillich, for reasons of expediency, separates the section, "History and the Kingdom of God," from "Life and the Spirit," where it belongs systematically.

In the light of all this we can see that self-integration poses some inherent questions: Whence comes the courage to affirm one's self _wholeheartedly_ in spite of the fragmentary character of all actualization? Where in existence is the power of being which not only successfully resists, but overcomes, "the revenge of the excluded possibilities"?[1] And whither lies unambiguous actualization that can be wholesomely affirmed? These are question of being-and-meaning which the ontological analysis itself raises but for which it has no answers.

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[1] Tillich calls these "the death of mere self-identity," and "the death of mere self-alteration," respectively.(ST, III, 33).

[2] ST, III, 309.

[3] According to the polarity of dynamics and form, a social group could not have being without form. And the social group's form is determined by the understanding of justice effective in the group" (ST, III, 79).

[4] ST, III, 82.

Self-creation: The cultural function.--"Life drives toward the new. It cannot do this without centeredness, but it does it by transcending every individual center."[2] This, too, is a life-long and history-long career. It is grounded in actualization--especially, but not exclusively, in the aspect of self-alteration. It is operative within the polar structure--especially, but not exclusively, under the predominance of dynamics and form. It is occasioned by continual encounters--especially, but not exclusively, that aspect of beings' ability to give themselves to one another and thus participate in each other's creativity and reinforce it.

The characteristic movement of this second life function is horizontal directedness. Its law is self-expansion or growth.[3]

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[1] _ST_, I, 153. [2] _ST_, III, 31. [3] _Ibid_.

The principle of this function is creativity. It is the power to create language and technology, "the basic functions of culture."[1] And in conjunction with these "something new beyond encountered reality" is created--"materially, as in the technical function; receptively, as in the functions of *theoria*; or reactively, as in the functions of *praxis*."[2]

Theoria and *praxis* need some explication. They correspond to our common speech distinction between "theory" and "practice," but they do not have the thinness of ring that these words have. *Theoria* embraces both the cognitive and aesthetic modes of receptivity. It is

> the act of looking at the encountered world in order to take something of it into the centered self as a meaningful, structured whole. Every aesthetic image or cognitive concept is such a structured whole. Ideally, the mind drives toward an image which embraces all images and a concept which contains all concepts, but in reality the universe never appears in a direct vision--it only shines through particular images and concepts. Therefore every particular creation of *theoria* is a mirror of encountered reality, a fragment of a universe of meaning.[3]

Theoria aims at "truth" and "authentic expressiveness" (beauty).[4] *Praxis*, on the other hand, aims at "the good." It is not unrelated to the technical act in that it involves the use of means for ends. It includes such activities as "economy, medicine, administration, and education."[5] The

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[1] *ST*, III, 57.

[2] *Ibid.*

[3] *ST*, III, 62.

[4] *Ibid.*, p. 66.

[5] *Ibid.*

"good" is defined as "justice" on the communal level and "humanity"--"the fulfilment of human potentialities"--on the personal level.[1] The all-embracing term which Tillich uses to designate "the good" of praxis is "humanism." It comprises "justice" and "humanity" in designating "the intrinsic aim of all cultural activity."[2]

The existential ambiguities of culture creation are best seen in the ambiguities of humanism. "The ambiguities of humanism are based on the fact that, as humanism, it disregards the self-transcending function of life and absolutizes the self-creative function."[3]

Here Tillich's debt to Existentialism is most profoundly evident, for all that we explored under that heading is involved here. Culture is the creating of "a universe of meaning."[4] It is a "second nature" not unlike the Kantian conception of character but much more inclusive--in fact, all-inclusive. Its ambiguity is that in promising humanism it simultaneously fulfills de-humanization or de-personalization. Its failure is a product of its success. Its threat is materialized in the realization of its promise.

All that we have said here concerning the self-creative function of life under the dimension of spirit has its ramifications for life under the dimension of history.

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[1] ST, III, 67.

[2] Ibid., p. 85.

[3] Ibid.

[4] Ibid., p. 84

But here it is even less accurate to talk of "re-duplication" than it was in the case of self-integration. Culture is the "substance" of life together. "A center does not precede growth in the life of social groups, but self-integration and self-creation are identical at every moment. . . . The processes of life coincide under the all-embracing dimension of the historical."[1]

However, we can still mark nuances of difference reflecting the difference between centeredness and growth. Under the dimension of history the expansive function of the "state" (centeredness) is apprehended as "empire" (growth).[2] The expansive function of "justice" is apprehended as "vocational consciousness."[3] In other words, this connotes the missionary impulse of empires and whole civilizations. Their growth is empowered by a sense of being bearers of a "gift" which justly belongs to all mankind, which can unite all mankind, and which they are "called" to share both by persuasion and coercion. The ambiguity of this (as no twentieth century man needs to be reminded!) is compounded a thousand-fold. It is the ambiguity of the ideal of "one-world."[4]

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[1] ST, III, 80. [2] Ibid., p. 339. [3] Ibid., p. 310.

[4] Tillich uses the term "united mankind," but I prefer here the term Wendell Wilkie made part of every household's vocabulary and aspiration. One who can remember the greatness of Wilkie as well as the brutal facts of the Cold War has a more existential referent for the pathos of the ambiguity of history. Cf. ST, III, 311-12.

Culture is the creation of a universe of meaning, but this is not the same thing as the meaning of the universe. "What is the meaning of the creation of a universe of meaning?"[1] Here we must be circumspect if we are to follow Tillich aright. This question does not imply the necessity for a leap from ontology (meaning of being) to personalism (meaning for being). In a very real sense we have already answered the question. "Humanism . . . [is] the intrinsic aim of all cultural activity."[2] "The universe of meaning is the fulfilment of the potentialities of the universe of being."[3] Does that not satisfy the question and bring our inquiry to a close?

The answer is "yes" and "no." It is "yes" because humanism, rightly understood, is the unsurpassable meaning of being. True humanism--"essential manhood under the conditions of existence"[4]--is what "New Being" is all about.

The answer is "no" because as the inner aim of one of the basic functions of life it cannot encompass the ground of that function of which it is the aim. It is not an impasse in the question of meaning but the lack of aseity of actualized meaning that drives to the question of the self-transcending character of being. In other words, life has an inner aim, self-fulfilment; it is self-creating in the direction of that fulfilment; but it is not self-creating in the absolute or original sense. "It presupposes the creative ground out of which it comes."[1] And what is asked for here is a ground "deeper" and more ultimate than the finite "ground" of actualization. It asks for the ground of the finite ground.[2]

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[1] ST, III, 84. [2] Ibid., p. 85. [3] Ibid., p. 84.

[4] This is the focal point of Tillich's Christology, and thus of his whole philosophy as well as theology. "The paradox of the Christian message is that in one personal life essential manhood has appeared under the conditions of existence without being conquered by them. One could also speak of essential God-manhood in order to indicate the divine presence in essential manhood; but this is redundant, and the clarity of thought is served best in speaking simply of essential manhood." (ST, II, 94.)

There is another reason why the answer is "no." Humanism even in its unambiguous manifestation still remains fragmentary, as does all actualization. Fragmentariness is the inherent frustration of finite self-fulfilment. If the humanist ideal is "the actualization of all human potentialities,"[3] then it is fatal to qualify that to mean: "the actualization of those human potentialities which are possible in terms of the historical destiny of this particular individual."[4]

Add to that the ambiguities of humanistic education and the problem is compounded:

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[1] ST, III, 31.

[2] Tillich calls this the "macrocosmic" answer to the alleged self-sufficiency of humanism as the aim of culture. See ST, III, 84.

[3] Ibid., p. 85.

[4] Ibid., p. 86.

> Even worse, the human condition always excludes--whether under aristocratic or democratic systems--the vast majority of human beings from the higher grades of cultural form and educational depth. The intrinsic exclusiveness of the humanist ideal prevents it from being the final aim of human culture. It is the ambiguity of humanistic education that it isolates individuals and groups from the masses, and the more it isolates them, the more successful it is. But in doing so, it diminishes its own success, for the community of man, as an ever open possibility, belongs to the humanist ideal itself. If such openness is reduced by humanist education, such education defeats itself.[1]

How can this "yes" and "no" be held together? How can humanism be the unsurpassable meaning of being and still fail both to account for its ground and to consummate its goal? This leads us to the question of "self-transcending humanism."[2]

Self-transcendence: the religious function.--Now that we have arrived at the formal consideration of "religion" it might be expected by one unfamiliar with Tillich that he is going to wave a magic wand and tie up all the loose ends of his ontology. Nothing could be farther from the case. The religious function of life is a function of the actualization of finitude and, as such, is subject to the same ambiguities of every function.

"Life, by its very nature as life, is both in itself and above itself, and this situation is manifest in the function of self-transcendence."[1] This is true of life as it functions in self-integration and self-creation, so self-transcendence is not a function alongside the first two. We referred to the curious duplication and yet unity of the self in the dialectics of actualization. The self is both in and above itself as self-alteration or else there could be no "return,' no self-alteration without self-loss. This power of self-objectification is what is here designated as the function of self-transcendence. "It is self-transcendence because life is not transcended by something that is not life."[2] Yet it is self-transcendence because the self is not irrevocably bound by either the "is" or the "ought-to-be." In it "life drives beyond itself as finite life."[3]

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[1] ST, III, 86. Tillich calls this argument the "microcosmic" answer to the alleged self-sufficiency of humanism as the aim of culture. Cf. p. 85.

[2] Ibid.

Great caution must be urged here. Tillich is not saying that the self "stands" in the infinite and supervenes upon the finite and ravishes it (Kant). Neither is he saying that self-consciousness is potentially one with Absolute Spirit (Hegel). For Tillich, self-transcendence neither comes from the infinite nor does it reach it. It reaches after it from within.

Self-transcendence is grounded in actualization--especially, but not exclusively, in the aspect of return to self. It is operative within the polar structure of the ontological elements--especially, but not exclusively, in the aspect of freedom and destiny. It is occasioned by repeated and continual encounters--especially, but not exclusively, that aspect of reflexive self-awareness and awareness of finitude.

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[1] ST, III, 31. [2] Ibid. [3] Ibid.

The characteristic movement of this third function is vertical, in contrast to the circular movement of self-integration and the horizontal movement of self-creation.

The principle of this function is "sublimation"--"'driving towards the sublime,' . . . a 'going beyond limits' toward the great, the solemn, the high."[1] This is what Tillich means by "religion" as a constitutive function of the human spirit. He is not here talking about the empirical religions, but rather about that which is the finite ground of all religions--that which makes "the religions" religious.

> Life, in degrees, is free from itself, from a total bondage to its own finitude. It is striving in the vertical direction toward ultimate and infinite being.
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> . . . .
>
> The question as to how the self-transcendence of life manifests itself cannot be answered in empirical terms, as is possible in the case of self-integration and self-creativity. One can speak about it only in terms which describe the reflection of the inner self-transcendence of things in man's consciousness. Man is the mirror in which the relation of everything finite to the infinite becomes conscious. No empirical observation of

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[1] ST, III, 31.

> this relation is possible, because all empirical knowledge refers to finite interdependencies, not to the relation of the finite to the infinite.[1]

The empirical world religions have careers. But neither their being nor history is related to actualization as the ground-consequent relation. The religions are products or residues of revelatory situations in which it is claimed that the infinite has "broken into' the finite to be received by the self-transcending function of life. The function itself produces no contents. The contents belong to culture (or to nature as interpreted by culture).

Here, as at all points before, we run into the phenomenon of continuity and discontinuity. "Revelatory situations" (the claims to them, not their individual validity) belong to the empirical description included in the contents of a history of culture. Their nature is that in them it is claimed that in and through some piece of finite reality (a being or an event or a constellation of events) the infinite is self-disclosed to the finite. It is a giving, not a production; a happening, not a necessity. It is "miracle" or "sign-event" in the sense of "that which produces astonishment," not "the bad connotation of a supernatural interference which destroys the natural structure of events."[2] There is continuity-and-discontinuity on the giving side.

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[1] ST, III, 86-87.

[2] ST, I, 115.

There is continuity and discontinuity also on the receiving side of the revelatory situation. This is pointed to by the term "ecstasy." Ecstasy is the self-transcending function "standing outside" of itself, being "grasped" or "possessed," yet without destroying the self. "Ecstasy occurs only if the mind is grasped by the mystery, namely, by the ground of being and meaning."[1] It is "the form in which that which concerns us unconditionally manifests itself within the whole of our psychological conditions. It appears through them. But it cannot be derived from them."[2]

Revelatory situations could also be described as historical existential commitments. They are not unlike the rhetorical phrase, "hinges of fate," except they are more accurately described as moments of the confluence of freedom and destiny. They give direction and power and a sense of unconditional validity to the life of a whole people.

The relation of religion to culture is a very important concern for Tillich. The now famous dictum of his that "culture is the form of religion and religion is the substance of culture"[3] indicates just how intimately they are conceived to be related. What he is saying is that there is a correlation between empirical religions and their cultures--a relation of depth to structure. Every existential historical commitment (whether self-consciously "religious" or not) shapes the style of the cultural expressions of the group in which it is a living tradition. And an analysis of any particular culture from the standpoint of the import of its style will lay bare the (often hidden or forgotten) existential historical commitment of that particular society. But he is not saying that the religious function (self-transcendence) per se produces either contents or style. If that were the case, then religion would essentially be reduced to the status of one function alongside the other functions of life instead of being the function in the vertical dimension operative in and above the functions of self-integration and self-creativity.[1] We shall have occasion to refer to this later. The point here is to see what religion is and where it belongs in the overview of Tillich's ontology.

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[1] ST, I, 112. [2] Ibid., p. 113. [3] ST, III, 158

The ambiguity of religion is the ambiguity of the holy and the profane. Life is a mixture of driving toward the sublime and of "resisting self-transcendence," which is what he means by the term "profane."[2] But even profanization or secularization is carried out in the power of self-transcendence. We saw in the case of humanism that its ambiguities "are based on the fact that, as humanism, it disregards the self-transcending function of life and absolutizes the self-creative function."[1]

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[1] ST, III, 96.

[2] Ibid., p. 87.

> Man has witnessed to the conflict between the affirmation and the denial of the holiness of life wherever he has reached full **humanity**. And even in such ideologies as communism, the attempt toward a total profanization of life has resulted in the unexpected consequence that the profane itself received the glory of holiness.[2]

This is not unrelated to what Tillich calls the ambiguity of the divine and the demonic in the empirical religions:

> Demons in mythological vision are divine-antidivine beings. They are not simply negations of the divine but participate in a distorted way in the power and holiness of the divine. The term must be understood against this mythological background. The demonic does not resist self-transcendence as does the profane, but it distorts self-transcendence by identifying a particular bearer of holiness with the holy itself. . . And the claim of something finite to infinity or to divine greatness is the characteristic of the demonic. Demonization of the holy occurs in all religions day by day, even in the religion which is based on the self-negation of the finite in the Cross of the Christ.[3]

Not only does the religious function of life not solve all the problems of his ontology, but for Tillich the fact of the empirical religions--and the universal existential necessity of them--is ambiguity reduplicated. The fact that institutionalized religion exists as one "part" of life, or of man's interests, alongside other "parts" betrays the existential distortion of the essential relation of the religious function to the functions of self-integration and self-creativity. It loses its in-and-above character and becomes "alongside," in competition and conflict. This is manifest in the profanization of religion in autonomy and the demonization of religion in heteronomy.[1] The cultural-anthropological omnipresence of institutionalized religion is one of the most intransigent facts manifesting existential distortion present in all life.

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[1] *Supra*, p. 370. [2] *ST*, III, 87. [3] *Ibid*., p. 102.

But that is only half of the story. *Under the conditions of existence* institutionalized religion is necessary. It is not "dead." It is not moribund. It cannot be historically superseded or synthesized with something else. It will not "wither away." As truly as it is the existential *distortion* of the self-transcending function, so is it the existential *necessity* of the self-transcending function; hence it is ineradicable.

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[1] In discussing the ambiguities of humanism Tillich points out that the absolutization of the self-creative function "does not mean that humanism ignores 'religion.' Ordinarily, though not always, it *subsumes* religion under the human potentialities and considers it accordingly as a cultural creation." (*ST*, III, 85; italics mine). Wherever "a place" is accorded to religion among the permanent, sociologically describable "institutions" of society (for example, there are Government, Economy, Education, Marriage and the Family, etc. . . . *and Religion*), there the self-transcending function is inherently denied. This is profanization. On the other hand, where a particular historical manifestation of the holy is elevated to Absoluteness *in its particularity*, there the *institutionalized relativity* "lords" it over all the other institutions. This is demonization.

> The self-transcendence of life under the dimension of spirit cannot become alive without finite realities which are transcended. Thus there is a dialectical problem in self-transcendence in that something is transcended and at the same time not transcended. It must have concrete existence, otherwise nothing would be there to be transcended; yet it should not "be there" anymore but should be negated in the act of being transcended. This is exactly the situation of all religions in history. Religion as the self-transcendence of life *needs the religions and needs to deny them*.[1]

In considering the relation between the religious function (self-transcendence) and the empirical or historical **religions** ("the church," "organized religion" and other such designations of institutionalized religion) we have already been dealing with the ambiguities of this third life function under the dimension of history. But more needs to be said.

First, self-transcendence under the dimension of history is not only the quest for unambiguous life but also for "the Kingdom of God." The two are distinguishable but inseparable. There is no personal fulfillment apart from social fulfillment, and vice-versa. But the social is predominant because it is the more all-inclusive.

> In terms of the symbol of the Kingdom of God, this means that "Kingdom" includes life in all realms, or that everything that is participates in the striving toward the inner aim of history: fulfilment or ultimate sublimation.[2]

Second, the traditional term "Kingdom of God" is here used to explicate that which was heretofore asked for in terms of "self-transcending humanism." "It has an inner-historical and a transhistorical side."[1] As inner-historical (self-transcending) it is humanism. As trans-historical (self-transcending) it points to participation in the ground of being and meaning.

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[1] *ST*, III, 97-98. (Italics mine.) [2] Ibid., p. 350.

Third, under the dimension of history all functions of life coincide.

> The aim of history can now be expressed in terms of the three processes of life and their unity in the following way: History, in terms of the self-integration of life, drives toward a centeredness of all history-bearing groups and their individual members in an unambiguous harmony of power and justice. History, in terms of the self-creativity of life, drives toward the creation of a new, unambiguous state of things. And history, in terms of the self-transcendence of life, drives toward the universal, unambiguous fulfilment of the potentiality of being.[2]

Fourth and finally--and this follows from the first three--the quest for "the Kingdom of God" is the ontological summit of the question of the relation of being and meaning.

> The interpretation of history includes more than an answer to the question of history. Since history is the all-embracing dimension of life, and since historical time is the time in which all other diemnsions of time are presupposed, the answer to the meaning of history implies an answer to the universal meaning of being. The historical dimension is present in all realms of life, though only as a subordinated dimension. In human history, it comes into its own. But after it has come into its own, it draws into itself the ambiguities and problems under the other dimensions.[3]

Excursus: the method of correlation.--It may be objected with some justification that I have no right here, in the overview of Tillich's ontological analysis, to use the phrase, "Kingdom of God," to describe the question which ontology ultimately poses. The phrase comes from the Christian revelation and purports to be the theological answer to the question, not the question itself. Here is a supreme example of where Tillich's "existential question" and "theological answer" fit so hand-in-glove that it is difficult to find synonymous terminology. Admitting the difficulty and ambiguity, I will defend the present usage on the following grounds:

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[1] Ibid., p. 357. [2] Ibid., p. 332. [3] Ibid., p. 350.

First, even within the Christian tradition the phrase "Kingdom of God" has suffered varied interpretations (progressivistic, utopian, and transcendental[1]), so its mere usage does not answer the question of its normative meaning.

Second, even in secular ideologies and utopias there are elements for which "Kingdom" is the best description. There is the vision of "an unambiguous state of things," and of "the universal, unambiguous fulfilment of the potentiality of being."[2] These elements connote something political, social, personalistic, and universal--in short, the "characteristics of the symbol 'Kingdom of God.'"[3]

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[1] Ibid., pp. 352-56. [2] Supra, p. 383.

[3] ST, III, 356-59.

Tillich maintains that his ontological analysis can stand on its own feet. He nowhere pulls in "revealed elements" as substitutes for description, analysis, and argumentation. He does not appeal to "revealed elements" as First Principles which are either incapable of or "too sacred" for critical investigation. This is why, in this overview, I have presented his ontology in dialogue with Kant and the post-Kantian developments in philosophy. Tillich's system wrestles with and incorporates core concerns and themes of both Idealism and Existentialism, not just peripheral items. His interest and method has been to converse with these movements and their predecessors as a philosopher and not as one privy to occult knowledge inaccessible to the unregenerate. He disclaims completeness or infallibility for his system. And wherever his ontological description and analysis can be decisively amended or even shaken to rubble, it begs for just such treatment.

Having said all of that--and without qualifying it--Tillich is still a Christian theologian. That his understanding and explication of the contents of the Christian answer should correlate precisely with the questions the ontological analysis poses is neither fortuitous nor coincidental. It is methodological. It is implied in the commitment (full of risk) that Jesus is the Christ, that the Christian faith is "the way, the truth, and the life."

This truth-claim could be falsified if the attempt at correlation were shown to be either impossible or faulty at crucial points.

Christianity does make the truth-claim. This leaves the methodological options open to the theologian stringently limited. Either he must cast his lot with the second century Apologists and explicate the truth of faith in relation to the truth wherever found; or, following Tertullian, he must insist that outside of revelation there is no truth at all.[1] In any event he may not, honorably or responsibly, reduce the Christian commitment to triviality by implying or saying: All I mean is that Christianity is the truth for me or for my group.

Tillich has taken his stand in the tradition of the Apologists. His conscious and disciplined method is that of correlating "theological answers" with "existential questions."[2] In his performance he may have unconsciously imported indefensible elements into his ontological description and analysis. Likewise he may have unwittingly distorted the contents of the faith in expressing them in correlation with the form of the question. These are matters open for debate. But the debate is over his performance as a philosopher and as a theologian, not over the validity of the method. The method itself does not inherently require either the rigging of the analysis or the distortion of the answer. The only basis on which that could be maintained is the commitment (itself full of risk) that Jesus is not the Christ. It is only fair to note that this, too, is a commitment which can be falsified. It could be falsified by the successful performance of a philosopher-theologian like Tillich.

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[1] Since the "double truth" or "two truths" position is self-contradictory, I am not according it the dignity of a serious option.

[2] Cf. ST, I, 59-66.

Summary: the self-world polarity as the microcosm/macrocosm relation

Even in this compressed overview we can see that Tillich's ontology is a marvelously intricate and delicately balanced system of polarities and encounters, of essential and existential qualifications, of dialectics and decision, of historical functions and destinies. It is dynamically and structurally interlocked from bottom to top and yet it is an open, not a deductive system. It is, like the reality it describes and analyzes, finite yet not rigid or absolutistic.

Now, is there some visual or conceptual image by which its unity can be grasped and summarized? The answer is: the self-world polarity seen as the microcosm/macrocosm relation. Both parts of this statement need elucidation.

The self-world polarity.--Tillich begins his ontology with the characterization of the self-world polarity as "the basic articulation of being."[1] It is equally necessary as a summary statement; and that way, keeping in mind all that has been heretofore sketched, it is far less likely to be taken as something merely epistemological.

Selfhood or self-relatedness is "not a thing that may or may not exist; it is an original phenomenon which logically precedes all questions of existence."[2] In man it is fully developed, but ontologically it is implicit "wherever the reaction to a stimulus is dependent on a structural whole."[3] It is not something other than or in addition to what we have been talking about but a summary statement of it. Selfhood is being and meaning under the aspect or countenance of granularity.

"World" is being and meaning under the aspect or countenance of totality or wholeness. However,

> "world" is not the sum total of all beings--an inconceivable concept. As the Greek kosmos and the Latin universum indicate, "world" is a structure or unity of manifoldness. If we say that man has a world at which he looks, from which he is separated and to which he belongs, we think of a structured whole even though we may describe this world in pluralistic terms. The whole opposite man is one at least in this respect, that it is related to us perspectively, however discontinuous it may be in itself.[4]

The self-world polarity is not co-ordinate with the chaos/cosmos polarity. Neither self nor world are ontological "elements," as is the case with chaos and cosmos. Rather, each is a complex of all of the ontological elements, structures, relations, qualifications, and functions. The self-world polarity cuts on an entirely different plane from any hitherto discussed.

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[1] ST, I, 164. [2] Ibid., p. 169. [3] Ibid.

[4] Ibid., p. 170.

Still the relation is a genuine polarity. Self and world are simultaneously within and outside of each other. They limit and sustain each other. They are concurrently adequate to each other.

The self is obviously "in" the world. In what sense is it genuinely "outside" of it? The answer is: just as man transcends his "environment" in having a "world," so he "can oppose his self to every part of his world, including himself as a part of his world."[1] In self-transcendence the self drives beyond perspectival synthesis indeterminately.

"World" is obviously "within" the self (as perspectival synthesizer). In what sense is it genuinely "outside" of it? The answer is: since "world" is a communal affair--not just an individual "projection," as in solipsism--it is outside every concrete self in the same way and in the same power that every other life-center unconditionally resists complete reification and domestication. So there is a genuine and serious "otherness" to world in relation to every concrete self. World has its own transcending character analogous to self-transcendence.

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[1] ST, III, 39.

But neither of these transcending powers is "the infinite." Both point "beyond" everything that is (that is, finite being as such), but neither transcends finitude. Tillich calls this dual expression of the power of indeterminate self-transcendence the awareness of "potential infinity."[1] "Infinity is a demand, not a thing."[2] It is

> a directing concept, not a constituting concept. It directs the mind to experience its own unlimited potentialities, but it does not establish the existence of an infinite being.[3]

We must remember this when we come to Tillich's handling of the so-called "arguments for the existence of God."

The microcosm/macrocosm relation.--Self and world, thus characterized, can be seen as a classic example of the microcosm/macrocosm theme. Everything that is needed to describe "self" is needed to describe "world," and vice-versa. There is complete reduplication of elements and structures. Selfhood--which in the complete sense means "man"--is the ontological mirror of the universe, or the World-as-a-whole. "Man [is] that being in whom all levels of being are united and approachable."[4]

However, a few precautionary words are in order here.

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[1] For example, ST, I, 206. [2] Ibid., p. 190.

[3] Ibid. [4] Ibid., p. 168. (Italics mine.)

First, macrocosm--the "world"--is not God. This is not what Tillich means by the term "Being itself," any more than it was what Edwards meant by Being-in-general.

Second, the microcosm/macrocosm relation here is not that of the part to the whole. Such a misconception here would deny polarity. It is only in polar relation to world (within and outside) that the self is microcosm. A "part" is never outside the whole.

With this explication, and with these precautions in mind, we can safely use the phrase, self-world polarity in the microcosm/macrocosm relation, as a workable summary statement of what Tillich means by "Being is finite; Existence is estranged; and Life is ambiguous." The chaos/cosmos theme has been incorporated and subsumed under the microcosm/macrocosm theme in a "self-transcending naturalism."

Tillich's Theological Doctrines of Creation and Consummation

We are now in a position to see the theological uses of Tillich's ontological analysis in the light of our question as to his conception of the relation of being and meaning. This, too, must be understood in relation to the post-Kantian theological developments; but fortunately for our purposes, this can be done in relatively brief compass. All that we need review is the varied theological stances toward "Natural Theology."[1] This we can do schematically.

Background

The debate over Natural Theology is a theologically sensitive index of the relation of being and meaning because it deals with one of the components of the doctrine of creation--namely, the relation between God and the World. One can see why it has a long tradition of being considered the prolegomenon to any systematic theology. It essays to establish the "reality" of God--more often it is called the "existence" of God--as a necessary rational inference from universal experience.[2] Thus the relation of God to being is anchored in conjunction with the principles of meaning.

Kant's impact on Natural Theology

Kant's Critical Philosophy was one of those "watershed" events in the history of Natural Theology. For some time prior to that event the main burden of proof for the existence of God lay on the "world" pole of the self-world polarity. God was inferred from the contingency of finite being (the cosmological argument) and/or from the contingency of finite meaning or structure (the teleological argument). Kant demonstrated that these arguments purporting to be based on outer universal experience surreptitiously rest on an argument from inner experience (the ontological argument). His understanding of that argument was that it maintained that the universal conditions of cognition itself contain the a priori knowledge of the existence of an Infinite Being. This he demolished by showing that whereas cognition does have a priori conditions, these conditions do not transcend finitude; they are constitutive of it. In short, cognition, since it is knowledge of finitude, at no point can jump its track and provide knowledge of supersensible reality. Traditional "metaphysics," as a cognitive enterprise, is inherently impossible because of the demonstrably finite character of cognition itself.

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[1] The reader is referred to the discussion of the plight of Natural Theology in the modern world as discussed in the Introduction (chap. i). What was discussed there will be employed in the present exposition in summary form.

[2] Cf. John E. Smith's delineation of the three basic ideas--universal, experiential, and rational--of Natural Theology (*supra*, chap. i, pp. 12-13).

Nevertheless--and this is where he provides a new beginning as well as an end to an old era--Kant did establish the reality (though not "existence," since that is a qualification of finitude) of God by an appeal to inner universal experience. The reality of God is secure as a rational postulate of universal moral experience.

Not cognitive experience (which deals with the outer), nor yet aesthetic experience (which is a curious compound of the outer and inner), but moral experience (the inner alone) is the locus of the experience of something unconditional, or categorical, or "divine." This shift from the outer locus or "world" pole to the inner locus of "self" pole was decisive for all post-Kantian developments in Natural Theology. But it was still "Natural" theology. The appeal was still to rational conviction, and it was consequently based on some aspect of universal experience.

Post-Kantian developments

The locus of where the infinite presents itself to the finite is inner experience or consciousness. No immediately post-Kantian theology--that is, one that took the Critical Philosophy seriously--tried to go behind Kant in that. Another way of saying this is that the doorway to theology became exclusively anthropological. In man's self-consciousness lies the key to the relation of the infinite and the finite. But not all schools were agreed on just what part or aspect of consciousness is the locus of the awareness of God. There were several possibilities, all of which were exploited.

Ethical Liberalism.--First (though not necessarily chronologically), one could accept the Kantian dichotomy, give up "metaphysics," and interpret religion as the resolute and progressive "in-substancing" of values. History is the "building" or realization of the Kingdom of God, making Nature (being) progressively conform to Spirit (meaning or value). This is broadly descriptive of Kantian and Neo-Kantian Liberalism.

Idealistic Liberalism.--A second possibility was that of identifying consciousness with the divine itself, at least in terms of potentiality. Man's spirit is actually a "moment" in Absolute Spirit dialectically enacting itself. God is the "world soul"--immanent in the world process, empowering it, and ever driving toward the Concrete Absolute. This, of course, is theological Idealism, following Hegel. It had the advantage of overcoming the Kantian dualism, but it did so at the price of being unable to make any ultimate and real distinction between God and the world.

Another way to see the contrast between these first two positions is to say that whereas Neo-Kantian Liberalism emphasized the "prophetic" side of religion as transforming reality, Idealistic Liberalism emphasized the "priestly" function of reconciling the mind to reality. It was a dynamic version of Alexander Pope's dictum "Whatever is, is right"--that is, if we but have the wit to discern it.

Mystical Liberalism.--A third way was to locate the presence of the divine not in a part of consciousness, nor yet in consciousness itself, but in the depths of consciousness. This was Schleiermacher's approach. God is present to the self in the "feeling of absolute dependence."[1]

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[1] Cited in ST, I, 41.

Since Tillich finds this method most congenial (but not entirely identical) to his own, let us let him characterize it:

> When [Schleiermacher] defined religion as the "feeling of absolute dependence," "feeling" meant the immediate awareness of something unconditional in the sense of the Augustinian-Franciscan tradition. This tradition was mediated to him religiously by his Moravian education, philosophically by Spinoza and Schelling. "Feeling," in this tradition, referred not to a psychological function but to *the awareness of that which transcends intellect and will, subject and object*. "Dependence," in Schleiermacher's definition, was, on the Christian level, "teleological" dependence--a dependence which has moral character, which includes freedom and excludes a pantheistic and deterministic interpretation of the experience of the unconditional.[1]

Tillich does concede that some who have claimed to be Schleiermacher's followers, and many who have thought themselves to be his critics, have misinterpreted his use of the word "feeling" to mean the psychological function or "the emotions." But this interpretation "is mistaken and even unfair, inasmuch as it can easily be avoided."[2]

> Religion, if banished to the realm of mere feeling, has ceased to be dangerous for any rational and practical human enterprise. But, we must add, it also has lost its seriousness, its truth, and its ultimate meaning. In the atmosphere of mere subjectivity of feeling without a definite object of emotion, without an ultimate content, religion dies.[3]

Such was hardly what Schleiermacher meant!

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[1] *ST*, I, 41-42. (Italics mine.)

[2] *Ibid*., p. 41. Also see footnote 11 on the following page (42).

[3] *Theology of Culture*, p. 7.

Although the designation may be a bit unusual, all of these types of theologies of experience may be subsumed under what in the Introduction were called "Theologies of Being."[1] They all assume some form of the religious a priori; that is, they insist that the possibility of the awareness of God is present in human experience universally, that the question of the reality of God is an existential necessity, and that if any answer to the question of God _is to be received_ it must be an answer to the question _human experience poses_. "Mind cannot receive a content which is entirely strange to it."[2] Further, they all imply that meaning is the meaning _of_ being, that religion is fulfilling of experience. Tillich summarizes the matter succinctly thus:

> Natural theology tries to explain the idea of God as a necessary category within human reason, as a category which belongs necessarily to a meaningful self and to a meaningful world. Of course it is not mathematical necessity by which God is to be proved. But it is the necessity of presupposing a meaningful universe in order to be capable of acting and thinking.[3]

The Crisis Theology.--Whereas theological Liberalism emphasized the continuity between the reality of God and the conditions of human experience, and also the immanence of God within the world-historical process; the "Crisis" theologians, foreshadowed by Kierkegaard and spearheaded by Karl Barth, countered by maximizing discontinuity and transcendence. It charged that any effort at Natural Theology was man-centered, idolatrous, and a complete reversal of proper theological method.[1] The various forms of the "Theology of Crisis" or of "Dialectical Theology" (as it is often called) are aggressive "theologies of Act."[2]

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[1] Cf. chap. i, pp. 21ff.

[2] Paul Tillich, "Natural and Revealed Religion," _Christendom_, I (Autumn, 1935), 164.

[3] _Ibid_., p. 160.

The Crisis Theology is genuinely post-Kantian. It does not attempt to go behind the Critical Philosophy. What it does is add to the Kantian rejection of outer experience the complete rejection of inner experience as containing the condition of the knowability of God. In accord with Existentialism, to which it is kin, it is an expression of anguish in the awareness that all experience is a predicament of "No-Exit." In short, it takes human finitude seriously and unequivocally.

Tillich has shown the impact of this criticism in his own thought. He has demonstrated his ability to face it without sidestepping or misrepresenting the central issues. He has represented the arguments sharply, fairly, vigorously, and with empathy as the following demonstrates:

> The history of theology has shown--that is [Barth's] argument--that the theology of revelation is lost at the moment when it presupposes a natural theology. For if

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[1] Cf. chap i, pp. 13-14. [2] *Ibid.*, pp. 20ff.

man has by his nature a God who is really God, he does not need revelation. But he needs revelation because he is separated from God. Therefore human nature only can produce imagination of a demonic character and the corresponding attitude of fear and superstition--as every natural religion in the interpretation of Barth does. Therefore theology is not allowed to use it as a substructure for the theology of revelation.

Natural theology--this is the basic point of view of Barth and the whole dialectical theology--gives man the power of determining to a certain extent his relation to God. Man's relation to God in this way is dependent to a certain extent on man's intellectual or moral activity, and that implies the presupposition that God in his relation to man is dependent to a certain extent on man. But a God who depends in any way on man is not God. He is a demon. Natural theology is an attack upon the majesty, the absoluteness of God; it is idolatry. And it has the consequences of every idolatry: it is not able to give a foundation to our inner existence. Every natural argument for God, rational as well as irrational, rooted in feeling as well as in intuition, remains uncertain. It may be an illusion, produced by demons as the older theology taught. It may be a complex, as psychoanalysis, or an ideology, as social-analysis calls it today; it may be a product of "libido" or "will to power," a projection of natural tendencies, so to speak, upon the sky of the Infinite as Feuerbach asserts. The God of natural theology is not able to give the religious certainty which is called "forgiveness of sins" or "grace." Since man by nature is in guilt, every one of his activities, every one of his thoughts, has an element of guilt in itself. And it is a contradiction in terms to assume that guilty thinking and guilty acting can overcome guilt. Guilt cannot be conquered by guilt and that means it cannot be conquered by human nature which is perverted by guilt. So from every point of view natural theology is to be denied. It is idolatry, because it makes God dependent on man; it destroys religious certainty, because it makes our knowledge of God dependent on man's fallacious insight[;] it destroys the certainty of salvation, because it makes grace dependent on our guilty activities. God can be known only by God himself, that is, by revelation. God's perfection can be reached only by God himself, that is, by salvation. And both revelation and salvation transcend human nature entirely. They are matter[s] of faith and not of self-development; they presuppose that man is gripped by a tran-

> scendent power and thrown upon something beyond himself and all the possibilities of his nature.[1]

This statement has been reproduced in its entirety because it shows precisely what we are up against in trying to understand Paul Tillich. A congeniality with Schleiermacher, and an empathy with the Crisis Theology--how can these two "incompatibles," in their core concerns, be brought together in one theological system! How can one make a both/and situation out of this uncompromising either/or? Like Edwards, one thing that has to be said for Tillich is that he never tackled small problems!

Tillich's stance

One way that we can see how Tillich has both continuity and discontinuity is in terms of his distinction between essence and existence. Essentially a natural theology is possible, but existentially it is distorted. And since life is the ambiguous mixture of essential and existential elements, we can account for both the presence of the debate over Natural Theology and the insolubility of the debate on its own terms.

Certainly we would be remiss if we failed to relate this problem to the insights achieved in the ontological description and analysis. But it would be an egregious mistake if we ever assumed that for Tillich this is the

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[1] "Natural and Revealed Religion," Christendom, I (Autumn, 1935), 161-62.

"answer." Theological issues are not resolved by ontological analysis.

The key to the resolution lies in the concept of grace. More specifically, it lies in our coming to terms with what Tillich means by "the Gestalt of grace."[1]

An explanatory note about Tillich's preference for the German word, "Gestalt," is in order here. Why not use the English words, "form" or "structure"? The reason is that both of the latter terms are abstractive. In themselves they do not connote subsistence. But Gestalt does; it is a living structure; it is in actualization--something palpable and ponderable. Thus he makes the distinction and defense as follows:

> We shall use the German word Gestalt in order to refer to the total structure of a living reality, such as a social group, an individual person, or a biological body. The German word is permissible since "Gestalt psychology" has introduced it into general scientific terminology. We shall use the word "form" whenever we refer to the different organic expressions of the total structure, for instance, the cult of a church or the character traits of a personality.[2]

Let us first delineate the salient features of the notion of the Gestalt of grace; and then we can consider how he arrived at it, how it relates to the problem of Natural

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[1] The Protestant Era, p. 207. The whole essay entitled "The Formative Power of Protestantism" (pp. 206-21) is a particularly good exposition of what we shall be dealing with here.

[2] Ibid., p. 206 (footnote).

Theology, and what ramifications it has for the whole of his theological system.

Gestalt of grace: its salient features

First, the Gestalt of grace is in history but not from it.[1] It is the designation of the divine presence in all of life as the creative precondition of there being anything at all. As such it is not just prescriptive for "saintliness" but is prescriptive for humanity.[2] Grace as a Gestalt precedes life but is manifest through it. As such it characterizes God's threefold creativity--originating, sustaining, and directing. It is the form of grace that is "simple and direct; it provides participation in being to everything that is, and it gives unique participation to every individual being."[3]

This character of being in-but-not-from, or of preceding-yet-manifest-through, is just as characteristic of saving grace as it is of creating grace. That "divine structure of reality" called faith

> does not come from man, but it is in man. And in so far as faith is in a community or personality, they are embodiments of grace. Faith is created by the hearing of the "Word." The Word is said from beyond us, to us, But if it is received, it is no longer only transcendent. It is also immanent, creating a divine structure of reality.[4]

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[1] Ibid., p. 210. [2] ST, III, 211. [3] ST, I, 285.

[4] Protestant Era, p. 210.

Both the creating and the saving forms of the Gestalt of grace are manifestations of the principle that being precedes acting.[1] It is not only the case of "without Thee, we are unable to please Thee," but also of "without Thee, we are not." "Structures of grace must be permanently actual in history--though they do not derive from history--if in any moment of history the Word is to be pronounced."[2]

Second, "the Gestalt of grace is not a Gestalt beside others. It is the manifestation of what is beyond every Gestalt through a Gestalt."[3] Like the self-transcending function which apprehends it, it is not a living reality alongside other living realities but the ecstasy of finite Gestalts, that which gives them inexhaustible "substance" and unconditional seriousness and validity. It is both meaning and power. But it is not a power beside other life powers, rather it is the ground and abyss of every power to be. It is not a meaning beside other meanings, but the ground and abyss of all meanings. The finite Gestalt in and through which it is manifest is not absolutized in its finiteness. Rather the finite is grasped in such a way that it becomes transparent or translucent to the unconditional in meaning and power. Here the observations concerning Tillich's conceptions of miracle and ecstasy are quite pertinent. It is apparent that this is a mystical notion. Both the self and the world are grasped and opened up so that what precedes and transcends the self-world polarity (and hence the subject-object character of all thought) is ecstatically apprehended. However, it should be duly noted that this is strictly a mediated mysticism. The unconditional in meaning and power cannot appear directly, nor can it be received prosaically. This is the root of the inherently paradoxical character of the manifestations of the Gestalt of grace. If it is anticipated and expected in terms of ordinary experience (and it can be anticipated and expected in no other terms!), then it is inevitable that in its manifestation the forms of expectation will be disappointed and put to shame. There are no cognitive or moral ways to grace; there are only cognitive and moral ways proceeding from grace as given and/or transformed reality.

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[1] ST, II, 80. [2] Protestant Era, p. 210.

[3] Ibid., p. 211.

Third, the Gestalt of grace is related dynamically, not statically, to human history. Negatively this means that the relationship is not one of natural necessity since that would preclude the freedom of man to contradict himself and his own nature, which freedom makes man man and which is the basis of his history.[1] Positively this means that every Gestalt of grace participates fully in the characteristics of "historical events"--namely, it is connected with purpose, it is influenced by freedom, it is creative of the new in terms of meaning, and it is uniquely and teleologically significant.[1] These characteristics distinguish "events" in "human history" from the countless occurrences that take place in life and in nature. The Gestalt of grace is related directly only to human history, and only indirectly to the sub- or pre-historical dimensions of being. But it is related to them indirectly in that the historical dimension is present in an anticipatory way in all the previous dimensions.

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[1] "Natural and Revealed Religion," Christendom, I (Autumn, 1935), 166-67.

Summary.--These three salient characteristics of the Gestalt of grace--(1) its being in-but-not-from or its preceding-yet-manifest-through human life; (2) the ecstatic-paradoxical character of its manifestation; and (3) its "timely" or "event" character--all together show the continuity-and-discontinuity of grace with human history. This, as we shall see, has the force of recasting the terms of the "problem" of Natural Theology.

Gestalt of grace: genesis of the notion

How did Tillich arrive at this particular conception? A word about that will further help us to understand it clearly. Tillich acknowledges a profound debt he owes to his teacher at Halle, Martin Kaehler:

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[1] ST, III, 305. Cf. pp. 302-305.

> I am indebted to him primarily for the insight he gave me into the all-controlling character of the Pauline-Lutheran idea of justification. The doctrine of justification on the one hand rends every human claim in the face of God and every identification of God and man. On the other hand, it shows how the decadence of human existence, guilt, and despair, is overcome by the paradoxical judgment, that the sinner is just before God.[1]

This is the root of what he calls the "Protestant Principle," and it prepared him for the acceptance of the radical protest of the Theology of Crisis. But there is more to it than he feels the Crisis theologians are willing to acknowledge:

> If Protestantism tries to protect the majesty of the unconditional against every attempt of a finite reality to set itself up as unconditioned, *it must somehow participate in the unconditional*. If Protestant criticism is not the criticism with which one finite being challenges other finite beings but a criticism coming from beyond finitude, Protestantism *must participate in the infinite*. But participating in the infinite, in the unconditional, in a trans-human authority, means living in a reality of grace, or--to use the term already explained--in a "Gestalt of grace," in a sacred structure of reality. No Protestant protest is possible unless it is rooted in a Gestalt in which grace is embodied.[2]

Tillich also acknowledges that under Kaehler's influence he was led to see implications of the doctrine of Justification that he had not hitherto envisaged:

> The step I myself made in these years was the insight that the principle of justification through faith refers not only to the religious-ethical but also to the religious-intellectual life. Not only he who is in sin

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[1] "On the Boundary," *Interpretation of History*, p. 32.

[2] *Protestant Era*, p. 209. (Italics mine.)

> but also he who is in doubt is justified through faith. The situation of doubt, even of doubt about God, need not separate us from God. There is faith in every serious doubt, namely, the faith in the truth as such, even if the only truth we can express is our lack of truth. But if this is experienced in its depth and as an ultimate concern, the divine is present; and he who doubts in such an attitude is "justified" in his thinking. So the paradox got hold of me that he who seriously denies God, affirms him. Without it I could not have remained a theologian. There is, I soon realized, no place _beside_ the divine, there is no possible atheism, there is no wall between the religious and the non-religious. The holy embraces both itself and the secular. Being religious is being unconditionally con-concerned, whether this concern expresses itself in secular or (in the narrower sense) religious forms. . . . Just as you are justified as a _sinner_ (though unjust, you are just), so in the status of _doubt_, you are in the status of truth. And if all this comes together and you are desperate about the meaning of life, the seriousness of your despair is the expression of the meaning in which you are still living. This unconditional seriousness is the expression of the presence of the divine in the experience of utter separation from it.[1]

The truth of the "so-called arguments for the existence of God"

The Gestalt of creative grace is prescriptive for life under the dimensions of spirit and history. It is this which makes possible the question of God, and with it the religious question of the Whence and Whither of the World-as-a-whole. This is Tillich's way of describing the truth of the "so-called ontological argument."[2] But the continuity is grace, not "Nature." This protects the infinite transcendence of God over the world while at the same time accounts for the reality and seriousness of the question of

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[1] _Ibid._, pp. xiv-xv. [2] _ST_, I, 204-208.

God in human experience universally, whether in affirmation or doubt.

The Gestalt of saving grace is implicit and anticipated in the awareness of estrangement, which is descriptive of life universally. It is this which makes necessary and urgent the quest for "New Being," in which the estrangement is overcome and life is fulfilled. This is Tillich's way of describing the truth of the "so-called cosmological and teleological arguments." The anxiety of separation and estrangement is the threat of the ultimate loss of being and meaning. But even the courage to affirm this existential discontinuity is a manifestation of the healing power of God operative in every human situation, whether consciously or unconsciously. It is grace, not "Nature." And this protects God's freedom for the world.

The truth of "Natural Theology"

Now we can see how Tillich mediates the dichotomy between the proponents of Natural Theology and its critics.

First, the proponents of Natural Theology are right in maintaining that the doorway to theology is anthropological. "Man is the mirror in which the relation of everything finite to the infinite becomes conscious."[1] But they are wrong in construing this to mean human "nature." It is not in human nature but in human history that the issue lies.

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[1] ST, III, 87.

Man is not a being (nature) who has a history (career), but rather he is an historical being--his being is essentially as well as existentially historical. "We have to reject the category 'natural' itself in this connection. Not nature, but history of man, is the place in which revelation as well as religious experience occur."[1]

Second, by seeing the locus as human history, the problem of whether God is present to "inner" experience or "outer" experience is obviated. History "is always a union of objective and subjective elements. An 'event' is a syndrome (i. e., a running-together) of facts and interpretation."[2] There is, as we have seen, an element of truth in both the ontological and cosmological approaches, but in neither of them as "arguments."

Third, since the Gestalt of grace is prescriptive for humanity as well as for saintliness, it is false to make an absolute dichotomy between natural and revealed religion.

> This means that there is no religion by nature, but by history; that there is no natural theology and no supernatural theology. There is only one theology--it is a theology which interprets human religious experience by revelation as criticism and transformation of human religious experience.[3]

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[1] "Natural and Revealed Religion," Christendom, I (Autumn, 1935), 166.

[2] ST, III, 302.

[3] "Natural and Revealed Religion," Christendom, I (Autumn, 1935), 167.

Tillich specifically relates this to, and distinguishes it from, the position of the Crisis theologians:

> I agree with Barth that there is no experience of God without revelation of God, that there is no natural knowledge of God. But I disagree with Barth if he says that there is no historical experience of God. It must be emphasized that such an assertion makes historical revelation utterly impossible. Consequently, I assert that in every historical experience of God there is implied an element of revelation; or that history must receive revelation in every moment in order to be able to receive it in any one moment. For every moment in history is dependent on every other one, the present on the past and the future on the present; and conversely, the meaning of the past on the meaning of the present, and the meaning of the present on the meaning of the future. This interdependence in history entails that the one moment which we call revelation can be revelation for us only because there is preceding revelation in every moment.[1]

Fourth, and finally, since the relation of "revealed religion" to "natural religion" is one of criticism and transformation of the latter by the former, the proper theological method is "the method of correlation." "The cleavage between natural and supernatural religion and theology is overcome through the one theology which has two poles: The question of human existence and the answer of divine revelation."[2] We have already had occasion to refer to the method of correlation, but let us see how it fits here, as it summarizes Tillich's position on the whole debate over "Natural Theology":

> Revelation is an answer which is understandable only if there has been a question. Answers without

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[1] Ibid. [2] Ibid., p. 170.

> preceding questions are meaningless. Therefore the questioning for revelation must precede revelation, but this questioning is not possible without a certain knowledge of the subject for which the question is asked. That means: the questioning for revelation presupposes revelation, and conversely: they are dependent on each other. The beginning of the history of religion is a question implying an answer and an answer implying a question. Man in history never is without revelation and he never is without questioning for revelation. The latter implies that man never can boast that he has the God who is really God; the former implies that man never is left by God and separated from him; and both imply that there is no natural relation to God which could be developed in history and which could be derived from human reason. Every doctrine of God is theology of historical revelation in so far as it is rooted in a revelation received in history. Every doctrine of God presupposes faith; for faith is correlated to revelation. Natural theology without preceding faith is nonsense, while natural theology which has the foundation in faith and revelation is not natural theology at all but theology of historical revelation, the only theology which is possible.[1]

Summary and estimate

The "Gestalt of grace" is the designation of the divine immanence in and transcendence over life. As "Gestalt" it is that living structure or reality in which all life is rooted and negated and affirmed. But as "grace," and not structural necessity, it safeguards the truth that "man, in relation to God, cannot do anything without him. He must receive in order to act."[2]

It provides the foundation to our inner existence. Even in sin and doubt--and all other manifestations of existential estrangement--we are not utterly forsaken by the reality of the divine Presence. It supports us in judgment as well as in reconciliation. The Gestalt of grace embraces itself and its own negation.

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[1] *Ibid*., p. 169.

[2] *ST*, II, 79.

It is related to life in history dynamically in terms of freedom and destiny, not in terms of either mechanical or logical necessity. A manifestation of the Gestalt of grace is related to destiny in terms of _kairos_, "the right time," a "moment of maturity in a particular religious and cultural development."[1] It is related to freedom in that it must be decided for.

> Awareness of a _kairos_ is a matter of vision. It is not an object of analysis and calculation such as could be given in psychological or sociological terms. It is not a matter of detached observation but of involved experience.[2]

This "timely" or epochal character of grace makes it what might popularly be called a "relative absolute." Its absoluteness is in its _qualitative_ aspect--namely, as manifesting the unconditional in being and meaning. As for its _content_, it is as relative historically as the particular finite Gestalt in and through which it appears.

This position is not without its problems. What is the relation between "creating" and "saving" grace? And if there is more than one manifestation of saving grace, which, if any, is normative for all the rest? And how? These questions lead us directly to the basic components of the doctrine of creation: the primary definition of God, the relation between God and the world, and the meaning and purpose of creation for both God and man.

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[1] _ST_, III, 370.

[2] _Ibid_., pp. 370-71.

The primary definition of God

It is well to approach Tillich's primary definition of God via the consideration of the Gestalt of grace. If the reality of God (the divine Presence in the Gestalt of grace) is the prius of that being (man as spirit) who can and does ask the question of God, then it is a false dichotomy to question whether the definition is "natural knowledge" or "revealed knowledge," as we have seen. Yet there is a difference between asking a question and receiving an answer, and the distinction as well as conjunction should be specified in the primary definition. Such a "boundary" statement is that God is being-itself.

God as being itself

"Being-itself" or "ground of being" or "power of being" are characteristic terms for Tillich's primary definition of God. That they are difficult notions Tillich himself admits.[1] At one time he was willing to say that "being-itself" is the one non-symbolic assertion we can and must make of God.[2] Later he acknowledges that even one non-symbolic assertion about God seems to endanger

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[1] ST, II, 9-10.

[2] ST, I, 238-39.

"his ecstatic-transcendent character."[1]

The "dialectical difficulty" is inherent and inescapable. "Being-itself" purports to be a concept, a definition; but it is no concept. It does not admit of a disjunction. It serves as a 'place holder' for that toward which the function of *theoria* drives: "an image which embraces all images," or "a concept which contains all concepts."[2] Given the subject-object character of all knowledge and the indeterminate self-transcendence of life, it has the character of an infinite regress or an hypostatized question. This character, far from being fatal to the notion, is essential to it. As such it is the quasi-conceptual expression of ultimate concern.

It is as an "ecstatic idea of God"[3] that being-itself serves as a primary designation of the reality of God. It is not in bringing the question to conceptual rest, but rather in the *questioner* being grasped by that which gives unconditional seriousness and validity to his questioning that man participates in the ground or power of being. As we noted in connection with the Gestalt of grace, the answer is not a concept beside others. It is the manifestation of what is beyond conceptualization through the quest for conceptualization.

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[1] *ST*, II, 9.

[2] *ST*, III, 62.

[3] *ST*, II, 8.

Summary and estimate.--We might summarize Tillich's position by saying that "being-itself" is a limiting notion: it is the most we can say non-symbolically of God and the least we can say symbolically of God.

> If we say that God is the infinite, or the unconditional, or being-itself, we speak rationally and ecstatically at the same time. These terms precisely designate the boundary line at which the symbolic and the non-symbolic coincide. Up to this point every statement is non-symbolic (in the sense of religious symbol). Beyond this point every statement is symbolic (in the sense of religious symbol). The point itself is both non-symbolic and symbolic. This dialectical situation is the conceptual expression of man's existential situation.[1]

We might well ask: Why use such a difficult and controversial notion as the primary definition of God? Admittedly this is not the language of the religions, particularly biblical religion, in either their mythic expressions or cultic usages. But this merely spotlights the task of the theologian. As Tillich points out: "There is no ontological thought in biblical religion; but there is no symbol or no theological concept in it which does not have ontological implications."[2] It is the task of the theologian to make these implications explicit and relate them systematically.

The main argument for the use of "being-itself" is that it is a necessary protective doctrine. It protects the doctrine of God from naturalistic and supernaturalistic distortions. God is not a being or the highest being or reality-as-a-whole. As being-itself God is "above" and "prior to" the distinctions between being and non-being, essence and existence, and potentiality and actuality.

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[1] ST, II, 10.

[2] Ibid., p. 12.

Positively, the notion of "being-itself" protects Tillich's doctrine of religious symbols, which is the way between or "beyond Naturalism and Supernaturalism."[1]

> If God as the ground of being [or being-itself] infinitely transcends everything that is, two consequences follow: first, whatever one knows about a finite thing one knows about God, because it is rooted in him as its ground; second, anything one knows about a finite thing cannot be applied to God, because he is . . . "quite other" or . . . "ecstatically transcendent." The unity of these two divergent consequences is the analogous or symbolic knowledge of God. A religious symbol uses the material of ordinary experience in speaking of God, but in such a way that the ordinary meaning of the material used is both affirmed and denied. Every religious symbol negates itself in its literal meaning, but it affirms itself in its self-transcending meaning. It is not a sign pointing to something with which it has no inner relationship. It represents the power and meaning of what is symbolized through participation. The symbol participates in the reality which is symbolized. Therefore, one should never say "only a symbol." This is to confuse symbol with sign. Thus it follows that everything religion has to say about God, including his qualities, actions, and manifestations, has a symbolic character and that the meaning of "God" is completely missed if one takes the symbolic language literally.[2]

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[1] The title to a whole discussion of the subject in ST, II, 5ff.

[2] ST, II, 9.

God as Spirit

Whereas "being-itself" is the protective doctrine of God, God as Spirit is the heart of Tillich's primary definition of God. He calls the assertion, "God is spirit," the "most embracing, direct, and unrestricted symbol for the divine life."[1] It is the "inclusive symbol" because

> it contains all the ontological elements. God is not nearer to one "part" of being or to a special function of being than he is to another. As Spirit he is as near to the creative darkness of the unconscious as he is to the critical light of cognitive reason. Spirit is the power through which meaning lives, and it is the meaning which gives direction to power. God as Spirit is the ultimate unity of both power and meaning.[2]

Both the ontological elements of chaos and cosmos are present as powers within the divine life:

> Human intuition of the divine always has distinguished between the abyss of the divine (the element of power) and the fulness of its content (the element of meaning), between the divine depth and the divine logos. The first principle is the basis of Godhead, that which makes God God. It is the root of his majesty, the unapproachable intensity of his being, the inexhaustible ground of being in which everything has its origin. It is the power of being infinitely resisting nonbeing, giving the power of being to everything that is. . . .
>
> The classical term logos is most adequate for the second principle, that of meaning and structure. It unites meaningful structure with creativity. . . . The logos opens the divine ground, its infinity and its darkness, and it makes its fulness distinguishable, definite, finite. The logos has been called the mirror of the divine depth, the principle of God's self-objectification. In the logos God speaks his "word," both in himself and beyond himself. Without the second principle the first principle would be chaos, burning fire, but it would not be the creative ground.[3]

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[1] ST, I, 249. [2] Ibid., p. 250. [3] Ibid., pp. 250-51.

With these two themes we have been dealing all through the philosophical and theological antecedents of Tillich. But nowhere, with the possible exception of Hegel, have we encountered quite the emphasis upon God as Spirit as we find in Tillich. But whereas Hegel made theogony (the genesis of Absolute Spirit) the end of cosmogony, Tillich sees God as Spirit the _prius_ of creativity.

> As the actualization of the other two principles, the Spirit is the third principle. Both power and meaning are contained in it and united in it. It makes them creative. The third principle is in a way the whole (God _is_ Spirit), and in a way it is a special principle (God _has_ the Spirit as he has the _logos_). It is the Spirit in whom God "goes out from" himself, the Spirit proceeds from the divine ground. He gives actuality to that which is potential in the divine ground and "outspoken" in the divine _logos_. Through the Spirit the divine fulness is posited in the divine life as something definite, and at the same time it is reunited in the divine ground. The finite is posited as finite within the process of the divine life, but it is reunited with the infinite within the same process. It is distinguished from the infinite, but it is not separated from it. The divine life is infinite mystery, but it is not infinite emptiness. It is the ground of all abundance, and it is abundant itself.[1]

All that we have been searching for concerning the relation of being and meaning in Tillich's theology is compacted here. What remains is to draw it out.

The relation between God and the world

The Spirit-spirit correlation

The Spirit is the principle of relatedness between

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[1] _Ibid_., p. 251.

God and the world. This is not only Tillich's most profound philosophical-theological insight, it is also where "the system" is in its most fundamental coincidence with biblical religion. It is the Holy Spirit which is God's agent in creation in the Genesis stories. It is the Spirit who "possesses" and speaks through the Prophets and Aposltes. It is the Spirit who "generates" the Christ or who is creative of the New Being. Salvation is to have the "first fruits" of the Spirit. It is the "outpouring" of the Spirit on "all flesh" that is the decisive eschatological symbol. We asserted previously that any conception of "ontology" that is implicitly or explicitly other than or less than a philosophy _of life_ cannot encounter Tillich or rightly criticize him. Now we must make the complementary assertion that any theology that is implicitly or explicitly other than or less than a theology _of the Holy Spirit_ cannot encounter Tillich or rightly criticize him. The spirit-Spirit correlation is the heart of the matter.

Dependence of the world

First, all that was said under the heading of the Gestalt of grace belongs here. "Gestalt of grace" and "Spritual Presence" are convertible terms. It is the divine Spirit that is creative of and manifest in the Gestalt of grace. Spirit precedes and is manifest through spirit. It is not spatially "alongside" or temporally "before" spirit but the ground and telos of finite spirit. It is the ground of spirit which is creative in the original sense and which drives spirit towards self-transcendence. It is the telos which grasps that drive in ecstasy and fulfills it in successful self-transcendence.

Continuous creation.--This is a notion of continuous creation. Tillich is explicit in this when he says that "the doctrine of creation is not a story of an event which took place 'once upon a time.' It is the basic description of the relation between God and the world."[1] But it makes all the difference to see this continuous dependence of finite being upon the infinite ground of being in terms of the spirit-Spirit correlation. Spirit as the "prior" actualization of power and meaning or of the co-involvement of entity and modality precedes-yet-is-manifest-through finite spirit; its sustaining relation to finite spirit is ecstatic-paradoxical; and its directing relation is timely or eventful.

Independence of the world

Second, a doctrine of creation must not only bespeak the dependence of the world upon God, it must also specify how the world is real and distinct from God. The spirit-Spirit correlation rules out any kind of literalistic theism (supranaturalism). The correlation cannot be expressed in terms of mutually exclusive "places," although we cannot wholly avoid spatial symbolism. But how does the correlation avoid the pitfall of pantheism? That is, how does Tillich avoid the position that, at some level of being, Spirit and spirit are indistinguishable?

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[1] Ibid., p. 252.

There are two lines of approach that we must follow in explicating Tillich here. Both are necessary, but both are **abstractions.** Neither, alone, tells the whole story. These two avenues are (1) finitude and (2) estrangement.

Finitude.--Created spirit is distinct from Spirit in terms of essential finitude. Man is finite freedom. Being is finite; it bears the "stigma" of non-being. The divine life is not conditioned by non-being as it is the infinite power of being continually overcoming non-being. Finitude is a specifiable distinction that is real, but in itself it does not account for creation being "outside" the divine life. Under the qualification of essence spirit bears the relation to Spirit as that of microcosm to macrocosm. There is a potential identity. The infinite embraces itself and the finite. "God is infinite because he has the finite (and with it the element of nonbeing which belongs to finitude) within himself united with his infinity."[1] To put it in other terms which Tillich employs, "dreaming innocence" as the trans-temporal "beginning" and "essentialization" as the trans-temporal "end" of finitude are distinct from yet not "outside" the divine life. It is of utmost importance, though, to note that the distinction rests upon considerations of being under the qualification of essence.

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[1] Ibid.

Estrangement.--Actualized spirit is "outside" of Spirit in terms of estranged existence. Under the qualification of existence the Spirit-spirit correlation can only be adequately symbolized by the chaos/cosmos relation. The negativities of existence (here represented by the "cosmos" symbol) cannot be absorbed into the divine life (the chaos symbol) but must be "conquered" and "exposed" and "cast out." This ascription of quasi-substantiality to the negativities of life is highly metaphorical but it says what has to be said in the only way we can say it. Under the qualification of existence there are no analogies for the negativities of spirit in the divine Spirit. Existential being is not only distinct from, it is "outside" of the divine life.

Thus far we can see how Tillich needs both the major themes of the God-world relation--the macrocosm/microcosm theme and the chaos/cosmos theme--to characterize the Spirit-spirit correlation. But we have yet to specify how he makes a both/and situation out of a seemingly uncompromising either/or one. The ontological symbol for this is "finite freedom." The teleological symbol for it is

"New Being."

Finite freedom

The complete description of the ontological term "finite freedom" needs the microcosm/macrocosm relation as its ground and the chaos/cosmos relation as possibility.

> The traditional discussion between the naturalistic and the supranaturalistic ideas of God uses the prepositions "in" and "above," respectively. Both are taken from the spatial realm and therefore are unable to express the true relation between God and the world--which certainly is not spatial. The self-transcendent idea of God replaces the spatial imagery--at least for theological thought--by the concept of finite freedom. The divine transcendence is identical with the freedom of the created to turn away from the essential unity with the creative ground of its being. Such freedom presupposes two qualities of the created: first, that it is substantially independent of the divine ground; second, that it remains in substantial unity with it. Without the latter unity, the creature would be without the power of being. It is the quality of finite freedom within the created which makes pantheism impossible and not the notion of a highest being alongside the world, whether his relation to the world is described in deistic or theistic terms.[1]

Nowhere is the interpenetration of the microcosm/macrocosm and the chaos/cosmos themes more evident than in Tillich's concept of "aroused freedom" and its polar coordinate "temptation." On the basis of the distinctness of the microcosm from the macrocosm, it is a separation (transition of microcosm to cosmos) which is not yet a separation but which is also no longer unbroken unity. "Aroused freedom" is the desire to separate. As "temptation" cosmos is envisaged (mistakenly) as a possible form of aseity.

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[1] ST, II, 8.

Transcendental fall.--The transition from "finite freedom" to the potentially but not yet actually distorted polarity of "aroused freedom" and "temptation" is "pre-temporal." Thus it is "ontological"--descriptive of all being and manifest in every instance ot it. This notion of transcendental fall (preceding-yet-manifest-through actualization) is an even more decisive argument than "finite freedom" against pantheism. But it poses one of the most delicate problems of Tillich's whole system. If the fall is transcendental, does it not imply something best expressed in the metaphor that the fall was "decreed" by God "before the foundation of the world"? The answer cannot be given here without the full context of our consideration of "New Being." But it must be raised, and Tillich has shown his awareness of it:

> Every theologian who is courageous enough to face the twofold truth that nothing can happen to God accidentally and that the state of existence is a fallen state must accept the point of coincidence between the end of creation and the beginning of the fall. Those theologians who are not willing to interpret the biblical creation story and the story of the fall as reports about two actual events should draw the consequence and posit the mystery where it belongs--in the unity of freedom and destiny in the ground of being. The supralapsarian Calvinists, who asserted that Adam fell by divine decree, had the courage to face this situation. But they did not have the wisdom to formulate their insight in such a way that the seemingly demonic character of this decree was avoided.[1]

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[1] ST, I, 256.

New Being

The teleological symbol of the conjunction of the microcosm/macrocosm and chaos/cosmos themes in the spirit-Spirit correlation is "New Being." The New Being is the appearance of microcosm (essential God-manhood) under the conditions of cosmos (existence). It is not a "seeming" conjunction but a real one. It is continuously in actualization. It is latent in all history and manifest in Jesus as the Christ. In manifesting New Being, Jesus continuously sacrifices everything he might be tempted to gain for himself as cosmos (the demonic lure of aseity) to himself as microcosm. Yet he could not do this unless he possessed himself as microcosm. This is the power of self-sacrifice without self-loss. Still, what he sacrifices are the negativities of cosmos, not the factuality of it. New Being is not the return to "dreaming innocence."

> The New Being is new in so far as it is the undistorted manifestation of essential being within and under the conditions of existence. It is new in two respects: it is new in contrast to the merely potential character of essential being; and it is new over against the estranged character of existential being. It is actual, conquering the estrangement of actual existence.[1]

Summary.--New Being is the central, concrete, and fully adequate symbol of the God-world relation. By being grasped by and participating in it alone does Reality-as-a-whole (the self-world polarity in the microcosm/macrocosm relation) actualize in principle (that is, in beginning and in power) its *telos* as microcosm of the divine Spirit. Tillich calls this "eschatological pan-en-theism."[1]

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[1] ST, II, 119.

The meaning of creation for both God and man

God's end in creating

Eschatological pan-en-theism is the end for which God created the world. Tillich avoids the term "purpose of creation" because it is too ambiguous. "Creation has no purpose beyond itself."[2] Instead he prefers the term, "'*telos* of creativity'--the inner aim of fulfilling in actuality what is beyond potentiality and actuality in the divine life."[3]

> The divine life is creative, actualizing itself in inexhaustible abundance. The divine life and the divine creativity are not different. God is creative because he is God. Therefore, it is meaningless to ask whether creation is a necessary or a contingent act of God. Nothing is necessary for God in the sense that he is dependent on a necessity above him. His aseity implies that everything which he is he is through himself. He eternally "creates himself," a paradoxical phrase which states God's freedom. Nor is creation contingent. It does not "happen" to God, for it is identical with his life. Creation is not only God's freedom but also his destiny. But it is not a fate; it is neither a necessity nor an accident which determines him.[4]

Man's end in living

Eschatological pan-en-theism is not only "God's end" in creation it is also man's end. As New Being it is true humanism--ecstatic humanism or successful self-transcendence. Participation in New Being is participation in the continual conquest of the ambiguities of life. It is unambiguous, but as long as history endures it is fragmentary. We have yet to show that aspect of eschatological pan-en-theism which overcomes the fragmentariness of the fulfillment. Tillich calls this "essentialization."

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[1] *ST*, III, 421. [2] *ST*, I, 263. [3] *Ibid.*, p. 264.

[4] *Ibid.*, p. 252.

Fulfillment

Essentialization is the complementary movement to actualization. As such it is the trans-temporal process of every moment in life and not something at the end of it. It is the elevation of what is positive in actualization to eternity where it is retained as "eternal memory."[1] In another metaphor Tillich likens essentialization to a portrait:

> The art of portrait-painting continually calls to mind the astonishing fact that molecules and cells can express the functions and movements of man's spirit which are determined by his personal center and determine it in mutual dependence. Beyond this, portraits, if they are authentic works of art, mirror what we have called "essentialization" in artistic anticipation. It is not one particular moment in the life process of an individual that they reproduce but a condensation of all these moments in an image of what this individual essentially has become on the basis of his potentialities and through the experience and decisions of his life process.[2]

Essentialization, then, conserves in composite form the particular and positive in actualization. Also, through the polarity of individualization and participation, the actualized particular participates in and contributes to the trans-historical fulfillment of reality-as-a-whole.

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[1] ST, III, 400.

[2] Ibid., p. 413.

> The new which has been actualized in time and space adds something to essential being, uniting it with the positive which is created within existence, thus producing the ultimately new, the "New Being," not fragmentarily as in temporal life, but wholly as a contribution to the Kingdom of God in its fulfilment. Such thought, however metaphorically and inadequately expressed, gives an infinite weight to every decision and creation in time and space and confirms the seriousness of what is meant in the symbol "ultimate judgment." Participation in the eternal life depends on a creative synthesis of a being's essential nature with what it has made of it in its temporal existence. In so far as the negative has maintained possession of it, it is exposed in its negativity and excluded from eternal memory. Whereas, in so far as the essential has conquered existential distortion its standing is higher in eternal life.[1]

Continuous fulfillment.--The complementarity of actualization and essentialization in stating the relation between the "Eternal Now" and every "existential now" has been imaginatively diagrammed by Tillich in the following summary statement:

> I would suggest [in contrast to the Augustinian straight line analogy of temporality] a curve which comes from above, moves down as well as ahead, reaches the deepest point which is the nunc existentiale, the "existential now," and returns in an analogous way to that from which it came, going ahead as well as going up. This curve can be drawn in every moment of experienced time, and it can also be seen as the diagram for temporality as a whole. It implies the creation of the temporal, the beginning of time, and

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[1] *Ibid.*, pp. 400-401.

> the return of the temporal to the eternal, the end of time. But the end of time is not conceived in terms of a definite moment either in the past or in the future. Beginning from and ending in the eternal are not matters of a determinable moment in physical time but rather a process going on in every moment, as does the divine creation. There is always creation and consummation, beginning and end.[1]

Theodicy

Now, in conclusion, we must attend to the problem of the place of estrangement in the economy of the divine Spirit. Tillich, as we have seen, is a "supralapsarian" of sorts. The Fall is not something that "happens" to God. The alternative to this is that it does have some place in the economy of Spirit although this assertion in itself does not specify what kind of place it has.

Tillich rightly judges that he has avoided the demonic implications of anything like the "decree" of double predestination. The degree of essentialization takes historical life with ultimate seriousness without falling on the one hand into the ontologically disruptive notion of "eternal damnation" or falling on the other hand into the sentimentalities of "universal salvation."[2]

But not even this fully satisfies such questions as: Why is existence fallen in the first place? Is anything ultimately and intrinsically gained by passing through it?

There is, in Tillich, no answer to the first question the way it is posed. The Fall is a possibility of finite freedom, but the "pre-temporal" transition from finite freedom to the polarity of "aroused freedom" and "temptation" is "the original fact"--"a story to be told and not a derived dialectical step." In short, actualization could take place without the distortions of existence--or at least in continual conquest of the threats of such distortion. This is not just speculation. It is fact in Jesus as the bearer of the New Being.

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[1] *Ibid.*, p. 420.

[2] *Ibid.*, pp. 406-409.

It is the "original fact" of the Fall and the historical fact of salvation that make it inevitable and inescapable that we apprehend the Gestalt of grace as dichotomous--that we must talk of the Gestalt of creative grace and the Gestalt of saving grace. It is not prescriptive for but descriptive of "man in the middle" that the drive toward self-transcendence and the power of successful self-transcendence are not one and the same. But what is apprehended as dichotomous to us is not so in the divine Spirit.

There is in Tillich, as there is in Edwards and every other orthodox Christian theologian, no answer to the question "Why is existence fallen in the first place?" except the answer that not even existence can separate us from the love of God in Christ Jesus our Lord. The fact of sin is "answered" by the rationality of conquest and not by the rationality of origin. This means that there is an answer to the second question posed above.

"Is anything ultimately and intrinsically gained by passing through existence on the way to essentialization?" The answer is "Yes." New Being is not only actualization but it is also conquest over the negativities, distortions, ambiguities, and fragmentariness of existence. The end of spirit is not a simple return to its beginning. Victorious life is ontologically greater than untested freedom. And this is true of the Spirit which precedes yet is manifest through spirit. Tillich expounds this in connection with the symbol of "eternal blessedness."

> The Divine Life is the eternal conquest of the negative; this is its blessedness. Eternal blessedness is not a state of immovable perfection--the philosophers of becoming are right in rejecting such a concept. But the Divine Life is blessedness through fight and victory.[1]

Conclusion

Undeniably there are deep Fichtean overtones to all this. There is a "serious otherness" in the divine Spirit, continuous victory over which is its being-in-act. But there is a very crucial difference from Fichte here. The victory is not that of Abyss (Ego) over Logos (Non-ego). The relation here is between Spirit and spirit, in both of which the union of the powers of being and meaning are operative. In Tillich it is not the victory over finitude but the victory over the negativities of existence which characterize the divine Presence. Moreover, it is not the analogy of the moral act (Fichte) but the symbol of ontological love which serves as the ultimate explanatory principle.

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[1] Ibid., p. 405.

> The trinitarian distinctions (separation and reunion) make it possible to speak of divine self-love. Without separation from one's self, self-love is impossible. This is even more obvious, if the distinction within God includes the infinity of finite forms, which are separated and reunited in the eternal process of the divine life. The divine life is the divine self-love. Through the separation within himself God loves himself. And through the separation from himself (in creaturely freedom) God fulfils his love of himself--primarily because he loves that which is estranged from himself.[1]

With this we have come to the end of our way. In Tillich's "eschatological pan-en-theism" we see clearly his conception of the relation of being and meaning. Life universally is "the way from essence through existential estrangement to essentialization."[2] This is not only the "shadow" but in a real sense part of the "substance" of the divine life eternally going out and returning into itself. Man's end and "God's end" ultimately coalesce. In one fine paragraph Tillich sums it up admirably.

> In this view the world process means something for God. He is not a separated self-sufficient entity who, driven by a whim, creates what he wants and saves whom he wants. Rather, the eternal act of creation is driven by a love which finds fulfilment only through the other one who has the freedom to reject and to accept love. God, so to speak, drives toward the

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[1] ST, I, 282. [2] ST, III, 421.

actualization and essentialization of everything that has being. For the eternal dimension of what happens in the universe is the Divine Life itself. It is the content of the divine blessedness.[1]

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[1] *Ibid*., p. 422.

CHAPTER IV

CONCLUSION

Recapitulation

In the introductory chapter we began by asking the question of the meaning of life. We saw that this is an expression of the religious question of the Whence and Whither of Reality-as-a-whole. In spite of the objections to the legitimacy of the question we concluded that it was inescapable. Further, we explored the problems of grasping and understanding the relation between the concepts of being and meaning. We concluded that a theology of Being, since it is the only methodological starting point that takes the religious question seriously--or perhaps we should say, with any positive significance--is the more adequate theological stance with which to seek a resolution. Finally, it was demonstrated that the doctrine of creation is the locus in any theological system where the conception of the relation between being and meaning is in clearest theological focus. The "meaning of life," in theological parlance, is "God's end in creation" or the teleological aspects of creation. And the elements of this doctrine are: (1) the primary definition of God, (2) the relation between God and the world, and (3) the meaning and purpose of the creation for both God and man.

We have examined the thought of Edwards and Tillich at great length, especially in relation to their ontologies (spirit ontologies), since, methodologically, being is the context in which the question of meaning arises and is answered. Now, let us compare and contrast them in their conclusions concerning the elements of the doctrine of creation.

The Primary Definition of God

God as Being itself

Both Edwards and Tillich are ontological theologians. Being-in-general and Being itself, respectively, are the primary designations of God. Let us recapitulate the similarities of the two notions before we turn to their differences.

The all-inclusiveness of God

First, these are mystical-ecstatic notions. God is not a being or the highest being or the sum of all being. Were any of these literal designations, then God would be the object of direct encounter or immediate vision. Further, he would be subject to ontological analysis rather than being the First Cause or Ground and Power of everything that is. God never appears directly but only mediately in and through something that has being as that which upholds all being. But though mediate, the manifestation is never "prosaic."

The half-truth of the statement "God is a being" is that God is ultimate reality. As Edwards had it, "God and real existence are the same," and it is impossible to make a disjunction between Being-in-general and nothing. For Tillich Being-itself is the power of being to eternally resist non-being, the ground of the astonishing awareness that there is something and not nothing.

The half-truth of the assertion that "God is highest being" is that all the principles and elements prescriptive for being and manifest in every instance of it are completely present in him and concurrently adequate to each other. He has aseity.

The half-truth that "God is the sum of all being" is that nothing that is or happens is ontologically outside of God. If being were ever cut off from its ground and power it would cease to be, absolutely. That both Edwards and Tillich affirm the notion of continuous creation is confirmatory of this. Neither in finitude nor in sin is being wholly other than the source which sustains it.

The duality in God

Second, the chaos/cosmos polarity is in God and descriptive of the divine life. God is neither inchoate, primordial will nor static, eternal form. He is Will and Intellect (Edwards) or Abyss and Logos (Tillich). He is concurrently the power of entity and the power of modality. There is a certain logical priority and dignity to the former over the latter, but it is not an ontological priority. Though they are separable for analysis, neither can be reduced to a function or a product of the other.

The unity of God: roots of trinitarian thinking

Moreover, the two principles or *archae* are mutually and concurrently adequate. In Edwards this was characterized as the co-inherence and co-extensiveness of the inner and the outer. In Tillich it is evident in the cardinal principle that depth precedes reason *and is manifest through it*. How this mutual adequacy is explicated constitutes a specifiable difference between Edwards and Tillich, but not so the adequacy itself. The point here is that there is no inherent *tragic* relation between the ontological elements either in essential finitude or in its ground.

Edwards: unity of "consent."--Let us specify the difference here. In Edwards the adequacy of chaos and cosmos approaches that of an identity relation. As we noted before,[1] "An absolutely perfect idea of a thing is the very thing; for it wants nothing that is in the thing, substance nor nothing else." The motive for this is undoubtedly his aestheticism--that is, the only fitness for mutual consent is equality and harmony of proportion. But had he pursued this line consistently the distinction between chaos and cosmos would have been obliterated or superseded by something else. If the Son completely reduplicates the Father, then the identity swallows up all possible differentia.

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[1] *Supra*, p. 223.

Edwards wanted to maintain that there are only three real distinctions in God: "God, and His idea, and His love and delight."[1] He saw this as the ontological root of the Trinity: The Father as "the deity subsisting in the prime, unoriginated and most absolute manner, or the deity in its direct existence;" the Son as, "the deity generated by God's understanding, or having an idea of himself and subsisting in that idea"; and the Spirit as the act of "God's infinite love to and delight in himself."[2] At first glance it appears that he is identifying the Father with the chaos pole, or the power of entity, and the Son with the cosmos pole, or the power of modality. This is more than just a fleeting impression. But there is some confusion or lack of clarity here. The Son is "generated by God's understanding, so the cosmos principle is implicit in the concept of the Father. Further, since the Son, as the "perfect idea," lacks "nothing that is in [the Father], substance nor nothing else," then the chaos principle, the power of entity, is constitutive of and manifest in the Son. In short, the chaos/cosmos polarity, rather than specifying the difference between Father and Son, is constitutive of both Father and Son. There is the profound intimation that God as Spirit--the dynamic unity of the powers of chaos and cosmos--precedes the distinction between God as Father and God as Son and is present in each. This would be consistent with his spirit ontology and would make more sense of his "identity" relation between Father and Son, but Edwards is nowhere explicit on this. And his basic emphasis is upon the adequacy of chaos (the "Father") and cosmos (the "Son") as characterized by co-inherence and co-extensiveness. God and "His idea" are in perfect agreement; and the mutual consent between them is not only "fit" or just, it is as spontaneous and as free of internal tension as gravity. What God thinks, he does. Spirit is all "love" and "delight."

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[1] Supra, pp. 211-12.

[2] Supra, p. 222.

Tillich: unity of polarity.--Tillich makes substantially the same distinction in the terms Abyss and Logos as Edwards does by the terms "God and His Idea."

But what is implicit in Edwards is conscious and explicit in Tillich. First, the chaos and cosmos elements are related as polar. This means that they are not identical or even potentially identical. They mutually limit and sustain each other. So there is some essential tension in the relation. But--and this is the crucial point--this polarity is _not_ taken as the ontological root of the Trinity. That root lies in the dialectical movement of life in self-identity, self-alteration, and return. And in each of these dialectical moments the ontological polarity is present and operative. It is in the dialectics of spirit, and not in the polarity of the ontological elements, that the root of the trinitarian distinction lies. As Tillich put it, God eternally "creates himself." There is "decision" and not just "consent" in self-alteration without self-loss. And decision implies risk and demands "courage."

This kind of dialectics in the divine ground of being is a notion that Edwards does not have. Further, we can and must say that he had the right instinct in rejecting it _if_ dialectics were made to explicate or compose the duality of chaos and cosmos. But that is not the only alternative, and Tillich does not do that.

God as Spirit

The chaos/cosmos duality in God, for both Edwards and Tillich, is underivable and incapable of being synthesized or superseded by something else. Even with Edwards' tendency toward aesthetic identity of the two principles or powers, he still preserves the permanent distinction between them by insisting that their unity is a function of *mutual consent* and not just that of being the same thing. Tillich is even less ambiguous on this point as the duality for him is a *polarity*: the two poles limit and sustain each other.

The designation for the unity of this underivable and uncomposable duality is the ontological assertion that God is Spirit.

Already in the immediately preceding section we have anticipated much of what needs to be reviewed here; but since, for the purposes of this study, this is such a crucial point--nay, *the* crucial point!--we had better not leave anything unspecified.

The primacy of spirit

First, spirit precedes the separability for thought of the ontological elements of chaos and cosmos. It is the *spirit ontology* of which chaos and cosmos, or the powers of being and meaning, are ontological *elements*. "Being" is not properly defined or designated by "entity" or "modality" taken separately. "Being" is spirit, and Being itself is Spirit. The unity of these elements is not "built up" in life or in history; it is the prius of both.

Spirit and creation

Second, Spirit is the ground of being. Tillich is emphatic on this point. It is as Spirit that the divine life is creative of being originally, continuously, and directionally. Creativity through the Spirit obviates the problem of whether creation is fatalistic (as would be the case if it were the function of Logos alone) or arbitrary (the case if it were a function of Abyss alone).

Edwards is no less determined on this point, though he does not label it explicitly as creativity through the Spirit. At every point being is a product of the concurrence of the powers of chaos and cosmos, which is the root meaning of "spirit." Finite spirit is the concurrence of spontaneity and perception. God's creativity is the concurrence of creation ex nihilo and general revelation. And this concurrence is the prius of creation and manifest through it.

Spirit and consummation

Third, Spirit is not only the ground but also the goal of being. The goal or telos of being for Edwards is the concurrence of the natural image and the moral image. Finite spirit is not fulfilled, or even adequate to its own dynamics, until it is indwelled and informed by the divine Spirit. Where true virtue is consent to Being-in-general, any consent to that which is less than Being-in-general is vicious and disruptive of life. It is giving unlimited or whole-hearted consent to that which is not worthy of it and which cannot bear it. But consent to Being-in-general is Spirit, and to "have it" is to be indwelled by the Spirit, to love God with the love with which he loves himself.

For Tillich the fulfilment of life is successful self-transcendence or "sublimation" or "true humanism." But this is only possible where Spiritual Presence or the Gestalt of saving grace is present and operative. Only where spirit is grasped and directed by Spirit is "true humanism" consummated.

Differences between Edwards and Tillich

That God as Spirit is the ground and goal of creativity Edwards and Tillich agree. In what way or ways do they differ in their conception of God as Spirit? There are several ways that we can get at this, but they all point to the same thing. We could say that for Edwards the dynamics of Spirit is "mutual consent" whereas for Tillich it is "the courage to be" or the eternal "conquest of non-being." We could say that for Edwards Spiritual creativity is not the ground of temporality but only of the "eternal now," whereas for Tillich the dialectics of Spirit is the pre-temporal ground of temporality as well as the eternal conquest of the ambiguities and fragmentariness of every "now." In short we can say that Edwards' conception of Spiritual creativity is non-dialectical whereas Tillich's is dialectical.

Edwards: the infinite consent that overflows or radiates.--Mutual "consent" specifies a different dimension (the one of internal relation) to the conception of the unity or "fitness" of the ontological elements, but it is not the "difference" of adding another "thing" or "element" or "process" to the conception of that unity. It is analogous to the place and function of gravity in the Newtonian philosophy of Nature. There, gravity is the principle of systematic unity, the conditioning force of all intrasystematic motion (the measure of temporality), but not itself temporal. As the mutual and concurrent attraction of bodies it is neither temporal nor the archetype of temporality. What gravity is for bodies in the Newtonian scheme consent is for spirits in Edwards. This much is understandable, even profound. But how does one make mutual consent, an internal relation, the ground and goal of creativity ad extra?

We noted the way Edwards handled this. "Consent" in

God is infinite. It overflows; it radiates. It is this emanation of "goodness" (Spirit) that excites God to create finite spirits who are capable of beholding it, delighting in it, and refunding it to its original. The emanation itself has neither beginning nor end. It is not itself creative, but it excites the creation of the finite spirits, who have a beginning but no end. It functions as the goal aimed at, "God's end in creation." But God does not emanate being. Edwards had to deny any direct or causal relation between the dynamics of Spirit and creativity in order to avoid Neo-Platonic pantheism. Spirit excites and fulfills creativity but is not inherently creative. In itself it is serene and "complacent" in both the archaic ("delightful") and modern ("self-satisfied") senses.

Tillich: the polarity that operates in dialectical process.--Tillich's doctrine of the Spirit has much more of the character of process in its dynamics. In place of "mutual consent" and "emanation" as the descriptions of Spirit he has self-identity, self-alteration, and return. This dialectical movement is something other than and added to the polarity of the ontological elements, which are present and operative in each of the moments. This dialectics is not creative of the polarity, nor does it compose it, rather it describes the operation of the polarity in life processes. It changes the vision of the divine aseity from that of God eternally loving and delighting in himself (Edwards) to that of God continually "creating himself," taking in and overcoming non-being continually. This gives an ontological foundation to temporality. Moreover, it demonstrates that a process metaphysics need not be theogonic, for this conception of Spirit in its fullness and completeness precedes-yet-is-manifest-through creativity. In Tillich, no less than in Edwards, God creates out of fullness, not out of need or lack. The difference is that for Edwards the creative motion of the Spirit is motivated by effulgence whereas for Tillich it is process.

The Relation Between God and the World

The key to understanding both Edwards and Tillich with respect to the God-world relation is the relation between the divine Spirit and finite spirits. We have already explored the implications of the spirit ontology for the doctrine of God, the source and power of all being; now let us recapitulate the same for the understanding of "world."

Rejection of dualism: "Spirit" as the middle term

"World" is such an ambiguous term that it will be helpful to rule out in advance some common meanings of it that both Edwards and Tillich reject. Both of them reject any kind of metaphysical dualism that would make world independent of either God (as in deism) or man (as in materialism or reductionistic naturalism). The former is an obvious implication of the doctrine of continuous creation; the latter may need some further elucidation.

In Edwards' peculiar brand of Idealism "world"--the total system of the outer including both nature and history--does not subsist independent of perception by finite spirits. It is not *simply* a case of "to be is to be perceived," but this is one irreducible component of what it means to have a world. Man is the world-soul. "World" is doubly dependent upon, on the one hand, the concurrence of the Idea and Will of God (Spirit) exerted *ad extra*; and, on the other hand, its being perceived by finite spirits. This means that one cannot discuss the God-world relation apart from man.

Tillich arrives at the same conclusion via a different route. His description of the self-world polarity as the basic articulation of being means that every level of synthesizing the manifold is strictly correlated to an appropriate dimension of individual self-relatedness. It is man alone who has "a world" (instead of just an "environment") because in him alone self-relatedness is completely actualized (spirit). Thus to discuss the God-world relation on any dimension *less than* spirit would be truncated. Man, then, is not only the doorway to ontology, he is also "the mirror in which the relation of everything finite to the infinite becomes conscious."[1]

Rejection of monism: "finitude" as the differentia

Another basic type of designating "world" that is ruled out by both Edwards and Tillich is any kind of metaphysical monism that ultimately makes no distinction between God and the world (as in pantheism). It is essential finitude ("finite freedom" for Tillich; "finite spirit" for Edwards) that distinguishes everything created from the divine ground of being and meaning. No part or level of man's being is simply continuous with the divine life; and the latter is present only mediately in-and-through that which is finite and which does not cease to be finite in becoming a medium.

Pan-en-theism

Pan-en-theism is the positive term most applicable to describe the positions of both Edwards and Tillich. This is best explicated in terms of the relation of spirit to Spirit.

First, finite spirit is continually dependent upon Spirit as its ground and goal.

Second, finite spirit is essentially related to

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[1] ST, III, 87.

Spirit as microcosm to macrocosm.

Third, the analogy of being is the dynamics of spirit. For Edwards it is the spontaneity of self-relatedness (self-objectification and self-affirmation); for Tillich it is the freedom of self-transcendence (self-alteration without self-loss).

Fourth, finite spirit is "outside" the divine Spirit not ontologically but existentially--as dissent to Being-in-general (Edwards) or as tragically abortive self-transcendence (Tillich). The chaos/cosmos model of the God-world relation is descriptive of man in estrangement. It is descriptive of the universal existential predicament, not of the essential ontological dependence.

Fifth, finite spirit is structurally and dynamically the same in sin or estrangement as it is in "original righteousness" or in salvation. The difference is that in sin spirit whole-heartedly affirms that which is less than wholeness (Edwards) or that self-transcendence actualizes either demonization or profanization instead of "sublimation" (Tillich).

Sixth, estranged finite spirit ("natural man" for Edwards, "existence" for Tillich) is both reconciled to Spirit and fulfilled within itself only by grace, which is prior to the activities of spirit yet manifest through them. With respect to salvation God alone has the initiative.

Seventh, God has taken this initiative in Christ Jesus; so reconciliation or restoration is not only a future to be hoped for but a past which is yet efficacious and is even now offered for appropriation.

Differences between Edwards and Tillich

Here, as in the case of the doctrine of divine Spirit, the chief difference between Edwards and Tillich is the absence of the dialectical character of spirit in Edwards. This can best be indicated by contrasting the notions of "spontaneity" and "freedom."

Edwards: spontaneity as the dynamics of finite spirit.--Throughout the explication of Edwards I have steadfastly and deliberately used the term "spontaneity" rather than "freedom." Spontaneity is a type of freedom in that it is action that proceeds from internal principles rather than external compulsion. But it lacks the element of deliberation between equally viable alternatives. Further, it involves choice (consent, affirmation) but lacks the element of decision, the "cutting off" of the excluded possibilities. There is full responsibility for the course of action taken (the will is in the deed), but none for the way the will is basically determined. As a man perceives, so he is affected; and as he is affected, so he thinks and acts.

Determinism as the principle of systematic rationality.--This is determinism; but it is moral, not mechanical. Finite spirit will and does spontaneously affirm his Idea (all the contents of nature and history that he perceives). He has the equipment ("natural ability") to love God and enjoy the fulness of life. Moreover, being spirit he has the rational capacity to know that he ought to love God, that consent to anything less than Being-in-general can only lead to injustice and self-destruction. But he does not have the ability to command perception of that which he has not in fact perceived! He cannot "put together" Being-in-general by adding perceptions. This is the "moral inability" of natural man apart from grace. He can be aware of what he lacks without having the means to supply what is lacking. Because he has being he can and does ask the religious question of the Whence and Whither of life; moreover, he can know that he lacks fulness or wholeness without being able to remedy the situation at will.

Estimate.--As a man perceives, so he is affected; and as he is affected, so he thinks and acts. This spontaneity is dependent upon a ground-and-consequent model of perception. This, like "mutual consent," is non-temporal. Where there is no dialectics in the ground (Spirit) there is no dialectics in the consequent (spirit).

Edwards was certainly consistent with himself in all parts of his system. He was also consistent with the best scientific thought of his age. Moreover, he has shown that it is possible, illuminating, and theologically crucial to develop a spirit ontology on the basis of the static presuppositions of the Enlightenment. But this was not Tillich's cultural situation. The questions now arise: Wherein is Tillich's conception of "finite freedem' necessarily different from Edwards' finite "spontaneity"? Is it a more adequate description of spirit? Has Tillich done as well with the scientific and theological elements of his cultural situation as Edwards did two humdred years ago?

Tillich: finite freedom as the dynamics of life.--Ever since Kant dialectics rather than mechanism has been the controlling scientific and philosophical category. This has not meant the end of all "determinism," as that would signify the abandonment of all rationality and meaning. But it has decisively recast the conception of finite spirit. Neither being nor meaning are simply "givens." The crucial change, as Existentialism has underlined, lies in the finiteness and relativity (temporality) of the "meaning" pole. It is this that has threatened to make an ontology impossible, or at least to make it suspect.

"To be," we have noted Tillich as saying, "means to come to form." But it is not the spontaneous affirmation of the form ineluctably given in perception, the "simple idea"--as in Edwards. Rather, the form itself is a project. It is the composite product of grasping _and_ _shaping_ as well as receiving elements of encountered reality. The form affirmed in actualization is the unique creation of finite spirit. It is a project compounded of both the possibilities and demands latent in the concrete, historical situation, on the one hand; and, on the other, the decisions actualized in the life functions: self-integration, self-creation, and self-transcendence. In short, both "self" and "world" are altered and transformed in actualization, "coming to be." This is a continual process.

The polarity of freedom-and-destiny in Tillich does justice to the concrete, historical, process character of meaning-creation in finite life. History is not the "unfolding" or "realization" of some pre-arranged "plan." It is not the acting out of what God has already produced or decreed from the foundation of the world. It is the actualization of the new. Still, this openness of life in the historical dimension does not leave us with complete, chaotic, historical relativism. It is ontologically intelligible and theologically relevant.

Destiny as the principle of systematic rationality.--Finite life drives toward the new in terms of the actualization of being and meaning. Man's destiny has a two-fold or two-dimensional character: concrete and universal. He has the destiny to actualize himself en kairo. This is the concrete side: real, yet always ambiguous and fragmentary. But he is also destined to actualize himself unambiguously and wholly as a participant in the creativity of Being itself. This is the universal side. The former is the arena of specific, finite meanings. They are "timely" and thus relative to the situation. The latter is not a meaning alongside other meanings--nor is it the sum of all meanings; rather it is a qualitative dimension that gives seriousness and dignity to man as a meaning-creating and meaning-actualizing being. It is the fulfilment in eternity that is the ground and goal of every act of self-integration and self-creation in time. Man has a destiny to be creative in time and eternity. The two dimensions are held together in Tillich's concept of true or self-transcending humanism, or again in the concept of "eschatological panentheism." It is specifiable, capable of being anticipated; though it is not some "plan" or archetype whose features can be known--or even conceived to "exist" in the "mind of God"--in advance of historical action and finite creativity. The process is open-ended toward the future, but it is a process which can be described. It is ontological. It is, then, destiny rather than determinism that makes Tillich's system a "system"--that is, intelligible.

In "existence" this two-fold character of destiny is operative, but it is distorted. In distorted actualization man aims at aseity, "self-sufficient finitude." This evidences the universal intention in all finite creativity. He denies, obscures, or simply cannot accept the ambiguous and fragmentary character of his meanings. This is demonization. Or else he cannot see anything but their ambiguous and fragmentary character. This is profanization. In either case he has lost the essential "transparency" or "translucency" of the concrete to the universal. Compulsively he either claims too much or too little for the meanings he actualizes in historical creativity. But he can and does ask for the concrete universal and he can know that without it he is lost. Every distorted actualization "asks for" it or testifies to it in caricature. Man can know what he lacks and have some profound intimations of his predicament without being able to remedy it at will. His life itself--the continual actualization of being and meaning--asks the religious question of its ultimate ground and goal.

It is to this situation that New Being is graciously given. It is present in the ground of actualization "prior to" yet manifest through the historical activity of the life functions, just as it was pre-eminently "prior to" yet manifest through the self-sacrifice without self-loss of

Jesus as the Christ. And having once entered the world it is still in being, in beginning and in power.

Estimate.--In Tillich, as we have seen, "actualization" is to the "life functions" as ground is to consequent. But the dialectics of self-identity, self-alteration, and return in the ground of actualization provides for the archetype for the temporality or the historical character of being in a way that Edwards did not have, nor did his a-historical age feel he needed. Moreover, the role of Tillich's polarity of freedom and destiny in the dialectics of ground enables Tillich to deal with the problem of historical relativism, which was not a problem for Edwards. But most crucially, the role of decision in the transition from potentiality to actuality not only gives more substance to Tillich's concept of "finite freedom" than Edwards' "spontaneity" had, it also enables Tillich to comprehend the sacrificial character of life (and, under the conditions of existence, its tragic character) in a way that Edwards' serene and all-positive "consent" could not comprehend.

Consequences of the difference in conceptions of "world"

There is one more contrast that needs to be made. Tillich's concept of "world" is more explicitly and intrinsically social than that of Edwards. This, of course, would also be reduplicated in the concept of "self." For Edwards all that is needed to have a "world" is God, the individual soul, and the "outer" as the medium of communication or perception. But for Tillich "world" is as much a product of peer level interpersonal encounter as is "culture," which is no small component of "world." We could highlight the contrast by saying that in Tillich the I-thou encounter necessary for having a "world" is an encounter between finite beings whereas for Edwards it is between God and the soul.

We may be doing Edwards an injustice thus to charge him with a "damnable individualism." After all, the "outer" for him was not just "nature," or inert stuff. The "outer" was both nature and history, and the two were regarded by him as complementary, not interchangeable. But as a point of emphasis the contrast still stands.

This has some serious implications for the locus and medium of grace in the world. For Edwards all that was requisite was a perception--it could be a storm, or it (more likely) could be a sermon. One percept of grace was sufficient for eternity. But where that was not given to the individual--each individual--nothing else could suffice as the locus of the saving divine presence in the world. This is why Edwards' philosophical theology could not handle the problem of the Church between the times of those rare outpourings of the Spirit like the Great Awakening.

Tillich's conception of the New Being does not have this defect. It is seen as actualized _in history_ and not just in the individual consciousness. This means that in principle--or in beginning and power--all dimensions of being participate in the conquest of the ambiguities of life. The Church is the locus, the history-bearing group, of Spiritual Presence. It is refreshed from time to time in subsidiary _kairoi_, but the Spirit's locus in being is not dependent upon such extraordinary seasons. Even the void between the times can be seen as a "sacred void." It is ironical that in this Tillich is much more "Puritan" than Edwards was. Tillich's conception of the objective locus of grace is much more akin to that of the Covenant of Grace in the Federal theology than was Edwards' individualized and internalized version of it.

The Meaning of Creation for Both God and Man

Summary

Every theology of Being is committed to the vision that "to be" is an end in itself and that the meaning of being is well-being. To "have life, and have it abundantly" is the be-all and end-all of the spirit ontologies of both Edwards and Tillich. However, such a spirit ontology requires a theology of Spirit. Spirit precedes spirit and is manifest through it. To "have life" is grounded in the divine Spirit. And the "abundant life" is to be indwelled by the Spirit (Edwards) or to be grasped by and participate in Spiritual Presence (Tillich).

The meaning of life

Man finds his life as man fulfilled by his relation to and participation in the divine life. His being is of, in, and to God. He does not need to be rescued from creatureliness, only its distortions. He does not need to receive some heteronomous set of meanings to which he must dutifully conform to make life worth-while. The meaning of life is not first of all something "to do" but something "to be." One lives the meaningful life not by doing "eternal things" but by being opened to and cognizant of the eternal import of "mundane things." Grace is a new perspective--and with it, power--for living meaningfully and creatively in the world and not a "plan" imposed upon an otherwise meaningless existence. In "spirit" meaning and being are inseparably related; they do not have to be "put together." And under the impact of Spirit, spirit is continuously created, restored, and consummated in time and in eternity.

Assurance: the divine aseity as the prius of creation

The security or assurance in all of this is rooted in the aseity of the divine life. This is why both Edwards and Tillich insist that the divine Spirit, in its *fullness* and *completeness*, is the *prius* of divine creativity. The abundance of the divine life is "the *whence*" as well as "the whither" of reality-as-a-whole. God does not create out of need or lack. Cosmogony is not theogony. The divine aseity is the *prius* of creativity, not just the *telos* of it.

This position bodes problems for both Edwards and Tillich which we must discuss. But first it is essential to see why they cannot surrender it. *Ex nihilo nihil fit*. Abundance cannot come out of want. This is a modified version of the Aristotelian insight that pure actuality must, in some sense, precede the raising of potentiality to actuality. Unless the divine life is abundant "apart" from the world there can be no assurance or reality of abundant life *in the world* through Spiritual Presence and participation in the divine life. God is always "beforehand with our souls," both in creation and in consummation.

Problem: Why, then, does God create?

Now, the problem this poses is, to put it crudely: If God does not need the world, then why does he create it?

The question is that of the intrinsic relation of creativity *ad extra* to the economy of the divine life.

Edwards

The aseity of the divine goodness.--Edwards, as we saw, handled this under the rubric of the divine "goodness," which to him was a synonym for the emanation of the infinite divine self-love, or consent to being-in-general. "The emanation itself was aimed at by [God] as the last end of the creation."[1] The creation provides the divine life with an opportunity to *exercise* the attributes of wisdom and power, to *communicate* the divine fullness so it can *be known* and *loved*; but none of these things, good in themselves as they are, result in an increment to the divine goodness. Even the "eminent fulfilment" of oneness with God, which the elect spirit approaches as a result of the increment of communication of goodness to him throughout eternity, is the reflection or "remanation" of the divine goodness, not an addition to it.

The excellency of doing the possible.--This extreme position of God being ultimately unaffected by the world is consistent with Edwards' strict theocentricity. God creates *ad extra* because it is possible for him to do so, and it is "amiable" and "excellent" for him to do the possible. But in terms of the economy of the divine life it is still a work of supererogation. It is not inconsistent with his fullness, but it is not necessary "in order to it."

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[1] *Supra*, p. 253.

Perhaps this is the reason why Edwards did not feel that "double predestination"--the creation of "vessels of wrath" as well as "vessels of mercy"--was ontologically disruptive. The damned exhibit the justice of God's power to reject that which dissents to being-in-general. Their creation is a possibility which _exhibits_ God's wisdom, power, and justice; but if it, too, is a work of supererogation, does it affect the economy of the divine life?

The irreversibility of the act of creation.--The answer to this question might easily be "No" if it were not for Edwards' doctrine of immortality. God creates _ad extra_ for no transient reason, even if it is not "necessary." Finite spirits have a beginning but no end. Not even the damned can be allowed to cease to be, for such would be tantamount to their not having been at all. And note that it was for theocentric considerations, not fond human hopes, that Edwards arrived at this position on immortality.

The ontologically disruptive character of double predestination.--This adds another dimension to the problem. God, if he creates at all, creates some spirits--beings--to whom he _everlastingly_ cannot, or will not, or does not consent in any wholly positive way. If he consents to their being, simply considered (as, by definition, he must), there can still be no "love of complacency" in it (that is, delight in _their_ consent to being-in-general). Any way one looks at this it is ontologically disruptive _of the divine life_ as characterized in the system. And in an ontological theology one is not permitted the luxury of hiding this behind the divine "inscrutability."

Tillich

Does Tillich, who no less than Edwards asserts the divine abundance as the _prius_ of creativity, do any better in handling the systematic problem of the intrinsic relation of creativity _ad extra_ to the economy of the divine life?

The nature of Spirit: creativity.--First of all, it is necessary to note the difference in Tillich's conception of Spirit from that of Edwards. In Edwards Spirit emanates. It is the overflow of infinite consent to being. It "excites" creativity, and it thus is capable of serving as God's ultimate end in creating. But Spirit per se is not creative. Creation is not a "necessity." In Tillich it is different. Spirit is the life process of separation and reunion. It *is* the principle of creativity. In the Spirit God "others" himself in the finite and continually re-unites the finite to himself. God "eternally creates himself" in and through the Spirit. Creation *ad extra is* a "necessity"--not in the sense of some external compulsion or fate, but in the sense that it is constitutive of life. So, strictly speaking, "necessity" is not the adequate term. But it does point out that creation is *not contingent*; it is not a work of supererogation. "Creation is not only God's freedom but also his destiny."[1] "The divine life and the divine creativity are not different. God is creative because he is God."[2]

The threat to aseity as the prius.--This makes creation of finitude intrinsic to the economy of the divine life, but does it not preclude or deny the priority of the divine abundance to any and every act of creation? The answer is both "Yes" and "No." It is "Yes" if priority means "chronologically prior" or "spatially alongside or above." God's aseity and fullness are not "apart" from the world in either of these senses. But the answer is "No" because the divine abundance *precedes yet is manifest through* creation. The divine life in its aseity precedes and is manifest through finite life. The precedence is that of the ground-consequent relation between the dialectics of the divine Spirit to that of finite spirit. Creativity fulfills "in actuality what is beyond potentiality and actuality in the divine life."[1]

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[1] *Supra*, p. 426.

[2] *Ibid*.

Essentialization: "immortality" and "final judgment."--This theme is carried through in Tillich's concept of "essentialization," which is the composite way he handles both "immortality" and "final judgment." This is the correlate of actualization in that what is particular and positive in actualization is the ground of the consequent "eternal memory." Ultimate judgment is not the separation of the sheep from the goats but the conservation of the positive and the conquering and casting out of the negativities actualized in each and every being in every moment of time. All that has being is conserved and the negativities are taken in as "conquered." The divine life is "blessedness through fight and victory," not "a state of immovable perfection."[2]

Resolution of the problem.--There is an increment in "eternal memory" corresponding to what has been and is actualized in life and history. There is a growing content and concreteness to the divine blessedness. It is this which "gives an infinite weight to every decision and creation in time and space and confirms the seriousness of what is meant by the symbol 'ultimate judgment.'"[1] But this openness to the new is not an evidence of ontological lack any more than it is ontologically disruptive. Being itself, since it is living, can be open without ceasing to be an intelligible process; just as Tillich's system, which aims to be adequate to its object, can be open without ceasing to be a "system" There is no intrinsic incompatibility between chaos and cosmos, the powers of being and meaning. And there is no inherent tragedy in the sacrificial character of actualization that is completed by essentialization.

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[1] Ibid.

[2] Supra, p. 431.

The consummation from the standpoint of the individual

There is one final comparison and contrast. Thus far we have been considering the similarities and differences between Edwards' and Tillich's conceptions of the relation of the creation to the aseity, integrity, and fullness of the divine life. This, in my judgment, is the most difficult systematic problem of an ontological theology, and Tillich has handled it more adequately than Edwards. But there remains the consideration of how all this looks from the standpoint of the believer, the man who asks the question of the meaning of his life, albeit in the necessary context of the Whence and Whither of Reality-as-a-whole.

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[1] *Supra*, p. 428.

"Eminent fulfilment" vs. "eschatological pan-en-theism"

In this respect Edwards' concept of "eminent fulfilment" seems more personally satisfying than Tillich's "eschatological pan-en-theism." To put it in popular imagery, Edwards' individual immortality is more immediately appealing than Tillich's trans-temporal socio-historical mosaic ("eternal memory") where no individual in his entirety is conserved any more than is any individual in his entirety excluded. Tillich's conception invites the epithets "cold" or "impersonal."

To evaluate this we must ask two questions: First, are the conceptions "eminent fulfilment" and "eschatological pan-en-theism" really that different? Second, what do we mean by (and cherish in) the term "personal"? The two questions are very closely related.

Similarities.--To address ourselves to the first question, both of these terms are eschatological in that they point to the "last things," the trans-historical dimension and consummation of the self's temporal career and that of all history. And both are pan-en-theistic in that they point to the ultimate consummation in "oneness" or "unity" with the divine life. Edwards, it so happened, took his cue from the Johannine version of Jesus' prayer (chapter 17), "That they may all be one, as thou, Father, art in me, and I in thee, that they also may be one in us, I in them, and thou in me, that they may be made perfect in one."[1] Tillich took his cue from "the Pauline vision that in ultimate fulfilment God shall be everything in (or for) everything."[2]

Difference.--The difference is that for Edwards the form of individuality is preserved while its content is progressively changed or transformed, whereas for Tillich the content of individual actualization is conserved while its form is altered. In "eminent fulfilment" all of Edwards' elect saints must look alike in that they are each and every one mirrors of the same thing: Being-in-general. All that is idiosyncratic in individuality is increasingly burned off and replaced with conformity to the divine image, which is all-things and no-thing in particular. In "eschatological pan-en-theism" all that is concrete and idiosyncratic in history is conserved in the "New Being" in which each finite spirit is a contributor. But he participates in and individualizes much more than what he alone has contributed. Each being shares in the fulfilment to which all have contributed, so that what he individualizes is not his fragmentary historical individuality but the whole of the "New Being." He is reunited with his excluded possibilities (actualized in others!) through the polarity of individualization and participation in the Kingdom of God.

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[1] Supra, pp. 254-55.

[2] ST, III, 421; to which he immediately adds, "One could call this symbol 'eschatological pan-en-theism.'"

Not "personal or impersonal," but "personal and social"

Now, to the question of what do we mean by--or better, cherish in--the term "personal." What is being said beneath the form of the assertion that Edwards' concept of immortality is "personal" while Tillich's "whatever-it-is" is "impersonal"? Is the "personal" the bare form of individuality without any of its idiosyncratic content--that which makes a person characteristically "this" and "not that"? Or is the "personal" precisely the idiosyncratic in actualization--that which a good portrait captures in composite form? Must we choose between the distinct-but-unrecognizable and the recognizable-but-indistinct? I do not believe that either Edwards or Tillich forces us into this kind of false dichotomy. To mirror (individualize?) Being-in-general is certainly supra-individualistic or "social." And to participate in New Being as it is fulfilled in the Kingdom of God is certainly "personal." The "personal" and the "social" are not dichotomous, but polar: they mutually limit and sustain each other. Any concept of ultimate fulfilment of the individual that did not contain both would be inadequate to the meaning of life.

Concluding Remarks

"Spirit" has emerged as the key ontological term in this inquiry. It is "spirit" which designates the unity of meaning and power in life. It was Edwards' spirit ontology (traditionally somewhat inappropriately called his "Idealism") that enabled him to find a middle way between Rationalism and Empiricism, uniting core concerns of each. And it was Tillich's spirit ontology that enabled him to find a middle way between Idealism and Existentialism, uniting core concerns of each. Any ontology that does not begin with the unity of the powers of being and meaning in spirit will not have that unity as a result.

The Spirit-spirit correlation has emerged as the key term of the God-world relation. It is this that has enabled both to find a middle way between supranaturalistic theism and pantheism.

Spirit ontologies are dynamic, not static. In Edwards it was the dynamics of self-relatedness. His theology could be designated as a theology of consciousness. In Tillich the dynamics is the dialectics of actualization.

His theology is a theology of life. Both men have achieved, in terms of the cultural situation of their times, a remarkable synthesis of the permanent insights of the Christian faith with the best tools of contemporary cultural self-interpretation.

What Tillich has had to master is something that was not yet a problem in the New Learning, which marked the emergence of the modern world-view. Broadly speaking, we could call it the "evolutionary" or "process" character of being. Tillich has shown that an ontology of life is not only possible and necessary, but that it opens up dimensions of a theology of Spirit that were not discernible before.

In view of the time span between them, the new problems raised, and the different theological traditions out of which they came, the structural similarities of their systems are all the more arresting. Theology in America lived a hundred years off the impetus given it by Edwards. What will Tillich's influence be?

The only reservations I have are terminological, not systematic. Can the term "spirit," the way Edwards and Tillich used it, be reclaimed for contemporary American usage? As one who has experienced the difficulty of "getting into" it (witness the prolixity of this essay!)

and making it "my own," I am apprehensive. Tillich has said that we must reclaim the word, that no other has the cultural and linguistic heritage to suffice. Perhaps its very strangeness can serve to jar out thought-patterns into a new-old configuration and point of departure. Time alone will tell.

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